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Chapter I
Why Whiteness Matters: My Existential and Epistemological Standpoint

“White” is a relatively uncharted territory that has remained invisible as it
continues to influence the identity of those both within and without its domain. It
affects the everyday fabric of our lives but resists, sometimes violently, any
extensive characterization that would allow for the mapping of its contours. It
wields power yet endures as a largely unarticulated position.
—Thomas Nakayama and Robert Krizek
Whiteness is everywhere in American culture, but it is very hard to see . . . . As
the unmarked category against which difference is constructed, whiteness never
has to speak its name, never has to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle
in social and cultural relations.
—George Lipsitz

Whiteness and the Distortion of the Black Body: My Existential Standpoint
The Black body has been confiscated. My Black body has been confiscated.1 When
followed by white security personnel as I walk through department stores, when a white
sales person avoids touching my hand, when a white woman looks with suspicion as I
enter the elevator, I feel that I have become this indistinguishable, amorphous, black
seething mass, a token of danger, a threat, a rapist, a criminal, a burden, a rapacious
animal incapable of delayed gratification. Within the space of these social encounters, I
become other to myself. I feel alienated from my own body.
Unlike the form of alienation described by the young Karl Marx, where workers
are alienated from their labor, philosopher Charles Mills states that “under white
supremacy, one has an alienation far more fundamental; since while one can always come
home from work, one cannot get out of one’s skin.”2 While I agree with Mills, I realize
that class standing and its role in alienation can also follow one home. Think here of real
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situations where low expectations constitute part of the lived normative framework of a
lower-class white family. Within such families, it may not even occur to parents to
imagine their children attending college or doing any other work than that characteristic
of their lower-class standing. Indeed, lower class whites (particularly, non-Anglo-Saxon
Protestant whites) in North America have also been characterologically described as
shiftless, lazy, and worthless, and have even been victims of systematic sterilization
during the American Eugenics Movement of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.3 However, despite this deplorable crime against poor white women and men,
immigrants, and the physically and mentally disabled, such “innate” character traits
attributed to poor whites were not conceptualized as resulting from a specifically “Black
essence.”4
My understanding of my own body undergoes a process of slippage when the
white imaginary, which has been historically structured and shaped through years of
white hegemony, ruminates over my dark flesh and vomits me out in a form not
recognizable by me. Phenomenologically, I feel “external,” as it were, to my body,5
delivered and sealed in white lies. The reality is that I find myself within a normative
space, a historically structured and structuring space, through which I am “seen” and
judged guilty a priori. This suggests the sense in which each person finds him/herself
within a context of shared intelligibility. I find myself within the context of North
America where the discourse of race and racism constitutes a context of shared
intelligibility, not only within which I actively negotiate my course of action, but it is also
a space within which I am part of an interpretive stream that has configured my identity
and shaped my course of action. On this score, I am said to bear the pernicious mark of
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dark skin, but not as a natural phenomenon. My darkness is a signifier of negative values
grounded within racist social practices that predate my existential emergence. The
meaning of my Blackness is not intrinsic to my natural pigment, but has become a valueladen “given,” an object presumed untouched and unmediated by various discursive
practices, history, time, and context. My Blackness functions metaphorically as a
stipulatory axiom: “Blackness is evil, not to be trusted, and guilty as such.” From this,
conclusions can be drawn. This “stipulatory axiom” forms part of a white racist distal
narrative that congeals narrative coherence and intelligibility, providing a framework
according to which the Black body is rendered “meaningful.” Whites “see” the Black
body through the medium of historically structured forms of “knowledge” that regard it
as an object of suspicion. This understanding of the white gaze vis-à-vis tacit forms of
“knowledge” has a family resemblance to Michel Foucault’s use of the term “positive
unconscious.”6 In other words, whiteness comes replete with its epistemic criteria for
what to expect of a Black body (or non-white body), how dangerous and unruly it is, how
unlawful, criminal, and hypersexual it is. The discourse and comportment of whites are
shaped through tacit racist scripts that enable them to sustain and perpetuate their
whitely-being-in-the-world.7
Frantz Fanon observes that “not only must the black man [woman] be black; he
[she] must be black in relation to the white man [woman].”8 It is this relational dimension
that is incredibly significant. Hence, the meaning of my Blackness gets constituted and
configured (relationally) within a semiotic field of axiological difference, one that is
structured vis-à-vis the construction of whiteness as the transcendental signified. To say
that whiteness is deemed the transcendental signified is to say that whiteness takes itself
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to be that which remains the same across a field of difference. Indeed, it determines what
is deemed different without itself being defined by that system of difference. In other
words, whiteness might be said to stand “external” to such differences as the determinate
of such differences. Whiteness is said to be that which is universal and functions to fix
the meanings of those things that are not white. Whiteness is that center according to
which that which is non-white is rendered Other, marginal, ersatz, strange, native,
inferior, uncivilized, ugly.
Unlike Black bodies physically confiscated from Africa, my body is confiscated
within social spaces of meaning construction and social spaces of transversal interaction
that are buttressed by a value-laden episteme. It is a peculiar experience to have one’s
body confiscated without physically being placed in chains, or imprisoned without one’s
consent. Well-dressed, I enter an elevator where an old white woman waits to reach her
floor. She “sees” my Black body, though not the same one I have seen reflected back to
me from the mirror on any number of occasions. She sees a Black body “supersaturated
with meaning, as they [Black bodies] have been relentlessly subjected to [negative]
characterization by newspapers, newscasters, popular film, television programming,
public officials, policy pundits and other agents of representation.”9 Her body language
signifies, “Look, the Black!” On this score, though short of a performative locution, her
body language functions as an insult. Over and above how my body is clothed, regardless
of the fact that I wear a suit and tie, she “sees” a criminal, a brute. Indeed, she does not
really “see” me. Rather, phenomenologically, she might be said to “see” a black, fleeting
expanse, a peripherally glimpsed vague presence of something dark, forbidden, and
dreadful. Despite what I think about myself, how I am for-myself, her perspective, her
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third-person account, trumps my efforts to maintain a sense of selfhood and humanity.
After all, from the perspective of white hegemony, hers is deemed the only real point of
view. One might say that the white woman’s consciousness of the meaning of my Black
body coincides with the meaning of the Black body as such, and that from her
perspective there is no meaning that the Black body possesses that is foreign to her, that
is, a meaning that is capable of enlarging her field of consciousness/“seeing.” When she
“sees” me, the symbolic order of “Blackness as evil” is collapsed: I am evil. My
Blackness is the stimulus that triggers her response. “The Negro,” as Fanon notes, “is a
phobogenic object, a stimulus to anxiety.”10
In the everyday world of encountering Black bodies, the meaning of my Black
body is deemed immediate (not mediate) to her consciousness.11 One might refer to this
as the “natural attitude” of her consciousness vis-à-vis my Black body. The meaning of
my body is reduced to a trans-historical signification, an essence with a fixed teleology.
Her perspective, however, is far from “direct” and veridical. Her consciousness is far
from transparent. Her gaze is “not a simple seeing, an act of direct perception, but the
racial production of the visible, the workings of racial constraints on what it means to
‘see.’”12 As Black, I am the “looked at.” As white, she is the bearer of the “white look.”
But note that I have not given my consent to have my body transformed, to have it
reshaped, and thrown back to me as something I am supposed to own, as a meaning I am
supposed to accept. She clutches her purse, eagerly anticipating the arrival of her floor,
“knowing” that this Black predator will soon strike. As she clutches her purse, I am
reminded of the sounds of whites locking their car doors as they catch a glimpse of my
Black body as I walk by.13
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The tragedy of young Black Emmit Till flashes before my mind. Only fourteen
years old, Till was murdered in 1955 by two white men for allegedly whistling at a white
woman. Beaten beyond recognition, and shot in the head, his body was tied to a heavy
metal fan and thrown into the Tallahatchie River in Mississippi. Given the long history of
white racism in North America, it is not at all unusual to have specific memories that fail
to fade, memories that associate the experience of whiteness with instances of lynching,
castration, and terror, memories that justifiably push Black people to the precipice of
existential fear and trembling. “Black men,” as Ann DuCille notes, “have been lynched
because someone said they looked at, spoke to, or thought about a white woman.”14
Created from the mire of the white imaginary, representations of Black males as
“lusting murderously after innocent white women,”15as buffoons, or inferior animals,
have been played out in the anti-Reconstruction filmic narratives and novels such as
D.W. Griffith’s Birth of a Nation (1915) and Thomas Dixon’s The Leopard’s Spots: A
Romance of the White Man’s Burden (1902).16 Like the spots on a leopard, Black males
are believed unable to change their lusting ways and inferior constitution. And Blacks,
more generally, are unable to eradicate the “curse” of their darkness. Through the mouth
of one of his characters, Dixon asks, “Can you change the color of his [the Ethiopian/the
Black] skin, the kink of his hair, the bulge of his lips, the spread of his nose, or the beat of
his heart with a spelling book?” The character answers, “The Negro is the human donkey.
You can train him, but you can’t make him a horse.”17 Of course, such racial
representations of Black males helped to create and sustain the rationalization to
“protect” white women through the creation of such “law-abiding” groups as the Ku Klux
Klan.
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Describing himself as part of the Emmit Till generation, philosopher Lucius
Outlaw notes that the egregious “racist murder of Emmit Till…solidified firmly in my
mind (and soul) certain notions regarding relationships with white females…notions that
conditioned my approach to white women for many, many years, even today.”18 The
multiple messages sent to Till and other Black males were to remind them of their place
within the world, to indelibly mark their bodies as trouble, bereft of full citizenship,
expendable, existentially insignificant, and vulnerable to white male authority and
brutality. To speak “inappropriately” to a white woman (to wink at, whistle at) was to
commit the error of thinking that you were a man (read: white man) and not a beast. On
this score, only white men can be “appropriately inappropriate” toward white women.
Returning to the old white woman in the elevator, she desires to look, but feels
uncomfortable doing so. She fears that a direct look might incite the anger of the Black
predator. She feels a strange combination of attraction, disgust, and trepidation. She fakes
a smile in order to sooth what she “knows” to be moving through my savage breast. By
her smile she hopes to elicit a spark of humanity from the dark savage. But I don’t return
the smile. I fear that it might be interpreted as a gesture of sexual advance.19 After all,
within the social space of the elevator, which has become, to use Judith Butler’s turn of
phrase, “a racially saturated field of visibility,”20 a hermeneutic transactional space within
which all of my intended meanings get falsified, it is as if I am no longer in charge of
what I mean/intend. What she “sees” or “hears” is governed by a racist epistemology of
certitude that places me under erasure. It is only through not seeing me that I am visible;
it is only through not hearing me that I am audible. Within this space, she controls the
“truth” of my intentions. Her alleged literacy regarding the semiotics of my Black body,
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however, is actually an instance of profound illiteracy. Her gaze upon my Black body
might be said to function like a camera obscura. Her gaze consists of a racist socioepistemic aperture, as it were, through which the (white) light of “truth” casts an
inverted/distorted image of me upon the back walls, so to speak, of her mind. My
meaning, in short, is flipped on its head.
I place particular emphasis upon this notion of the racist socio-epistemic aperture.
Consider this brief excursus. Take the well-known Plessy v. Ferguson case (1896), which
resulted in the United States Supreme Court’s establishment of the separate but equal
doctrine. Homer Plessy was 7/8 white and 1/8 Black. He argued that because of this he
should be allowed to sit in the whites only railroad car. This was a calculated effort on the
part of Plessy and the “Citizens Committee to Test the Constitutionality of the Separate
Car Law” to call into question the Louisiana statute (1890) that made it mandatory for
Blacks and whites to ride in separate railroad cars. However, Plessy lost the case and was
forced to pay a fine of $25. Apparently, just having 1/8 of “Black blood” was sufficient to
make him Black. Consider the following hypothetical scenario. Plessy enters the elevator.
It is my assumption that the old white women would not automatically begin her ritual
performance of anti-Black racist suspicion. On the contrary, she would probably perform
her whiteness in ways that signify that she feels comfortable and safe around this “white”
male. However, let’s further assume that the Plessy v. Ferguson case was televised and
that she had just watched the news, seeing pictures of Plessy. According to my argument,
despite his phenotypic whiteness, she would react to him in ways that she would react to
my dark body. The point here is that the white gaze as a racist socio-epistemic aperture
will “see” a threatening Black body in white. Again, this points to the conceptualization
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of the white gaze as operating at the level of the symbolic.21 Her “physical eyes” may
“see” white skin, but her gaze overrides what is visual.22 Made accessible through those
myths and tropes that constitute the socio-epistemic aperture of the white gaze, she “sees”
a Black in whiteface, she discerns the “stained” Black body in white. Citing (though
critical of) the racist assumptions propagated in R. W. Shufeldt’s The Negro, A Menace
to American Civilization, Charles Johnson notes:

One drop of black blood, for example, will cause a white family to revert
to Negroid characteristics even after a full century; the mulatto, though
possessing white blood, is depicted as dangerous because his surface
“outside,” not being stained, betrays the criminality and animality of his
interior.23

On this score, her gaze comes replete with an essentialist ontological perspective on
Blackness, no matter the abundance of “white blood” or the miniscule amount of “Black
blood.”
Again, returning to my experience with the white woman on the elevator, it is
through her gaze that I become hyper-vigilant of my own embodied spatiality. On
previous occasions, particularly when alone, I have moved my body within the space of
the elevator in a non-calculative fashion, paying no particular attention to my bodily
comportment, the movement of my hands, my eyes, the position of my feet. I did not
calculate the distance between my arm, hand, and my fingers in relationship to the
buttons indicating the various floors. On such occasions, my “being-in” the space of the
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elevator is familiar; my bodily movements, my stance, are indicative of what it means to
inhabit a space of familiarity. In short, it is a space within which I am meaningfully
absorbed in the habitual everydayness of riding on elevators. Of course, the elevator
could break down, in which case I might experience the space within the elevator as too
confining; I might panic as I perhaps only now, all of a sudden, begin to experience how
stuffy the elevator is, how tiny it is, and how it does not have a phone that is operational.
Under these circumstances, I become calculative. The elevator is perceived as an object
that represents a challenge to me, as something standing over and against me. What was
previously a familiar space in the elevator, which I inhabited as an uncomplicated
modality of my meaningful bodily comportment, has all of a sudden become “a
something” that is threatening; my everyday mode of “being-in” has become a mode of
being-trapped-in.
The movement from the familiar is what is also effected vis-à-vis the old white
woman’s gaze. My movements become and remain stilted. I dare not move suddenly. The
apparent racial neutrality of the space within the elevator (when I am standing alone) has
become an axiological plenum, one filled with white normativity. As philosopher
Shannon Sullivan would say, I no longer inhabit the space of the elevator “as a corporeal
entitlement to spatiality.”24 I feel trapped. I no longer feel bodily expansiveness within
the elevator, but corporeally constrained, limited. I now begin to calculate, paying almost
neurotic attention to my body movements, making sure that this “Black object,” what
now feels like an appendage, a weight, is not too close, not too tall, not too threatening.
So, I genuflect, but only slightly, a movement that feels like an act of worship. My livedbody comes back to me like the elevator, as something to be dealt with, as a challenge, an
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unfortunate yet troubling occurrence. Indeed, my lived-body begins to feel like
something ontologically occurent, something merely there in its facticity. Notice that she
need not speak a word (speech-acts are not necessary) to render my Black body
“captive.” She need not scream “Rape!” She need not call me “Nigger!” to my face.
Indeed, although how she reacts to me is certainly not without its deeper moral
implications, and must be called into question, it is not a necessary requirement that she
hates me, possesses ill will toward me or is morally vicious in order for her to script my
body in the negative way that she does. Her non-verbal movements construct me,
possessing their own socio-ontological effects on my body. Her Negrophobia depicts me
in a shockingly monstrous fashion. White America has bombarded me and other Black
males with the “reality” of our duel hyper-sexualization: “you are a sexual trophy and a
certain rapist.”25 Her gaze gives me form, albeit a distorted form.
Fanon, aware of the horrible narrative myths used to depict Black bodies, notes
that the Negro is the genital and is the incarnation of evil,26 being that which is to be
avoided and yet desired. Face to face, the white woman “feels the need to recall the times
of cannibalism.”27 Ritualistically enacting her racialized and racist consciousness, she
reveals her racist narrative competence, a putative self-evident script vis-à-vis the
“savage” Black body. After all, my Black body is reduced to the biological. And though
“one cannot decently ‘have a hard on’ everywhere,” within the white imaginary, I
apparently fit the bill. To put a slight interpretive inflection on Fanon here, as the
unquenchable Black phallus, a walking, talking, hard-on, I am believed eager to introduce
white women into a sexual universe for which the white male “does not have the key, the
weapons, or the attributes.”28 Within the lived and consequential semiotic space of the
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elevator, the white woman has “taken” my body from me, sending its meaning back to
me, forcing a cognitive dissonance, a lived or phenomenologically given disparity, that I
must now struggle to overcome.
The space within the elevator has become a microcosm of some of the dynamic
processes of a larger, systemic form of colonial invasion within which its undesired
incursions, pernicious acts of usurpation, and its regulatory processes of white
normativity are played out on the lived body of the colonized. Just as the colonial
presence attempts to deplete the power of the colonized, I feel as if my power to script
my own identity, my agency to disrupt the constellations of meaning imposed from
without, has been/is being depleted. On this score, my agency to act-in-the-world, to
assert how I understand/narrate my own identity, appears reduced to a form of knowledge
regarding my actions of which I am restricted to having privileged, epistemic access only.
In other words, I feel forced within an epistemic solipsistic position because her
interpretive hegemony displaces my intended meanings with her own set of
interpretations. Thus, she effectively erases my ability to press my meaning into service
and thereby counter her interpretations.
What is left of agency once it is truncated and rendered impotent and devoid of
expression within the sphere of the social? For once I act, my action enters into a
hermeneutic traffic of semiotic distortion, my actions have undergone a process of
transvaluation. The meaning that I intend through a given action, which is the embodied
correlate of that intention, becomes a token extraneous to me. What then am I to do?
Within this racially saturated field of visibility, I have somehow become this predator
stereotype from which it appears hopeless to escape. It is as if with every attempt on my
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part to resist this racially saturated field of visibility, for example, when I think about
smiling, my good and harmless intentions return to me, interpreted, through the medium
of this field of visibility, as “evidence” of my ulterior predatory or criminal motives. The
old white woman thinks that her act of “seeing” me is an act of “knowing” what I am, of
knowing what I will do next, that is, hers is believed to be simply a process of
unmediated/uninterpreted perception. However, her coming to “see” me as she does is
actually a cultural achievement, a racist socio-historical schematization, indeed, an act of
epistemic violence.
Judith Butler provides an insightful analysis of the Rodney King beating and
verdict that squares well with my interpretation of the interconnections between what is
“seen,” what is “not seen,” racism, and the construction of the “Black body.” As she
makes clear, “the video shows a man being beaten.”29 She asks, though, how is it that the
jury in Simi Valley came to “see” King’s prone body as a dangerous and threatening
object to be further subdued over and over again through the use of wielding batons?
Like in the elevator, there emerges a contestation within the field of the visual, and a
battle over the meaning of the Black body’s intentions. According to Butler, King’s
Black body has been schematized through “the inverted projections of white paranoia.”30
In short, King’s “threatening” Black body is produced within a white meta-narrative that
constitutes “the racial production of the visible.”31 She argues:

The kind of “seeing” that the police enacted, and the kind of “seeing” that
the jury reenacted, is one in which a further violence is performed by the
disavowal and projection of that violent beating. The actual blows against
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Rodney King are understood to be fair recompense, indeed, defenses
against, the dangers that are “seen” to emanate from his body. Here
“seeing” and attributing are indissoluble. Attributing violence to the object
of violence is part of the very mechanism that recapitulates violence, and
that makes the jury’s “seeing” into a complicity with that police
violence.32

This process forms a racist hermeneutically constituted hermetic space that translates into
a site of phantasmagoria. Butler:

In this sense, the circuit of violence attributed to Rodney King is itself the
circuit of white racist violence which disavows itself only to brutalize the
specter that embodies it own intention. This is the phantasm that it
ritualistically produces at the site of the racialized other.33

Further theorizing this space of phantasmagoria, it is important to note that not
only does the white woman in the elevator ontologically freeze my “dark” embodied
identity, she becomes ontologically frozen in her own embodied (white) identity. For she
only “sees” a criminal, a predator. She too is a prisoner of her own historically inherited
imaginary. She “sees,” but she does not necessarily reflect upon, herself as normative,
innocent, pure. Her performances reiterate the myth of the proverbial white victim at the
hands of the Black predator. Butler argues that the reading of the video of the King
beating is indeed a form of reenacting “the phantasmatic scene of the crime, reiterating

15
and re-occupying the endangered status of the white person on the street.”34 Like Emmet
Till, King’s body, the “Black body,” is the very embodiment of all that is antithetical to
“civilization” (read: white).
Philosopher Robert Gooding-Williams speaks of interpreted images of Blacks that
are racial representations, backed by racist rhetorical strategies, that are “constituted by
assigning a particular function (e.g., the function or role of causing fear in white people)
to Negroes when they appeared in the legends and stories we have inherited from the
past.”35 Regarding the manner in which King’s body was said to be a “self-evident
threat” to the police officers, Gooding-Williams, like Butler, challenges the positivist
myth of “brute facts” when it comes to the process of “seeing” Black bodies within a
white racist context of constituted social reality. He argues:

After inviting the jurors to see events from the point of view of the police
officers, the defense attorneys elicited testimony from King’s assailants
that depicted King repeatedly as a bear, and as emitting bear-like groans.
In the eyes of the police, and then again in the eyes of the jurors, King’s
black body became that of a wild “Hulk-like” and “wounded” animal,
whose every gesture threatened the existence of civilized society. Not
surprisingly, the defense attorneys portrayed the white bodies which
assailed King as guardians against the wild, and as embodying a “thin blue
line” that separates civil society from the dangerous chaos which is the
essence of the wild.36
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Regarding the woman in the elevator, however, she does not realize that she has
come to see herself as pure, civilized, as innocent, as an easy victim vis-à-vis untamed
Black males, through a socially constructed and historically manufactured normative
framework that has become inter-subjectively and intra-subjectively “real” through
systemic social practices of white hegemony. Her whiteness is deemed “nonthreatening.” Of course, it is through the self-constructed centrality of whiteness’s
ontology that these constructions appear at all. The Black body (in this case the Black
male body) is by nature criminal, because the white body (in this case the white female
body) is by nature innocent, pure, and good. Of course, there is nothing historically
necessary about the fact that the Black body has been typified as criminal. “Yellow
bodies” (Asian Americans) and “red bodies” (Native Americans) have also been
criminalized and Othered within contexts involving white racist hegemonic practices.
Think here of the fact that Asians are referred to as “Yellow Negroes” and Arab bodies
are characterized as swarthy “Sand Niggers.”
In reference to what he refers to as the “average ordinary White Man,” Gilles
Deleuze notes that “the first divergence-types, are racial: yellow man, black man . . . .”37
Note how “divergence” is marked as racial. It is in diverging or deviating from whiteness
(the “non-racial” center) that the yellow, the black, and the red are signifiers of inferior
difference vis-à-vis whiteness as the same/transcendental signified. According to
Deleuze, “racism never detects the particles of the other; it propagates waves of
sameness . . . .”38 While I agree with Deleuze that Blacks have been defined relative to
their divergence from the historically constructed “standard” of whiteness, as a critical
addendum to Deleuze’s position I would only add that within the European imaginary
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Blacks have not only been conceptualized as divergent, but as a different kind. For
example, let x stand for the standard against which y and z are judged divergences. In this
case, x, y, and z might still be said to be of the same kind, where y and z are said to
diverge more or less in some fashion. In instances involving the European imaginary visà-vis the “nature” of Blacks, however, Black people were not simply “divergent” from
the standard (x), and hence were neither y nor z, but belonged to a fundamentally
different type. On this score, then, not only does whiteness reserve the power to define
others as “divergent” or “deviant,” but it also has the power to define “differences”
entirely outside the standard-divergence dialectic. Addressing the self-Other dialectic in
terms of the “Black Other,” Afro-Caribbean philosopher Lewis Gordon notes:

But what the Black is, is the not-Other and not-self. To put it differently,
in the Western framework the only way the Other can emerge is if there
were some notion that the Other can be a human being. Racism, properly
understood, reduces Blacks below the human. Speaking of what was also
conquest, Fanon says, in Les Damnes, that when the French took Algeria
they saw themselves as taking nothing more than the land. And in a
context like that it is the Hegelian thesis that there is no Geist there, there
is no human being there – and consequently no “experience.” And literally
if there is no Geist, then one cannot even get into the dialectics of
recognition.”39
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Within the context of the long history of white racism in America, it is the Black
that is deemed by nature the Untermenschen, because whites are by nature the
Ubermenschen. Whiteness sets itself up as the thesis. Blackness, within the dialectical
logic of whiteness, must be the antithesis. Within the space of the elevator, the white
woman clings to her identity as white, effecting thereby the necessary distance/difference
between the white self (her white self) and the Black Other (my Blackness as Otherness).
The space of our “confrontation” is governed by a dialectical representational logic,
which can be “understood as the representational form wherein two terms are positioned
in a diametrically opposed and hierarchical structure.”40
On the elevator, my Black body is ontologically mapped, its coordinates lead to
that which is always immediately visible: The Black surface. Philosopher Merleau-Ponty
writes, “But the thing is not really observable: there is always a skipping over in every
observation, one is never at the thing itself.”41 Not so with the Black body. There is no
transcendence that faces the visible (that is, the invisible). Of course, this is not to deny
the spatially angular physicality of my back as opposed to my front or my side. The point
here is that the Black body vis-à-vis the white gaze appears in the form of a sheer
exteriority, implying that the Black body “shows up,” makes itself known in terms of its
Black surface. There is only the visible, the concrete, the seen, all there, all at once: a
single Black thing, un-individuated, threatening, ominous, Black. The old white woman
thinks that she takes no part in this construction; she acts “in the name of the serious.”42
She apparently fails to see how her identity is shot through in terms of how she constructs
me.
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In the case of Rodney King’s showing of his palm, for example, which was turned
away from his body,43 the construction of the “innocence” of the white police officers
hinged upon a reversed interpretation of a show of the palm as an act of violence, and,
hence, as further justification to subdue the “supernaturally” powerful Black male body.
So, too, the woman in the elevator fails to see that her identity is constructed and shaped
through her negation of my humanity. She takes her identity to be a pure self-presence.
What is her “positive” whiteness apart from my “negative” Blackness? The point here is
that the narrative intelligibility of her white identity is always already linked to the
narrative exclusion of my Black identity. “To the extent that identity always contains the
specter of non-identity within it, the subject is always divided and identity is always
purchased at the price of the exclusion of the Other,”44 in this case the Black Other.
Like the white police officers of the LAPD in the King beating, the white woman
on the elevator sees herself as on the side of the law. The “law” functions here as a
metonymic term for what it means to be white. Within the framework of a binary
economy of racial metonymic opposites, blackness is deemed “unlawful.” Since the
Black body is deemed unlawful, the act of “seeing” King or “seeing” my Black body in
the elevator is linked to the issue of what a white racist episteme in fact produces as the
visible.45 My Blackness, for her, is a sufficient register used to substantiate/confirm the
“veridicality” of her perception. My Blackness is sufficient evidence of my brutality.
What is passed off as “seeing,” however, is really a form of reading.46 She does not
realize the incredible amount of work that she performs to sustain the socially constructed
nature of her gaze, and, hence, to continue to perpetuate the falsehood of my Black body
as criminal. On this score, she is not simply influenced by racist practices, but she is the
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vehicle through which such practices get performed and sustained. She is cognitively
dysfunctional vis-à-vis the deep racist socio-epistemological forms of belief, and
systemically racist institutional structures, of which she is partly a product. As a
“product,” this does not mean that she is simply an epiphenomenon of social
conditioning, although such conditioning is formative. And, yet, her performance of the
white gaze is not reducible to an individual, isolated act. Moreover, she is not the
“metaphysical originator,” as it were, of the first white gaze. There is no white Ur-gaze.
Rather, the intelligibility and effectiveness of the performative white gaze is always
already fueled by a larger social imaginary, an imaginary that is historically grounded in
white institutional and brute power. More specifically, my sense is that against this
institutional and socio-epistemological backdrop, she maintains the potential for
resistance, for “sliding into,” as it were, an anti-racist discourse with its counter-racist
practices.
What is interesting is that as she “takes up” this anti-racist discourse, the antiracist discourse “takes over” her. There is something significant and true about the claim
that this alternative, this non-racist way of understanding oneself-in-the-world, always
already exists as a position to be taken up. She does not create the position that is
counterposed to racism. Moreover, it is not as if she stands in the middle of two horizons,
one racist and one not, saying to herself, “Which one should I choose?” In neither case
does she determine “the selection of the inventory of culturally actionable thoughts.”47
Rather, both horizons, with their respective inventory of culturally actionable thoughts,
and other multiple differential contending voices, constitute the discursive traffic through
which she is defined and through which she attempts to define herself. After all, when she
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“slides into” the counterposed racist horizon, she does not do so “involuntarily.” For the
woman in the elevator, the white racist horizon has somehow come to have greater
saliency for her.48 The objective is to get the counter-racist horizon to have greater
saliency for the white woman. There is no Archimedean position from which to convince
her to be attentive to the alternative non-racist horizon/voice. There are no
epistemological foundations according to which I can appeal that would incontrovertibly
convince her that it is immoral to be a racist. This does not mean, however, that
arguments and counter-arguments cannot be advanced against a particular horizon like
white racism. Powerful arguments can still be marshaled in the form of various rhetorical
strategies, persuasive techniques, and through internal criticism. The assumption, of
course, is that my interlocutor is reasonable, but there is always the stubborn racist.49
The white woman’s gaze is reiterated within the context of power relations that
not only help to sustain the larger social racist imaginary, but such power relations
sanction her performance of the gaze in the first place, guaranteeing its performance with
impunity, and ensures material effects on the gazed upon Black body. Nevertheless, she
engages in a form of evasion. It is through the process of an epistemology of ignorance
that she makes sense of the “racial order of things” and thereby consequently further
cements her bad faith. More specifically, an epistemology of ignorance involves “a
particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are
psychologically and socially functional), producing the ironic outcome that whites will in
general be unable to understand the world they themselves have made.”50 So, she inhabits
a dysfunctional cognitive space; she suffers from a structured blindness, a socio-
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psychologically reinforcing opacity, a refusal to “see” beyond falsehoods that continue to
uphold white hegemony and mythos.
While performing this gaze, while performing an act of “reading the surface” of
my Black body, which is really an act of constructing the surface of my Black body, I
suffer. Within this context, “I [take] myself far off from my own presence, far indeed,
and [make] myself an object.”51 I become other to myself, alien, feeling my
understanding of my own body slip away from me, pushing me ever closer toward the
precipice of epistemic violence, ever closer to living in a state of self-hatred.
Phenomenologically, it is as if I become “Black” (read: evil, sexually rapacious) anew
within the context of each encounter with the generative dimensions of the white
gaze/imaginary. I am, as it were, a phantom, indeed, a “spook,” that lives between the
interstices of my physical, phenotypically dark body and the white woman’s gesticulatory
performances. She performs, ergo, I am. These gesticulatory performances, ways of being
non-verbally toward me, provide evidence of the generative workings of the white
imaginary. On this score, I become a racial hypostasis/Black essence, as it were. This
process of racial hypostatization manifests itself to the white woman in the form of my
dark body’s “intention” to do her harm. I become, for her, “the origin and potential
instrument of all danger in the [elevator] scene.”52 Within the dynamic racialized space of
the elevator, I have undergone a process of what might be termed “misplaced
concretion.” From the abstract sphere of the white imaginary, my dark body is the
concrete and particular instantiation of a racist abstraction: Blackness is dangerous. The
copula congeals me in an undesirable and unwanted identity relationship. I have become
the externalized figure, the fantasized object, of the white woman’s own white
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distortion.53 Hence, her actions only further perpetuate the construction of racial
boundaries that sustain her transactions with me on the elevator.
I think that it is important to note that the range of racist behaviors performed by
whites in response to the presence of Black bodies in elevators, for example, is not
reducible to a single explanatory model that postulates that such racist behaviors are due
to consciously held prejudices/beliefs that might be further said to be capable of being
ameliorated through the mere process of encouraging more rigorous epistemic
attentiveness to how whites intellectually assent to a given proposition (for example,
“Blacks are evil and not to be trusted”). For there are many whites who will reject being
racists qua consciously assenting to a set of racist propositional beliefs about Blacks, and,
yet, who might be said to perform “whitely” (that is, distancing themselves physically,
looking with suspicious eyes, feeling themselves physically threatened or repulsed by
Blackness) in the presence of Black bodies. My point is that acting whitely is not limited
to possessing occurrent racist beliefs or feeling hatred for (or having that hatred directed
toward) a particular Black person encountered on an elevator. Acting whitely might be
described as a form of orientation that comes replete with a set of sensibilities that
unconsciously/pre-reflectively position or configure the white self vis-à-vis the non-white
self.
Of course, simply reducing whiteness qua racism to a set of false beliefs can lead
to the consequence of not acknowledging or even rejecting the existence of larger
systemic power relationships (that exist beyond the space of elevators) that form a system
of white supremacist practices that are supported by white legal, material, socioeconomic,
sociopolitical, and cultural power. The faulty reasoning might run something like this:
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“White racist beliefs are agent-centered.54 Systems of power don’t denote persons qua
agents. Hence, systems of power relationships don’t constitute white racism.” Moreover,
to reduce whiteness to a set of false beliefs overlooks the fact that many whites, those
who have very honorable intentions, those who might be described as “goodwill” whites,
who deny holding racist beliefs, benefit from acting whitely-in-the-world in ways that
they themselves may not consciously intend. On this score, benefiting from acting
whitely-in-the-world can have negative implications for non-whites, even if whites are
unaware of the consequences of their actions. I feel compelled to exclaim: But, he/she
ought to have been aware! And where he/she ought to have been aware, he/she can
indeed be aware.
In a socio-political and cultural structure where whiteness is privileged and
normative, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that people designated as white cling to
racist beliefs in order to benefit from whiteness. Hence, even though there are white
bodies that do not possess what might be referred to as a “white supremacist
subjectivity,” they will still manage to reap benefits from being more highly valued
within a larger white racist socio-political, cultural context. I am arguing that there is
nothing intrinsically problematic about one’s white phenotypic constitution. White racist
supremacy is not a natural property that inheres within the skin of those classified as
white; it does not result from an innate, genotypic disposition. There is indeed a
contingent relationship between having “white skin” and being a white racist.55 Then why
not use the term “white supremacy” as opposed to “whiteness,” so as to avoid giving the
impression that the problem lies with phenotypic whiteness? The term “whiteness” not
only points to the ways in which colorism (white as believed to be supremely beautiful,
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untainted, moral, good, intelligent, civilized, lawful) is the hallmark of racism practiced
in North America and in Europe, but it also speaks to those who are phenotypically white
who make every effort to guard against racist beliefs, but, as stated, because of the larger
social positioning and valuing of certain bodies over others, still stand to unjustly benefit
from being white in their phenotypic constitution56 and still play a role in constituting the
Black body as Other and sustaining white racism.
The elevator example is designed to illustrate a slice of my lived reality. Of
course, the space within the elevator is only a pale reminder of how the Black body has
been historically marked and inscribed in derogatory terms, how it has been subjected to
inhuman brutality and pernicious acts of violence, and how it has been marginalized and
derailed within the space of the white body politic. This history serves as an important
reference point in terms of which I position and negotiate my identity. This history also
partly positions me, constituting my identity and hence informing my lived standpoint.
This history is the past and present threatening space within which I move and have my
being. On any given late evening, I know that I might be killed by white police officers as
I reach for identifying information. As with King when he showed his palms, any
intentional movement toward my wallet - which I struggle to produce so as to identify
myself, attempting to cut through the historical layers of white lies that have identified
me - is interpreted as an act of violence. Such identifying information, though, is always
relevant ex post facto. This is because what I am has been determined. I am the Black
who is present in his absence, whose genuine intentions arrive too late. I am a “seen
absence.” I am visible in my invisibility. What is seen is a stereotypical “object” that is
devoid of nuance. I am “seen” and begin to appear to myself in the mode of anonymity.
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After all, tautologously, “a Nigger is just a Nigger.” On this score, white racist practices
construct an iterable conception of the Black body: All Blacks are the same. Within the
space of racist logic, “A nigger has always done something.”57
As the Black male body, I am Amadou Diallo (1999), who reached for his wallet
and was shot at 41 times by the NYPD and hit with 19 bullets58; I am Abner Louima
(1997), who was sodomized with a plunger handle by white New York police officers; I
am Garnett Paul Johnson (1997), who was burned alive and beheaded by two white men;
I am James Byrd, Jr. (1998), who was dragged to death by three white men; and, I am
Rodney King, who underwent a brutal beating by white police officers (1991). Each of us
inhabits the same socially constructed space of being present in our absence, of being
tokens of danger beyond our control. I am that pre-marked Black thing, that site of
historical white discursive markings that precede my birth, leaving me typified and
nameless. Hence, I arrive on the scene already “determined.” Before I am born, my body
is not my own. It belongs to those historically embedded racist practices, discourses, and
institutional forces that struggle to remain invisible. Even whites who do not profess to be
racist, but who nevertheless benefit from being embodied as “white,” also have their
bodies defined relative to certain racist practices, discourses, and institutional forces,
though their bodies carry less immediate negative consequences.59
Contrary to the existentialist credo, I am an essence (“Blackness”) that precedes
my existence. Hence, my emergence upon the historical scene requires that I engage in
battle, a battle to stay alive in white America. Indeed, the Black body, my Black body, is
itself a battleground. The Black body has been historically marked, disciplined, scripted,
materially, psychologically, and morally invested in to ensure both white supremacy and
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the illusory construction of the white subject as a self-contained substance whose
existence does not depend upon the construction of the Black qua inferior. This is my
existential standpoint. This is my inheritance. This existential standpoint, this historical
inheritance, informs my epistemological standpoint.

Epistemological Standpoint or Doing Philosophy in Black
My reading of standpoint theory is consistent with its original Marxist interpretation,
though I do not limit its significance to a class analysis. My epistemological standpoint,
my location, as a Black male allows for a kind of perspective, a range and depth of vision
and knowledge that those in power (read: white) do not possess.60 Of course, one could
argue that on a male gendered axis, my perspective may very well come with its own
gendered blinkers and distortions. This is a significant critique advanced by feminist
standpoint epistemology. Nevertheless, I do see the world through the lived experience of
being Black, of being a particular “subaltern” Other within white racist America. I see the
world through the underside of history. Feminist and educational theorists also use the
term positionality to denote the fact “that since our understanding of the world and
ourselves is socially constructed, we must devote special attention to the differing ways
individuals from diverse social backgrounds construct knowledge and make meaning.”61
Hence, for me, to do philosophy in Black skin is to engage in the process of
conceptualizing the social world from an existential, historical, and raciated here. Many
of my ideas must pass through a layer of historically codified, invisiblized and scarred
flesh. I see the world and the world sees me through the historical narrative of my dark
skin. It is as if many of my philosophical intuitions pass through a flesh and blood
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structure; they are informed by, and speak to, the reality of aching backs, tired feet,
broken bones, chained wrists, ankles, and necks, whipped and scarred backs, and violated
wombs.
Much of the historical angst that I have inherited gets transmuted and articulated
philosophically. Hence, I philosophize within a historically situated context, a context
that is informed by the historical suffering of so many Black people. Just when I feel like
I can practice philosophy in the privacy of my own heated room, to engage in Cartesian
hyperbolic doubt, to doubt my own existence, to think about the metaphysical distinction
between mind and body, I am reminded that to be a philosopher in Black skin in racist
white America already places me on high alert, ever diligently watchful of those who
would call my philosophical identity, my capacity to think, into question. After all, I too
am being watched. Regardless of my philosophical acumen, one mistake will be my
undoing. “No exception,” as Fanon writes, “was made for my refined manners, or my
knowledge of literature, or my understanding of the quantum theory.”62 I am indeed
walled in; I am a prisoner not of an essence, but in terms of how I have been positioned
by and within a white body politic.
Positioned by this white racist body politic, my identity as a Black philosopher is
still perceived as an oxymoron. To inhabit the life of the mind, to cognize, to theorize, I
am deemed a credit to my race, an exception. To inhabit the life of the mind-in-white is to
do what is expected, to be normal. “Black intelligence,” as philosopher Cornel West
notes, “is always guilty before proven innocent in the court of the life of the mind; The
Bell Curve is just a manifestation of the cycle.”63 However, philosopher or not, I live my
existence in Black as a target of white violence. West notes that he struggled with the
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problem of evil by “grappling with the absurd in America and the absurd as America.”64
He also notes that it was not necessary to read the works of Jean-Paul Sartre or see a play
by Samuel Beckett to come to a realization of what constituted the absurd. It was enough
that he “had a black body in a civilization deeply shaped by white supremacist
perceptions, sensibilities, and institutional practices.”65 In America, where the white body
is the paragon of beauty, one pays for having the “wrong hips, lips, noses, skin texture,
skin pigmentation. And hair texture.”66 On this score, those “nonwhites socialized into
the acceptance of this somatic norm will then be alienated from their own bodies,”
according to Mills, “in a sense estranged from their own physical being in the world.”67
Indeed, to live one’s existence in Black in white America is to live one’s humanity as
problematized.68 To be Black in North America is to be a problem. The zone of
Blackness, that lived existential region of Black embodiment that is set off as distinct
from the surrounding regions of whiteness, is believed to be a zone of trouble. As
demonized, as problematized, I existentially inhabit my lived space as “outside” the
racialized space of whites. Within the interstitial social context of white racist power, I do
not traverse what I take to be an objective neutral space (walking through a white
neighborhood at night, for example). Rather, the space of the white neighborhood has
already been polarized “into inside and outside” in such a way that “curtails black
people’s inhabiting of [that] space.”69
Jane Lazarre, a white Jewish mother of Black sons, describes her fears around
America’s demonizing of Blackness. Lazarre:
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I look in the mirror and see skin that is tan to medium brown. I look at my
children and see skin that is tan to medium brown. But the other night, I
was told by one of our building guards that some cops came to the door
after Khary [one of her Black sons] had walked out, on his way up to the
video store. They asked about him, if he lived in the building, what kind of
person he was. They were looking for someone who “looked like him.”
For weeks I was frightened each time he went out in the street, night or
day; that he might be arrested, “mistaken” for a criminal they were
following. I wanted to follow him down the street, to his job, to his
friends’ houses, hiding behind him, ready to protect at a mother’s notice,
as I once did the first time he walked alone to school in the second grade.
To deny the reality of Blackness can be literally psychotic or suicidal.70

Lazarre’s last point is well-taken. After all, how can one live in a country where
“Blackness” signifies criminality, inferiority, danger, evil, predation, and hyper-sexuality,
and lay claim to a liberal, colorless “I’m just me” status?71 However, I would add that it
is only through the dialectics of mis-recognition (or non-recognition) by whites that
Blackness as a problem emerges at all. Hence, it is to deny the reality of whiteness that
can be literally psychotic or suicidal. It is not a question of denying the reality of one’s
dark skin as such that is psychotic or suicidal, but denying the reality of how one’s
“darkness” has been constructed vis-à-vis the construction of whiteness as purity,
innocence. Lazarre:
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The whiteness of whiteness is the blindness of willful innocence. It is
being oblivious, out of ignorance or callousness or bigotry or fear, to the
history and legacy of American slavery; to the generations of racial
oppression continuing; to the repeated indignities experienced by Black
Americans every single day.72

Whether one agrees with her or not, by “willful innocence” Lazarre wants to argue, or so
it seems, that the whiteness of her whiteness is something for which she plays a
“conscious” role. In other words, her innocence is “willful” to the extent that she
exercises some form of agency over maintaining the appearance of innocence from her
own white racism. In her case, she recognizes that she benefits from the whiteness of
whiteness, and, yet, she suggests that it is through an act of “will” that she sustains the
feeling of innocence. Her deeper point here, though, is that whites are “blind” to this act
of willful innocence. Lazarre is also poignantly aware of the anxiety that her sons and her
African-American husband feel when they enter into the social matrix of differentially
and hierarchically raced bodies. But as she notes, “I forget, [I] am privileged to remain
innocent.”73
Cornel West provides two very powerful personal examples of what it was like to
have his Black body typified as criminal while “driving Black.” He notes, however, that
the incidents that he experienced “are dwarfed by those like Rodney King’s beating or the
abuse of black targets of the FBI’s COINTELPRO efforts in the 1960s and 1970s.”74 He
recalls that he was stopped three times in his “first ten days in Princeton for driving too
slowly on a residential street with a speed limit of twenty-five miles per hour.”75 Also,
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driving to teach at Williams College from New York, West describes having been
stopped on concocted charges of trafficking cocaine. He tried to explain to the police
officer that he was a professor of religion. The police officer replied, “Yeh, and I’m the
flying Nun. Let’s go nigger!”76 Note the police officer’s sarcasm. The Flying Nun was a
sitcom during the 1960s. Actress Sally Field played the character Sister Bertrille who
could fly. The sitcom was a fantasy. Hence, the subtext of the officer’s caustic “wit” is
designed to portray West as an irony (etymologically, a dissembler, one who simulates,
puts on the appearance of). There is no way that this Black man can be who he says he is.
In the police officer’s view, West’s description of himself as a professor of religion is
only a fantasy, like the sitcom. It is during times like these that one’s other identities (as a
professor of religion or philosophy, for example) are rendered invisible by white
America’s negative valuation of Blackness. It is as if the figure of a Black philosopher
who is a professor of religion becomes an obscene image, one that registers cognitive
dissonance for many whites. After all, is not the very notion of a Black philosopher
indicative, though unconscionable, of a public display of Auguste Rodin’s “The Thinker”
fully equipped with an erection?77
Regarding the relationship between reflective thought and context, Gordon
argues:

If the epistemic correlate of essence is conceptualization, then the
theoretical or conceptual domain is always situated on what can be called
the reflective level. The reflective dimension of situated life always brings
in an element of concrete embodiment of relevance. What this means is
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that theory, any theory, gains its sustenance from that which it offers for
and through the lived-reality of those who are expected to formulate it.78

My philosophizing is fundamentally situated within a lived historical context of
relevance, interests, purposes, normative aims, and so on. This bespeaks my
philosophical alignment with certain aspects of the pragmatist tradition. It is within a
lived context of concern, more generally, that philosophical thought evolves and takes
shape. My philosophizing, and the knowledge that informs it, is a species of praxis. My
philosophizing/theorizing informs and is informed by lived concrete experiences; it is an
effective way of dealing with obstacles of my own creation or those created by others.
One might say that there is a “dialogical” relationship between theory and action, moving
in an ongoing mutual relationship of growth. I am reminded of Black theorist bell hooks
where she says that she came to theory because she was hurting and because she wanted
to comprehend what was happening within and around her.79 Of course, she knows that
theory can assist our existential and political efforts only if we shape it toward that end.
There is always the danger of making a fetish of theory, rendering theory a fixated
object of intellectual gratification that obstructs the need for and exercise of praxis
regarding larger emancipatory aims. I see whiteness (again, not one’s white phenotypic
constitution) as fundamentally an ethical and a human problem, not a philosophical
problem, though, to be sure, second-order philosophical reflection on whiteness can bring
clarity and greater complexity to bear upon the various facets of whiteness. In my reading
of William Shakespeare’s The Tempest, Caliban’s freedom does not hinge upon the mere
mastery of Prospero’s language. After all, it is possible for Caliban to theorize in
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Prospero’s language and yet remain subservient to him. Rather, Caliban must also act so
as to disrupt Prospero’s colonial order of things, and create spaces within which to order
and to sustain a de-Calibanized mode of identity/being. Hence, my philosophical project
in this dissertation is the goal of knowledge production regarding whiteness. More
specifically, I see my philosophizing about whiteness vis-à-vis the Black body as
engaging in a shared process of employing and perpetuating “critical intelligence as a
practice of life that has as its goal raising to consciousness the conditions of life,
historical practices, and blocked alternatives [for whites and Blacks] that, if pursued,
might lead to life experienced as qualitatively – progressively – different,”80 and, on my
reading, better. As a practice of life, critical intelligence is not only brought to bear upon
the process of de-Calibanization, but also to bear upon a new way in which Prospero
might engage in “a continuously affirmed refusal to prolong the ontological and
existential project of whiteness.”81
Part of what forms the impetus of my theorizations is a hermeneutics of
interrogation and overthrow vis-à-vis whiteness. It is from this perspective that
whiteness, as a site of cultural, sociopolitical and material hegemony, has become an
important site of interrogation for me, a site that implicates my very survival. Hence, one
important way in which I understand the function of philosophical analysis (or secondorder reflection) is in terms of how such an activity serves broader liberatory efforts. As
with Toni Morrison, then, my “project is an effort to avert the critical gaze from the racial
object to the racial subject; from the described and imagined to the describers and
imaginers.”82 Jean-Paul Sartre, although having a more specific endeavor to critique the
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Negritude movement as being only a minor moment (or negative moment) of a larger
dialectical progression, similarly comments upon whiteness as seen :

Here are black men [women] standing, looking at us, and I hope that
you—like me—will feel the shock of being seen. For three thousand
years, the white man has enjoyed the privilege of seeing without being
seen; he was only a look—the light from the eyes drew each thing out of
the shadow of its birth; the whiteness of his skin was another look,
condensed light. The white man—white because he was man, white like
daylight, white like truth, white like virtue—lighted up the creation like a
torch and unveiled the secret white essence of beings.83

Morrison’s efforts to avert the critical gaze from the racial object are laudable.
Her move points in the direction of uncovering the source of white hegemony as opposed
to the effects of white hegemony. Morrison’s shifting of the critical gaze so as to unveil
whiteness, which attempts to conceal itself by claiming a universal status, is precisely one
of the important goals of critical whiteness studies. As noted, however, the “racial
subject” is dialectically linked to the “racial object.” Whiteness is linked to “a fabricated
brew of darkness, otherness, alarm, and desire that is uniquely American,”84 though there
does exist a “European Africanism,” as Morrison calls it, that gets performed as colonial
white power. Hence, as I avert my critical gaze from the racial object, it is important that
I remain cognizant of the impact of the raced subject upon the raced object. The very
process of naming whiteness in terms of race is itself an important move as white
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supremacy has attempted to avoid its racialized status by conceptualizing non-white
Others as raced. Thus, I explore the impact of the white gaze upon the raced Black body
as I critically expose the raced white gaze in tandem. Both are inextricably linked. The
historical construction of the Black body as “evil” emerges precisely within whiteness’s
Manichean divide, that is, a divide within which Blackness and whiteness constitute a
logical binary, where one is meaningless without the Other.
The title of this dissertation speaks to the core of its aims. The overall aim is to
map the epistemological and ontological dynamics and generative power of whiteness
vis-à-vis the distorted phenomenological return of the Black body. My use of the term
“return” does not mean that I hold that the “Black body” is sent back, or restored to its
“proper place.” This smacks of an essentialism that belies my understanding of the
semiotic and narrative structuration of the body. By “return,” I mean the sense in which
the Black body is experienced by me after it has been reconstructed (as opposed to
uncovering its essence) through the white racist gaze, how it comes back to me as that
which is deformed and distorted in its appearance.85 Moreover, even before my Black
body was “taken,” as it were, and sent back, it was not an un-interpreted given. The body
is always already an object of interpretive discourse.
Not only am I interested in critically exploring whiteness in terms of how it is
instantiated in the structure of the white gaze, a kind of synecdoche, so to speak, of
whiteness, I am also interested in how this gaze is structured through a larger white
episteme. Both the white gaze and this larger white episteme are mutually reinforcing.
Although I will revisit what I mean by the notion of a white episteme vis-à-vis the white
gaze, I understand it to be comparable to a discursive field or a paradigm that tacitly
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shapes, informs, confirms, and supports a broad range of actions performed by whites.
Across various contexts, these actions are designed to uphold the privileges and power of
whites. The white gaze, given the power of the ocular metaphor in Western culture, is an
important site of power and control, a site that is structured by the white episteme and in
turn perpetuates the white episteme. As I will argue, the gaze cannot be confined to the
physical eye. The gaze is literally a species of the ocular power of “looking” and
“seeing,” being “looked at” and “being seen.” Hence, though taking its departure from a
literal form of “seeing,” the gaze (and in this case the white gaze) manifests itself in other
modalities such as socially constructing the Other as “Other,” that is, being the
represented “Other,” being the manipulated “object” of a manipulating “subject,” being a
discursive artifact of a certain discursive field, being a cultural production, and being
fashioned through a generative episteme that implicates “cognitive agents within social
practices.”86 I am reminded of Kant where he says that percepts without concepts are
blind, and concepts without percepts are empty. The dark body is “seen,” but this
“darkness” does not mean anything without the (generative) concepts through which that
which is “seen as dark” gets mediated/constructed.

Method
My methodological approach will involve a form of ideology exposure. My use of
ideology exposure vis-à-vis whiteness involves the following three integrally related
aims: a) to expose whiteness as a practice that is invested in masking its historically
contingent structure and presenting its “truths” as if they were completely unconditioned,
universal, and dislocated from a historically limited, reactive-value creating hegemonic
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site of power; b) to expose that whiteness involves the process of attributing a natural
status (in the sense in which a physicalist would say “x exists”) to something that
fundamentally has a socio-historical status. In other words, to expose the ways in which
white racists objectify their own practices “to be something ‘foreign’ to them, especially
if they take that activity to be a natural process outside their control”87; and, c) to expose
white racism as consisting of projective fantasies and to expose how these function. In
other words, I will expose the fact that the regime of whiteness creates barriers that
function to nullify the reality that such fantasies exist, that whites react to them, and that
they are products created by whites themselves. Moreover, these fantasies, through
various processes of denial (e.g., rationalization), are reconfigured in the form of “truths”
and “facts” about the Black body. These so-called truths and facts about the Black body
are buttressed by a racial realism that assumes that there is a direct referential
correspondence between the language of racism (Blacks are inferior, child-like, hypersexed, lazy) and the Black body qua referent. These fantasies also function as barriers
that prohibit the recognition of the humanity of (non-white) Others. Whites thereby
refuse to see their own practices as fundamentally immoral and misanthropic. My use of
ideology exposure is predicated upon a certain modality of suspicion regarding
something (in this case, whiteness) that re-presents itself as “true”/“real” when in fact it is
false/unreal. On this score, whiteness is understood as an idol, an imposter of
universality, moral purity, and natural superiority, that demands demystification not only
for non-whites, but for the sake of the existential integrity of whites. I understand the use
of exposure to be a form of philosophical and political intervention into the structure of
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whiteness. Each site of exposure points toward the hope of existential conversion
regarding the values of whiteness.
This dissertation, then, involves the critical analysis of four themes, all of which
are integrally related. First, I will explore the structure of whiteness as the transcendental
signified and interrogate this structure and thereby expose whiteness as a historically
constructed value-creating power that assumes the role of speaking as the oracle voice, as
if it is the one and only universal voice. It is not enough to show that whiteness is a false
universal that masquerades as a “true universal,” it is also important to expose how
whiteness came to construct itself as universal. As stated, however, whiteness as the
transcendental signified is inextricably linked, in this case, to the ways in which the Black
body becomes “Othered” and is demonized. Hence, I will explore the emergence of white
supremacy within the context of the emergence of European modernity and Europe’s
expansionist hegemony. It is “European expansionism in its various forms –
expropriation, slavery, colonialism, settlement – [that] brings race into existence as a
global social reality, with the single most important conceptual division historically being
that between ‘whites’ and ‘nonwhites.’”88 While Mills does not mention gender or class
within this context, and it is not clear that he needs to given the historically pervasive
Manichean (white-Black) divide resulting from European expansionism, it is still
important to note their significance as powerful vectors of social ordering and oppression.
Within the context of European expansionism, Mills notes:

Those termed white have generally had a civil, moral, and juridical
standing that has lifted them above the other “races.” They have been the
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expropriators; others have been the expropriated. They have been the slave
owners; others have been the slaves. They have been the colonizers; others
have been the colonized. They have been the settlers; others have been the
displaced. So one gets a formal ontological partitioning in the population
of the planet, signified by “race.”89

Second, I will expose the structure of the white gaze in terms of how it is linked to
the raced structuration of the visual field and the raced codification of the visualized
Other. This requires exposing the dynamics of “seeing” the Other as “Othered,”
particularly in terms of how this form of “seeing” is structured through a white racist
episteme, one that has deep implications for the development of “sciences” that are laden
with xenophobic and misanthropic norms of categorization. In other words, I will expose
how the white gaze is constituted through the medium of white power and serves the
maintenance of white power, how the white gaze “sees” differences along a hierarchical
chain of Being, thus perpetuating the myth/idol of Western supremacy and further
cementing the illusion that whites are “superior” to nonwhites because whites possess a
trans-historical essence that grounds their “superiority.”
The third theme involves an examination of the phenomenological return of the
Black body. It is one thing to admit that the Black body has been oppressed, enslaved. It
is quite another to provide an analysis of the profoundly distorted phenomenological
effects upon the lived Black body. My objective is to expose how the Black body
undergoes a process of ontological calcification, as it were, into that which is deemed
inferior, ugly, savage, and lascivious. The Black body vis-à-vis the white gaze undergoes
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a historical process of becoming, revealing itself through various transformations in the
phenomenological mode of appearing perverse, uncivilized, and dirty. It is precisely this
phenomenological return of the Black body, the fact that Blacks undergo a process of
epistemic violence, not only in terms of how they become “known” by whites, but
through the internalization of white myths and fictions, that helps to serve the function of
white nation building and world-making.
The fact that the body, in this case, the Black body, is capable of undergoing a
socio-historical process of “phenomenological return” vis-à-vis whiteness, speaks to how
I understand and theorize the body. Moreover, how I conceptually anchor my
understanding of the body demonstrates the reality that the Black body is capable of
negating/opposing/resisting a distorted phenomenological return and reclaiming and reperforming its being-in-the-world in ways that re-signify its meaning, that places it within
reach and within range of a counter-episteme that reads against the semiosis of whiteness.
On this score, the meaning of the body is not that which is “given” trans-historically. As
Foucault says, the body does not escape the sway of history, and hence there is the need
to “expose a body [the Black body] imprinted by history….”90
The body’s meaning, its ontology, its modalities of aesthetic performance, its
comportment, is in constant contestation. The hermeneutics of the body, how it is
understood, how it is “seen,” its “truth,” is partly the result of a profound historical,
ideological construction. “The body” is positioned by historical practices and discourses.
The body is codified as this or that in terms of meanings that are sanctioned, scripted, and
constituted through processes of negotiation that are embedded within and serve various
ideological interests that are grounded within further power-laden social processes. The
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historical plasticity of the body, the fact that it is a site of contested meanings, and that it
can undergo what I am referring to as a “phenomenological return,” speaks to the
historicity of its “being” as lived and meant within the interstices of social semiotics.
Hence: a) the body is less of a thing/a being than a shifting/changing historical meaning
that is subject to cultural configuration/reconfiguration. The point here is to interrogate
the “Black body” as a “fixed and material truth” which pre-exists “its relations with the
world and with others”91; b) the body’s meaning is fundamentally symbolic.92 The body’s
meaning is congealed through symbolic repetition and iteration that emits certain signs
and presupposes certain norms; and, c) the body is, as stated, a battlefield, one that is
fought over again and again across particular historical moments. “In other words, the
concept of the body provides only the illusion of self-evidence, facticity, “thereness” for
something fundamentally ephemeral, imaginary, something made in the image of
particular social groups.”93 On this score, it is not only the “Black body” that defies the
ontic fixity projected upon it through the white gaze, and, hence, through the episteme of
whiteness, but the white body is also fundamentally symbolic, requiring demystification
of its status as norm, the paragon of beauty, order, innocence, purity, restraint, and
nobility. In other words, given the three suppositions above, both the “Black body” and
the “white body” lend themselves to processes of interpretive fracture, and to strategies of
interrogating and removing the veneer of their alleged objectivity.
Given the above, this dissertation would be incomplete without a consideration of
how Black bodies have resisted the distorted ways in which they have undergone
processes of phenomenological return vis-à-vis the systemic practices of whiteness
prevalent within the context of an anti-Black world. It is here that one might ask,
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“Resistance in the name of what?” Hence, the fourth theme is to theorize a conception of
Black resistance that is linked to issues of counter-identity formation, ways in which
Blacks have historically resisted white performances that help to generate the distorted
phenomenological return of the Black body, a body which is actually the return of the
white same. My aim is to explore ways of reclaiming the Black body along a
philosophical route that avoids the specter of essentialism, and, yet, is able to lay claim to
a conception of Black identity, and Black embodiedness. Of course, given the parasitic
formation of white identity in terms its construction of Blackness, I will also suggest
ways of reclaiming the “white body” that avoid certain strains within the area of critical
whiteness studies, namely, the race traitor advocates.
This dissertation makes significant incursions into the abstract domain of
philosophical practices. Undertaking this project in the field of philosophy precisely
theorizes against the grain that the sine qua non of philosophical analysis is to “abstract
away from history and social process to get at ostensibly necessary and universal truths
about people qua people, the deep eternalities of the human condition.”94 This project
does speak to/about the human condition, but it is grounded in critical inquiry, which, by
its very nature, is fallible. There is no attempt to discern abstract truths or eternal verities
regarding whiteness or the phenomenological return of the Black body. The philosophical
examination of whiteness and the Black body places me squarely within the domain of
social ontology, a form of ontology that does not move (or pretend to move) beyond the
existential.
When dealing with the messiness of race, I imagine that many philosophers would
rather relegate it to the confines of sociology, biology, anthropology, and history. After
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all, Western philosophy concerns itself with the most general truths95 about the human
condition, truths that transcend the murkiness of race, racism, and embodiment. I agree
with Mills that abstraction is not in and of itself to be avoided. The point here is to avoid
the idealizing of abstraction that abstracts itself from important determinants.96 So many
times I have taken courses or sat in on courses in Western philosophy, with its usual
cadre of white male representatives, and there is absolutely no mention by the professors
of how race/racism (misogyny and class) structured the views of the so-called major
philosophers. What is so difficult about saying, “Yes, Kant was a racist and that the
various instantiations of his Categorical Imperative would have proven problematic in
their application to Blacks, particularly given Kant’s understanding of Africans”? But
even when the taboo of rendering philosophy concrete is momentarily lifted, revealing its
bad faith regarding its racist history, this is done in such a way that Western philosophy’s
racism is treated as an incidental, extrinsic feature that can be excised from what are
otherwise brilliant philosophical insights that are untainted with such mundane and
quotidian matters as race/racism. It is important that white philosophers radically critique
their “uncomplicated” raced bodies and the raced corpus of Western philosophical
discourse. Making important incursions into the whiteness of philosophy through the
process of demanding important meta-philosophical questions, philosopher Anna
Stubblefield notes:

Many [nonwhite philosophers] struggle with feeling that they,
themselves—their bodies, their experiences, their worldviews—are at best
ignored and at worst seriously and harmfully misrepresented in what they
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have been taught as the philosophical tradition. They have had to invest
their time and energy and self-definition (what does it mean to be a
philosopher?) in an intellectual history that fundamentally denies them full
standing and relegates their experiences to the margins of “particularity”
in contrast to the center of white “universality.” White philosophers, on
the other hand, can easily avoid ever having to think about their racial
identity in relation to their work. A white person in philosophy can be
considered a well-educated philosopher and one who has made important
contributions to the field without having to think even once about race,
without having to think of himself [herself] as raced.”97

It is also important to keep in mind that the concept of race evolves out of a sociohistorical and material set of conditions/forces that are inextricably linked to the West.
Mills:

Indeed, Westerners created race in the first place, by demarcating
themselves from other “races,” bringing into existence a world with two
poles, so it is doubly ironic that they should feign a hands-washing
ignorance of these realities. Once the sociality and historicity of the term
is recognized, the claim that philosophy, along with less lofty varieties of
intellectual labor, is going to be influenced by race should seem less
provocative and controversial. This claim does not imply any kind of
biological determinism; rather, it entails a pervasive social construction, a
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set of positions in a global structure, for which race will be an assigned
category that influences the socialization one receives, the life-world in
which one moves, the experiences one has, the worldview one develops—
in short, in an eminently recognizable and philosophically respectable
phrase, one’s being and consciousness.”98

Value and Unique Contribution of Project
In the 1990s, white scholars such as David Roediger, Ruth Frankenberg, Richard Dyer,
and Peggy McIntosh published seminal works that influenced the critical study of
whiteness, challenging other white scholars to examine ways in which whiteness remains
unmarked and silent, and, thereby, formative and powerful.99 The objective was to render
whiteness visible, a project that Black thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Ralph Ellison,
James Baldwin, bell hooks, and Toni Morrison had already long begun. While many
white scholars have made remarkable and insightful contributions toward the end of
rendering whiteness visible, it is of great value that Black scholars, like myself, help keep
whiteness studies theorists honest through the process of revealing the existential cost of
whiteness to Black lives. It is very easy for whiteness studies theorists to occupy safe
spaces within the academy as sites for theoretical discourse regarding the socio-historical
problematicity of whiteness. On this reading, various disciplinary approaches to
whiteness might be said to seize upon critical whiteness discourse as a means to repress
collective guilt given their historical lack of concern and silence vis-à-vis white racism.
For many whites, critiquing whiteness at the level of the theoretical may result in
psychological and “moral” dividends, but fail to provide the necessary initiative and
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courage (on the part of whites) needed to bring about substantial systemic socio-political
change. Of course, in the end, a Black and white critical discourse regarding whiteness is
necessary. In this way, a shared and honest critical discourse regarding whiteness may
evolve, a critical discourse that is capable of prolongation in the face of moments of
mutual misunderstanding, exaggeration, defensiveness, denial, and myopia.
Although I draw from the work of critical whiteness theorists, particularly in
terms of rendering whiteness as seen, I remain focused dialectically upon the impact of
whiteness on the Black body/existence in Black. Hence, within this project, by means of
ideology exposure, not only do I expose some of the ways in which whiteness operates as
a site of invisibility, but I also focus on what I term the “phenomenological return” of the
Black body. It is one thing for critical whiteness theorists to become cognizant of their
whiteness as norm; it is another for Blacks to do so. This speaks to the interplay between
my standpoint approach and ideology exposure. As a Black male who has experienced
the invisibility “tactics” of whites, indeed, experienced what it means to be a “victim” of
such “tactics,” my standpoint epistemological framework provides a way of offsetting
white ways of being normative.
The critical gaze that I cast upon whiteness does not dehumanize white people. As
an embodied Black person, it is an assertion of my subjectivity, a form of subjectivity
that has been historically denied by whites, not a form of subjectivity that deems itself
absolute and normative or takes the form of a racist superimposition. Whites are the
carriers of the norm. I am the victim of the norm. Whites “see” me through the norm;
whereas, I see whites through the norm’s impact upon me. Think here of how many
women experience having been sexually objectified by men. And then think of how many
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men do not think of their sexual enactments as forms of “objectification,” but as normal
ways of interacting with women. As “objects” of the norm, women are able to speak
truth/knowledge to male normative power, to provide more complete accounts of the
implications of such power in ways that many men, because of having been shaped by
institutional male performative roles, are unaware. Males have very little reason to be
motivated to understand the negative impact of their positions of power on women. Also,
the majority of whites have very little reason to thematize and call into question the
norms that privilege them and thereby marginalize non-whites. As whiteness theorist
Ruth Frankenberg maintains, “Whiteness, as a set of normative cultural practices, is
visible most clearly to those it definitely excludes and those to whom it does violence.
Those who are securely housed within its borders usually do not examine it.”100 Hence,
whites’ understanding of themselves will be significantly distorted; whereas, as a Black
person, I am invested in exposing and critiquing whiteness, and disrupting the status quo
of white normativity and power. Hence, the place from which I gaze upon whiteness, my
standpoint, empowers my efforts and insights toward a more complete form of exposing
and understanding whiteness.101
The unique contribution of this dissertation is that the full range of the following
themes as they relate to whiteness has not been undertaken within a single project. These
themes are: a) exposing whiteness as the transcendental signified, b) exposing the white
gaze vis-à-vis a white episteme, c) providing and extending, within the philosophical and
psychological framework of Fanon, a descriptive account of the deformation of the Black
body, d) examining Black resistance to whiteness102 and e) theorizing the process of
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existential conversion as a means through which whites can re-narrate their identities in
ways which belie whiteness as an absolute value/meta-narrative.
Many professional white philosophers have only relatively recently begun to
explore whiteness, to name it, to critique it, to disrupt it. And out of these philosophers,
the majority have been white feminist philosophers. Although Black philosophers have
been incredibly forthright and diligent in carving out critical discursive spaces within
philosophy and academia, more generally, regarding the importance of giving
philosophical attention to the concept of race, my edited volume, What White Looks Like:
African-American Philosophers on the Whiteness Question (2004), is the first anthology
that contains a critical collection of philosophical essays on whiteness written by Black
philosophers. Moreover, my recently published anthology, White on White/Black on
Black (2005), is the first to call upon white and Black philosophers to explore what it
means to be white/Black, respectively, within the same volume. This dissertation is
consistent with my intellectual commitment to at least one major goal in the field of
African-American philosophy or Africana thought, that is, to deploy theory in the service
of struggle and liberation. Given the pervasiveness of white supremacy, the relevance of
this dissertation reaches far beyond the disciplinary confines of philosophy. Whiteness
matters because it speaks to how certain (white or nonwhite) bodies will generally
undergo certain experiences, how they will be generally differentially positioned within
the polity, and how one’s being and consciousness will be more or less predictably
shaped.
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Outline of Chapters
In chapter two, I draw from a number of critical whiteness theorists and from my use of
ideology exposure to demystify whiteness. My aim is to delineate various quotidian
examples of how the power of whiteness is predicated upon a normative structure and to
demonstrate the instability of this normative structure. Part of the use of the term
exposure has to do with showing the limitations of something that takes itself to be
universal. This process of exposing/uncovering (showing the limits of) that which is
passed off as universal/normative is a common link shared by ideology exposure and
critical whiteness studies. Both are attendant to particular value-codes (whiteness within
this context) that presume to detach themselves from their historicity and contingent
character.
In chapter three, I will pull from the work of three significant theorists of colonial
oppression—Aimé Césaire, Frantz Fanon, and Albert Memmi—who have insightfully
theorized white colonial spaces.103 It is my contention that white colonial spaces do
indeed attempt to produce, sustain, and defend new forms of “knowledge” regarding what
is normative, and, thereby, attempt to script the colonized as a “natural” category. The
work of these theorists will explicate whiteness in terms of its generative and productive
racial economy, an economy that is not only driven by whiteness as the transcendental
signified, but an economy that has profound negative implications for both the colonized
and the colonizer. In critical whiteness literature, there is a significant lacuna as few
critical whiteness studies theorists draw from the work of Césaire, Fanon, and Memmi.
However, these three theorists provide theoretical insights that can be marshaled both in
the service of a descriptive account of whiteness qua colonial power and with regard to
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the dismantlement of whiteness as a site of “universality” by exposing just how whiteness
is predicated upon specific colonial interests and values (material, political, cultural) that
are served through the dialectical reconfiguration of Blackness, the native, the colonized
as animal-like, inferior, and bestial. My aim here is to fill this lacuna by drawing from
their work to expose the socio-ontological construction of the colonizer/colonized. I will
also note how non-white women were constructed within the white male colonial
imaginary. Specifically, I give attention to the French male (white) colonial gaze vis-à-vis
Sarah Bartmann, the so-called Hottentot Venus. The aim of this chapter is to expose
colonialism as structured along a Manichean divide and how this divide juxtaposes the
embodiment of the colonized vis-à-vis the colonizer. After all, it is this colonial,
epistemological, and socio-ontological productive space within which the “raced”
deformation of Sarah Bartmann’s body takes place. Again, central here is how the Black
body gets returned.
In chapter four, I analyze the production of the Black body and its
phenomenological return as this theme is either alluded to or explicitly examined in the
work Frantz Fanon, Ralph Ellison, Malcolm X, and W.E.B. Du Bois. In exploring the
phenomenological return of the Black body, I also show how Du Bois’ notion of double
consciousness is a species of the existential and phenomenological instantiation of the
negative return of the Black body. I will also provide an exploration of Du Bois’
understanding of the structure of whiteness as he develops this in his pivotal essay, “The
Souls of White Folk” (1920). Although critical whiteness studies theorists draw from Du
Bois’ use of the concept of double consciousness and his notion of whiteness as a
psychological wage, his essay on whiteness has been overlooked. Du Bois’ essay
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provides another critical hermeneutic lens through which to understand whiteness as the
transcendental signified, and, hence, understand the powerful dynamics manifested
within the phenomenon of double consciousness. Du Bois is aware of the devastating
consequences (upon Blacks and whites) that result when whiteness as the apex of
humanity is lived within the social space of human transaction. He notes, “This
assumption that of all the hues of God whiteness alone is inherently and obviously better
than brownness or tan leads to curious acts.”104 It is these “curious acts,” for example,
where Blackness is constructed as evil and whiteness is constructed as good, which
negatively impact the Black body/self. Indeed, Du Bois’ understanding of double
consciousness, as a form of pathology, does not make sense outside of the “racial”
performance of these “curious acts.”
In chapter five, I will explore how Black people have resisted the distorted and
distorting projections of the white imaginary and re-narrated their body/selves through
the embodiment of rich existential and cultural practices that they themselves have forged
out of a larger matrix of historical struggle. My point here is that the white gaze, though
undeniably pervasive in its pernicious and violent performative impact on Black people,
is not immune to processes of critical intervention. Indeed, as argued above, it is
precisely given how I conceptually anchor my understanding of the body that
demonstrates the reality that the Black body is capable of resisting and transcending its
distorted phenomenological return.
Chapters six and seven reflect the themes that structure the dissertation as a
whole: a) exposing whiteness, b) exposing the white gaze, c) exposing the dynamics
involved in the phenomenological return of the Black body, and d) exploring the theme
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of Black resistance. My objective is to examine two texts, one non-fiction and the other
fiction, treating them as case examples, as a means for illustrating the above four themes.
The texts are very provocative forms of African-American literature that provide insights
into the existential phenomenological dynamics of the white/Black Manichean divide.
Hence, in chapter six, I draw from two of Frederick Douglass’s three socio-politically
and existentially rich autobiographical narratives, gleaning insights regarding whiteness
and the deformation of the Black body. Drawing from the work of Simone de Beauvoir,
who was greatly influenced by the phenomenological and politico-praxic work of Black
novelist Richard Wright, it is argued that Douglass disrupts the power/knowledge regime
of white American slavery through the exercise of his existential reality in the form of
agential transcendence. Within this chapter, I will delineate what Beauvoir terms in The
Ethics of Ambiguity “the serious man.” Whiteness is fundamentally predicated upon the
construction of a “serious world,” one that enables whiteness to sustain itself as an
unconditioned state of being. On this score, acts of performing whiteness are interpreted
as forms of flight from agency.
In chapter seven, I will explore and expound upon the exposure of the
psychological deformation of the fictional character Pecola Breedlove in Toni Morrison’s
The Bluest Eye. I argue that Du Bois’ use of double-consciousness is indispensable for
understanding Pecola’s psychopathology. Pecola is one of the most tragic figures in
African-American fictional literature. Pecola is the quintessential product of the white
gaze and white hegemony. Indeed, her psyche, through the dynamic process of epistemic
violence, will be shown to bear the devastating consequences that stem from the
power/knowledge regime of whiteness. The Bluest Eye, however, does not restrict itself
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to exposing Pecola Breedlove’s psychological fissure vis-à-vis the social and aesthetic
performance of whiteness as the transcendental signified. Morrison is keenly aware of the
complex relational reality of identity. Hence, the pathology of double consciousness
from which Pecola suffers is also shown to be linked to her parents, both of whom not
only bear the psychological scars of whiteness-induced self-hatred, but function as
conduits through which the powerful norms of whiteness get performed. Pecola’s
immediate community also forms a powerful social matrix within which to understand
her fractured identity. Although in The Bluest Eye Morrison implicitly acknowledges the
function of the blues as a mode of resistance, I will explicitly elaborate upon the character
Claudia McTeer’s disruption of the impact of whiteness through the power of a blues
ontology.
Given the dialectic between whiteness and Blackness, or the distorted Black body
vis-à-vis the white gaze, and the distorted white body vis-à-vis the white gaze, in chapter
eight I explore how whites might live their phenotypic white bodies in ways that are not
structured through white racist hegemony. I will draw upon Simone de Beauvoir’s
concept of existential conversion as an important approach for whites in their struggle
toward anti-white racist forms of whitely being-in-the-world.
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Chapter II
Whiteness: “Unseen” Things Seen
In our usual ways of thinking about this, whiteness is something you don’t have to
think about. It is just there. It is a naturalized state of being. It is “normal.”
Anything else is “other.” It is the there that is never there. But, it is there, for in
repositioning ourselves to see the world as constituted out of relations of power
and privilege, whiteness as privilege plays a crucial role.
—Michael W. Apple
It is hypocritical to espouse the importance of race theories on the one hand and
then turn a blind eye to the daily, personal interactions that center on racial
dynamics on the other.
—Frances V. Rains

Philosophy is not simply born of the mind, but born of the body. This heretical claim—at
least judged to be so from some philosophical orientations—shapes my philosophical
embarkation vis-à-vis an analysis of whiteness as a fundamental process of racialization.
Since my project revolves around race as an embodied experiential phenomenon, as that
which gets produced and performed within the social interstices of quotidian life, it is
important that my philosophical discourse on race is not abstracted from the everyday
world of how people are “raced” within the context of various social transactions. It is not
my contention, however, that this is the only approach in terms of which to make sense of
race.
There has been a great deal of important work that argues that race is semantically
empty, ontologically bankrupt, and scientifically meaningless. In short, there are many
philosophers who argue that race is an illusion, that there is no factual support for a racial
taxonomy.1 Since race has no referent and does not cut at the joints of reality, so to speak,
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it is said to be a fiction. From this, we are advised to abandon the concept of race2 just as
the concepts of phlogiston and spontaneous generation were abandoned.3 On this score, a
physicalist view of race would logically lead to the acceptance of eliminativism. “The
eliminativist argues that races do not exist, either because they fail to be objective or
because they’ve been falsely posited by hopeless theories of human difference.”4 The
problem with this, however, is that the phenomenological or lived intelligibility and
reality of “race” exceed what is deemed “real” within the framework of a physicalist
ontology. Indeed, one can reject the concept of race from a physicalist perspective, and
yet engage in various forms of social performance that are racist. In order words, one can
live/embody the fiction of race in such a way that generates real effects in the real world.
It is also important to note that to believe that there is no more to be said about race
because it is impossible to reduce it to a naturally occurring object in the spatiotemporal
world is to engage in a form of disciplinary hegemony. As African-American philosopher
John McClendon notes, “Being in nature does not limit the boundaries of reality.”5 In
stream with McClendon, Afro-Caribbean philosopher Clevis Headley points out that it
should not be taken lightly that “‘Whiteness’ does not name a real essence precisely
because it is not a natural kind . . . . At the same time, we should also not be seduced into
a dogmatic realist treatment of ‘whiteness’ as an empty and meaningless semantic term.”6
To engage the issue of whiteness as a process of racialization is not to fall into a
problematic and unwanted essentialism. The fact is that whiteness continues to exist
within the socially and existentially lived sphere of our experiences. On this score, I
reject the following disjunction: “either race is biologically real or it is non-existent.” On
my view, race is neither biologically real nor is it “non-existent.” A physicalist ontology
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does not exhaust all the ways in which we talk about the being/reality of things.7 The
“reality” of race, then, though not a natural kind, is purchased within the framework of a
social ontology that recognizes the very serious persistence and implications of race
beyond its ontic vacuity. In short, the persistence of race does not have anything to do
with its “ontic” reality or its “biologistic” basis. Let X represent race. On this score, “X
need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not
determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.”8 “Race,” in other words, is a
social category, but the real bodily-cum-material-institutional-symbolic effects of race
are profoundly devastating to which the history of racism attests. In order to sustain the
effects of race as “a real social kind at some site . . . [there] has to be present . . . social
forces—labels, institutions, individual intentions, laws, mores, values, traditions—
combined in a dynamic with enough strength to give the category presence and impact at
that site.”9
On this score, whiteness is not a metaphysical substantive; it is a relationally lived
phenomenon. This is why I emphasize the importance of narrative vis-à-vis “race.”
Narrative is important because of its powerful capacity to communicate lived and
imaginative dimensions of reality. This approach advances the importance of narrative as
a dynamic structure through which we weave and reweave the particulars of lived
experience into philosophical discourse without losing either imaginative power or
theoretical rigor.10 Narrative captures the crucible of whiteness qua race beyond mere
abstract reflection. One’s feet must be planted firmly on the ground in order to see the
“unseen” of whiteness. It is not enough that the concept of race is shown to be false or
ontologically bankrupt at the reflective level. Even if science provided an exhaustive list
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of reasons why we should abandon race-talk and how race is a fiction, this need not
impact the everyday performance of that fiction. In my experience, whiteness is often
enacted directly before our eyes. However, if one is seduced by philosophical abstraction
alone vis-à-vis race, one might become, like Thales of Miletus,11 the object of a
housemaid’s scornful laughter or even worse the object of white desire, control, fear, or
hatred.
At a recent American Philosophical Association (APA) conference, I had the
misfortune of living through an experience where the normative status of whiteness was
communicated in the form of “advice.” While standing alone at the conference, waiting
between sessions, a well-respected white philosopher whom I admire caught sight of me
and decided to approach in order to congratulate me on a new book that I had recently
edited.12 I had contributed a chapter detailing aspects of what/who influenced my coming
to the field of philosophy. Within the chapter, I consciously decided to use AfricanAmerican vernacular speech. Had I not drawn from this mode of speech, I would not only
have failed to capture the reality of my lived linguistic mode of being-in-the-world, but I
would have also failed to honor this speech as a viable mode of communication that was
indispensable as a vehicle for capturing what it was like to be raised in the urban ghettoes
of North Philadelphia. The white philosopher noted how much he had not known about
my life and how he really enjoyed reading the chapter. But the rub came when he added:
“I really enjoyed it, but why did you use that language [meaning African American
vernacular speech]? You speak very well [meaning in “Standard American English.] You
don’t have to use that language to make your point.”
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My sense is that his intentions were good. He no doubt thought that he was
providing me with helpful advice. There are, however, layers of white racialized meaning
within the context of this communicative encounter that need to be exposed. This points
to the larger issue of how whiteness gets performed everyday under the banner of “good
intentions.” Despite his own philosophical partiality to forms of anti-foundationalism, the
social and historical basis of knowledge production, and the acceptance of a form of
relativism that this entailed, he showed no recognition that he understood the political and
philosophical reasons for my choice of African-American vernacular speech as a
locutionary mode for making sense of my cultural reality. Hence, not only did he not see
the philosopher in me critically staking out the most effective exegetical means for
capturing a unique mode of lived reality, but he did not see the complexity of my identity
and how it was possible for me to inhabit joyfully a language-game that was historically
described as “baby-talk.” Given the close link between language and identity, in rejecting
my use of Black vernacular language, he rejected an important aspect of my identity.
Like the white woman in the elevator, he “saw” something that was phantasmatic.
He saw me as a burgeoning Black philosopher on the verge of sacrificing the linguistic
and intellectual gifts given to me by Anglo-American culture, gifts for which I ought to
be thankful. My use of that language was a clear indication that, at least from his
perspective, I had started down the dark side, that I had privileged such embarrassingly
sloven speech over “Standard” American philosophyspeak. I had sullied the English
language. Like Caliban, he was my Prospero. Like Crusoe, I was his Friday. I had dared
to speak my “native” tongue, providing him with the opportunity to remind me that patois
was unacceptable within the domain of the “civilized.” His gaze was directed at what

66
made him feel uncomfortable, perhaps taken aback. And yet, he also saw me through a
racialized socio-epistemic aperture that made him feel comfortable. For he immediately
disallowed the possibility of being challenged, of having his assumptions and
misconceptions corrected, by my philosophical position vis-à-vis language choice.13
Notice that he never said, “slang.” He said, “that language,” which suggested the sense in
which the use of Black vernacular speech offended him in some deep way, and ought to
have offended me. This, however, was not simply about language.
He proceeded with a story about how he was surprised when he heard a wellknown Black philosopher speak at a conference once. By the way, he even had the
audacity to provide the name of the philosopher with absolutely no concern with whether
or not I personally knew this philosopher, which, of course, I did. He noted how poorly,
how badly, this particular Black philosopher had spoken. One might argue that the white
philosopher was simply imposing his class values. While I grant that class was no doubt
operative, it was not sufficient to account for his remarks.
The message was clear and it spoke of race. The problem was not only that I had
used “broken” English to express myself, but it was an issue of him reminding me to
continue to distinguish myself, to make sure that I did not speak like one of my Black
colleagues. It was important that I continue to show the world that I wrote and spoke
“Standard” American English well. After all, he did say, “You speak very well.” In
saying this, I was actually being reduced to his fictive, one-dimensional notion of
“Blackness.” I was being reminded that for a Black, I spoke well. Hence, I was being
reduced to a distorted conception of Blackness, while simultaneously being insulted by
being removed from that general horde of Blacks who speak English so poorly. I was an
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exception, perhaps an anomaly. He not only invalidated my unique approach to writing
my philosophical autobiography, but he insulted other Blacks, essentializing them, by
making me an exception. In fact, I suspect that the subtext of his advice meant that I
should continue to speak like him and the majority of white male philosophers. As a
representative of that “elite” group, he was there to encourage and secure their
intellectual assets, to reinforce their “dispassionate” authority in matters of style, to
engage in surveillance to ensure that the white mask that I was expected to wear with
honor concealed my Black skin.14 His ex cathedra pronouncements settled the issue; his
was, after all, the white male oracle voice, the imperial self.
I was “too Black” in my speech and thereby speaking an ersatz form of English.
As Frantz Fanon observed, “Nothing is more astonishing than to hear a black man
express himself properly, for then in truth he is putting on the white world.”15 Fanon’s
observations suggest deeper relationships that may exist between the function of
language and a specifically racialized and racist philosophical anthropology: “The Negro
of the Antilles will be proportionately whiter—that is, he will come closer to being a real
human being—in direct ratio to his mastery of the French language.”16 In her concluding
reflective and insightful remarks regarding the implications of the white philosopher’s
reaction to my use of Black vernacular speech, African-American philosopher Janine
Jones notes:

Suppose Yancy, following the recommendation of the mysterious, white
professor, gave up AAL [African-American Language]: suppose he no
longer found it necessary to talk like that, even in speaking about his own
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life. What else is he suppose to give up, in addition to his language?
Certain ways of living, I imagine. And should he give them up, where will
he then belong? Would he be able to go home? Would his homies
recognize him? . . . . Would the academy become his new home, its
stewards his new fathers? Would they truly recognize him as one of their
own, or would he become their Nigger Son, who no longer possessed the
power to express his own life for having freely chosen to extricate his
tongue from its roots? Mastery of language may afford remarkable power.
But it should never be forgotten that what we have here is no more than a
necessary condition for attaining some (un)certain degree of power within
a world, within an institution where origins of species do matter.17

Asian-American psychologist Derald Wing Sue recalls having experienced what
he terms “micro-invalidations and micro-aggressions”18 committed by whites. He had
this experience while riding in a cab in Washington, D.C. After some preliminary casual
conversation about boxing, the cabdriver said, “You know, you speak excellent
English—no accent at all.”19 Sue views the cabdriver’s statement as a reminder that he is
an alien in his own country. He maintains that the cabdriver’s assumption was that “only
White people speak good English.”20 Raka Shome, whose native tongue is Bengali,
remembers when she was being taught “Standard” British English. She relates the entire
experience of learning to speak British English and learning English literature as a
process of being “caught up in an ‘always already’ desire for the West—and paying a
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terrible ideological price for having undergone colonialism. At the risk of making a
generalized statement, we were in many ways participating in our own Orientalizing.”21
In my own case, the white philosopher remained silent about his own identity as
white. And yet, his interaction with me served to constitute his whiteness. On this score,
his normative whiteness was expressed through his maintenance of the status quo
regarding “proper” English and how Black philosophers ought to obey basic grammatical
rules, particularly if they want to do “serious” philosophy and not be ostracized by
respectable white gatekeepers. His whiteness is there and yet not there through his
discursive interaction. “You speak English well” marginalizes my identity as Black vis-àvis his unquestioned (centered) white authority regarding his natural ability to speak
English (and perhaps other European languages) well. One might argue that his
assessment regarding how well I speak English functioned as an elliptical expression that
meant: “You speak English well, but just well enough.” On this interpretation, as I have
indicated, I speak English very well for a Black. Yet, as a Black, I speak English just well
enough. In short, I parrot really well, but I should not forget that I am Black and thereby
still under suspicion, always already perceived as a potential threat. So, I am both
encouraged to wear the mask of whiteness, but simultaneously reminded that I should not
take the mask too seriously. As Fanon writes, “When a Negro talks of Marx, the first
reaction is always the same: ‘We have brought you up to our level and now you turn
against your benefactors. Ingrates! Obviously nothing can be expected of you.’”22
Within the context of the “safe” space of a professional meeting of American
philosophers that space quickly became transformed/reconfigured into a threatening
space governed by white male normativity. At the APA, white bodies are thought to
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move and have their being in the midst of so-called neutral professional space. However,
“as constitutive of the lived space that surrounds the objects of interest in the world, one’s
[white] body is part of the horizon through which the disclosure”23 of my Black body as
problematic is made possible. But what remained unmarked—at least no doubt from his
perspective—was his “raced” body as white. The more he talked to me about my
problematic use of Black vernacular, the more he no doubt remained distant as the white
“raced” authority. One might say that he gets to “play in the dark” without the
recognition of how his own white identity is inextricably dependent upon (indeed
produced through) my Black body’s inability to achieve the privileged state of normative
“absence.”24 As Richard Dyer notes:

In the realm of categories, black is always marked as a colour (as the term
“coloured” egregiously acknowledges), and is always particularising;
whereas white is not anything really, not an identity, not a particularising
quality, because it is everything—white is no colour because it is all
colours. This property of whiteness, to be everything and nothing, is the
source of its representational power.

Within the context of the APA conference, I already felt marginalized in a sea of
white bodies, but here I was, with someone I knew, in a “benign” social transaction, or so
I thought, undergoing a dynamic process of being marginalized and dominated through a
ritual of white “praise.” Through the process of what Dreama Moon calls “Whitespeak,”
the white philosopher was able to engage in a form of dialogue that concealed that he was
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talking about race. The more he talked the more I felt different. The more he spoke from
the discursive center, the more I occupied the discursive margin. “Race is constituted
through the repetition of acts, verbal and nonverbal, that continue to communicate
difference.”25 Drawing from the work of Ruth Frankenberg and Adrienne Rich, Moon
explains white enculturation in terms of evasion of whiteness and white solipsism. Think
here of the white philosopher at the APA:

In the evasion of whiteness, whites experience a disconnection with issues
of race and, indeed, do not “see” . . . issues of race, racism, racial
formation, or the power relations surrounding race as related to their lives.
On the other hand, white solipsism configures the world as a white space
wherein “whiteness” is perceived as a normative and universal condition.26

However, as he continued to point out my racial blunder, suggesting that I had
egregiously “revealed my color,” his whiteness began to feel like an unwanted
imposition. So, this is what the professional field of philosophy had to offer: an unwanted
burden of white bodies determined, with procrustean and narcissistic vigor, to get me to
resign myself to those who failed to see me, to recognize my critical Black subjectivity,
to honor my philosophical perspective on the world. His whiteness became heavy laden
with the unacceptable and ridiculous presumption that bonding, at least philosophically,
with white philosophers meant—for me—some form of self-erasure. In that single
mundane encounter, he became “the master self . . . grasping at the confirmation of its
supremacy through defeating or imposing its existence on [non-white] others.”27 I think
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that it is important not to reduce his position vis-à-vis my use of that language to an
individual anomaly. Rather, it is important to theorize his whitely response within the
context of the larger normative values of American philosophy as a significant white
institutional force. In this way, the institution of American philosophy no longer appeared
to me as a site of play for multiple voices, particularly some of those Black voices28
replete with their unique inflections, tropes, verb deletions, and so on. All I seemed to
hear was: “turn white or disappear.”29
I have found that within the world of academe, the evasion of whiteness and white
solipsism are enacted on a daily basis. Audrey Thomas, part of whose work is
importantly concerned with theorizing whiteness vis-à-vis pedagogy, observes, “In
educational research, a study of student-centered pedagogy in an all-white classroom is
likely to be regarded as ‘not about race,’ whereas a similar study of American Indian
students typically would be viewed as involving race.”30 I recall once having registered
for a graduate course in African American literature. My desire was not fueled simply by
an intellectual quest to familiarize myself with the African-American literary canon. My
aim was not simply to position those texts within the horizon of my own lived
experiences and assumptions. Rather, I desired to reflect upon how I was positioned by
those historical texts, how they spoke to me as I spoke to them. The class material and the
students proved to be very challenging and stimulating. There was only one Black female
student, and I was the only Black male. All of the other students, with the exception of
one woman from the Middle East, were white.
One day after discussing Frederick Douglass’s Narrative of the Life of Frederick
Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself, and Harriet Jacobs’ Incidents in the
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Life of a Slave Girl, I felt as if there were significant questions that needed to be raised.
On this particular day, the Black female student was absent. So, there I was challenging
whiteness within the “pristine” space of the academy that historically had been closed to
Blacks. “After I read these texts, I noticed how angry I became. I find that these texts
speak to me as a Black male. I feel angered by the behavior of whites in these texts,” I
announced. I went on to add: “I would like to know what the rest of you feel about the
white racist behavior of the whites in these texts. Do the texts speak to you as a white
person? Do you feel guilty? And how do you feel about the fact that your own whiteness
implicates you in a structural white power system from which you are able to gain so
many privileges? How do you understand your whiteness vis-à-vis the whites in the
texts?” After all, I had a deep visceral response to the various texts. Take Frederick
Douglass’s slave narrative, for example. Surely, I thought to myself, the white students
feel as enraged as I do by the white sadistic behavior of Covey or Mr. Plummer or the
hypocrisy of Mr. Auld? And how does a white person fail to pose counterfactually:
“What if I were Covey or Mr. Plummer?” I certainly posed, “What if I were Douglass?”
And surely Mr. Flint’s obsessive sexual drive to possess Harriet Jacobs would have
stimulated in the white students critical thoughts around the past and contemporary white
representations of Black women as overly-sexed, dark, exotic sexual objects.
In retrospect, I should have collapsed my questions into one succinct and effective
question. Nevertheless, after posing these questions, there was absolute silence in the
room. The silence appeared to last longer than it actually did. Some looked perplexed and
others looked thoughtful. However, no one ventured to speak. In a very helpful and
skillful pedagogical intervention, the white female professor broke the silence. After
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reflecting on this episode many times since, I would now say that she broke the silence of
white normativity; she disrupted the performance of whiteness as non-raced, and exposed
the sham of whiteness as “innocent” invisibility. She very effectively narrowed my
questions down to two. Asking if what she rearticulated was what I was saying, I agreed.
Again, however, no one spoke.
Having my questions rearticulated and re-asked from the perspective of a white
body apparently made no difference. The silence continued. The norm of whiteness
continued to resist exposure, avoiding its own particularization as a “raced” position.
The professor then dared say aloud that the emperor wore no clothes. She provided a very
thoughtful, short narrative about being born in the South. She specifically named her
raced location, disclosing that she was cognizant of her own whiteness as a site of power
and privilege. She then explained how she too felt angered by the whites in the text. It
was at this moment that one student broke in and attempted to address the questions, even
if only in a groping fashion. As the student spoke, one could sense that she appreciated
the questions that I had raised. No one else volunteered to respond, though one white
male student did say to me as the class ended: “George, I need to get back to you on this.
I have not given thought to this before.”
Since that time, I have often wondered what motivated the white students to take
that course. As they were mostly graduate students in the English Department, I assume
that they were not going to miss the opportunity to take what I believe was an
unprecedented course in the department’s history. Beyond this, however, what can be
theorized/exposed about how the students understood this course on Black literature visà-vis their own identities as white? They came to see, but not to be seen. Perhaps many of
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them conceptualized Black literature (indeed, all non-white literature) as an exotic site of
difference. My sense is that they came to learn about those dark Others, to get a taste of
what the “multicultural” had to offer. They had no idea that a course in African-American
literature would fundamentally speak to their whiteness as well; indeed, that it would call
into question their privileged status as “non-racialized” readers.
We did read Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark, but the white students did not
recognize how they too were “playing in the dark” while their whiteness remained
unfathomable, veiled, and curtained.31 There was no critical self-reflexivity with regard
to how they positioned themselves as white readers or how the ideology of whiteness
positioned them as “race-free.” In short, the classroom became an important site of/for
performing whiteness. Again, the presumably “benign”—in this case, the reading of
Black texts by white students—is exposed as revealing something far more dynamic and
extraordinary.
In retrospect, my sense is that the classroom was always already a social
formation shaped by the dynamics of whiteness to remain invisible through its normative
hegemony. As the white students read the various texts, which were highly charged with
racial and racist themes, they spoke not of themselves, but of the texts. Their selective
silences, whether conscious or unconscious, allowed them to talk about racism as it was
performed within the body of the texts without any attention paid to their own white
privilege, which, in this context, signified the very real power to “remove” themselves
from the complicity involved in maintaining the normative structure of whiteness. In this
case, what was not said was far more revealing than what was said.32 The “not said” held
the group behind a protective racial barrier, so to speak. From behind this barrier, the

76
white students’ mutually shared self-understanding, their shared interests, and their
understanding of what was/was not appropriate territory for interrogation, shaped the
classroom dynamics in a specifically racist fashion.33 This was not a mere symbolic show
of power. Their silence controlled the discursive direction of the class, privileged their
unquestioned authority to decide the exegetical angle from which to exhume the meaning
of the texts, and perhaps instilled levels of trepidation in the few non-white students who
may have thought any counter-discursive move might eventuate in some form of
unwanted backlash—perhaps being pegged a “hate monger.”
Not naming their whiteness, not identifying their whiteness, had the impact of
interpellating Blackness (as exemplified in the texts) as marked, as the “real” object of
their gaze. Their whiteness was left unmarked, thus effectively providing them with the
needed latitude to distance themselves from the white racists within the texts. They
continued to establish racialized meaning within the classroom through the (white)
communicative strategy of silence. Whiteness, as normative, legitimated their silence;
indeed, guaranteed their whiteness as absence. As John T. Warren argues:

The presence of the body of color and the fact that it cannot achieve
absence is exactly what maintains white privilege. It is exactly the
presence of “different” bodies that demands the hierarchy which places
whiteness invariably over color, for what could ensure the dominance of
whiteness more than the impossibility of the erasure of bodies of color?
Thus, the desire for bodily absence works to secure the maximum amount
of privilege for whiteness through the continual marking and disciplining
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of bodies of color—those bodies that are already outside the “normalized”
construct of the educational system.34

Refusing to be merely a marked and disciplined body of color, the essentialized
Other according to which whites dialectically secure and establish their “unmarked”
identities, I took the risk and named their whiteness. By doing so, I not only “marked”
my own body as resistant, but I attempted to disrupt their strategy to remain absent. In
effect, they became “colored.” It was as if my line of interrogation forced them to
experience their whiteness as raciated, as denaturalized, in ways that they had not
previously experienced. I wanted to communicate to them that they were not unseen, but
seen. They were specifically seen from an embodied Black subjectivity.35 My guess is
that in that moment they felt uncomfortably exposed, perhaps they even felt a sense of
amazement. However, as bell hooks notes, “[Whites’] amazement that black people
watch white people with a critical ‘ethnographic’ gaze, is itself an expression of
racism.”36
Given the historical racist practice of denying Black people a perspective on the
world, my action of “looking” was not only deemed a “transgression,” but an insult, an
act of “violence” for which years ago I could have been killed. In the eyes of many
whites, I was being the “impudent” Negro, too proud, too reactionary, and too militant. I
was a threat to the “collective unconscious” of the white body politic that shaped the
discourse through a collective act of policing things unsaid. As an act of securing
whiteness as invisible, whites silence, segregate, and de-legitimate “voices that speak
about whiteness from a nonwhite location.”37 As philosopher Crispin Sartwell notes,
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“Above all we [whites] can’t stand to be looked at, described, or made specific.”38
According to Alice McIntyre:

Whiteness is not a topic that is usually covered in college classrooms. One
of the concerns then becomes not knowledge enough about whiteness to
conduct an effective and educative class. In addition, talking about
whiteness with white students is not easy. It generates uncomfortable
silences, forms of resistance, degrees of hostility, and a host of other
responses that many of us would prefer to avoid.39

To allow whiteness the power to go unnamed is to reinforce its status as given, as
natural, as simply a site of being human. Moreover, whites often effectively engage in
power evasion and color evasion through the deployment of various discursive strategies
such as, “I don’t see color, I just see people,” or “After all, we are all human.” Through
such a strategy, “the stability of whiteness—as location of privilege, as culturally
normative space, and as standpoint—is secured and reproduced.”40 Within this context,
unnamed whiteness places the issue of racism outside the sphere of the everyday
experiences of white bodies. Non-raced white bodies are able to “soar free” of the messy
world of racism. “That is, in fact, what white self-construction is for, to float free of the
material, to forget the body, and to forget the body’s implication in . . . the machinery”41
of racialized and racist actions, privilege, and hegemony. This process of “forgetting the
body” has profound existential implications involving the theme of bad faith. On this
score, whites believe themselves able to inhabit a space that is not granted to those who
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are “trapped” in their bodies, who are nothing more than their bodies or pure facticity.
Whiteness is a site of “release ; it is the place where I can be relieved of my particularity,
where I can take pleasure in an a priori apparent purity.”42
Therefore, in the process of naming whiteness, it is important that whites
understand their role in normalizing whiteness and also understand how whiteness is a
site that is dutifully maintained.43 To say that whiteness is “dutifully maintained” is to
argue that whites engage in self-constructive efforts at maintaining their normative status.
This does not deny the extent to which white bodies are also positioned by an always
already larger white racist systemic power structure. Nevertheless, as subjects, we are
both subjects qua agents and yet we live our existential freedom in the modality of
situational reality or facticity. The latter, however, is what whiteness denies. Whiteness is
lived as pure mind. Blackness is lived as pure body. As African-American philosopher
Robert Birt argues:

Whiteness is the privilege of exclusive transcendence. But it can live as
such only through the denial of the transcendence of an Other, the
reduction of that Other to an object, to pure facticity. At least in America,
that Other has been primarily the black. Whiteness could not exist without
that Other. Whiteness is a parasitic identity.44

Hence, whiteness is not only a form of bad faith because it assumes the position of
exclusive transcendence, but, by implication, it is a form of bad faith because it denies
transcendence to Blacks.
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The white, in other words, flees not only some aspect of him/herself, but also
attempts to hide some truth from others. Through an elaborate ideology that sustains the
appearance of truth (that whites are pure transcendence), whites are not only able to
conceal what they know to be the truth about themselves (that they are located, invested
in their lived embodied situation as white), but they also attempt to convince Blacks of
the appearance of this truth. The lie that whites tell themselves has implications beyond
themselves. Indeed, as I will argue later in this project, the lie of whiteness is dialectically
embedded within the lie about “Blackness.” As Birt says, “But it should be noted too that
it was also themselves whom the whites were inventing in and through their invention of
the Negro.” 45
There is another way to understand the phenomenon of whites fleeing processes
of self-identifying as raced. Thandeka46 theorizes the refusal of whites to name
themselves white qua “raced” in terms of early childhood moments that involve
memories that are confusing and shameful, memories from which adult whites would
rather flee. My point here is that the phenomenon of whites fleeing self-ascription as
white qua “raced” is complex and can be interpreted at different levels of analysis.
Thandeka writes about her move to Massachusetts to teach at a local college. She
relates that after being there for several weeks, a wealthy white colleague, as they were
having lunch, asked her what it felt like to be Black. Thandeka says that she did not feel
offended by the question. She was, however, cognizant of the white woman’s
presumption (or denial) that there was nothing from her own experience that she could
pull from that would help her understand what it felt like to be Black. After all, as argued
above, whiteness is deemed a site that is non-raced. Implicit in the woman’s question
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was: “What does it feel like to be different, to be raced ?” Being white, after all, is simply
being human; it is to feel, to see, to be, like any other normal (white) person. Perhaps the
white woman had just read philosopher Thomas Nagel’s “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”
(Lest the reader think this comparison exaggerated, keep in mind that to be raced Black
was sufficient to be relegated to the status of a fundamentally different “kind” of animal.)
To be Black, to be raced, was just enough to convince the white woman that her alleged
non-raced experiences/identity/subjectivity prevented her from mapping her experiences
onto those of Thandeka’s.47 It was from this conversation that Thandeka created what she
calls appropriately the “Race Game.”
According to Thandeka, whites have adopted a racial lexicon that positions “their
own racial group [as] the great unsaid.”48 Her objective was to get the white woman “to
give voice to her whiteness as the racial unsaid in her life. By consciously referring to
this unvoiced color, she would become aware of what it feels like to take on and maintain
a racial identity in America.”49 The Race Game consisted of a single, but powerful rule:

For the next seven days, she [the white woman] must use the ascriptive
term white whenever she mentioned the name of one of her EuroAmerican cohorts. She must say, for instance, ‘my white husband, Phil,’
or ‘my white friend Julie,’ ‘my lovely white child Jackie.’ . . . I guaranteed
her that if she did this for a week and then met me for lunch, I could
answer her questions using terms she would understand.
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It was so incredibly easy for the white woman to use Black as a racial designator, but she
failed to use the term white to describe herself and her friends. Describing the
disappointing outcome, Thandeka notes, “We never had lunch together again. Apparently
my suggestion made her uncomfortable.”50
During a public lecture in which Thandeka described to whites in the audience
how others had refused to play the Race Game, a white woman in the audience threw
down the gauntlet and challenged the other whites in the audience, all of whom appeared
enthusiastic, to play the Race Game for the duration of the day. The participants were
asked to respond to Thandeka by mail. She notes:

A month later, I received my one and only letter from these enthusiasts—
sent by the Euro-American woman who had originally proffered the
challenge. She could not do it, she wrote apologetically, though she hoped
someday to have the courage to do so. Courage? Why courage? What had
I asked her to endure? What was she afraid of seeing? What didn’t she
want to feel? To glimpse? To know?51

Thandeka poses a set of challenging questions. Indeed, what is it that many whites
are afraid to see by identifying themselves in racial terms, specifically those whites who
do not self-identify as white supremacists? David Roediger is also aware of this process
of avoiding the use of racial terms to describe whiteness: “When residents of the US talk
about race, they too often talk only about African Americans, Native Americans,
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Hispanic Americans, and Asian Americans. If whites come into the discussion, it is only
because they have ‘attitudes’ towards nonwhites.”52
On my view, there are various reasons why whites would rather not admit that
they are white qua raced.53 One reason could involve the disavowal of any responsibility
in terms of how their whiteness positively positions them within the systemic workings of
white racism and white power. By avoiding whiteness as a raced term, whites effectively
distance themselves from whiteness as a governing ideology in the US. By avoiding
being raced as white, whites are able to maintain the illusion that they have always been
individuals, that they have always accomplished their achievements on the basis of
meritocracy. “White” as a racial descriptor inevitably brings in the body. This forces the
white to come to terms with his/her corporeality, thus relinquishing the view that
whiteness signifies a disembodied abstract mind, while the Black remains stuck at the
level of the body in the mode of facticity. Another problem with saying the unsaid is that,
as raced, whiteness becomes simply one more element in a system of differences as
opposed to the transcendental signified or that site from which “racial” differences are
established and identified. In this way, whiteness, which maintains its invisibility through
its normativity, becomes another marked Other, a space of specificity and particularity.
Also, naming their identity as white qua raced politicizes their identity in ways that
exposes it as deeply invested in its own survival. Whites would rather masquerade under
the rubric of “the non-racialized human” so as to live their identities in a de-politicized
fashion, as natural, as given. To attempt to do so, however, is to engage in profound
levels of bad faith. Also, by naming the unnamed site of whiteness, whites must come to
terms with how their racialized whiteness is predicated upon negation—as in, “I’m not
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Black.” By naming oneself as white qua raced unveils the mystery of whiteness as a fixed
metaphysical essence, reducing it to a socio-historical status whose power is not ahistorically given, but selfishly and brutally maintained through human practices. Hence,
the very process of naming functions to historicize whiteness and to dislodge it from
those values—beauty, truth, reason, goodness, civilization, humanity—that are deemed a
priori constitutive features of its being.
Thandeka forges a response to her own questions through psychodynamic insights
gleaned from asking “Euro-Americans about their earliest memory of incidents that
helped form their white racial identities.”54 She locates the psychodynamic problem of
avoidance vis-à-vis self-identifying as “racially” white at the incipiency of whites
actually learning to be white. Thandeka offered a series of formal and informal
invitations to Euro-Americans (across class, age, and religious affiliation) to discuss their
early narrative experiences around the process of white racialization. The following are
three examples:

Frank remembers putting a coin in his mouth when he was five. His
mother disgustedly told him not to put coins in his mouth because “niggers
keep them in their underwear.” Frank said he felt both confused and
wrong. He knew that he would have to be more careful about what he did
in the future.55

Mike, at age four or five, was walking down the street with his father and
uncle. They passed by an interracial couple. The man was black, the

85
woman white. Mike’s father and uncle began a series of critical statements
about the man and descriptions of the kind of woman his companion must
be. Mike remembers feeling uncertain and confused. He now knew that
there was a certain way he must act when he grew up, but he was unsure
what it was and whether he could do it.56

In high school, Jackie talked about one of her teachers so often as
someone who was playing a formative role in her education that her
parents encouraged her to invite him home for dinner. Jackie remembers
her mother’s flushed and astonished face when she opened the door and
discovered that the teacher was black. After he left, Jackie’s parents were
outraged that she had not told them of his race, making Jackie feel she had
done something wrong, that she had broken a rule that until that moment
she did not realize existed. She was sorry she had embarrassed her parents
and knew she must be careful not to embarrass them again in the future.57

Each narrative details how three phenotypic white adults, when they were
children, became white in terms of developing a racialized/racist consciousness through a
set of lived experiences. The process of becoming white, as is clearly implied, is not the
same as being phenotypically white, otherwise I would be committed to saying
something like: “The whites became white” or “all whites are white.” Like the
tautological proposition “All white horses are white horses,” there is nothing new being
communicated. Hence, to say that three phenotypic white children became “white”
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suggests the sense in which “becoming white” is an additional characterization to that
captured by reference to phenotypic markers alone. In a somewhat awkward expression,
they became whitely. “Being white-skinned (like being male),” as Frye argues, “is a
matter of physical traits presumed to be physically determined; being whitely (like being
masculine) I conceive as a deeply ingrained way of being in the world.”58 I would only
complicate Frye’s position by arguing that while being white-skinned is physically
determined, the materiality of one’s white-skin, within the context of pervasive
institutional white racism, is also constituted through social forces. As Warren argues:

I wish to account for both the material and the rhetorical understandings of
the body by acknowledging that the body is not accidental. It exists in the
form (color) because of a history of individual acts, informed by social
and cultural norms, that then produced bodies. In other words, the body is
a result of a repetition of acts—acts that are both discursive (through
reifying racial categories, the process of racial naming and identification,
and metaphorically embedded understandings of race) and reproductive
(through the implicit and explicit discursive constructions that dictated
who could mate with whom that then created the very skin color that
continues to mark one as white).59

In this sense, “if one is white, one is a member of a continuously and politically
constituted group that holds itself together by rituals of unity and exclusion.”60 Through
the above three experiences one is able to grasp the oppressive nature of the discursive
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and non-discursive modalities through which whiteness (or whiteliness) becomes a
deeply political, existentially lived, social category that shapes the subjectivities and
future racialist/racist practices of whites. On this score, whiteness is a way of performing
both one’s phenotypic white body and one’s subjectivity as structured through a specific
white racist epistemic orientation. Whiteness involves creating a boundary between the
(white) self and those “darkies” that elicit a flushed and astonished look on one’s
mother’s face; creating a distance from those who cause one’s parents to become
enraged; knowing the appropriate degrading discourse to use when describing
miscegenation; becoming aware of those dark and dangerous male bodies that sully the
purity of white women; and, keeping informed about the practices of those nasty
“niggers” who keep money in their underwear. The reader will note that this process of
becoming white has nothing to do with a genetic substratum, but everything to do with
what happens at the level of social constitutionality, how the human being comes to be
the white self that performs acts of white racism. It would be naive to say that the
children could have realistically exercised greater agential power, particularly in the case
of Frank and Mike. Of course, this does not mean that they are forever prisoners within a
white racist community of intelligibility. “Your [white] membership in it is,” as
philosopher Marilyn Frye notes, “in a way or to a degree, compulsory—nobody gave you
a choice in the matter—but it is contingent and, in the Aristotelian sense, accidental.”61
The reader will note that before becoming adults, each of the children achieved 62
their white identities/white racialized consciousness through a contrastive dynamic, a
dynamic that exposed them early on to a Manichean dualism that came replete with racist
value-codes of exclusion and inclusion. From the above examples, the ontology of
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whiteness is constituted through what it learns to detest about Blacks. The construction of
one’s white identity merely through negating, disliking, and hating the dark Other creates
an identity which is constantly on the precipice of undergoing complete ontological
evisceration. As David Roediger notes, “Whiteness . . . is the empty and therefore
terrifying attempt to build an identity based on what one isn’t and on whom one can hold
back.”63 Hence, for its own survival, whiteness needs the dark Other in the form of a
coon, a boy, nigger lips, big feet, erect penis, rapist, insatiable Black vagina, Black bitch,
welfare queen, you name it. In this way, whiteness is clearly understood as a reactive
value-creating power. But it is not the materiality of the dark body as such against which
whites form and perpetuate their identities. Rather, it is also the dark body as the
phantasmatic object of the white imaginary that regulates the production of the white self.
Before long, the authority and power of whiteness, through white ideological sleight of
hand, appears devoid of a beginning or an end. White reactionary values become human
values. The Western world becomes the destined site of greatness. Black male bodies
become equated with criminality. The dark body becomes the site of the uncivilized. The
act of lynching Black bodies becomes North America’s pastime. And soon whiteness as a
racial marker becomes the “great unsaid.”
While it is certainly plausible that Frank, Mike, and Jackie may have previously
had pre-reflective experiences of racism, indeed, may already have possessed an
unconscious repertoire of learned behaviors regarding how to behave differently around
socially sanctioned (“racially”) marked bodies, the important point is that each of the
adults had childhood memories that were saturated with significant racialized meaning.
At the moment of animating the Black body as something to be avoided, Thandeka
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argues that there is an associative core feeling of shame. It is this shame, according to
her, that prevents so many whites from playing the Race Game. To play the Race Game,
whites are forced to recall and expose “feelings that had to be set aside in order to stop
the racial attack against the child by members of its own white community.”64 Jackie, for
example, had no problem inviting her Black teacher to her home. However, to become
white she had to deny her legitimate feelings for her Black teacher, that is, she was forced
to engage in an unnecessary reevaluation of what felt natural to her, re-signify the
teacher’s Black body as something foreboding, and dismantle old relationships (possibly
with other Blacks besides her teacher) that no doubt felt right to her. To avoid being
ostracized from the community of white folk, and from parents who actually loved them,
these children had to become white. Patricia J. Williams notes, “Hate learned in a context
of love is a complicated phenomenon.”65 Furthermore, the feeling of shame does not start
and stop with the white individual:

[T]he Game succeeds in indicting their families and communities because
they were not-quite-good enough to raise a child as human rather than
white, this indictment simply makes the players feel worse. Because it
publicly exposes one’s experience of becoming white, the Game is
intolerable. It is, in a word, shameful because it reveals the differences
within the child that it had to deny in order to become congruent with its
own caretaking environment. This induction process of the EuroAmerican into whiteness is costly.66
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At this juncture, I will address how whites obfuscate their own racism through the
deployment of the “good white”/“bad white” dichotomy, and continue to address the not
so obvious ways in which whiteness is a site of privilege. I will draw from the insights of
critical whiteness theorists67 Alice McIntyre, Jessie Daniels, and Peggy McIntosh.
Returning to the classroom situation that I described earlier, I would argue that there was
perhaps a sense of collective “crisis” felt by the students around the possibility of
analyzing and theorizing their raced identities as white on a continuum with those clearly
racist whites in the texts. This “crisis” prevented the potential fruits that could have been
had from such an analysis. Of course, this does not deny that there are situations where
the experience of crisis leads to transformations that are productive. My sense is that the
white students understood Mr. Auld, Mr. Flint, Mr. Plummer, Covey, or Mrs. Hick, as
“ultra-racists.” The white students were able to distance themselves from these figures
through a process of juxtaposing the “good white” with the “bad white.” They saw
themselves as “good whites,” whites incapable of such acts of racial brutality. Through
this process of subterfuge, however, they failed to locate their own center of power, a
center that enabled them to make such a distinction without any recognition of their own
whiteness as a species of white racism. When whites take it upon themselves to define
what is and is not a racist act, is this not tied into the very power of whiteness? After all,
this is another way that whites exercise their power to render null and void the epistemic
and affective certainty in terms of which a Black person, for example, knows that he/she
has just been subjected to white racism. Living their whiteness as racially unmarked, it is
not difficult to understand many whites’ strategy to mute the claim that white racism is
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not simply limited to the KKK, Neo-Nazi Skinheads, White Aryan Resistance, various
instantiations of the so-call Christian Identity movement, and other white racist groups.
McIntyre uses a participatory action research (PAR)68 approach to explore how to
best get a small group of white female teachers to name their whiteness. Describing one
episode where one of the teachers manages to avoid facing her whiteness through the
deployment of the above dualistic way of thinking, McIntyre notes:

Faith’s struggle with whether or not she is a racist becomes embedded in
an all too common game that white people play with themselves. We
compare the various degrees of racism. On the other hand [sic.], the
participants conceptualize whites as rednecks, people with a Ku Klux Klan
mentality. On the other hand, the participants label some whites as more
open-minded and liberal, better educated, and trying to be ‘better’ people.
And then there are the whites who are somewhere in between those two
extremes. The participants vacillated about their own locations on this
artificially constructed continuum of racism.69

In the process of avoiding the implications of her whiteness, Faith attempts to shift
attention away from her whiteness by refocusing attention on the “extremism” of white
supremacy. The interesting point here, though, is that “throughout the history of the U.S.,
the ‘extremism’ of the far right has often converged with the cultural and political
center.”70
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Critical whiteness theorist Jessie Daniels, in her qualitative content analysis71 of
white supremacist discourse, also raises the issue of dualistic thinking as a means of
shifting the conversation away from the pervasive and systemic nature of white racism.
Discussing how this phenomenon functions within the framework of academia, she
writes:

By obfuscating the connections between white supremacist movements
and the white supremacist context in which they exist, traditional
paradigms “e-race” the central importance of being “white.” And, more to
the point, these interpretations leave unexamined – indeed, completely
irrelevant within such a framework – the privileged position of white
academics, or the ways white supremacy (with all the connections to class,
gender, and sexuality in place), are inscribed in academic institutions.72

Tracing the theme of the ways in which many whites attempt to derail a direct
analysis of the centrism of white racism, Daniels argues that nationally syndicated shows
tend to let many whites off the proverbial hook by portraying white racism as contained,
isolated, and marginal. What she says is worth quoting in full:

In a different milieu, nationally syndicated shows—such as “Donahue,”
“Geraldo,” “Oprah,” and “Sally”—offer an important lens for viewing
white supremacists because they provide millions of Americans with their
(perhaps only) knowledge of white supremacists. I contend that the format
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of talk shows frames racism, as it is expressed by white supremacists, so
as to make it appear contained, distant, and nonthreatening; and, the shows
in which white supremacists appear distance racism by marginalizing their
views in a variety of ways. First the producers of these shows marginalize
white supremacists by consistently referring to the groups as “hate
groups.” Shows featuring white supremacists appear with titles such as,
“I’m Proud to be a Racist,” “Young Hate Mongers,” “I’m Raising My
Kids to be Racists,” and “Hatemonger Moms.” Through rhetoric such as
“racist,” a label that only the most committed white supremacists utilize,
as well as, “hate” and “hatemonger,” terms even white supremacists do
not embrace, the shows signal audiences that the guests are members of a
lunatic fringe bearing not the slightest connection to the vast majority of
viewers. Talk-show audiences are alerted to tune in to “see what racists
are like.” Framing the appearance of white supremacists in this way
preempts any other interrogation of racism by the audience, the host, or
society at large.73

Note that it is not my position that the KKK, for example, attempts to conceal
their white racism. Indeed, they are not at all reticent about naming themselves and
announcing their white racist views. While white supremacy is a doctrine and those who
hold to this doctrine apparently do so intentionally, it is false to assume that just because
one is not a card-carrying member of the KKK that one is not a racist/engages in racist
actions. For example, think here again of the African-American literature class and the
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white philosopher at the APA conference. In both cases, there was a clear case of
investment in whitely ways of behaving, that is, performed rituals that were
communicated from a position of white normative power. Though he exhibited no signs
of white physical aggression, the white philosopher’s communicative performances were
no less crushing, no less directed at the/my Black body. As white, he had the privilege of
living his white body as an individual. Through my use of that language, however, I
became a stereotype, one of many of those Blacks who bastardize the English language
on a daily basis. In the case of the predominantly white classroom, whitely ways of being
in the world were covered over, rendered invisible vis-à-vis the white racists in the texts.
This process of “covering over” insured that the white students would continue to think
of themselves as authentic individuals who were incapable of engaging in such abhorrent
acts as those performed within the various texts.
This sense of authenticity, however, was purchased at the price of living in bad
faith. Were they to find themselves within the context of the Race Game, the students in
the classroom would probably have refused to identify themselves as raced white readers,
thus effectively establishing themselves as race-free, atomic elements within a power-free
space within which all voices were equally audible and all subjectivities equally
respected. As Beverly D. Tatum notes, “Because racism is so ingrained in the fabric of
American institutions, it is easily self-perpetuating. All that is required to maintain it is
business as usual.”74 To have read those texts without auto-critique, without thematizing
their own whiteness, the white students completely sidestepped the opportunity to
identify and call into question the inertial “business as usual” performance of racism. I
argue that there is no difference between their passivity with respect to their whitely ways
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of being-in-the-classroom, and situations where whites collude with other whites who
laugh “when a racist joke is told, . . . [who let] exclusionary hiring practices go
unchallenged, . . . [who accept] as appropriate the omissions of people of color from the
curriculum, and . . . [who avoid] difficult race-related issues.”75 In all these cases, having
internalized such white behavior as the norm, and therefore ethically “unproblematic,”
many whites remain silent. Living their whiteness as nugatory, because they are not like
the Klan or skinheads, many whites manage to remain invisible to the ways in which their
whiteness is translated into advantage and group solidarity. George Lipsitz warns against
the logic of the discourse of liberal individualism when it comes to critical discussions
regarding race:

As long as we define social life as the sum total of conscious and
deliberative individual activities, we will be able to discern as racist only
those individual manifestations of personal prejudice and hostility.
Systemic, collective, and coordinated group behavior consequently drops
out of sight. Collective exercises of power that relentlessly channel
rewards, resources, and opportunities from one group to another will not
appear “racist” from this perspective, because they rarely announce their
intention to discriminate against individuals. Yet they nonetheless give
racial identities their sinister social meaning by giving people from
different races vastly different chances.76
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This raises the issue of white privilege. Again, it is here that many whites operate under
the Horatio Alger myth. They see themselves as having achieved their status in society
independently of race. Their success is due to ingenuity, wise choices, or even good luck,
but not because throughout their lives they have been invested, even if unconsciously, in
whiteness. It is easy not to see how one is necessarily invested in something about which,
by its very structure, one is supposed to remain ignorant. On this score, whites develop a
form of immunity that enables them not to be “mindful of that from which one is exempt.
The complicity in racism that privilege provides remains nameless and unnoticed. The
responsibility that comes with the location and role of white privilege can be denied.”77
On my view, it is not necessary that whites intentionally invest in whiteness in
order to reap the benefits of being white. Indeed, as Tatum argues, “All White people,
intentionally or unintentionally, do benefit from racism.”78 Hence, whiteness is not just a
question of deliberative investments in whiteness, but has to do with how one is
positioned by a white racist social structure that provides one with certain privileges. This
does not deny the fact that whites are differentially invested in whiteness, or that there are
whites that engage in anti-racist forms of praxis, though, even in this case, they will
continue to benefit from being white independently of their good intentions. Furthermore,
this does not deny that white people are “privileged by racism while [they] are targeted
by sexism, classism, ageism, or homophobia,”79 nor do I deny that whites reap the
benefits of being white in different ways. This demonstrates that whiteness, as a socially
constructed sign of power, is mobile and dependent upon different contexts for its
effective deployment. Hence, Donald Trump will be able to deploy his whiteness in ways
that are different from those of poor whites. This does not, however, erase all of the

97
multiple contexts in which whiteness will function as a site of privilege/power for poor
whites. Those same poor whites can go into department stores, in ways that I cannot
because of my Blackness, and reap the pleasures of not being followed by security. If we
define power only in terms of the ways in which someone like Trump has power, then, of
course, the poor white can be said not to have power. This, however, would unnecessarily
restrict the multiple ways that power can be/is operationalized.
On a class analysis, one would think it ridiculous, or so it would seem, to claim
that poor whites possess advantages or privileges on the basis of their whiteness that
trump the class status of someone like law professor Patricia Williams or talk show host
Oprah Winfrey. However, Williams provides a moving story of having been barred from
entering a Benetton store as she went shopping one evening in New York in 1986. She
saw a sweater that she wanted to get for her mother. She notes that buzzers had been
installed in various stores to keep out “undesirables” in order to reduce crime. She writes:

I pressed my round brown face to the window and my finger to the buzzer,
seeking admittance. A narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes
and feasting on bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would
pit me against the limits of his social understanding. After about five
seconds, he mouthed “We’re closed,” and blew pink rubber at me. It was
two Saturdays before Christmas, at one o’clock in the afternoon; there
were several white people in the store who appeared to be shopping for
things for their mothers.80
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Needless to say, Williams felt humiliated and enraged. She writes that the white
teenager’s denial to admit her entrance into the space of the store was indicative of “an
outward manifestation of his never having let someone like me into the realm of his
reality . . . . He saw me only as one who would take his money . . . [he] could not
conceive that I was there to give him money.”81
Seeing a Black face at the door, the white teenager saw the Black face at the door.
The Manichean color-line, which was always already there, made itself felt in the form of
segregated spaces, creating an unbridgeable gap between the safe and secure space of
whiteness and the unsafe and dangerous space occupied by the Black body. “The tomtoms,” as Cynthia Kaufman notes, “start to beat in the subconscious mind of the clerk.”82
As Williams decided to ring the buzzer, she no doubt inhabited her body as an
“anonymous shopper.” It was when the white teenager—filled with anxiety, filled with
suspicion, filled with Negrophobia—refused to allow her entry into the store that she
became fixed, reduced to her body as raced. Providing an analysis of Williams’
experience through the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, philosopher Shannon Sullivan
argues:

Because bodies are part of the horizon against which objects and situations
stand forth, the spaces of “inside Benetton” and “outside on the sidewalk”
were not neutral, uniform spaces. They racially demarcated an “inside”
from the “outside” and an “us” from a “them.” Black and white bodies
disclosed objects in these spaces, such as the Benetton store and the
teenage clerk, in different ways. The horizon of black and white bodies
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made visible and invisible, respectively, the coloring and separation of
spaces. The apparent racial neutrality of the spaces inside and outside
Benetton was itself a product of the racialization of bodies. Space
appeared as an empty, unconstituted void when only white people
populated both inside and outside, an appearance that can be attributed to
what one might call the “whitewashing” of space. When nonwhite people
also populated the space outside Bennetton’s doors, the illusion of
nonraced space in this situation was made visible.83

Similarly, in 2005, Oprah Winfrey, along with a group of friends, was allegedly
not allowed to enter an Hermes boutique in Paris because of her race. Although at the
time of this writing it is not clear whether she was turned away because the store was
throwing a private public relations party, and therefore officially closed, or, as has been
reported, whether she was turned away because the store had been “having a problem
with North Africans lately.”84 For the purpose of establishing a parallel with Williams’
experience, I will assume it was the latter. On the basis of Sullivan’s analysis, it can be
argued that “the polarizing of objective space into inside and outside that racism effects
curtails black people’s inhabiting of space. White existence [those inside the store] is
allowed an expansiveness when transacting with its world that is not equally available to
nonwhite people [Oprah, who was outside the store].” My point here is that her wealth
became insignificant within the racist framework where Blackness becomes the essential
marker of difference, that is, “difference” defined relative to the norm of whiteness. In
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this instance, Oprah became just one more troublesome North African, a dark body
whose standing had no legitimacy within the domain of white space.85
Even in stores such as the GAP, although allowed entry, it is not uncommon for
Blacks to be followed closely, pegged as potential shoplifters.86 I have lived this
experience. I have had Black male relatives communicate this point to me in anger. I
have read about such cases. To be surveilled is different from being acknowledged as one
enters a store. In the latter case, one is simply seen, acknowledged as a potential paying
customer. In the former case, however, to be surveilled or “watched over” suggests the
sense of being a threat or a potential threat. Helpless things, items of extreme value, and
dangerous things need watching over. I am neither helpless nor an item of extreme value.
So, when I am followed either by security, or by a mounted camera, I become
transformed into a problem, my Black body is given back to me, returned, as a criminal, a
site of danger.
The feeling of being seen/constituted as a criminal cannot be captured by what it
feels like when one is casually mistaken for another. In such a case, one’s personhood
remains intact. To be criminalized through white surveillance is to be attacked at the level
of one’s personhood; it involves the invasion of the ontological integrity of one’s sense of
self, one’s self-conceptualization. The white security guard who performs this act of
surveillance might, if asked, disclose his abhorrence toward organized white racist
organizations. Such a disclosure need not, however, translate into how he performs
whitely in the presence of dark bodies shopping in department stores. He is a working
class white security guard, making very little money, and yet he has the very real power
of effecting ontological violence at the level of my being qua possibility. Indeed, in a
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court of law, though I could be making three times the income that he makes, his
whiteness has a greater chance of outweighing the veracity of my intentions not to steal.
Not only does he see me as a criminal (or as criminality), the courts, the criminal justice
system, also foreclose any possibility of my being other than that dictated by the white
imaginary. In this way, as Black, I am always already known. “Namelessness,” according
to Lewis Gordon, “characterizes most generalizable features of the social world.” He
notes:

It is usually characterized by the indefinite article “a.” One sees “a
student” or “a passerby” or “a police officer” or “a man” or “a woman.” In
ordinary encounters, we admit limited knowledge of individuals who may
occupy these roles or social identities. The encounters become skewed,
however, when we presume complete knowledge by virtue of individuals
who exemplify an identity. The schism between identity and being is
destroyed, and the result is a necessary being, an overdetermined,
“ontological” reality. To see something this way is to close off
possibilities.87

According to African-American philosopher John McClendon, it would be false
“to call all white people, by virtue of their whiteness, white supremacists.”88 Although I
agree, it is important that we still remain attentive to those whites that continue to benefit
from being white despite the fact that they are not white supremacists. Critical reflections
on whiteness should not begin and end with critical reflections on white supremacy. I

102
would certainly not describe the white philosopher, in my earlier example, as a white
supremacist, nor would I describe the white students, in terms of their non-reflective
posture toward their whiteness and hence their maintenance of white normativity, white
supremacists. What is important is that the critical project of making seen the unseen of
white privilege in mundane contexts is a significant endeavor that transcends the
unambiguous cases of white supremacy. Our choice should not be limited to the
disjunction of either giving critical thought to whiteness qua mundane whitely ways of
being-in-the-world or giving critical thought to white supremacy. On my view, both are
part of a continuum.89 If we think of whiteness as a mobile sign whose power may be
significantly depleted in one sphere of social existence, this does not mean that it does not
maintain its power, its privilege, in another sphere.
Critical whiteness theorist Peggy McKintosh challenges whites to think about
their privileges in terms of the metaphor of an invisible knapsack. McKintosh is fully
aware of how she was taught about racism in terms of the disadvantages it had for certain
groups of people. She adds, however, that she was not taught how whiteness, her own
whiteness, functioned as an advantage. She writes, “White privilege is like an invisible
weightless knapsack of special provisions, assurances, tools, maps, guides, codebooks,
passports, visas, clothes, compass, emergency gear, and blank checks.”90 Although she
provides forty-six examples, eleven that I find particularly interesting are:

•

I can go shopping alone most of the time, pretty well assured that I will not be
followed or harassed.
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•

I can turn on the television or open to the front page of the paper and see people
of my race widely represented.

•

When I am told about our national heritage or about “civilization,” I am shown
that people of my color made it what it is.

•

I can be sure that my children will be given curricular materials that testify to the
existence of their race.

•

I do not have to educate my children to be aware of systemic racism for their own
daily physical protection.

•

I can do well in a challenging situation without being called a credit to my race.

•

I am never asked to speak for all the people of my racial group.

•

I can remain oblivious of the language and customs of persons of color who
constitute the world’s majority without feeling in my culture any penalty for such
oblivion.

•

I can be pretty sure that if I ask to talk to “the person in charge,” I will be facing a
person of my race.

•

If I have low credibility as leader, I can be sure that my race is not the problem.

•

I can easily find academic courses and institutions which give attention only to
people of my race.91

To get a sense of “the state of being Black in America,” it is only necessary to modify
any one of the examples above through the use of a negation (for example, “It is not the
case that when I am told about our national heritage or about ‘civilization,’ I am shown
that people of my color made it what it is”). McKintosh’s observations are important
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because they remind us that within a polity where whiteness continues to be valued, and
continues to be privileged, obstacles will continue to exist for non-white people. It is
important, to realize, however, that by “white privilege” I am not saying that all whites
are lifted in all dimensions above all Blacks.92 This would be empirically false. It is also
important to note that although I believe that all whites can/do benefit from the
deployment of their whiteness within various contexts, this does not mean that they “all
benefit equally.”93
What I find particularly incredulous is the view that says that America has moved
significantly beyond race and racism. After all, or so the reasoning goes, we now live in a
post-colonial/post-segregation period in which Blacks have made significant historical
gains. I recall a white philosopher recently denying the legitimacy of the claim that
Blacks still experience inordinate discrimination. To make his point, he argued that since
the anti-racist movements of the 1960s, Blacks have done extraordinarily well. George
Lipsitz captures the climate of this type of thinking where he notes:

The present political culture in this country gives broad sanction for
viewing white supremacy and antiblack racism as forces from the past, as
demons finally put to rest by the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
the 1965 Voting Rights Act.94

This particular white philosopher not only assumed the authority to speak for the
experiences of the majority of Black people, but the subtext of his message was that
Blacks ought to stop complaining and start doing for themselves,95 that affirmative action
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had run its course, and that there were new victims, white men, whose rightful claims of
having been discriminated against need to be adequately addressed. Indeed, I would
argue—as Fanon says of French psychoanalyst Dominique Octave Mannoni, given
Mannoni’s flawed analysis of the colonial oppression of the Malagasy in Madagascar—
that the white philosopher “has not tried to feel himself into the despair of the man of
color confronting the white man.” The white philosopher appeared to be under the
impression that “racism exists now only because people of color keep talking about it.”96
Hence, on this assumption, racism is not something that continues to happen to Black
people or something that exists systemically within the fabric of American life. Rather,
racism is something concerning which Blacks have the mysterious power of speaking
into existence. This move is characteristic of many whites to make the problem of racism
the problem of Black people. Externally imposed acts of white racism are then
conveniently reconstructed as arising from the weak constitutionality, as it were, of
Blacks. Fanon:

The appearance of varicose veins in a patient does not arise out of his
being compelled to spend ten hours a day on his feet, but rather out of the
constitutional weakness of his vein walls; his working conditions are only
a complicating factor. And the insurance compensation expert to whom
the case is submitted will find the responsibility of the employer extremely
limited.97
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Besides the self-righteousness of his claims, there appeared to be no awareness of the
impact of the Reagan and Bush years of the 1980s and early 1990s and how this period
was so devastating to race relations, significantly weakening federal civil rights
enforcement programs during this period.98 He possessed no knowledge that although
Blacks are about one-eighth of the national population, they are six times more likely
than whites to be incarcerated and they constitute 40 percent of those who are executed.99
In contrast, white males make up a little over 35 percent of the population, yet they
constitute more than 80 percent of the Forbes 400 group, those who are worth well over
240 million. Of course, within the political sphere, white males dominate as state
governors, in the Congress, in the Senate, and in the House of Representatives. White
males are also dominant in numbers when it comes to such areas as tenured college
faculty (80 percent), daily-newspaper editors, television news directors, corporate
management, you name it.100 There is also the reality that increased urbanization,
inequality, and class segregation have had a disproportionate impact on Blacks than on
whites. For example, Black home ownership is lower than white home ownership, even at
the same income levels. Even in terms of the level of poverty of poor Blacks and poor
whites, Blacks are still disproportionately affected. For example, in 2001, 11.7 percent of
the total population lived in poverty. What is significant is that in the white population,
only 9.9 percent lived in poverty, less than the percentage in the total population;
whereas, in the Black population, 22.7 percent lived in poverty, twice the percentage of
that in the total population. For children under the age of eighteen in 2001, 16.3 percent
of the total population lived in poverty. Again, what is significant is that in the white
population, only 9.5 percent of white children lived in poverty, far less than the
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percentage in the total population; whereas, in the Black population, 30.2 percent of black
children live in poverty, almost twice the percentage of that in the total population.101
According to Fanon, “A society is racist or it is not.”102 There is no need to quibble:
America is racist.
In addition to these economic and social realities, I continue to live my body in
Black within a culture where Blackness is still over-determined by myths and
presuppositions that fix my body as a site of danger. I notice, more times than I would
like to recall, that a white sales person will drop my money on the counter rather than
touch my hand. Perhaps I am, and this image has persisted in the white imaginary for
centuries, a site of uncleanliness. These are some of the many things that are often unseen
within a society that prides itself on being colorblind. But it is the reality of the
mundanity of the everyday world of white racist communicative performances—resulting
in effects that I somatically bare—that reveals the continued efficacy of the historical
force of white embodied ideology.
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who actually spoke to her at the front door said something/did something that was very hurtful. Again,
however, viewers were never told the details of the interaction. Prior to Chavez coming on the show, it was
implied that Oprah had been told that the store had been having a problem with North Africans lately. The
North African reference was never made by Oprah as she attempted to clear the air, not even as a rumor to
be disputed. Nor did Chavez mention the North African reference. Personally, though I could be incorrect,
my sense is that the person at the door probably did make reference to North Africans, which would have
implicated Oprah as a mistaken North African Black body, that is, she would have been typified as a
“Black problem.” This would explain, at least for me, the need to make a public apology, although viewers
would not have gotten the point because of Oprah’s vague reference to being hurt. So, why didn’t Oprah
mention the North African issue? Perhaps, and again this is speculation, if it was known that the derogatory
North African reference was made in such a way as to imply that Oprah was mistaken as a North African
and hence not allowed in the store (or at least that there was reticence regarding letting her in), this would
have been a heavy charge against Hermes for hiring “racists.” See “Hermes President Apologizes On-Air
to Oprah for Snub.” Retrieved from http://www.turkishpress.com/news.asp?=71323.
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What is particularly interesting here are the multiple and relational modalities in terms of which
oppression works. While it is unjust and oppressive to be followed around in a GAP department store, think
of what happens when, though followed and pegged a criminal, I nevertheless purchase an item from the
GAP. I could decide not to shop at the GAP because of such racist behavior shown toward myself and other
Blacks or I could decide to shop there, ignore the racism, and contribute to the oppression of workers in El
Salvador, for example. As I endure the gaze, eventually purchasing a T-shirt from the GAP, my actions are
linked to the oppression of a Salvadoran who works in a garment sweatshop. He/she is overworked, lacks
necessary health benefits, and gets paid perhaps ten cents for a T-shirt that I purchase for over twelve
dollars at retail price. I am then confronted with the ethical question: Is the T-shirt really worth undergoing
the process of being pegged a criminal and contributing to the oppression of others? Even if I were
allowed access into the GAP without triggering the insidious operation of racism in the form of being
followed, though I will have escaped one site of oppression, I would then trigger and sustain another site of
pernicious oppression, effectively transforming my status from a victim to a victimizer.
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Chapter III
Whiteness’s Manichean Divide: Colonialist Gazing and “Seeing” Hottentot Venus

My turn to state an equation: colonization = “thingification.”
—Aimé Césaire
Colonial power produces the colonized as a fixed reality which is at once an
“other” and yet entirely knowable and visible.
—Homi K. Bhabha
The European has only been able to become a man through creating slaves and
monsters.
—Jean-Paul Sartre

The above three epigraphs point to a profound Fanonian truth: “European civilization and
its best representatives are responsible for colonial racism.”1 Moreover, each of the above
epigraphs points to a dynamic process of interpellating the colonizer/colonized through
processes of affirmation/negation, respectively. The logic of this racist form of
establishment precludes mutual recognition as equals. Indeed, on this score, the two
elements or poles of this relationship are paradoxically at once mutually exclusive and
yet mutually dependent. Through the process of ideological structuration, the colonizer
and the colonized are deemed opposites in an ontologically hierarchical structural
relationship. The former are deemed naturally superior and the latter are said to be
naturally inferior and fit for domination. The reality, however, is that the creation of the
inferior/monstrous colonized is contingent upon the European as superior and nonmonstrous. The colonized is fixed, because the colonizer does the fixing, and the
“thingification” of the colonized is dialectically linked to the transcendent/master
consciousness of the colonizer. In short, what emerges is a dualism that is believed to be
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metaphysically fixed. “We go from biology to ethics, from ethics to politics, from politics
to metaphysics.”2 Of course, the claim that the relationship between the colonizer and the
colonized is metaphysically fixed and outside history is a position taken up “within the
terrain of racialist ideology.”3
In this chapter, my objective is to focus on the dynamics of colonialism “through
the economy of its central trope, the Manichean allegory,”4 and how this allegory
(dichotomy of black/bad, white/good) creates boundaries of inclusion and exclusion.5
Although it is important to keep in mind that colonialism grew out of and was sustained
by both material and discursive forces, I am less concerned with the political economic
dimensions of colonialism than I am with the existential phenomenological aspects of
how the colonizer and colonized undergo existential nullification through processes of
white ideological discursive formations. I am interested in examining how white
“colonial domination required a whole way of thinking, a discourse in which everything
that is advanced, good, and civilized is defined and measured in European terms.”6
Hence, I am concerned with how colonialism, as a means of socially producing reality,
shapes colonized bodies through powerful processes of inscription. In short, there is the
violent geo-spatial dimension of colonial territorialization,7 and there is also the violent
form of psycho-cultural territorialization. The latter is designed to place the colonized in
a pathological relationship to him/herself. This is accomplished not simply through geospatial modalities of incursion, but also through the process of getting the colonized,
through inculcation, to internalize the desired, phantasmatic image in terms of which they
are depicted by the colonizer. On this score, one might speak of colonialism as a form of
Foucauldian “governmentality” in which the colonized body is governed and controlled
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through various physical and discursive disciplinary strategies. Would that Foucault had
given serious attention to the governmentality of whiteness.
I am particularly interested in the specular dimensions of the colonial situation
and how “instead of seeing the native as a bridge toward syncretic possibility, it uses him
[her] as a mirror that reflects the colonialist’s self-image.”8 Theorizing the specular/ocular
dimensions of colonialist power and knowledge is a significant point of entry into the
racist colonialist Weltanschauung. Indeed, “the hegemony of vision in Western
modernity, its ocularcentric discourse, has been subjected to much scrutiny, and Afrodiasporic thinkers, in particular, have stressed the centrality of the scopic in constructions
of race and racism.”9 The European gaze was able to discern with “clarity” and
“accuracy” the “truth” about certain human bodies vis-à-vis a white racist discursive
regime of truth. The gaze reinforced the truth of the categories and the categories
reinforced the gaze. However, with regard to the white gaze, it was predicated upon
fictive “racial” categories that were believed to designate empirical differences. The
white colonialist gaze was invested in a racist regime of classificatory “truth.” As
philosopher David T. Goldberg observes:

The neutrality and objectifying distantiation of the rational scientist
created the theoretical space for a view to develop subjectless bodies.
Once objectified, these bodies could be analyzed, categorized, classified,
and ordered with the cold gaze of scientific distance.10

It is not my aim to relegate to insignificance the politico-economic factors vis-à-vis the
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formation of colonialism. Such a move would skew the actual historical emergence of
colonialism. I do, however, find wanting those theories that privilege the economic
aspects of colonialism (or the African slave trade) in terms of its genesis over the
discursive and ideological. As intimated, on my view, the politico-economic and the
ideological and discursive are interwoven. As Goldberg notes, “Materially colonialism
seeks to strengthen domination for the sake of human and economic exploitation.
Representationally, it seeks to sustain the identity of the ideological or discursive image it
has created of the colonized.”11 I question, for example, Abdul R. JanMohamed’s
observations, though he is referring specifically to the African slave trade, where he
states:

The perception of racial difference is, in the first place, influenced by
economic motives. For instance, as Dorothy Hammond and Alta Jablow
have shown, Africans were perceived in a more or less neutral and benign
manner before the slave trade developed; however, once the triangular
trade became established, Africans were newly characterized as the
epitome of evil and barbarity.12

JanMohamed not only implies the priority of significance regarding economic motives in
the enslavement of Africans and the colonization of Africa, but his “in the first place”
phraseology suggests priority in time. On JanMohamed’s view, it would appear that there
was first the economic motive, pure and simple, and then, second, temporally speaking,
there was the epiphenomenal emergence of European discourse regarding the “evil
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barbarity and monstrosity” of the African. On my view, not only does the dark African
body as a site of denigration exceed Europe’s economic interests (territorial expansion,
wealth, the acquisition of bodies for labor), but the dark African body in the European
imaginary, prior to European colonialism, was already scripted and codified as morally
and aesthetically problematic. It is not the African’s dark phenotype as such that is
problematic. Rather, it is the reactive-value creating power13 of those whites who brought
with them pre-existing categories of the Same-Other dialectic.
I am fully aware of the Same-Other dualism “where social inequality based on
birth was the general rule among Europeans themselves.”14 Even the Greeks distinguished
themselves from those that they deemed “Barbarians.” I am also cognizant of the fact that
the Irish were characterized as “savages.” And who can forget the prevalence in Europe
of the horrors of anti-Semitism and the portrayal of Jews as having committed deicide.15 I
have no wish to engage in the politics of who suffered the most or to say that whites did
not oppress and label “sub-human” those who were also white in their phenotypic
constitution. However, unlike Jews,16 the Irish, and Slavs, Africans represented those who
were “diametrically opposed” to whites.17
The “visible epidermal terrain”18 of the dark African body was the site of
Otherness within the framework of a deeper, historically embedded axiological
Manichean divide in Europe itself, an epidermal terrain that would continue, even today,
to signify (moral, scientific) “truths” regarding the entire cartography, as it were, of the
dark African body. As George Fredrickson notes:

If the demonization of the Jews established some basis for the racial antiSemitism of the modern era, the prejudice and discrimination directed at
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the Irish on one side of Europe and certain Slavic peoples on the other
foreshadowed the dichotomy between civilization and savagery that would
characterize imperial expansion beyond the European continent.19

We should keep in mind that Africa and Africans stood outside of Europe proper.
“The myths of [dark] Africa and other continents correlate with the myth of [light]
Europe itself.”20 In short, it is my sense that the myth of Europe, driven by its
expansionist greed and narcissism, is fundamentally predicated upon tropes of whiteness,
bringing luminosity and light to bear upon the dark world, the dark continent of Africa.21
Hence, the Manichean divide was already fundamentally operative in European
consciousness. As Gustav Jahoda writes:

For several of the church fathers in the West the colour black was
associated with darkness, the devil and evil, and this has been suggested as
a causal factor. However, the symbolism of black and white had already
been prevalent in Greece and Rome, black having been the colour of evil
demons, and this does not appear to have had any bearing on attitudes
towards blacks. On the other hand there is evidence that it did have such
an effect already at the beginning of the 5th century. The monk John
Cassian wrote a series of spiritual Conferences, some of which depicted
the devil “in the shape of a hideous Negro,” or a demon “like a Negro
woman, ill-smelling and ugly.” Since Cassian’s admirer, St Benedict,
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ordered the Conferences to be read in the monasteries, they probably had a
wide circulation.22

Consistent with the early axiological frames of reference that codified “blackness” as that
which is evil, Jan Nederveen Pieterse maintains:

The symbolism of light and darkness was probably derived from
astrology, alchemy, Gnosticism and forms of Manichaeism; in itself it had
nothing to do with skin colour, but in the course of time it did acquire that
connotation. Black became the colour of the devil and demons. Later, in
the confrontation with Islam, it came to form part of the enemy image of
Muslims: the symbolism of the “black demon” was transferred to
Muslims—in early medieval paintings black Saracens, black tormentors
and black henchmen torture Christ during the Passion. This is the tradition
of the devil as the Black Man and the black bugaboo.23

My point is that the “economic motive” is necessary for explaining colonial
racism, but it is not sufficient. Indeed, in stream with JanMohamed, the perception of
racial difference is influenced by economic motives, but economic motives are neither
sufficient to explain the complexity of the origins of colonial desire and adventure, nor
sufficient to explain the complexity of the Anglo-American/European racist gaze. In
short, I question the implications of JanMohamed’s prioritization of “material” causal
factors vis-à-vis colonialism or the slave trade. JanMohamed’s view would suggest that
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the discursive constitution of “whiteness” and “Blackness,” in terms of the slave trade or
colonialism, functions as a super-structural phenomenon resulting from a prior material
causation. This does not mean, however, that I give explanatory priority to
“ideational”/“idealist” causation. Intuitively, at least with respect to the slave trade and
the colonialization of Black bodies, my sense is that neither explanatory approach should
be subordinated to the other, but that both work in conjunction. In this way, whether
effectively or not, I avoid a materialist-idealist taxonomy.24
European colonialism is a form of deep existential trauma, dispossession,
displacement, oppression, and physical and psychological murder. It is messianic and
imperialistic. Colonialist practices can range from the complete genocide of a native
people and/or the deracination of a native people from their land (who are then taken to
foreign lands to work as “slaves,” controlled, disciplined, policed, and inculcated to think
of themselves as “slaves”) to colonial occupation, resulting in the disruption and
devastation of the lived cultural, teleological space of native people, to say nothing of
their agricultural ways of life.25 Colonial invasive powers bring with them their own
myths, beliefs, and forms of colonial ordering which create a bifurcated form of hierarchy
that is designed to distinguish between the natives and the colonizers, a form of hierarchy
where the colonizer (white, good, intelligent, ethical, beautiful, civilized) is superior in all
things, while the native (dark, exotic, sexually uncontrollable, bad, stupid, ugly, savage)
is inferior. Hence, colonialism is a form of violent usurpation that disrupts the
psychosocial equilibrium of those indigenous to their lived cultural cosmos. This outside
power/violence interrupts “their continuity, making them play roles in which they no
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longer recognize themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own
substance.”26
Christopher Columbus’ invasive presence, for example, brought not only the myth
of superiority and civilization, but domination, death, and genocide. Upon his second trip
to the Caribbean, Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain provided Columbus with more men,
seventeen ships, “cannons, crossbows, guns, cavalry, and attack dogs.”27 Why so many
weapons of destruction? “Standard” history tells us that he wanted to prove that the earth
was not flat and find a western route to the East. This view of history, however, fails to
capture the pernicious consequences suffered by those “Others” encountered during
Columbus’ “courageous” voyages. The omission of Columbus’ ignoble deeds from
“standard” textbooks bespeaks a form of ideological revisionism. For example, after
Columbus’ arrival in Haiti, when a native Arawak committed a minor offense, he/the
Spanish “cut off his ears or nose. Disfigured, the person was sent back to his village as
living evidence of the brutality the Spaniards were capable of.”28 Of course, the Arawaks
did not stand a chance against Columbus. He had horses, cannons, crossbows and the 20
attack dogs, “who were turned loose and immediately tore the Indians apart.”29 Also,
there were Spaniards who hunted the natives for sport and “murdered them for dog
food.”30 The following depict the devastating impact of colonialism on those indigenous
to the land of Haiti: natives had their limbs cut off; women killed their own children to
avoid having them oppressed; natives killed themselves in mass suicides; many suffered
from malnutrition; massive depopulation occurred; native female sex slaves, ages nine to
ten, were in demand by the Spaniards; their young bodies were raped and invaded; etc.
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Whether in Haiti, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico, the Canary Islands, Cuba,
Guadeloupe, Antigua, colonialist desire for wealth, with its logic of centralization of
power, and its selectivity regarding who and what is deemed “human,” trumped universal
humanism. After all, it was at this time that the Renaissance was having its impact.
Césaire:

And that is the great thing I hold against pseudo-humanism: that for too
long it has diminished the rights of man, that its concept of those rights
has been—and still is—narrow and fragmentary, incomplete and biased
and, all things considered, sordidly racist.31

As with Césaire, Fanon was cognizant of Europe’s hypocrisy regarding its own professed
humanism:

That same Europe where they were never done talking of Man, and where
they never stopped proclaiming that they were only anxious for the
welfare of Man: today we know with what suffering humanity has paid for
every one of their triumphs of the mind.32

The point here is that European humanism, which might be deemed one of the most
valued aspects of European civilization, became a Euro-humanism vis-à-vis those
deemed non-European. The irony is that this universal humanism was shaped through an
ideology of exclusion. Indeed, the development of ideas regarding the nature of humanity
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and “the universal qualities of the human mind as the common good of an ethical
civilization occurred at the same time as those particularly violent centuries in the history
of the world now known as the era of Western colonialism.”33 Hence, to the extent that
Euro-humanism was a culturally and “racially” politicized humanism, its very conception
of the “human” functioned as an ideological category, a category in the name of which
violence toward the Other (the “sub-human”/“non-human”) could be enacted with little
or no remorse. Euro-humanism, however, did not simply fail to include “the Other.”
Rather, the core of its meaning was exclusionary. However, once faced with “the
striptease of our [European] humanism,”34 as Sartre writes, Euro-humanism stands naked,
“and it’s not a pretty sight. It was nothing but an ideology of lies, a perfect justification
for pillage; its honeyed words, its affectation of sensibility were only alibis for our
aggression.”35
To the extent that Euro-humanism was/is grounded within the ideology of
whiteness, its conception of the “human” must be rejected as it is really a form of antihumanism.36 In the face of a pernicious and racist ontology of the “human,” with its
misanthropic axiological frames of reference, it is no wonder that “the native laughs in
mockery when Western values are mentioned in front of him.”37 Critiquing the very
concept of European “civilization” and turning its “civilizing” efforts across the globe on
its head, Ricky Lee Allen argues:

Given the behavior of whites over the last 500 years, I would argue that it
is we whites who are the ones who are yet to achieve the status of
“civilized beings” because we have yet to grasp fully what has happened
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and is still happening. Consider this: What would it mean to white folk if
we found out that our history was in reality not a narrative about the
evolution of civilization, but rather a myth that masks our perpetual state
of savagery and dehumanization vis-à-vis direct and indirect forms of
genocide and institutional violence? The tough reality to face is that we
whites, as a people, have yet to move from savagery to civilization. Our
notion of “civilization” is part of a dream state that keeps us unconscious
of and complacent within our necrophilic desires. Meanwhile, we project
our true selves onto Others.38

In Mexico, Peru, and Florida, to name a few, the conquistadors/conquerors
enslaved the natives of these lands, exploiting their bodies and their land. The fallout of
Columbus’ colonial “progress” became infectious:

Other nations rushed to emulate Columbus. In 1501 the Portuguese began
to depopulate Labrador, transporting the now extinct Boethuk Indians to
Europe and Cape Verde as slaves. After the British established beachheads
on the Atlantic coast of North America, they encouraged coastal Indian
tribes to capture and sell members of more distant tribes. Charleston,
South Carolina, became a major port for exporting Indian slaves. The
Pilgrims and Puritans sold the survivors of the Pequot War into slavery in
Bermuda in 1637. The French shipped virtually the entire Natchez nation
in chains to West Indies in 1731.39
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“Because the Indians died,” according to James W. Loewen, “Indian slavery then led to
the massive slave trade to the other way across the Atlantic, from Africa.”40 Under King
Leopold II, Black bodies were cut, hacked, and torn in order to feed his greed in the
Congo, to say nothing of Angola “where . . . malcontents’ lips were pierced in order to
shut them with padlocks.”41 Imagine having to look upon the severed limbs of one’s
children. Nsala, a native Congolese, knew what it was like to sit, emotionally catatonic,
and look at the severed hand and foot of his five-year-old daughter, Boali, who was a
victim of Anglo-Belgian colonialism.42 The hands of innocent children were viciously
severed, and black women’s bodies raped. Within the context of the Congo alone, ten
million or more Africans were murdered because of the pernicious phenomenon of
colonialist expansionism, colonialist logic, colonialist myths, procrustean narcissism
(where the native is forced to yield to the self-centered, all-consuming importance of the
colonizer), misanthropic values (some people are hated and simply do not matter and can
be enslaved, colonized and decimated), hegemony, and solipsism (only we, the
colonizers, really matter, only our ex-istence is really significant). Cornelius Castoriadis
matter-of-factly observes that “the earth has been unified by means of Western
violence.”43
One only need think of the sheer percentage of “ownership” of the earth through
European control. Around 1800, 35 percent of the earth’s surface was “owned” by
Europeans. This figure had increased to 67 percent by 1878. However, “between 1878
and 1914, the period of the ‘new imperialism,’ European control expanded over 84.4
percent of the [earth’s] surface. The expansion took place mainly in Africa.”44 In 1920,
W. E. B. Du Bois notes:
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With the dog-in-the-manger theory of trade, with the determination to reap
inordinate profits and to exploit the weakest to the utmost there came a
new imperialism—the rage for one’s own nation to own the earth or, at
least, a section large enough portion of it to insure as big profits as the
next nation. Where sections could not be owned by one dominant nation
there came a policy of “open door,” but the “door” was open to “white
people only.” As to the darkest and weakest of peoples there was but one
unanimity in Europe—that which Herr Dernberg of the German Colonial
Office called the agreement with England to maintain white “prestige” in
Africa—the doctrine of the divine right of white people to steal.45

Aimé Césaire also sees through the empty rhetoric of colonial expansionism and
its mission to “civilize” the world. He is cognizant that colonialism results in “a whole
barrelful of ears collected, pair by pair, from prisoners, friendly or enemy.”46 He asks:

Was there no point in quoting Colonel de Montagnac, one of the
conquerors of Algeria: “In order to banish the thoughts that sometimes
besiege me, I have some heads cut off, not the heads of artichokes but the
heads of men.”47

Césaire understands barbarity to be intrinsic to the very structure of colonialism. It is my
sense that colonialism, Eurocentric expansionism, and whiteness are inextricably linked.
As Samir Amin notes, “Eurocentrism is a culturalist phenomenon in the sense that it
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assumes the existence of irreducibly distinct cultural invariants that shape the historical
paths of different peoples.”48 Moreover, the source of these cultural invariants is believed
grounded within invariant ontological features of various excluded groups. Whether
referring to the colonized Black or the stereotyped Jew, there is a sense in which both
excluded groups are deemed eternally problematic. Memmi:

It is easy to understand how the same movement also extends through
time, back into the past and forward into the future. The Jew has always
been greedy, the Black man has always been inferior. Conclusion: the Jew
will always be greedy, the Black man will always be inferior. There is no
hope of a change, no salvation to be expected.49

Within the white colonial order of things, the Black/native body bears the imprint
of the colonial gaze, its myths and its lies.50 The imaginary projection upon the Black
body becomes the imagined in the flesh. There is a coalescing of the signifier with the
signified.51 Of course, the Black body is also the object of colonial sadistic brutality. The
white colonial gaze is that broadly construed epistemic perspective, a process of seeing
without being seen, with its discursive and non-discursive performances, that constructs
the Black body into its own colonial imaginary. Masking any foul play, the colonizer
strives to encourage the colonized to embrace his/her existential predicament as natural
and immutable. The idea is to get the colonized to accept the colonialists point of
reference as the only point of reference.52 As JanMohamed notes:

129
By thus subjecting the native, the European settler is able to compel the
Other’s recognition of him and, in the process, allow his own identity to
become deeply dependent on his position as a master. This enforced
recognition from the Other in fact amounts to the European’s narcissistic
self-recognition since the native, who is considered too degraded and
inhuman to be credited with any specific subjectivity, is cast as no more
than a recipient of the negative elements of the self that the European
projects onto him. This transitivity and the preoccupation with the inverted
self-image mark the “imaginary” relations that characterize the colonial
encounter.53

In point of fact, however, “Blackness” vis-à-vis the white colonial gaze is a
historically constructed tertium quid ; it is that which emerges as a third element,
between, as it were, the dark or swarthy skin color of the colonized, which is a natural
phenomenon, and the white colonial gaze, which is a form of hegemony and control.
Within the colonial space of intelligibility, this Manichean divide, Blacks are neatly
positioned along taxonomic-zoological lines. As Frantz Fanon notes:

At times this Manicheism goes to its logical conclusion and dehumanizes
the native, or to speak plainly, it turns him into an animal. In fact, the
terms the settler uses when he mentions the native are zoological terms.
He speaks of the yellow man’s reptilian motions, of the stink of the native
quarter, of breeding swarms, of foulness, of spawn, of gesticulations.
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When the settler seeks to describe the native fully in exact terms he
constantly refers to the bestiary.54

On this score, the Black/colonized/Other/native constitutes the natural wild flora and
fauna of the landscape. Sharpley-Whiting describes this phenomenon through an
insightful analysis of the naturalist writer Guy de Maupassant’s short story, “Boitelle.” In
her analysis, she exposes the perversion of love between a white man and a certain
“Negress.” The point is that the colonial gaze vis-à-vis the Black body distorts a form of
relationality predicated upon the dynamics of reciprocal recognition. In the story,
Boitelle, the exoticist, one day sees the “Negress” as he gazes upon a wild bird. What he
“sees” through his gaze, as Sharpley-Whiting makes clear, is of the same exotic kind as
the wild bird. As Sharpley-Whiting notes, “In one fell swoop, Boitelle objectifies and
reduces the black woman not only to a quasi-bountiful rarity to be tasted and sampled,
but also to a state of animality through the comparative gaze.”55 Within the framework of
the Manichean divide, to say “Black woman” is automatically to imply a so-called
untamed and mysterious “object” of interest. The colonialist racist “ascribes to his victim
a series of surprising traits, calling him [her] incomprehensible, impenetrable, mysterious,
strange, disturbing, and so on. Slowly he makes of his victim a sort of animal, a thing, or
simply a symbol.”56
Blacks and other indigenous peoples were deemed things vis-à-vis an economy of
white sameness. As “things,” they were considered devoid of feeling, humanity, reason,
etc. This form of rationalization functioned to erase the dynamic of human relationality, a
form of inter-subjectivity where two or more people respond to each other as equally
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human, mutually respecting the other’s subjectivity. In the context of colonialism, there is
“no human contact,” as Césaire maintains, “but relations of domination and
submission.”57 When the colonizer and the colonized are face-to-face, Césaire sees only
“force, brutality, cruelty, sadism, conflict.”58 Colonialism had embedded within it a racist
colonial ethnography/anthropology (or theory of the anthropos). Césaire observes:

Gobineau said: “The only history is white.” M. Caillois, in turn, observes:
“The only ethnography is white.” It is the West that studies the
ethnography of the others, not the others who study the ethnography of the
West.59

As the humanity of the Black/native/colonized is rendered suspect, individualized
subjectivity is denied. Albert Memmi refers to this process of depersonalization as the
mark of the plural.60 The ontological structure of the Black/native/colonized is rendered
non-distinct. The Black/native/colonized vis-à-vis the white colonizer is an amorphous
collectivity, as if moved by the same collective essence.

The colonized is never characterized in an individual manner; he is
entitled only to drown in an anonymous collectivity (“They are this.”
“They are all the same.”). If a colonized servant does not come in one
morning, the colonizer will not say that she is ill, or that she is cheating, or
that she is tempted not to abide by an oppressive contract. (Seven days a
week; colonized domestics rarely enjoy the one day off a week granted to
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others.) He will say, “You can’t count on them.” It is not just a
grammatical expression. He refuses to consider personal, private
occurrences in his maid’s life; that life in a specific sense does not interest
him, and his maid does not exist as an individual.61

This process of “thingification”62 is a dialectical process that negatively impacts
both the colonized and the colonizer. For Césaire, dehumanization is not simply restricted
to the colonized. His point is that:

Colonial activity, colonial enterprise, colonial conquest, which is based on
the contempt for the native and justified by that contempt, inevitably tends
to change him who in order to ease his conscience gets into the habit of
seeing the other man as an animal, accustoms himself to treating him like
an animal, and tends objectively to transform himself into an animal. It is
this result, this boomerang effect of colonization, that I wanted to point
out.63

Memmi was also aware of this boomerang effect of colonization and dehumanization.
Memmi: “To handle this, the colonizer must assume the opaque rigidity and
imperviousness of the stone. In short, he must dehumanize himself, as well.”64 On this
score, the colonizer also becomes a thing, denying his/her freedom to be other than white
colonial sameness. In becoming a “thing,” the colonizer need not feel responsible for
his/her actions. The colonizer attempts to repress the anxiety that accompanies his/her
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freedom either through the process of becoming a “thing” (“I am following the order of
nature’s teleological dictates”) or making the colonized into a “thing” (he/she is fixed in
his/her nature to be animal-like, inferior). Memmi provides an insightful observation
where he notes: “Whenever the colonizer adds, in order not to fall prey to anxiety, that
the colonized is a wicked, backward person with evil, thievish, somewhat sadistic
instincts, he thus justifies his police and his legitimate severity.”65
In his Preface to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre characterizes the
colonizer as undergoing a process of transmutation from the for-itself to the “in-itself.”
Sartre writes, “This imperious being, crazed by his absolute power and by the fear of
losing it, no longer remembers clearly that he was once a man; he takes himself for a
horsewhip or a gun.”66 On this score, the white colonizer attempts to blur the distinction
between his/her own freedom/praxis and the putative “objective necessity” of
colonialism.67 Commenting upon Memmi’s notion of how colonizers manage to engage
in a process of “self-absolution,” a process that involves an elaborate process of selfdeception and bad faith, Sartre writes:

How can an elite of usurpers, aware of their mediocrity, establish their
privileges? By one means only: debasing the colonized to exalt
themselves, denying the title of humanity to the natives, and defining them
as simply absences of qualities—animals, not humans. This does not prove
hard to do, for the system deprives them of everything. Colonialist
practice has engraved the colonialist idea into things themselves; it is the
movement of things that designates colonizer and colonized alike. Thus

134
oppression justifies itself through oppression: the oppressors produce and
maintain by force the evils that render the oppressed, in their eyes, more
and more like what they would have to be like to deserve their fate.68

The white colonialist strategy was to get the colonized Black (or native) to
undergo a process of epistemic violence (a form of violence that can take place within the
white semiotic space of an elevator, as discussed in chapter one), a process where the
Black begins to internalize all of the colonizer’s myths and thus begins to see his/her
identity through the paradigm of white supremacy/Eurocentricity. Indeed, the objective of
the colonialist was to get the Black (or native) to become blind to the farcicality of the
historical “necessity” of being colonized. The idea here was to get the native, and in this
case the Black, to conceptualize his/her identity/being as an ignoble savage,69 bestial,
hyper-sexual, criminal, violent, uncivilized, brutish, dirty, inferior, and as a problem.70
This kind of physical/psychological colonialist conquest, as Paulo Freire says, “is at all
times present in anti-dialogical action.”71 The colonialist was not interested in dialogue,
but a form of monological speech that maintained unequal power. The strategy was to
create in the Black (or the native) a psychological fissure, a double consciousness, a
profound sense of psychic dissonance. Moreover, the colonizer’s strategy was to get the
native to think of his/her own cultural ideals/beliefs as worthless. Fanon:

The customs of the colonized people, their traditions, their myths—above
all, their myths—are the very sign of that poverty of spirit and their
constitutional depravity. That is why we must put the DDT which destroys
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parasites, the bearers of disease, on the same level as the Christian religion
[or certainly certain ways of practicing it] which wages war on embryonic
heresies and instincts, and on evil as yet unborn. The recession of yellow
fever and the advance of evangelization form part of the same balance
sheet.72

He continues:

The Church in the colonies is the white people’s Church, the foreigner’s
Church. She does not call the native to God’s ways but to the ways of the
white man, of master, of oppressor. And as we know, in this matter many
are called but few are chosen.73

What the colonizer knows about the colonized constitutes what the colonized is.
Perception, epistemology, and ontology are collapsed. With regard to the Black/native/
colonized, what is seen is what is known, and what is known is what is seen. Moreover,
what is known and seen or seen and known is what there is. This will become clear in the
case of Sarah Bartmann vis-à-vis the French imaginary. Within the European purview of
the white gaze/cartographic grid of representation, Bartmann is seen, known and is a
highly developed animal. She will then be “closely scrutinized in order to determine her
relationship to other animals and human beings. She will be used as a yardstick by which
to judge the stages of Western evolution, by which to discern identity, difference, and
progress.”74 According to Memmi, “Far from wanting to understand him as he really is,”
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the colonizer strips the colonized of any recognizable human form through “a series of
negations.”75 The Black body, for example, is not beautiful, not civilized, not moral, etc.
Of course, the white is constituted through a series of affirmations. These negations and
affirmations are designed to be passed off as normal. The colonizers/oppressors “develop
a series of methods precluding any presentation of the world as a problem and showing it
rather as a fixed entity, as something given—something to which people, as mere
spectators, must adapt.”76 Stating this relationship in correlative terms, Fanon argues,
“The feeling of inferiority of the colonized is the correlative to the European’s feeling of
superiority. Let us have the courage to say it outright: It is the racist who creates his
inferior.”77 These negations also manifest themselves in the form of negating the very
existence of the Black/the Other. “When I search for Man in the technique and style of
Europe,” according to Fanon, “I see only a succession of negations of man, and an
avalanche of murders.”78
To help explain what happens within the space of the white colonial performative
gaze, consider the following elements: mythos, codification, ritual, ontologization,
constructivity, stereotypification, and over-determination. As in my earlier example with
the white woman in the elevator, the white gaze freezes the Black through a process of
mythopoetic constructions. The white imaginary projects onto the Black body its own
fears in the form of certain created myths (the “Black rapist”). This renders an
exploration of the source of these fears unnecessary. After all, once the fears have been
projected upon the Black colonized body, the white colonizer erases his/her connection
with the projected image. In this way, what is in reality a mere fantasy is made real.79
These constructions are so powerful that it makes sense to say that the white fails to “see”
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anything else. The adequation between the fantasy and the colonized qua “object” has
already been firmly established.
The white imaginary also creates a system of codification through which white
perception is shaped in predictable ways. Hence, the Black body is coded as a form of
pathology; it is coded as evil, dirty, and promiscuous. Indeed, the Black body is coded as
a site of axiological nullification. Concerning this last point, Fanon notes:

The colonial world is a Manichean world. It is not enough for the settler to
delimit physically, that is to say with the help of the army and the police
force, the place of the native. As if to show the totalitarian character of
colonial exploitation the settler paints the native as a sort of quintessence
of evil. Native society is not simply described as a society lacking in
values. It is not enough for the colonialist to affirm that those values have
disappeared from, or still better never existed in, the colonial world. The
native is declared insensible to ethics; he represents not only the absence
of values, but also the negation of values. He is, let us dare to admit, the
enemy of values, and in this sense he is the absolute evil. He is the
corrosive element, destroying all that comes near him; he is the deforming
element, disfiguring all that has to do with beauty or morality; he is the
depository of maleficent powers, the unconscious and irretrievable
instrument of blind forces.80
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These codes possess incredible cultural and historical weight because of the many
agencies of white power and knowledge (e.g., anthropology, phrenology, philosophy,
medical discourse, etc.) that function as vehicles through which white hegemony is
further expressed and maintained. The point here is that knowledge and power are
interwoven. Within the context of colonial power, the science of ethnology helped toward
colonial administration. Literary and artistic works depicting the non-Western “Others”
combined “with Medieval fables and notions drawn from the Bible and the classics.”81 As
Pieterse states, “In painting, poetry, theatre, opera, popular prints, illustrated magazines,
novels, children’s books—a broad range of imaginative work—non-European worlds
were represented as part of European scenarios.”82
“Seeing” the Black body through these myths and codes, the white will frequently
engage in a series of rituals (e.g., a white woman grabs her purse on an elevator and
avoids direct eye contact). The above leads to a process of ontologization, a process
whereby the being of the Black body (and the white body) undergoes a process of
transformation. This involves the process in which the historically and culturally
contingent signifiers of the Black/white body are transformed into ontologically intrinsic
natural and eternal dispositions.
The white gaze also involves a process whereby both the colonizer/white and the
colonized/Black undergo a mutual process of constructivity. As argued above, the social
construction of the Black is dialectically linked to the construction of the white, where
the latter occupies a superior place within the construction. In other words, the
relationship is asymmetrical. There is also the process of stereotypification, that is, where
whites and Blacks (and, of course, all other non-white “Others”) become “solid types,”

139
indelibly marked by nature’s teleological design. Then there is the process of overdetermination.83 In this process, Blacks are over-determined from the outside, premarked, prefigured aesthetically as ugly, fixed as immoral, and zoologically categorized
as primitive animals. On this score, new knowledge (non-alienating and countercolonialist knowledge) of the Black body is always already epistemologically foreclosed.
As Fanon writes, “I am being dissected under white eyes, the only real eyes. I am
fixed.”84 In this way, the Black body appears as something it is rather than as something
that is done to it.
Before considering the white gaze vis-à-vis Hottentot Venus,85 I would like to
address the notion of the reactive value-creating stance of whiteness as sameness. To
refer to whiteness as sameness speaks to the hegemonic core of whiteness. In “Boitelle,”
for example, the white male exoticist did not come to see himself as different in the
presence of the so-called Negress. Rather, his reactive value-creating stance involved an
assimilatory process. He fixed her within the structure of how he is positioned by and
how he positions himself within the economy of whiteness. One might say that her
“difference makes no difference at all, since the difference is always the same.”86 Her
“difference” amounts to sameness given that her “difference” is already known within the
cultural space of white representations that reflect the narcissistic structure of whiteness.
Within the bounds of a white socio-ontological cartography, whites “see” the
Black/colonized, but only through symbols that always already privilege whiteness. The
One (the white) “sees” the Black (the Other) as an instantiation of white normativity or
the same. In a socio-ontological encounter with the Black/colonized, whiteness does not
abandon itself or stray from its familiar white scripts and its familiar acts of scripting.
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Even the comportment of the white body, in its daring, its self-assuredness, its spatial
distancing vis-à-vis the Black, confirms whiteness as the One. Of course, it is through the
physical and spatial movements of the white body that “fixes me, just like a dye is used to
fix a chemical solution.”87 Note that it is the entire white body, its movement, that
functions as a metaphoric gaze that structures the Black as the not-One, that has the
capacity to fix. All that is visible might be said to fall within the panoptic gaze of the
One/the same/the white. Whiteness as the One is deemed “omniscient.” The
Black/Other/colonized/native is rendered permanently visible, always the same. In
Discipline and Punish, permanent visibility is what Foucault says “assures the automatic
functioning of power.”88 Although this is a theme that will reappear through this project,
the Black body internalizes the white gaze such that it continues to exert a controlling
influence on the Black body/self even in the absence of a white gazer. On this score,
whiteness as the One operates under an imperialistic ontology. It is a form of totalization
“in which the same constitutes itself through a form of negativity in relation to the other,
producing all knowledge by appropriating and sublating the other within itself.”89
Whiteness refuses to see itself as alien, as seen, as recognized, as the not-One. For
whiteness to become the not-One would partly involve the destruction of its imperial
epistemological and ontological base from which it gazes. To reject the Black as the
instantiated sameness of whiteness, would force whiteness to interrogate its status as the
One. It might be said that whiteness as the One secures its status as the One vis-à-vis the
construction of the Black as the not-One. Not to dismantle the powerful structuration of
the white gaze, which is linked to political and material power, whiteness occludes the
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possibility to be Other (to be “the not-same”), to see through the web of white meaning
that it has spun.
The Other emerges within cultural semiotic and material structures of power. It is
not the colonized who, in defining him/herself as colonized, interpellates the colonizer.
The colonized is posed as such by the colonizer in defining him/herself as the colonizer.90
As Beauvoir says, “Thus it is that no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once
setting up the Other over against itself.”91 Hence, the reactive value-creating power of
whiteness constructs the Other (read: non-white in this case) as inferior. Whiteness, then,
as a site of reactive value-creating power not only constructs and perpetuates negative
valuations of the Other, but whiteness’s reactive value-creating stance presupposes a
subtext of sameness that underwrites its reaction. Moreover, the colonial intervening
presence of whiteness is deemed that without which the Other could not possibly
advance. In other words, whiteness might be said to be the sine qua non of historical
evolution. As Howard Winant notes:

It was the use made of the “other” to define the self, the reliance on
difference to produce identity, that constituted the cultural dimensions of
modernity on the foundation of racial hierarchy. By relegating most of the
world’s population to the derogatory status of lesser and indeed “other”
beings, by using them to represent identities antithetical to those of the
“civilized” West, Enlightenment culture and its sequelae performed
spectacular acts of symbolic violence.92
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In stream with Winant, critical whiteness theorist Ruth Frankenberg observes:

Colonization also occasioned the reformation of European selves. Central
to colonial discourses is the notion of the colonized subject as irreducibly
Other from the standpoint of a white “self.” Equally significant, while
discursively generating and marking a range of cultural and racial Others
as different from an apparently stable Western or white self, the Western
self is itself produced as an effect of the Western discursive production of
its Others. This means that the Western self and the non-Western other are
co-constructed as discursive products, both of whose “realness” stand in
extremely complex relationships to the production of knowledge, and to
the material violence to which “epistemic violence” is intimately linked.93

According to Fanon, the Black body is held captive by “the white man, who had
woven [the Black body] out of a thousand details, anecdotes, stories.”94 At this juncture, I
will explore how the so-called Hottentot Venus was indeed held captive by the colonial
white gaze95 that had woven her out of a thousand details. To theorize the so-called
Hottentot Venus is to theorize the French male imaginary as it gets expressed through
monopolizing desire and power. Indeed, Hottentot Venus is a mirror through which
nineteenth-century French male desire and power get reflected. As Hortense J. Spillers
notes:
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Let’s face it. I am a marked woman, but not everybody knows my name.
“Peaches” and “Brown Sugar,” “Sapphire” and “Earth Mother,” “Aunty,”
“Granny,” God’s “Holy Fool,” a “Miss Ebony First,” or “Black Woman at
the Podium”: I describe a locus of confounded identities, a meeting ground
of investments and privations in the national treasury of rhetorical wealth.
My country needs me, and if I were not here, I would have to be
invented.96

Functioning as a site of rhetorical wealth, the Black female body is identified
and constructed for her. She inhabits a social universe within which she is
constantly named. As a “sexual abnormality,” Bartmann’s Black body is a site of
discursive formation that is structured through a larger historical a priori that
always already constitutes a white epistemic orientation to the Black (female) body.
In short, the Black female body as marked Other is “trapped” within an “essence” that
functions as an important ontological register that constitutes the AngloAmerican/European as Same/One. She is the exotic phantasm of the white imaginary.
Like the French colonial postcards depicting Algerian women, a phenomenon that was
created between 1900 and 1930, Bartmann’s Black body became the fantasized object of
the Frenchman’s desire and power. Her body became the phantasm of the French scopic
gaze. The scopic gaze directed at Bartmann was a violent act of reduction and mutilation.
In The Colonial Harem, Malik Alloula argues that it is through the aperture of the
French photographer’s camera, which is actually an extension of his voyeurism, that the
Algerian, Oriental female became a sexualized object, an effect of a “vast operation of
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systematic distortion.”97 The postcard became a cheap opening (a form of penetrating)
into the unveiling (strip teasing) of the Orient. It became “the poor man’s phantasm: for a
few pennies, display racks full of dreams. The postcard is everywhere, covering all the
colonial space, immediately available to the tourist, the soldier, the colonist.”98
Not only is the Black female body exotic, it is a site of contradictory investments,
at once desirable and undesirable, known and unknown. It was important that Bartmann
was both an object of sexual interest and yet degraded. In short, to reconfigure her into
“an object of derision, ‘a spectacle, a clown,’ is to strip away her sexual appeal, albeit
perverse and objectified, to the French male spectator, to reinforce and reinscribe
Bartmann’s position in the Manichaean social world as a primitive savage.”99 Hence, one
consistent theme in the European imaginary is that the Black female body was not
“normal”(read: white, civilized). Indeed, it “represents the abnormal in Eurocentric
discourse.”100
Given the connections between anthropology and European expansionism, it is no
wonder that the Black female body, and the Black body more generally, would come to
signify the “abnormal,” the “bizarre.” V.Y. Mudimbe notes that the development of
European anthropology was “a visible power-knowledge political system,” which led to
the “reification of the ‘primitive.’”101 As Pieterse argues, “Anthropology, as the study of
‘otherness,’ never disengaged itself from Eurocentric narcissism.”102
Capturing the gendered, racial and sexual dimensions at stake in the production of
the “truth” of Hottentot Venus, Sharpley-Whiting notes:
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Black women, embodying the dynamics of racial/sexual alterity,
historically invoking primal fears and desire in European (French) men,
represent ultimate difference (the sexualized savage) and inspire repulsion,
attraction, and anxiety, which gave rise to the nineteenth-century
collective French male imaginations of Black Venus (primitive
narratives).103

The production of the “truth” of Hottentot Venus is fundamentally linked to the French
white gaze. Sharpley-Whiting:

I refer to the concept of the (white) male gaze as a desire to unveil, “to
dissect,” “to lay bare” the unknown, in this case the black female. The
gaze “fixes” the black female in her place, steadies her, in order to decode
and comfortably recode her into its own system of representations.104

On this score, one might say that Sarah Bartmann as Hottentot Venus is always already
constrained within the anthropological text of a chain of signifiers. The chain of signifiers
point back to their source: the white racist and racialized episteme. Sarah Bartmann is
caught within the dialectical structure of the same-Other. “Anthropology, as well as
missionary studies of primitive philosophies, are then concerned with the study of the
distance from the Same to the Other.”105
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One can only imagine the pain felt as Bartmann measured her body by the
constructions projected upon her from the unconscious/conscious European imaginary.
Consider the following:

Oh, my god. Becky, look at her butt.
It is so big. She looks like,
One of those rap guys’ girlfriends.
But, y’know, who understands those rap guys?
They only talk to her, because,
She looks like a total prostitute, ‘key?
I mean, her butt, is just so big.
I can’t believe it’s just so round, it’s like,
Out there, I mean—gross. Look!
She’s just so . . . black!106

The above quote is consistent with French European discourse used to describe Sarah
Bartmann. However, the introductory lines are from a rap video in which Sir Mix-A-Lot
performs his famous release, “Baby Got Back.”107 The reader will note the chain of
signifiers that move from having a big butt, to being a prostitute, to being Black. This is
precisely the inter-referential semiotic space within which Bartmann was constructed.
Within the context of early nineteenth century French society, where Bartmann
was put on display for five years (which includes time being displayed in London108) for
the French public to gaze upon, to gaze upon her big butt, French spectatorship109 was an
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active, constructive process that transmogrified Bartmann’s body. One might argue, “But
they were only looking.” However, as I will continue to argue throughout this project,
“the white racist gaze” is itself a performance, an intervention, a violent form of marking,
labeling as different, freakish, animal-like. While in London (where her name was
changed from Saartjie Baartman, which was given to her under Dutch colonial rule in
South Africa, to Sarah Bartmann), Bartmann, who was of African Khoisan cultural
identity, and who stood four feet six inches high, became the “grotesque” prized object to
be “seen” by parties of five and upward in a location at 225 Piccadilly.110 Bartmann later
found herself in Paris. Having parted with her previous “guardians” (Alexander Dunlop
and Hendrik Cezar) in London, her new “guardian” was “a showman of wild animals
named Réaux.”111 Like a monkey, Bartmann was fed small treats in order to entice her to
dance and sing, probably moving in such a way as to clearly exhibit her “large cauldron
pot.”112 For three francs one could either go and “see” the Hottentot Venus or “at rue de
Castiglione and for the same admission price, Réaux was also exhibiting a five-year old
male rhinoceros.”113 One had a choice between two wild and exotic animals. Both were
oddities, placed on specular display,114 waiting to be visually dissected by the curious
French onlookers. Clearly, Bartmann was being violated despite her right to inviolability.
Then, again, “animals” would not have had such rights to inviolability.
Hottentot Venus became the Other through which the French gazers could
measure their own humanity and superiority. Echoing Spillers, the French needed
Bartmann. Similar to the empire or colonial French films of the 1930s, Bartmann was an
outlet for the greatness of French national identity. Sharpley-Whiting writes, “Like
travelogues and documentary films, elaborate feature films, depicting ‘happy savages’
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and exotic and lush landscapes ripe for the taking, helped to garner support for continued
colonial expansion among the French spectators at home.”115 Hence, the creation of
Bartmann and the colonial Other is part and parcel of empire building. The sense of
national failure (given “France’s defeat in the Franco-Prussian War and a not-so-stellar
performance during World War I”116), weakness, and overall fear regarding its status, the
“savage Other” writ large (on the screen) became the medium in terms of which France
could eject all of its historico-psychodynamic crises. The very act of gazing (even if
while sitting in the dark watching a film117) is itself a form of visual penetration by the
phallocentric hegemony of the colonizing gaze. As Sharpley-Whiting argues:

The gaze is always bound up with power, domination, and eroticisation; it
is eroticizing, sexualized, and sexualizing. The indisputable fact that
throngs of a predominantly male, French crowd paid to gaze upon
Bartmann as the essential primitive, as the undeveloped savage unable to
measure up to Frenchness, is undercut by her practically au naturel
presentation.118

Sharpley-Whiting demonstrates how “seeing” Bartmann is inextricably linked to
discourses of power, dominance, and hierarchies. She is aware of the dialectical
relationship between whiteness (as pure, good, innocent) vis-à-vis Blackness (as impure,
bad, freakish, guilty). The French Africanism is tied into the perception of the French as
racially superior. This dialectic is clear where Sharpley-Whiting argues that
“geographically, linguistically, culturally, and aesthetically, France, the French language,
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French culture, and Frenchwomen are privileged sites against which Bartmann, and
hence Africa, are measured as primitive, savage, and grotesque.”119 Within the context of
the French imaginary (a site where race, gender, and class intersect), “truth” about Black
women, and Bartmann in particular, is manufactured to foreclose any possibility of
knowing Black women other than as prostitutes, sexually dangerous, diseased, and
primitive. Historically, and I think that this speaks to the pervasiveness of white male
hegemony, it is interesting to note that late nineteenth century science constructed all
women as pathological (where this is linked to their sexuality), and that they could easily
be “seen” as possessing the bestial characteristics of the Black female Hottentot. Within
this context, it is also interesting that Freud referred to adult white female sexuality as the
“dark continent” of psychology.120 Nevertheless, white women (read: civilized) were still
superior to non-white women (read: savages).
Although she is not writing about the colonial context, it is difficult to resist
making reference to Toni Morrison’s examination of a passage from Ernest
Hemingway’s To Have and To Have Not. The point that she raises speaks to the way in
which white women, though historically oppressed by white men, receive an “existential
wage,” as it were, in virtue of being white when compared to Black/non-white women.
The ideological significance of this example vis-à-vis Bartmann is powerful. Within a
particular scene in the novel, the character Harry is making love to his wife, Marie. The
latter asks:

“Listen, did you ever do it with a nigger wench?”
“Sure.”
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“What’s it like?”
“Like nurse shark.”

Morrison notes:

The strong notion here is that of a black female as the furthest thing from
human, so far away as to be not even mammal but fish. The figure evokes
a predatory, devouring eroticism and signals the antithesis to femininity, to
nurturing, to nursing, to replenishment. In short, Harry’s words mark
something so brutal, contrary, and alien in its figuration that it does not
belong to its own species and cannot be spoken of in language, in
metaphor or metonmy, evocative of anything resembling the woman to
whom Harry is speaking—his wife Marie. The kindness he has done
Marie is palpable. His projection of black female sexuality has provided
her with solace, for which she is properly grateful. She responds to the
kindness and giggles, “You’re funny.”121

At the apex of aesthetic beauty, “Hottentot maidens and Indian squaws are
beautiful because of their comparability to Frenchwomen, the embodiment of beauty
itself.”122 Prima facie, it would appear that to refer to Sarah Bartmann as “Venus” might
function as a term of praise. As Sharpley-Whiting points out, however, the use of the
term “Venus” to describe the Black female body simply re-inscribes the power of the
sameness of European superiority. She writes:
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The Roman deity of beauty, Venus, was also revered as the protectress of
Roman prostitutes, who in her honor erected Venus temples of worship.
Within these temples, instruction in the arts of love was given to aspiring
courtesans. It is the latter image of prostitution, sexuality, and danger that
reproduced itself in narrative and was projected onto black female bodies.
The projection of the Venus image, of prostitute proclivities, onto black
female bodies, allows the French writer to maintain a position of moral,
sexual, and racial superiority.123

To reiterate, it is the European who has created a Manichaean world to buttress
his/her own sense of who he/she is. The creation of “essences” justified what the French
“perceived” to be “true” about Bartmann, and, hence, “true” about themselves. She was
reduced to a wild animal. Just as the Black male was constructed as a walking phallus,124
“most nineteenth-century French spectators did not view her as a person or even a
human, but rather as a titillating curiosity, a collage of buttocks and genitalia.”125 During
a three-day examination of Bartmann, with “a team of zoologists, anatomists, and
physiologists,”126 the prominent naturalist Georges Cuvier also wanted to do a painting of
Bartmann, just as a naturalist would want to get a better picture of the physiology and
physiognomy of any other wild and exotic animal. The idea here was to create a kind of
physiological cartography of Bartmann, to map her primitive differences against the
backdrop of the European subject.
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“To see” her “big butt” (what was called steatopygia) and her other alleged
hypertrophies (enlarged labia minoria and her large clitoris) was not to “see” her at all.
Concerning the labia minoria or the Hottentot apron, “investigators of racial differences
would spend the eighteen century debating its anatomical specifications, producing in the
absence of actual evidence a variety of phantasmatic representations.”127 Having the
opportunity to examine Bartmann’s body after she died, Cuvier’s “objective scientific
gaze” revealed the “truth” about her Black body. Sharpley-Whiting:

This very detailed examination of Bartmann’s sex, proceeding by the
nominating of the visible, consists of Cuvier’s use of measurements,
adjectives, and metaphors. His language is flowery and feminine: fleshy,
rippled petals, crests, and heart-shaped figures. Bartmann’s sex blooms,
blossoms, before his very eyes; the body becomes legible. As he reads and
simultaneously writes a text on Bartmann, the mystery of the dark
continent unfolds.”128

In short, Bartmann’s body “came into being” through the existence of categories that
were ideologically fashioned. As John Bird and Simon Clarke note, “White people’s
phantasies about black sexuality, about bodies and biology in general, are fears that
center around otherness, otherness that they themselves have created and brought into
being.”129 Commenting specifically on the “objective” sketches made of Bartmann,
Sharpley-Whiting notes:
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The sketches allow the viewer to observe, document, and compare her
various physiognomic and physiological differences, differences that
vastly differentiate the Other from the European self. Through this
comparative/definitive exercise, Bartmann will be relegated to the terrain
of the primitive—the lowest exemplum of the human species—while the
European will always assume the pinnacle of human development. This
process of mediating the self, of reflecting the self, through the body of the
black female Other begins and rebegins with every regard.130

Bartmann’s body becomes the distorted sexual thing that “it is” in terms of the
paradigm/the epistemic regime through which she is being “seen.” Hence, the European
power/knowledge position of spectatorship—mediated by certain atavistic assumptions,
fears, theories regarding polygenetic evolutionary development—gives rise to an
historical accretion, making for the epistemic conditions under which Bartmann
“appears.” If we think of Bartmann as the “referent” of the colonial gaze and colonial
discourse, Bartmann then becomes Hottentot Venus qua referent, that is, Hottentot Venus
as phantasm is located within the discursive field of white re-presentational power.
Concerning the power of discursivity, Robert Young notes, “ [Edward] Said’s most
significant argument about the discursive conditions of knowledge is that the texts of
Orientalism ‘can create not only knowledge but also the very reality they appear to
describe.’”131 The white colonist is able to control the epistemic conditions according to
which Hottentot Venus becomes an ideological emergent phenomenon, while maintaining
its own distance as a mere observer.
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On this score, in reference to Hottentot Venus, French male knowledge
production and the perception of “reality” is negotiated within a context that ensures
immunity to its own vested interests and desires. For this elaborate colonial form of
vision to take place, cognitive agents operate under unacknowledged presuppositions that
guarantee the “veridicality” of their perception of the projected object of speculation.
Hence, one might say that the use of the term “truth” when describing Hottentot Venus is
not an epistemic indicator of correspondence, but a way of ideologically fixing belief
within the entire colonial form of orientation vis-à-vis the dark Other. If the truth of one’s
beliefs were determined simply by stimulation from the external world,132 then by simply
opening one’s eyes one could immediately “see” Hottentot Venus. However, to “see”
Hottentot Venus requires nothing short of having lived within a particular languagegame, a form of life that always already runs ahead, as it were, creating conditions of
intelligibility that have already reconfigured the meaning of some x, for example, as that
“dark continent.” In this way, because Hottentot Venus is not simply given, the
construction of the phantasmatic object must involve a constant process of maintenance,
not only at the level of projecting new information onto Bartmann, providing ad hoc
explanations to sustain conceptual coherence, but also to maintain ignorance regarding
the role that one plays in the construction. As David Bloor reminds us, “Nature has power
over us, but only [we] have authority”133 Such authority signifies “the ways in which
seemingly impartial, objective academic disciplines had in fact colluded with, and indeed
been instrumental in, the production of actual forms of colonial subjugation and
administration.”134
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To the extent that Bartmann does not approximate the norm of European identity,
which is also always already “seen” and “always constituted within, not outside,
representation,”135 she is deemed ersatz, the femme fatale. Drawing from the antagonistic,
binary logic of Prospero/Caliban, JanMohamed notes:

If . . . African natives can be collapsed into African animals and mystified
still further as some magical essence of the continent, then clearly there
can be no meeting ground, no identity, between the social, historical
creatures of Europe and the metaphysical alterity of the Calibans and
Ariels of Africa. If the differences between the Europeans and the natives
are so vast, then clearly . . . the process of civilizing the natives can
continue indefinitely. The ideological function of this mechanism, in
addition to prolonging colonialism, is to dehistoricize and desocialize the
conquered world, to present it as a metaphysical “fact of life,” before
which those who have fashioned the colonial world are themselves
reduced to the role of passive spectators in a mystery not of their
making.136

Sander L. Gilman asks, “How do we organize our perceptions of the world?”137
This question is particularly important when it comes to my efforts to articulate the
structure of the white gaze. Gilman, too, is concerned with the issue of how the world is
“seen” from the perspective of the white gaze. Gilman ties perception, historical
convention, and iconography together in relationship to the science of medicine, that
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science that helped to “uncover” the “reality” of Bartmann’s “inferiority”/
“primitiveness.” Gilman writes:

Medicine offers an especially interesting source of conventions since we
do tend to give medical conventions special “scientific” status as opposed
to the “subjective” status of the aesthetic conventions. But medical icons
are no more “real” than “aesthetic” one’s. Like aesthetic icons, medical
icons may (or may not) be rooted in some observed reality. Like them,
they are iconographic in that they represent these realities in a manner
determined by the historical position of the observers, their relationship to
their own time, and to the history of the conventions which they deploy.138

The (iconic) ideologically “seen” difference in the buttocks and genitalia of the Hottentot
was very important “evidence” to justify drawing the distinction between lines of
evolutionary development. Hence, autopsies were performed, differences were “seen,”
“facts” and “realities” suddenly “appeared.” Gilman:

The polygenetic argument is the ideological basis for all the dissections of
these women. If their sexual parts could be shown to be inherently
different, this would be a sufficient sign that the blacks were a separate
(and, needless to say, lower) race, as different from the European as the
proverbial orangutan.139

157
Of course, within a larger context, Africa was deemed that mysterious exotic dark
continent. It is “the light of white maleness [that] illumines this dark continent.”140 Of
course, this same light (read: “reason”) illuminated Bartmann’s dark body, creating a
historico-racial schematized body through which her alleged simian origins were
“recognized.” Sharpley-Whiting:

[Georges] Cuvier’s description abounds with associations of black
femaleness with bestiality and primitivism. Further, by way of
contemplating Bartmann as a learned, domesticated beast—comparing her
to an orangutan—he reduces her facility with languages, her good
memory, and musical inclinations to a sort of simian-like mimicry of the
European race. By the nineteenth century, the ape, the monkey, and
orangutan had become the interchangeable counterparts, the next of kin, to
blacks in pseudoscientific and literary texts.141

The comparison of Bartmann to an ape is central to the French imaginary concerning the
bestial nature of Black women. The sexual appetites of Black people, more generally,
were believed to have no end. Some French theorists even claimed that Black women
copulated with apes.142 Robyn Wiegman examines Edward Long’s History of Jamaica
(1774), which proposed a sexual compatibility between Hottentot women and apes. Long
notes, “[L]udicrous as the opinion may seem, I do not think that an oran-outang husband
would be any dishonour to an Hottentot female.”143 After all, or so the myth goes, the
Black female body is insatiable. The point here is that Bartmann became the site for an
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entire range of sexual “perversions.” Bartmann’s “anomalous” labia was linked to the
over-development of the clitoris, which was linked to lesbian love. Hence, “the
concupiscence of the black is thus associated also with the sexuality of the lesbian.”144
The “truth” of the Black body is not outside the domain of white colonial power.
White colonial power is exercised through its representational practices that actually
constrain the Black body, passing over its embodied integrity and creating a chimera
from its own imaginary. As Dyer notes:

White discourse implacably reduces the non-white subject to being a
function of the white subject, not allowing her/him space or autonomy,
permitting neither the recognition of similarities nor the acceptance of
differences except as a means for knowing the white self.145

Mythopoetic constructions of Bartmann were designed to “discover” the hidden
“truths” about Blacks in general and Black women in particular. It was this “knowledge”
that enabled the European/Anglo-American to repress many of its fears. “Sexual and
racial differences,” as Sharpley-Whiting argues with psychoanalytic insight, “inspires
acute fears in the French male psyche. Fear is sublimated or screened through the desire
to master or know this difference, resulting in the production of eroticized/exoticized
narratives of truth.”146 Bartmann was codified as the very epitome of unrestrained
sexuality. Through various rituals (medically mapping her body while dead or alive,
voyeuristically peeping and peering), Bartmann was further “seen” as strange, a
throwback to some earlier moment in evolutionary history. Bartmann became what her
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gazers, operating in bad faith, wanted to “see.” She was the victim of “a totalizing system
of representation, that allows the seen body to become the known body.”147 Through the
process of “looking,” which I have argued is a powerful act of construction, Bartmann
was ontologized into the Hottentot Venus. In “becoming” Hottentot Venus, Bartmann
underwent a process of dehumanization.
One can only imagine how Sarah Bartmann felt as she learned to re-inhabit her
body, to re-relate to it, as her consciousness of her body was shaped through a racial and
racist epidermal schema. After all, everywhere she looked she found herself reconfigured
by (heteronomous) gazes that returned her to herself, distorted and animal-like,
imprisoned in a primitive essence. Within the semiotic social field of whiteness, she
became an ontological cipher, waiting to be assigned meaning and identity from without,
perhaps forever estranged from her African Khoisan identity.148 One can only imagine her
traumatic experience of double consciousness, how she underwent the psychological
duress of seeing herself through white symbols that ontologized her into the epitome of
grotesqueness. Even while alone, the white gaze was no doubt operative. As she
measured her soul by the tape of a white French world that gazed/looked on in amused
contempt, desire, and pity, one wonders whether or not she had the dogged strength to
keep herself from being torn asunder.149
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Chapter IV
Whiteness and the Phenomenological Return of the Black Body: Franz Fanon,
Ralph Ellison, Malcolm X, and W. E. B. Du Bois

It is sometimes advantageous to be unseen, although it is most often rather
wearing on the nerves.
—Ralph Ellison
Blackness embodies the ostracized. Under the duress of racial domination, I
undergo the now familiar two-pronged process of externally imposed
inferiorization and subsequent internalization of that inferiority. It is thus probable
that in my routine state, I carry White hatred of me within me as my own
property.
—Thomas F. Slaughter
When you’ve made a man [woman] hate himself [herself], you’ve really got it and
gone.
—Malcolm X

I write out of a personal existential context. This context is a profound source of
knowledge connected to my “raced” body. Hence, I write from a place of lived embodied
experience, a site of exposure. In philosophy, the only thing that we are taught to
“expose” is a weak argument, a fallacy or someone’s “inferior” reasoning power. The
embodied self is bracketed and deemed irrelevant to theory, superfluous and cumbersome
in one’s search for truth. It is best, or so we are told, to reason from nowhere. Hence, the
white philosopher/author presumes to speak for all of “us” without the slightest mention
of his/her “raced” identity. Self-consciously writing as a white male philosopher, Crispin
Sartwell observes:

Left to my own devices, I disappear as an author. That is the “whiteness”
of my authorship. This whiteness of authorship is, for us, a form of
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authority; to speak (apparently) from nowhere, for everyone, is
empowering, though one wields power here only by becoming lost to
oneself. But such an authorship and authority is also pleasurable: it yields
the pleasure of self-forgetting or apparent transcendence of the mundane
and the particular, and the pleasure of power expressed in the
“comprehension” of a range of materials.1

To theorize the Black body one must “turn to the [Black] body as the radix for
interpreting racial experience.”2 It is important to note that this particular strategy also
functions as a lens through which to theorize and critique whiteness; for the Black body’s
“racial” experience is fundamentally linked to the oppressive modalities of the “raced”
white body. However, there is no denying that my own “racial” experiences or the social
performances of whiteness can become objects of critical reflection. In this chapter, my
objective is to describe and theorize situations where the Black body’s subjectivity, its
lived reality, is reduced to instantiations of the white imaginary resulting in what I refer to
as “the phenomenological return of the Black body.”3 These instantiations are embedded
within and evolve out of the complex social and historical interstices of whites’ efforts at
self-construction through complex acts of erasure vis-à-vis Black people. These acts of
self-construction, however, are myths/ideological constructions predicated upon
maintaining white power. As James Snead has noted, “Mythification is the replacement
of history with a surrogate ideology of [white] elevation or [Black] demotion along a
scale of human value.”4
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I think that it is important to note that I do not hold the view that Blacks only offer
experiences while whites provide the necessary theoretical framing of those experiences.
Consistent with my own theorizations on the subject, philosopher Lewis Gordon
recognizes the historical impetus of this move toward experience and how such a move as
such is not problematic. “After all,” as Gordon argues, “for a long time there was the
denial of black inner life, of black subjectivity; the notion of a black person’s point of
view suggested consciousness of the world, which would call for dynamics of reciprocal
recognition.”5 Of course, the objective is to 1) avoid a reductionist move whereby Blacks
are reduced to experience and 2) avoid the move of making whites the oracle
interpretative voices of Black experiences. Hence, by implication, the objective is to
avoid a relationship of dependency and to assert an agential Black exegetical role in
rendering their experiences meaningful.
To have one’s dark body invaded by the white gaze and then to have that body
returned as distorted is a powerful experience of violation. The experience presupposes
an anti-Black lived context, a context within which “the lived experience of the Black”
unfolds. The late writer, actor, and activist Ossie Davis recalls that at the age of six or
seven two white police officers told him to get into their car. They took him down to the
precinct. They kept him there for an hour, laughing at him and eventually pouring cane
syrup over his head. This only created the opportunity for more laughter, as they looked
upon the “silly” little Black boy. If he was able to articulate his feelings at that moment,
think of how the young Davis was returned to himself: “I am an object of white laughter,
a buffoon.” The young Davis no doubt appeared to the white police officers in ways that
they had approved. They set the stage, created a site of Black buffoonery, and enjoyed
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their sadistic pleasure without blinking an eye. Sartwell notes that “the [white] oppressor
seeks to constrain the oppressed [Blacks] to certain approved modes of visibility (those
set out in the template of stereotype) and then gazes obsessively on the spectacle he has
created.”6 Davis notes that he “went along with the game of black emasculation, it
seemed to come naturally.”7 After that, “the ritual was complete.”8 He was then sent
home with some peanut brittle to eat. Davis knew at that early age, even without the
words to articulate what he felt, that he had been violated. He refers to the entire ritual as
the process of “niggerization.” He notes:

The culture had already told me what this was and what my reaction to
this should be: not to be surprised; to expect it; to accommodate it; to live
with it. I didn’t know how deeply I was scarred or affected by that, but it
was a part of who I was.9

Davis, in other words, was made to feel that he had to accept who he was, that
“niggerized” little Black boy, an insignificant plaything within a system of ontological
racial differences. This, however, is the trick of white ideology; it is to give the
appearance of fixity, where the “look of the white subject interpellates the black subject
as inferior, which, in turn, bars the black subject from seeing him/herself without the
internalization of the white gaze.”10 On this score, it is white bodies that are deemed
agential. They configure “passive” Black bodies according to their will. But it is no
mystery; for “the Negro is interpreted in the terms of the white man. White-man
psychology is applied and it is no wonder that the result often shows the Negro in a
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ludicrous light.”11 As in the case of the elevator, where I lived my body as confiscated,
Davis too had his young Black body stolen. The surpluses being gained by the whites in
each case are not economic. Rather, it is through existential exploitation that the surpluses
extracted can be said to be ontological—“semblances of determined presence, of full
positivity, to provide a sense of secure being.”12
When I was about seventeen or eighteen, my white math teacher initiated such an
invasion, pulling it off with complete calm and presumably self-transparency. Given the
historical construction of whiteness as the norm, his own “raced” subject position was
rendered invisible. After all, he lived in the real world, the world of the serious man,
where values are believed anterior to their existential founding. As I recall, we were
discussing my plans for the future. I told him that I wanted to be a pilot. I was earnest
about this choice, spending a great deal of time reading about the requirements involved
in becoming a pilot, how one would have to accumulate a certain number of flying hours.
I also read about the dynamics of lift and drag that impact a plane in flight. After no
doubt taking note of my firm commitment, he looked at me and implied that I should be
realistic (a code word for realize that I am Black) about my goals. He said that I should
become a carpenter or a bricklayer. I was exposing myself, telling a trusted teacher what I
wanted to be, and he returned me to myself as something that I did not recognize. I had
no intentions of being a carpenter or a bricklayer (or a janitor or elevator operator for that
matter).
The situation, though, is more complex. It is not that he simply returned me to
myself as a carpenter or a bricklayer when all along I had this image of myself as a pilot.
Rather, he returned me to myself as a fixed entity, a “niggerized” Black body whose
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epidermal logic had already foreclosed the possibility of being anything other than what
was befitting its lowly station. He was the voice of a larger anti-Black racist society that
“whispers mixed messages in our ears,”13 the ears of Black people who struggle to think
of themselves as a possibility. He mentioned that there were only a few Black pilots and
that I should be more realistic. (One can only imagine what his response would have been
had I said that I wanted to be a philosopher, particularly given the statistic that Black
philosophers constitute about 1.1% of philosophers in the US). Keep in mind that this
event did not occur in the 1930s or 1940s, but around 1979. The message was clear.
Because I was Black, I had to settle for an occupation suitable for my Black body,14
unlike the white body that would no doubt have been encouraged to become a pilot. As
with Davis, having one’s Black body returned as a source of impossibility, one begins to
think, to feel, to emote: “Am I a nigger?” The internalization of the white gaze creates a
doubleness within the psyche of the Black, leading to a destructive process of superfluous
self-surveillance and self-interrogation.
This was indeed a time when I felt ontologically locked into my body. My body
was indelibly marked with this stain of darkness. After all, he was the white mind, the
mathematical mind, calculating my future by factoring in my Blackness. He did not “see”
me, though. Like Ellison’s invisible man, I occupied that paradoxical status of “visible
invisibility.” Within this dyadic space, my Black body phenomenologically returned to
me as inferior. To describe the phenomenological return of the Black body is to disclose
how it is returned as an appearance to consciousness, my consciousness. The (negatively)
“raced” manner in which my body underwent a phenomenological return, however,
presupposes a thick social reality that has always already been structured by the ideology
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and history of whiteness. More specifically, when my body is returned to me, the white
body has already been constituted over centuries as the norm, both in European and
Anglo-American culture, and at several discursive levels from science to philosophy to
religion.15 In the case of my math teacher, his whiteness was invisible to him as my
Blackness was hyper-visible to both of us. Of course, his invisibility to his own
normative here is a function of my hyper-visibility. It is important to keep in mind that
white Americans, more generally, define themselves around the “gravitational pull,” as it
were, of the Black.16 The not of white America is the Black of white America. This not is
essential, as is the invisibility of the negative relation through which whites are
constituted. All of embodied beings have their own “here.” My white math teacher’s
racist social performances (for example, his “advice” to me), within the context of a
white racist historical imaginary, asymmetric power relations, suspends and effectively
disqualifies my embodied here. What was the message communicated? Expressing my
desire to be, to take advantage of the opportunities for which Black bodies had died in
order to secure, my ambition “was flung back in my face like a slap.”17 Fanon:

The white world, the only honorable one, barred me from all participation.
A man was expected to behave like a man. I was expected to behave like a
black man—or at least like a nigger. I shouted a greeting to the world and
the world slashed away my joy. I was told to stay within bounds, to go
back where I belonged.18
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According to philosopher Bettina Bergo, drawing from the thought of Emmanuel
Levinas, “perception and discourse—what we see and the symbols and meanings of our
social imaginaries—prove inextricably the one from the other.”19 Hence, the white math
teacher’s perception, what he “saw,” was inextricably linked to social meanings and
semiotic constructions and constrictions that opened up a “field of appearances”
regarding my dark body. As was argued in the case of the white woman on the elevator,
there is nothing passive about the white gaze. There are racist socio-historical and
epistemic conditions of emergence that construct not only the Black body, but the white
body as well. So, what is “seen” when the white gaze “sees” “my body” and it becomes
something alien to me?
In stream with phenomenology, consciousness is always “consciousness-of.”
What was my white math teacher “conscious-of”? The answer to this question, to which I
already alluded, can only be given through the acknowledgment of a culturally and
historically sedimented “racialized” consciousness-of structure. Moreover, all acts of
consciousness for phenomenology are meaning-giving. However, white racist acts of
consciousness vis-à-vis the Black body are meaning-giving in ways that specifically
distort the Black body. After all, they are acts of meaning-giving that are structured
through the white imaginary. Indeed, the construction of the “manners-of-givenness” of
the Black body as inferior, for example, is contingent upon white racialized
consciousness-of a socially ordered, and, by phantasmatic extension, naturally ordered
world. Conversely, the construction of the “manners-of-givenness” of the white body is
contingent upon the distortion or negation of the Black through the reactionary valuecreating force of whites. But instead of my white teacher self-consciously admitting to
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the role that he has played, and continues to play, in the perpetuation of this white social
imaginary (and the racist way in which he is conscious-of my body) in his everyday
social performances, ideologically he “apprehends” the Black body, my Black body, as
pre-given in its constitution as inferior. Of course, he cannot claim responsibility for the
entire stream of white racist consciousness given the fact that these constructions are part
of a larger historical imaginary, a social universe of white racist discourse which comes
replete with long, enduring myths, perversions, distorted profiles, and imaginings of all
sorts regarding the non-white body.
African-American philosopher Charles Johnson notes that one can become blind
to seeing “other ‘meanings’ or profiles presented by the object if the perceiver is locked
within the ‘Natural Attitude,’ as Husserl calls it, and has been conditioned culturally or
racially to fix himself upon certain ‘meanings.’”20 On my reading, within the framework
of an anti-Black racist world, the meaning of the Black body is a synthesis formed
through racist distal narratives, narratives that ideologically inform whites of their
“natural superiority,” that enable whites to flee their part in constructing a “racial regional
ontology” fit for Blacks only. Phenomenologically, I experience myself as “the profile
that their frozen intentionality brings forth.”21 After all, whiteness is deemed the horizon
of all horizons, unable to recognize the imaginary “racial” dualism that it has created. The
white gaze has constructed the Black “as the specular negative images of itself and that
hence, abstracts the white person into an abstract knower.”22 Hence, the meaning of my
lived body is phenomenologically skewed when white consciousness negatively intends
me as my Black (read: “inferior,” “evil”) body. I become alienated, thrown outward, and
assigned a meaning not of my intending. In my everydayness, I live my body from an
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existential here. Wherever I go, I go embodied. As Gordon writes, “Here is where I am
located. That place, if you will, is an embodied one: it is consciousness in the flesh. In the
flesh, I am not only a point of view, but I am also a point that is viewed.”23 In my
phenomenological return, however, I am reduced to a point that is viewed. My here is
experienced as a there. The experience of being reduced to one’s “Black exteriority,”
rendered thing-like, through processes of meaning-intending acts of white racist
intentional consciousness, is insightfully described by Charles Johnson:

I am walking down Broadway in Manhattan, platform shoes clicking on
the hot pavement, thinking as I stroll of, say, Boolean expansions. I turn,
thirsty, into a bar. The dimly-lit room, obscured by shadows, is occupied
by whites. Goodbye, Boolean expansions. I am seen. But, as black, seen as
stained body, as physicality, basically opaque to others . . . . Their look, an
intending beam focusing my way, suddenly realizes something larva in
me. My world is epidermalized, collapsed like a house of cards into the
stained casement of my skin. My subjectivity is turned inside out like a
shirtcuff.24

In the face of my white teacher’s racism, I could have decided to lose myself in
laughter, but, like Frantz Fanon, I was aware “that there were legends, stories, histories,
and above all historicity.”25 My dark embodied existence, my lived historical being,
becomes a chain of signifiers: inferior, Nigger, evil, dirty, sullen, immoral, lascivious. As
Fanon says, “In the unconscious, black = ugliness, sin, darkness, immorality.”26 When
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phenomenologically returned to myself, I appear no longer to possess my body, but a
“surrogate” body whose meaning does not exist anterior to the performance of white
spectatorship. Under the white gaze, “the Black has no ontological resistance in the eyes
of the white man.”27 Again, this involves the asymmetry of representational power. The
Black body appears to have no resistance vis-à-vis the somatic regulatory epistemic
regime of whiteness. The Black body becomes ontologically pliable, just a thing to be
scripted in the inverse image of whiteness. Cutting away at the Black body, the Black
becomes resigned to no longer aspire to his/her own emergence or upheaval.28 Blacks
undergo processes of ontological stagnation and epistemological violence while standing
before the one “true” gaze. In very powerful discourse describing how he was
“unmercifully imprisoned,” how the white gaze forced upon him an unfamiliar weight,
Fanon asks, “What else could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage
that spattered my whole body with black blood?”29
The burden of the white gaze disrupts my first-person knowledge, causing
“difficulties in the development of [my] bodily schema.”30 The white gaze constructs the
Black body into “an object in the midst of other objects.”31 The non-threatening “I” of my
normal, everyday body schema becomes the threatening “him” of the Negro kind/type.
Under pressure, the corporeal schema collapses. It gives way to a racial epidermal
schema.32 “Below the corporeal schema,” says Fanon, “I had sketched a historico-racial
schema. The elements that I used had been provided for me not by ‘residual sensations
and perceptions of a primarily tactile, vestibular, kinesthetic, and visual character,’ but by
the other, the white man [woman].”33 In other words, Fanon began to “see” himself
through the lens of a historico-racial schema. Note that there was nothing intrinsic to his
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physiology that forced his corporeal schema to collapse; it was the “Black body” as
always already named and made sense of within the context of a larger semiotics of
privileged white bodies that provided him with the tools for self-hatred. His “darkness,” a
naturally occurring phenomenon,34 became historicized, residing within the purview of
the white gaze, a phenomenal space created and sustained by socio-epistemic and
semiotic communal constitutionality. On this score, the Black body is placed within the
space of constitutionality vis-à-vis the racist white same, the One. Against the backdrop
of the sketched historico-racial (racist) scheme, Fanon’s “darkness” returns to him,
signifying a new genus, a new category of man: A Negro!35 He inhabits a space of
anonymity (he is every Negro), and yet he feels a strange personal responsibility for his
body. He writes:

I was responsible at the same time for my body, for my race, for my
ancestors. I subjected myself to an objective examination, I discovered my
blackness, my ethnic characteristics; and I was battered down by tomtoms, cannibalism, intellectual deficiency, fetishism, racial defects, slaveships, and above all else, above all: “sho’ good eaten’.”36

Fanon writes about the Black body and how it can be changed, deformed, and
made into an ontological problem vis-à-vis the white gaze. Describing an encounter with
a white woman and her son, Fanon narrates that the young boy screams, “Look at the
nigger!…Mama, a Negro!”37 Fanon:
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My body was given back to me sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in
mourning in that white winter day. The Negro is an animal, the Negro is
bad, the Negro is mean, the Negro is ugly; look, a Negro, it’s cold, the
Negro is shivering because he is cold, the little boy is trembling because
he is afraid of the nigger, the nigger is shivering with cold, that cold that
goes through your bones, the handsome boy is trembling because he thinks
that the nigger is quivering with rage, the little white boy throws himself
into his mother’s arms: Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.38

The white imagery of the Black as a savage beast, a primitive and uncivilized animal, is
clearly expressed in the boy’s fear that he is to be eaten by the “cannibalistic” Negro.
“The more that Europeans dominated Africans, the more ‘savage’ Africans came to
seem; cannibalism represented the nadir of savagery . . . .”39
Presumably, the young boy does not know that his words will (or how they will)
negatively impact Fanon. However, for Fanon, the young white boy represents the whole
of white society’s perception of the Black. The boy turns to his white mother for
protection from the impending Black doom. The young white boy, however, is not simply
operating at the affective level, he is not simply being haunted, semi-consciously, by a
vague feeling of anxiety. Rather, he is operating both at the affective and the discursive
level. He says, “Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.” This locutionary act carries a
perlocutionary force of effecting a phenomenological return of Fanon to himself as a
cannibalistic threat, as an object to be feared. Fanon, of course, does not “want this
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revision, this thematization.”40 African-American philosopher Robert Gooding-Williams
notes:

For Fanon, the boy’s view of the Negro (of Fanon himself in this case) as
an object of fear is significant, as it suggests (1) that the image (racial
epidermal schema) of the Negro posited by the boy’s verbal performance
has a narrative significance and (2) that such images are available to the
boy as elements of a socially shared stock of images that qualify the
historicity (the historical situatedness) both of the boy and of the Negro he
sees.41

One is tempted to say that the young white boy sees Fanon’s Black body “as if ” it
was cannibal-like. The “seeing as if,” however, is collapsed into a “seeing as is.” In
Fanon’s example, within the lived phenomenological transversal context of white racist
behavior, the “as if ” reads too much like a process of “conscious effort.” On my reading,
“youngwhiteboyexperiencesniggerdarkbodycannibalevokestrepidation” is what appears
in the uninterrupted lived or phenomenological flow of the young white boy’s racist
experience. There is no experience of the “as if.” Indeed, the young white boy’s linguistic
and non-linguistic performance is indicative of a definitive structuring of his own selfinvisibility as: “whiteinnocentselfinrelationshiptothedarkniggerself.” This definitive
structuring is not so much remembered or recollected as it is always present as the
constitutive imaginary background within which the white boy is both the effect and the
vehicle of white racism; indeed, he is the orientation of white epistemic practices, ways
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of “knowing” about one’s (white) identity vis-à-vis the Black Other. The “cultural white
orientation” is not an “entity” whose origin the white boy needs to grasp or recollect
before he performs whiteness. He is not a tabula rasa, one who sees the Black body for
the first time and instinctively says, “Mama, the nigger’s going to eat me up.” On this
score, the boy does indeed undergo an experience of the dark body as frightening, but
there is no concealed meaning, as it were, inherent in the experience qua experience of
Fanon’s body as such. Rather, the fright that he experiences vis-à-vis Fanon’s dark body
is always already “constructed out of . . . social narratives and ideologies.”42 The boy is
already discursively and affectively acculturated through micro-processes of “racialized”
learning (short stories, lullabies, children’s games,43 pre-linguistic experiences, etc.) to
respond “appropriately” in the presence of a Black body. The gap that opens up within
the young white boy’s perceptual field as he “sees” Fanon’s Black body has already been
created while innocently sitting on his mother’s lap.44 His mother’s lap constitutes a
“raced” zone of security. This point acknowledges the fundamental “ways the
transactions between a raced world and those who live in it racially constitute the very
being of those beings.”45 The association of Blackness with “nigger” and cannibalism is
no mean feat. Hence, on my view, he is already attending to the world in a particular
fashion; his affective and discursive performances bespeak the (ready-to-hand) inherited
white racist background according to which he is able to make “sense” of the world.
Like moving my body in the direction of home, or only slightly looking as I reach
my hand to retrieve my cup of hot tea which is to the left of my computer screen, the
young white boy dwells within/experiences/engages the world of white racist practices in
such a way that the practices qua racist practices have become invisible. The young boy’s
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response is part and parcel of an implicit knowledge of how he gets around in a
Manichean world. Being-in a racist world, a lived context of historicity, the young boy
does not “see” the dark body as “dark” and then thematically proceed to apply negative
value predicates to it, where conceivably the young boy would say, “Yes, I ‘see’ the dark
body as existing in space, and I recognize the fact that it is through my own actions and
intentions that I predicate evil of it.” “In order even to act deliberately,” as philosopher
Hubert L. Dreyfus maintains, “we must orient ourselves in a familiar world.”46
My point here is that the young white boy is situated within a familiar white racist
world of intelligibility, one that has already “conceded” whiteness as “superior” and
Blackness as “inferior” and “savage.” Involved within the white racist Manichean world,
the young boy has found his orientation, he has already become part and parcel of a
constituted and constituting force within a constellation of modes of being that are
deemed natural. However, he is oblivious to the historicity and cultural conditionedness
of these modes of being. Despite the fact that “race” neither exists as a naturally
occurring kind within the world nor cuts at the joints of reality, notice the evocative
power of “being Black,” which actually points to the evocative power of being white. The
dark body, after all, would not have evoked the response that it did from the young white
boy were it not for the historico-mythos of the white body and the power of white
normativity through which the white body has been pre-reflectively structured, resulting
in forms of action that are as familiar and as quotidian as my reaching for my cup of tea.
His white racist performance is a form of everyday coping within the larger unthematized
world of white social coping. On this score, one might say that the socio-ontological
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structure that gives intelligibility to the young white boy’s racist performance is prior to a
set of beliefs of which he is reflectively aware.
Notice that Fanon undergoes the experience of having his body “given back to
him.” Having been “given back to him,”47 Fanon undergoes a profound
phenomenological experience of being disconnected from his body schema. Fanon
experiences his body as flattened out or sprawled out before him. And, yet, Fanon’s
“body,” its corporeality, is forever with him. It never leaves. So, how can it be “given
back”? The physical body that Fanon has/is remains in space and time. It does not
somehow disappear and make a return. And, yet, there is a profound sense in which his
“corporeality” is interwoven with particular discursive practices. Under the white gaze,
Fanon’s body is not simply the res extensa of Cartesian dualism. Within the context of
white racist practices vis-à-vis the “Black” body, there is a blurring of boundaries
between what is “there” as opposed to what has been “placed there.” Hence, the body’s
“corporeality,” within the context of lived history, is shaped through powerful cultural
schemata. This does not mean that somehow the “body” does not exist. After all, it is my
body that forms the site of white oppression. To jettison all discourse regarding the body
as “real,” being subject to material forces, etc., in the name of the “postmodern body,” is
an idealism that would belie my own philosophical move to theorize from the position of
my real lived embodiment. The point here is that the “body” is never given as such, but
always “appears there” within the context of some set of conditions of emergence.48 The
conditions of emergence for the phenomenological return of Fanon’s body qua inferior or
bestial are grounded in the white social imaginary, its discursive and non-discursive
manifestations. Having undergone a gestalt-switch in his body image, his
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knowledge/consciousness of his body has become “solely a negating activity. It is a thirdperson consciousness. The body is surrounded by an atmosphere of certain
uncertainty.”49
Linda Alcoff discusses this phenomenological sense of being disjointed as a form
of “near-incommensurability between first-person experience and historico-racial schema
that disenables equilibrium.”50 What this points to is the “sociogenic” basis of the
“corporeal malediction”51 experienced by Blacks. On this score, “the black man’s
[woman’s] alienation is not an individual question.”52 In other words, the distorted
historico-racial schema that occludes equilibrium takes place within the realm of
sociality, a larger complex space of white social inter-subjective constitutionality “of
phenomena that human beings have come to regard as ‘natural’ in the physicalist sense of
depending on physical nature.”53 Of course, within the context of colonial or neocolonial
white power, the objective is to pass off what is historically contingent as that which is
ahistorically given.
In Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison’s “thinker-tinker,” his “Jack-the-Bear,” his
invisible man, also experiences the phenomenological “return of his Black body.”
Although he tries to live the life of an individualist, he soon finds that this is an illusion,
particularly given the fact that at every turn he learns that his efforts at “autonomy” are
threatened by whites. After all, he is constantly under erasure, unable to stand out as an
individual. In an anti-Black racist context, it is difficult for Blacks to be “just me.” His
Blackness prevents a mode of living according to liberalistic ideals. More accurately, it is
whites who are able to enact a “just me” status because of their normative status.
However, they prevent the Black from hiding in a fictive world where race ceases to
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matter. Society whispers, “Don’t forget. Don’t think that you’re above race, that you’re
one of us. After all, you are Black!”
The invisible man knows himself as embodied flesh and blood, and yet he is
invisible. His body is, and yet he is not. The invisible man observes:

I am an invisible man. No, I am not a spook like those who haunted Edgar
Allen Poe; nor am I one of your Hollywood-movie ectoplasms. I am a man
of substance, of flesh and bone, fiber and liquids—and I might even be
said to possess a mind. I am invisible, understand, simply because people
[in this case white people] refuse to see me.54

The reader will note that in Fanon’s example, the Black body is seen as hyper-visible,
while, for Ellison, the Black body is seen as invisible. In the case of hyper-visibility, the
Black body becomes excessive. Within this racially saturated field of hyper-visibility, the
Black body still functions as the unseen as it does in the case of its invisibility. Perhaps in
the case of invisibility, though, one has a greater opportunity of not being seen while
taking advantage of this invisibility. Think here of those whites who may have disclosed
pertinent information in the company of Blacks that had been rendered invisible,
information that may have functioned to empower them in some way. The ocular frame
of reference in both cases is central. “Seen invisibility” suggests the paradoxical sense in
which the Black body is a “seen absence.” In either case, the Black body “returns”
distorted.
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There is a fundamental phenomenological slippage between one’s own felt
experience of the Black body and how others (whites) understand/construct/experience/
see that “same” Black body. Ellison also raises the issue of how the Black Other is a
reflection of the white same. Ellison says that when whites “see him” they see
“themselves, or fragments of their imagination—indeed, everything and anything except
me.”55 The invisible man’s invisibility is a racialized invisibility. The white One sees
everything and anything vis-à-vis the Black Other, but not the Black. Fanon questions,
“A feeling of inferiority? No, a feeling of nonexistence.”56 Felt invisibility is a form of
ontological and epistemological violence resulting from “the construction of their inner
eyes with which they [whites] look through their physical eyes upon reality.”57
Note Ellison’s reference to the inner eyes that look through the physical eyes. The
“inner eyes” are precisely those white racist, epistemic perspectives, interlocked with
various social and material forces, from which whites “see” the world/violate Black
subjectivity. The “inner eyes” which Ellison refers to as “a matter of construction” raises
the issue of the sociogenic. Ellison’s invisible man is “seen” against the unthematized
backdrop of everyday forms of white coping. To be “seen” in this way is not to be seen at
all. Gordon: “The black is invisible because of how the black is ‘seen.’ The black is not
heard because of how the black is ‘heard.’ The black is not felt because of how the black
‘feels.’”58 Within this context, the Black is trapped, always already ontologically closed.
In each case, the Black is held captive by the totalizing power of whiteness. When the
Black speaks or does not speak, such behavior has been codified in the white imaginary.
To be silent “confirms” passivity and docility. To speak, to want to be heard, “confirms”
brazen contempt and Black rage. The point here is that no matter the response, Black

186
emergence outside of whiteness’s scopic power is foreclosed. Ellison’s invisible man
knows the frustration of being “seen” and yet “not seen.” There is an upsurge of
protestation whereby the Black body begins to make itself felt. Invisible man:

You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real
world, that you’re a part of all the sound and anguish, and you strike out
with your fists, you curse and you swear to make them recognize you.
And, alas, it’s seldom successful.59

Again, note that even as he protests it is seldom successful. Perhaps this is partly why the
invisible man decides to “walk softly so as not to awaken the sleeping ones. Sometimes it
is best not to awaken them; there are few things in the world as dangerous as
sleepwalkers.”60
Throughout the text, the invisible man finds himself objectified/distorted by the
white gaze. Hence, like Fanon, he has difficulties in the development of his bodily
schema. Consider the Black males who are made to participate in the battle royal. This is
a site constructed for white men only, indeed, for white eyes. During the fight, the Blacks
are all blindfolded. Symbolically, the blindfolds replicate the larger socio-economic
powerlessness of Blacks vis-à-vis whites. The Black body is looked at. The Black body
does not return the gaze. The white body is the looker. The battle royal is a spectacle, a
visual (or ocular) power zone within which Black male bodies are mere surfaces. Before
they are instructed to fight like animals for the pleasure of the lookers, however, a naked
blond white woman, with a small American flag tattooed on her abdomen, sensuously
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dances before them. One might say that she is “dangled” before them like a piece of
white flesh that they dare not touch or look upon. Indeed, “some of the boys stood with
lowered heads, trembling.”61 Some of the white men threatened them if they actually
looked, while others were threatened if they did not look. After all, she is a white woman
and therefore tabooed. She is not to be looked at by Black males, and yet some of the
white men forced them to look. This creates a psychosexual “complex fusion of desire
and aversion.”62
The Battle royal is a site of pain, pleasure, hatred, misogyny, and white myths
interwoven into a sadistic and erotic spectacle. It is a site of white male terror, anxiety,
and desire. I would argue that the white men—the “bankers, lawyers, judges, doctors, fire
chiefs, teachers, merchants”63—create a context of sexual intensification through the
unthinkable juxtaposition of the Black male bodies with the white female, creating an
erotic space in terms of which the white male imaginary is able to “get off” at the thought
of watching a Black male desiring a white woman. The erotic ritual is designed to
intensify the pleasure of the white men as they imagine one of the Black men having sex
with the blond white woman. Referring to the early days of Malcolm X’s career as a
hustler, Sartwell notes, “Thus interracial sex has a very intense and particular erotic/
specular power, an erotic power that draws the white men . . . to stare obsessively at
black men fucking white women.”64
It is also through the eyes (inner eyes) of white women that the protagonist is
rendered invisible. Ellison explores this theme through the female character, Sybil. She
never really sees our protagonist. All that she sees is her own distorted and sexually
perverse projections upon the Black male body. He describes himself as “Brother Taboo-
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with-whom-all-things-are-possible”65 She is interested in symbolically enacting the myth
of the “Black rapist.” She wants him to take her against her will, to play at being raped by
a Black “buck.” “But I need it,” she says, uncrossing her thighs and sitting up eagerly.
“You can do it, it’ll be easy for you, beautiful. Threaten to kill me if I don’t give in. You
know, talk rough to me beautiful.”66 She describes him as “ebony against pure snow.”67
She describes her husband as “forty minutes of brag and ten of bustle.”68 She describes
the protagonist, however, as having unbelievable sexual endurance, who she wants “to
tear [her] apart.”69 Playing into her fantasies, and playing within his own invisibility, he
says, “I rapes real good when I’m drunk.”70 She replies, “Ooooh, then pour me
another.”71 In a state of mythopoetic (and masochistic) frenzy she says, “Come on, beat
me, daddy - you - you big black bruiser. What’s taking you so long?” she said. “Hurry
up, knock me down! Don’t you want me?”72 He never rapes her, but constructs the
moment with a different semiotic spin, writing on her belly with lipstick: “SYBIL, YOU
WERE RAPED BY SANTA CLAUS, SURPRISE.”73 Invisible man has unveiled the
core of Sybil’s projections. What she wants is a fantasy that does not exist. The point
here, though, is that Ellison provides a rich narrative portrayal of the psychosexual
dynamics involved in the erasure of Black male identity vis-à-vis white female desire for
the Black body as phantasmatic object.
Throughout the text, Ellison’s protagonist is never really in charge of who he is,
which is another manifestation of his invisibility and powerlessness. When he joins the
Brotherhood,74 which is where he thinks he will finally gain recognition, he is still treated
as amorphous, invisible. During a moment in the text where he is used to give a speech at
a rally, invisible man notes:
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The light was so strong that I could no longer see the audience, the bowl
of human faces. It was as though a semi-transparent curtain had dropped
between us, but through which they could see me—for they were
applauding—without themselves being seen.75

Significant here is the influx of light. In one way or another throughout the text, the
protagonist has had to contend with the blinding light of whiteness, its power to see, to
gaze, to control. Here again, the protagonist cannot return the gaze, he is seen, but cannot
see. Indeed, he cannot see that he is being tricked by the Brotherhood. Beneath the façade
of an intrinsic interest in the invisible man, the Brotherhood want him as a political and
ideological speaking Black body, a mere verbal Black surface. For example, a character
named Emma asks, “But don’t you think he should be a little blacker?”76 His subjectivity
and humanity are not valued. Rather, it is his Blackness that simply functions as a site of
political semiosis; he is a manipulated political tool. The invisible man notes, “Maybe she
wants to see me sweat coal tar, ink, shoe polish, graphite. What was I, a man or a natural
resource?”77 Perhaps the history of American slavery offers the answer: he is a means to
a larger white purpose.
Ellison explores the dialectics of how whiteness is constructed through the
reconstruction/negation of Blackness through a brilliant example where the protagonist
gets a job working for a paint plant. As Ellison arrived at the plant, he sees a large sign
that reads: “KEEP AMERICA PURE WITH LIBERTY PAINTS.”78 Working under Mr.
Kimbro, invisible man is told how to make the paint. He is instructed to open each bucket
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of paint and to put in ten drops of a liquid that is black. To his surprise, as the black liquid
disappears, the pure white paint appeared. After completing a few buckets, Mr. Kimbro
exclaims, “That’s it, as white as George Washington’s Sunday-go-to-meetin wig and as
sound as the all mighty dollar! That’s paint!” he said proudly. “That’s paint that’ll cover
just about anything!”79 Another white employee, Lucius Brockway, later describes the
pure white paint as “Optic White.” Describing how he helped to create the slogan for
Optic White paint, Brockway says, “If It’s Optic White, It’s the Right White.”80
The symbolism regarding the black liquid is fascinating. It raises the dynamics of
Black erasure vis-à-vis whiteness. Just as the paint’s quality of pure white needs the black
drops, “racialized” whiteness as normative, moral, good, and pure is dependent upon the
projection of the Black body as “inferior,” “stained,” and “impure.” Of course, by the
time the paint as become pure white, there is no trace of Blackness. Think here of white
America’s denial that its very existence is inextricably linked to the presence of Black
people. On this score, the large sign rings true, America must be kept pure. The pure
whiteness of the paint is also said to “cover just about anything.” Hence, whiteness
“covers” that which is sullen, dirty, evil. It does away with the unclean. As will be
demonstrated in chapter seven, the tragic character Pecola Breedlove, in Toni Morrison’s
The Bluest Eye, believes that whiteness can “cover” over her Black ugly features,
permanently washing from her the stain of Blackness. Also, think here of how American
culture “covers” the cultural productions by Black people. To acknowledge Blackness,
after all, might lead to the uncovering of whiteness. It might also be said that the power
and normative structure of whiteness, through the denial of its own history, “covers” over
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its acts of injustice and brutality through an ideological structure that gives the
appearance of all things are proceeding as normal.
“Optic White” can literally be translated as “eye white” or “seeing white” or
figuratively as, “I white,” where the verb is deleted. Of course, “Optic” raises the issue of
the gaze. Optically, the protagonist is rendered invisible. Optically, whites refuse to see
him or they see him as if he was the reflected image given back as a result of being
“surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass.”81 As Optic White is “Right White,” the
white gaze, as it renders the protagonist invisible/distorted, is exempt from critique
because white is always right. Moreover, since Optics is the science that deals with the
propagation of light, which, historically, Europeans have supposedly brought with them
to backward cultures of “darkness,” Optic White is “Right White.” Of course, on this
score, Africa became “dark” as “explorers, missionaries, and scientists flooded it with
light, because the light was refracted through an imperialist ideology that urged the
abolition of ‘savage customs’ in the name of civilization.”82
As stated earlier, felt invisibility is a form of ontological and epistemic violence, a
form of violence initiated through white spectatorship, a generative gazing that violates
the integrity of the Black body. The white gaze defines me, skewing my own way of
seeing myself. But the gaze does not “see” me, it “sees” itself. This is similar to what
happened in Malcolm X’s early experience with his English teacher, Mr. Ostrowski.83
The reader will note the parallel between my early experience with my math teacher and
Malcolm’s early experience. At Mason Junior High School, Malcolm was the only Black
student in the eighth grade. Although Malcolm mentions that he had not given thought to
it before, he says that he disclosed to Mr. Ostrowski that he wanted to be a lawyer.
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Malcolm makes it clear that Ostrowski always provided encouragement to white students
when asked for his advice regarding their future careers. Ostrowski replied:

Malcolm, one of life’s first needs is for us to be realistic. Don’t
misunderstand me, now. We all here like you, you know that. But you’ve
got to be realistic about being a nigger. A Lawyer—that’s no realistic goal
for a nigger. You need to think about something that you can be. You’re
good with your hands—making things. Everybody admires your carpentry
shop work. Why don’t you plan on carpentry? People like you as a
person—you’d get all kinds of work.84

The reader will note the perverse construction of “We all here like you.”
Ostrowski is attempting to obfuscate the fact that he is a racist. He wants to clear his
conscience by stating upfront his “affections” for Malcolm right before he violates
Malcolm’s body integrity, reducing him to a nigger, as someone who must learn to live
with mediocrity and accept his place within the “natural” order of things. The young
Malcolm is returned to himself qua nigger. “To forcibly strip someone of their selfimage,” as Drucilla Cornell argues, “is a violation, not just an offense.”85 Keep in mind
that at this time Malcolm had already been elected class president and was receiving
grades that were among the highest in the school. Yet, all that Ostrowski “saw” was a
nigger. Despite the countervailing empirical evidence, Ostrowski “sees” more of
whiteness’s same. As Malcolm notes, “I was still not intelligent enough, in their eyes, to
become whatever I wanted to be.”86 Malcolm’s point is consistent with what has been
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theorized thus far. First, within a white racist order of things, for the Black, there is
apparently no being-as-possibility beyond the totalizing white gaze. As argued above,
this is where perception, epistemology and ontology are collapsed. Second, Malcolm’s
first-person perspective (“I desire,” or “I have my own perspective on the world”) is
disrupted and rendered void vis-à-vis the third-person (white) perspective that has
negatively over-determined his Blackness.
Malcolm also describes his history teacher, Mr. Williams, as one who was fond of
“nigger jokes.”87 Of course, such “nigger jokes” were told at Malcolm’s expense and no
doubt “confirmed” many of the circulating myths consciously or unconsciously held by
the white students. Malcolm notes:

[W]e came to the textbook section on Negro history. It was exactly one
paragraph long. Mr. Williams laughed through it practically in a single
breath, reading aloud how the Negroes had been slaves and then were
freed, and how they were usually lazy and dumb and shiftless. He added, I
remember, an anthropological footnote of his own, telling us between
laughs how Negroes’ feet were “so big that when they walk, they don’t
leave tracks, they leave a hole in the ground.”88

Although Malcolm heard these racist jokes, one might say, in stream with Alexander G.
Weheliye, that “the white subject’s vocal apparatus merely serves to repeat and solidify
racial difference as it is inscribed in the field of vision.”89 Whether through the ritualistic
practice of Ostrowski putting Blacks in their “natural” place or through the racist jokes
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told by Mr. Williams, whites “adjusted their microtomes”90 and objectively cut away at
Malcolm’s reality. After such racist acts, Malcolm later admitted, “I just gave up.”91
Fanon:

I slip into corners, and my long antennae pick up the catch-phrases strewn
over the surface of things—nigger underwear smells of nigger—nigger
teeth are white—nigger feet are big—the nigger’s barrel chest—I slip into
corners, I remain silent, I strive for anonymity, for invisibility. Look, I will
accept the lot, as long as no one notices me.92

Malcolm was reduced to the anonymous Black Other. He is returned to himself as
an absence. Although “accepted” by whites, he is accepted only on their terms. “We
[whites] will sweep you up into significance; we offer you a name: our name. But as we
inscribe ourselves on you, we erase you.”93 Hence, there is no genuine acceptance. There
is only further distancing from the Black body. Only as a mascot does Malcolm come to
experience his “acceptance” (his erasure!) by whites. Malcolm:

They all liked my attitude, and it was out of their liking for me that I soon
became accepted by them—as a mascot, I know now. They would talk
about anything and everything with me standing right there hearing them,
the same way people would talk freely in front of a pet canary. They
would even talk about me, or about “niggers,” as though I wasn’t there, as
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if I wouldn’t understand what the word meant. A hundred times a day,
they used the word “nigger.”94

Malcolm is cognizant of the hidden questions residing at the heart of white acceptance:
How much are you (the Black) willing to erase of yourself? How much are you willing to
conform to our (white) stereotype of you? How much can you hate yourself, while
forgetting that it came from us? On this score, within the context of an anti-Black racist
context, white acceptance comes at an existential ontological price for Black people: a
mode of non-being.
Critiquing the “good-will” white, Malcolm notes, “I don’t care how nice one is to
you; the thing you must always remember is that almost never does he really see you as
he sees himself, as he sees his own kind.” Expounding upon the Ellisonian theme of
invisibility, Malcolm notes:

What I am trying to say is that it just never dawned upon them that I could
understand, that I wasn’t a pet, but a human being. They didn’t give me
credit for having the same sensitivity, intellect, and understanding that
they would have been ready and willing to recognize in a white boy in my
position. But it has historically been the case with white people, in their
regard for black people, that even though we might be with them, we
weren’t considered of them. Even though they appeared to have opened
the door, it was still closed. Thus they never did really see me.95
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When one thinks about the long-range negative impact of Ostrowski’s and Mr.
Williams’ racism on the young Malcolm, one can understand the dynamic of Black selfhatred. Self-surveillance or getting the Black body to regulate itself in the physical
absence of the white gaze is a significant strategy of white racist ideology. Malcolm had
internalized the white gaze. Through the act of conking his hair, he policed his Black
body in the image of whiteness:

This was my first really big step toward self-degradation: when I endured
all of that pain, literally burning my flesh to have it look like a white
man’s hair. I had joined that multitude of Negro men and women in
America who are brainwashed into believing that the black people are
“inferior”—and white people “superior”—that they will even violate and
mutilate their God-created bodies to try to look “pretty” by white
standards.96

It is not difficult to comprehend the powerful appeal that the Nation of Islam had
for the older Malcolm. Given the murder of Malcolm’s father, Earl Little, who was
believed to have been killed by white racists because of his affiliation with Marcus
Garvey’s Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), given that the KKK had
surrounded Malcolm’s house and threatened his family while his mother, Louise, was
pregnant with him, given that the white state social service system had broken his family
apart,97 and given that his mother was declared insane by white doctors, the Nation of
Islam’s narrative of Yacub’s history would certainly have helped Malcolm to make sense
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of white America. According to the narrative of Yacub’s history, a Black mad scientist
named Yacub rebelled against Allah and created, along with 59,999 of his followers, evil
white people.98
In his seminal work, The Souls of Black Folk (1903), W.E.B. Du Bois, on my
reading, also locates the problem of white racism within the realm of the sociogenic. As
will be shown, Du Bois’ conceptualization of double consciousness attests to the
significance of the lived experience of race.99 Du Bois provides a revealingly profound
example of how “Blackness” gets negatively configured within a (white) gestural,
semiotic space. In the following example, the reader will note the phenomenological
moment of slippage, resulting from the white gaze/glance, between how he may have
understood himself and how he suddenly feels different from the other (white) children.
Du Bois writes:

In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into the boys’ and girls’
heads to buy gorgeous visiting cards,—ten cents a package—and
exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused
my card,—refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me
with a certain suddenness that I was different from the others; or like,
mayhap in heart and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a
vast veil.100

In this example, Du Bois suggests that he was in some sense similar to the other
(white) children. In “heart,” “life” and “longing” he appears to have felt a kindred
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relationship. But something went awry. There was this sudden self-doubt, which
presumably did not exist prior to this encounter. Hence, Du Bois undergoes a distinctive
phenomenological process of coming to appear to himself differently. He moves from a
sense of the familiar to the unfamiliar. A slippage occurs in his corporeal schema. In this
example, it is Du Bois’ body schema that has become problematic. He is forced to deal
with the meaning of a racial epidermal schema as a result of (or introduced by) the
meaning-constituting activities of the young girl’s racialized consciousness. As with
Fanon, Ellison’s invisible man, and Malcolm X, he was “taken outside” of himself and
returned. Surely, Du Bois is the same self that he was prior to the gestured glance
performed by the tall white girl. Surely, he was classified as “Black” prior to his
encounter that day with the tall newcomer, though he may not have experienced this
classificatory designation as something problematic or as a mark of disdain. But is he the
same? As the tall white girl refused him, she sent a semiotic message, a message whose
constructive meaning was immediately registered in the consciousness of the young Du
Bois. Her body language, her refusal, involved a ritual that had tremendous power. The
ritual glance (and the refusal) took place within a pre-interpreted space of racial meaning.
This is the only way in which the glance’s meaning could have registered for Du Bois
that something had become problematic at the level of his phenotype. I would argue that
in order for Du Bois to have understood the specific racial meaning of the glance he had
to have a certain level of racial narrative competence. In short, part of Du Bois’ horizon
involved an awareness of difference, but also an awareness of difference in an
exclusionary sense.
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The ritual glance is both a product of this space and a vehicle through which
racial and racist performances are perpetuated. Note that she is said to have “refused it
peremptorily, with a glance.” This involves the arrogance and self-centeredness of
whiteness, a form of white narcissism articulated within the form of a glance. The
performance of whiteness, then, is not restricted to a set of articulated propositional
beliefs or in the deployment of various rhetorical strategies. White racism can be
expressed through the modality of physical comportment, a way of inhabiting physical
space, a way of glancing/not glancing. “Seen” through the eyes of the newcomer, Du
Bois’ Black body was already coded as different, as a problem, as that which should be
avoided. Though young, the tall white newcomer had already learned complex ways of
white coping, ways of “seeing” the Black body as a site of avoidance. It is through this
exclusionary act that her whiteness as norm is reinforced. The tall newcomer’s racial
status as white is marked and congealed as white in this communicational space, though
she never spoke. Within the context of this highly raced communicational space, Du
Bois’ body came to matter. Indeed, the newcomer’s ritual glance functioned to produce
Du Bois’ body in its materiality as “raced”; her glance “produced bodily effects through
immediate [non] verbal acts that reify racial difference.”101 By refusing to exchange with
Du Bois, he returns to himself as excluded. The white girl, however, returns to herself as
the center; her glance policed her whiteness as a privileged (unspoken) site.102 She never
says in a declarative voice, “I’m white!” Her whiteness is interpellated, performed,
claimed, through a non-verbal gesture of negation. Although young and “innocent,” her
actions reflect larger political hallmarks of white racism: the audacity and power to
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relegate non-whites to the margins, to segregate them, to instill in them the sense of
existing outside the space of white normalcy and normativity.
The tall white newcomer has been situated (and situates her own identity) in the
role of a member of a “superior” group. As within a dramaturgical narrative (as homo
histrio), she plays her assigned role well. One might say that she has been given a role to
play from within a distal narrative (an influential narrative of white supremacy that
extends back into her past) that comes replete with assumptions regarding how to act in
the presence of a dark body qua Other. In other words, she has become a prisoner of a
distal anti-Black racist hermeneutic that informs her actions vis-à-vis differentially
“raced” bodies. Through the performative act of refusal, though words were presumably
never spoken, Du Bois became, even if unknowingly, “a damn nigger.” Through her
glance and her refusal, she reduced Du Bois to his Blackness, a mere surface, a thing of
no particular importance, though important enough to reject and avoid. Du Bois was no
longer within the group, but outside of it, left looking upon himself through the eyes of
the newcomer. One might say the meaning-giving acts of his own consciousness vis-à-vis
his own dark body for all intents and purposes functioned as an instantiation of white
racist consciousness intending the Black body as Other. Hence, he became Other to
himself.
Like Fanon, who describes the phenomenological dimensions of corporeal
malediction, Du Bois undergoes a similar process, one that he terms “double
consciousness.” Du Bois:
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It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always
looking at one’s self through the eyes of others, of measuring one’s soul
by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. One
ever feels his twoness—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts,
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose
dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn asunder.103

Du Bois began to experience a disjointed relationship with his body. In this process of
disjointedness, one ceases to experience one’s identity from a locus of self-definition and
begins to experience one’s identity from a locus of externally imposed meaning. In short,
Du Bois is forced into a state of doubleness, seeing himself as Other (the inferior Black)
through the gaze of the young girl as the One (the superior white). This white scopically
imposed meaning of Blackness as dirty, immoral, and inferior, interpellates the Black
body as a pre-scopic essence. The tall white newcomer’s glance marked Du Bois as
absent, as different. Her white glance possesses the power to confiscate the Black body,
only to have it returned to Du Bois as a burden and a curse.
At the heart of each of the aforementioned experiences (those of Fanon, Ellison’s
invisible man, Malcolm X, and Du Bois) emerges a question. The question is posed from
within what Du Bois calls the “veil.” Whether interpreted as symbolic of systemic
racism/structural segregation or as that which “indicates, rhetorically, a knowledge of
difference that is itself discursively based,”104 the veil is fundamentally linked to the
hegemonic performances of whiteness, performances that can lead to deep societal
fissures or to profound levels of existential phenomenological fracture. It is the latter that
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is emphasized within this project. So what is this question? It is not a question born of
solitude, but of racial, embodied struggle, a struggle that emerges within the interstices of
a powerful racializing white regime. It is not born of hyperbolic doubt, a questioning of
all things that fail the test of epistemological indubitability, though it may involve, as Du
Bois says, “incessant self-questioning and the hesitation that arises from it.”105 The
question is: “What, after all, am I?”106 Unlike Descartes, who asked a similar question—
“But what then am I?”—after arriving at the indubitable Cogito argument and who
reaches the eventual conclusion that he is a thing that thinks,107 Du Bois’ question is
linked to his suddenly having been racially marked. Far from a disembodied thing that
thinks (res cogitans), Du Bois feels marked, cursed in his racially epidermalized
embodiment. Stuart Hall writes:

It is one thing to position a subject or set of peoples as the Other of a
dominant discourse. It is quite another thing to subject them to that
‘knowledge,’ not only as a matter of imposed will and domination, by the
power of inner compulsion and subjective con-formation to the norm.108

Hence, one plausible answer to the question might be: “I am a problem! Who I am as an
embodied Black body is a problem!” This response to the question would indicate, as
Halls says, an “inner compulsion and subjective con-formation to the [white] norm.”
The connection between Blackness and the concept of “being a problem” is
central to Du Bois’ understanding of what it means to be Black in white America. Du
Bois reveals how whites engage in a process of duplicity while speaking to Blacks. They
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often approach the Black in a hesitant fashion, saying “I know an excellent coloured man
in my town; or, I fought at Mechanicsville; or, Do not these Southern outrages make your
blood boil?”109 Du Dois maintains that the real question that whites want to ask is: “How
does it feel to be a problem?”110 Du Bois also points out that as a Black, some whites
greet you with a certain amicable comportment. They talk with you about the weather,
while all along performing hidden white racists scripts:

My poor, un-white thing! Weep not nor rage. I know, too well, that the
curse of God lies heavy on you. Why? That is not for me to say, but be
brave! Do your work in your lowly sphere, praying the good Lord that into
heaven above, where all is love, you may, one day, be born—white!111

Notice with regard to the notion of being a problem, whites do not ask, “How
does it feel to have problems?” The question is raised to the level of the ontological:
“How does it feel to be a problem?” As a problem, from the perspective of white
mythopoetic constructions, Du Bois is aware that it is the “stained” Black body at both
the phenotypic and the consanguineous level that is deemed criminal. He notes:

Murder may swagger, theft may rule and prostitution may flourish and the
nation gives but spasmodic, intermittent and lukewarm attention. But let
the murderer be black or the thief brown or the violator of womanhood
have a drop of Negro blood, and the righteousness of the indignation
sweeps the world.112
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The reader will note that the question regarding how it feels to be a problem does not
apply to people who have at some point in their lives felt themselves to be a problem. In
such cases, feeling like a problem is a contingent disposition that is relatively finite and
transitory. When Black people are asked the same question by white America, the
relationship between being Black and being a problem is non-contingent. It is a necessary
relation. Outgrowing this ontological state of being a problem is believed impossible.
Hence, when regarding one’s “existence as problematic,” temporality is frozen. One is a
problem forever. However, it is important to note that it is from within the white
imaginary that the question “How does it feel to be a problem?” is given birth. To be
human is to be thrown-in-the-world.
To be human not only means to be thrown within a context of facticity, but it also
means to be in the mode of the subjunctive. It is interesting to note that the etymology of
the word “problem” suggests the sense of being “thrown forward,” as if being thrown in
front of something, as an obstacle. Within the white imaginary, to be Black means to be
born an obstacle at the very core of one’s being. To ex-ist as Black is not “to stand out”
facing an ontological horizon filled with future possibilities of being other than what one
is. Rather, being Black negates the “ex” of existence. Being Black is reduced to facticity.
For example, it is not as if it is only within the light of my freely chosen projects that
things are experienced as obstacles, as Sartre might say; as Black, by definition, I am an
obstacle. As Black, I am the very obstacle to my own meta-stability and transphenomenal being. As Black, I am not a project at all. Hence, within the framework of
the white imaginary, to be Black and to be human are contradictory terms.
Du Bois, akin to Toni Morrison, is aware of the strategic significance of averting

205
the critical gaze from the racial object (the Black) to the racial subject (the white). In
1920, in a powerful and engaging chapter entitled “The Souls of White Folk,” Du Bois
writes:

I see these souls [the souls of white folk] undressed and from the back and
side. I see the working of their entrails. I know their thoughts and they
know that I know. This knowledge makes them now embarrassed, now
furious! They deny my right to live and be and call me misbirth! My word
is to them mere bitterness and my soul, pessimism. And yet as they preach
and strut and shout and threaten, crouching as they clutch at rags of facts
and fancies to hide their nakedness, they go twisting, flying by my tired
eyes and I see them ever stripped—ugly, human.113

At this juncture, I will provide a delineation of what Du Bois’ “tired eyes” have
seen of whiteness “ever stripped.” As stated earlier, in my view, critical whiteness
theorists have not given the attention to this pivotal chapter that it deserves. Du Bois says
of whites that he is “singularly clairvoyant.”114 He claims to be able to see the working of
their entrails. Du Bois’ project is to demystify whiteness, to reveal “the mechanisms by
which whiteness has reproduced its foundational myths.”115 Hence, Du Bois might be
said to work within the critical space of ideology exposure. Historically situating the
whiteness of Pan-Europeanism, Du Bois writes, “Today…the world in a sudden,
emotional conversion has discovered that it is white and by token, wonderful!”116 Blacks,
under this “religion of whiteness,”117 as Du Bois says, come to see themselves as inferior,
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often resulting in a powerful form of psychological deformation. Within the context of
white power and brutality, Black people have come to internalize negative images of
themselves, thus resulting in what I have previously referred to as epistemic violence.
Aware of how myths harden into “empirical truths,” Du Bois writes:

How easy, then, by emphasis and omission to make children believe that
every great soul the world ever saw was a white man’s soul; that every
great thought the world ever knew was a white man’s thought; that every
great dream the world ever sang was a white man’s dream.118

Many Blacks, through white “emphasis and omission,” have come to internalize the
myth, at their own psychological peril, that whiteness is supreme. This raises the larger
issue of how whites exclude non-whites from playing significant roles in the movement
of human history. Through the deployment of “meta-narrative” historical constructions,
white (read: western) civilization is unified across space and time to represent the apex of
human genius, scientific thought, political organization, philosophical speculation, and
ethical behavior. As Du Bois notes, though, this is achieved through “emphasis and
omission,” which points to the interest-laden, self-referential dynamics of whiteness. On
this score, Black children are taught to believe that “Blackness” is an aberration, that
Black people, those who carry the human stain, are stupid by nature, uncivilized, and
uneducable. Blackness is said to be that which sullies the “purity” of whiteness. Indeed,
all is beautiful without Blackness; all is rational without Blackness; all, indeed, is perfect
without Blackness. “In fine,” Du Bois writes, “that if from the world were dropped
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everything that could not fairly be attributed to White Folk, the world would, if anything,
be even greater, truer, better than now.”119
Du Bois’ “tired eyes” have seen even more. As long as Blacks resign themselves
to “naturally” assigned stations in life, whites are content to provide them with gifts for
minimal sustainability. As long as Blacks remain docile and thankful for “barrels of old
clothes from lordly and generous whites, there is much mental peace and moral
satisfaction.”120 However, as soon as Blacks begin to question the entitlement of whites
to the best things that life has to offer, and when their “attitude toward charity is sullen
anger rather than humble jollity,”121 whites charge Blacks with impudence. They say
“that the South is right, and that Japan wants to fight America.”122 Note how Du Bois has
internationalized the rationalizations of whiteness vis-à-vis the Japanese, the so-called
Yellow Negro. Whiteness, within this context, functions as a trope of capitalist
domination, exploitation, and cultural imperialism.
Du Bois notes that as whites begin to think that Blacks are insisting upon their
right to human dignity, as John Jones did,123 and as whites subsequently begin an
unapologetic wage of brutality and oppression against Black people, “the descent to Hell
is easy.”124 This “descent to Hell” is a powerful image. Du Bois sees whiteness as a form
of misanthropy, a form of hatred that lusts for Black blood. Du Bois:

I have seen a man—an educated gentleman—grow livid with anger
because a little, silent, black woman was sitting by herself in a Pullman
car. He was a white man. I have seen a great, grown man curse a little
child, who had wandered into the wrong waiting-room, searching for its
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mother: “Here, you damned black —.” He was white. In Central Park I
have seen the upper lip of a quiet, peaceful man curl back in a tigerish
snarl of rage because black folk rode by in a motor car. He was a white
man.125

The reader will note the refrain, “He was a white man.” Du Bois uses this refrain to
establish a deepening and deafening portrayal of anti-Black racist hatred.
One tragic way in which this hatred has historically expressed itself is in the form
of lynching, that spectacle of white fear, anxiety, desire, and sexual psychopathology,
with its attendant pleasure reserved for the white racist scopophiliac. “These lynchings,
then, formed a crucial part of the black subject’s ecology both as physical threats and
media representations,” according to Weheliye, “making them subject to the look of
white folks, yet unable to return the look.”126 Within this context, Du Bois speaks of the
“lust of blood”127 that fuels the madness of lynching Black bodies, that “strange fruit”
about which Billie Holiday sang. Du Bois was aware of how it really did not matter
whether or not the Black person that was lynched had done anything wrong. All that
mattered was that some Black, any Black, had to pay. Blood had to be spilled to satisfy
and appease the white demigods. With deep psychological insight into the “entrails” of
whiteness, Du Bois observes:

We have seen, you and I, city after city drunk and furious with
ungovernable lust of blood; mad with murder, destroying, killing, and
cursing; torturing human victims because somebody accused of crime

209
happened to be of the same color as the mob’s innocent victims and
because that color was not white! We have seen—Merciful God! in these
wild days and in the name of Civilization, Justice, and Motherhood—what
have we not seen, right here in America, of orgy, cruelty, barbarism, and
murder done to men and women of Negro descent.”128

Du Bois places the responsibility on whites to be honest about their anti-Black
racism. He writes, “Ask your own soul what it would say if the next census were to report
that half of black America was dead and the other half dying.”129 He responds:

I suffer. And yet, somehow, above the suffering, above the shackled anger
that beats the bars, above the hurt that crazes there surges in me a vast
pity—pity for a people imprisoned and enthralled, hampered and made
miserable for such a cause, for such a phantasy!130

It is important to focus on Du Bois’ use of such terms as “imprisoned,” “enthralled,”
“hampered,” “miserable,” and “phantasy.” Du Bois feels pity for those who are white,
because they have to live with the lie of being “greater” than non-whites by virtue of
“natural design”; they live their whiteness in bad faith, covering over the truth that
whiteness is not beyond interrogation. Substituting the historical constructivity of
whiteness for “manifest destiny,” whites remain imprisoned within a space of white
ethical solipsism (only whites possess needs and desires that are truly worthy of being
respected131). Although I will say more about this in chapter eight, it would seem that
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many whites would rather remain imprisoned within the ontology of sameness, refusing
to reject the ideological structure of their identities as “superior.” The call of the Other
qua Other remains unheard within the space of whiteness’s sameness. Locked within
their self-enthralled structure of whiteness, whites occlude the possibility of developing
new forms of ethical relationality to themselves and to non-whites. It is partly through the
process of abandoning their hegemonic, monologistic discourse (functioning as the
“oracle voice”) that whites might reach across the chasm of (non-hierarchical) difference
and embrace the non-white Other in his/her Otherness. “A true and worthy ideal,” as Du
Bois says, “frees and uplifts a people.”132 He adds, “But say to a people: ‘The one virtue
is to be white,’ and people rush to the inevitable conclusion, “Kill the ‘nigger’!” Of
course, the idea that “the one virtue is white” is a false ideal, for it “imprisons and
lowers.”133
Du Bois writes of the arrogance of white power mongers: “These super-men and
world-mastering demi-gods listened, however, to no low tongues of ours, even when we
pointed silently to their feet of clay.”134 Whiteness, however, takes itself as that
transcendent universality that is beyond the realm of particularity. It is Black people who
embody particularity, who have “feet of clay.” Whiteness, however, embodies all that is
good, moral, beautiful, and supreme. This is confirmed in terms of a veritable social
field/stream of “truths”:

This theory of human culture and its aims has worked itself through warp
and woof of our daily thought with a thoroughness that few realize.
Everything great, good, efficient, fair, and honorable is “white”;
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everything mean, bad, blundering, cheating, and dishonorable is “yellow”;
a bad taste is “brown”; and the devil is “black.” The changes of this theme
are continually rung in picture and story, in newspaper heading and
movie-picture, in sermon and school book, until, of course, the King can
do no wrong—a White Man is always right and a Black Man has no rights
which a white man is bound to respect.135

The last line in this quote is an explicit reference to the famous Dred Scott decision in
which (white) Chief Justice Roger B. Taney declared that Dred Scott and his wife,
Harriet, who had petitioned to be freed, would remain enslaved. How could it have been
otherwise when whiteness proves “its own incontestable superiority by appointing both
judge and jury and summoning only its own witnesses.”136
Whiteness is a “particular social and historical [formation] that [is] reproduced
through specific discursive and material processes and circuits of desire and power.”137
On this score, reproduced through circuits of desire and power, whiteness strives for
totalization; it desires to claim the entire world for itself and has the misanthropic
effrontery to territorialize the very meaning of the “human.”
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Chapter V
The Agential Black Body: Resisting the Black Imago in the White Imaginary

Disalienation will come into being [for Blacks] through their refusal to accept the present
as definitive.
—Frantz Fanon
Ol’ Aunt Jemima was always spitting in massa’s soup, while ol’ John out in the field
couldn’t pick up a hoe without it just seeming to break in his hands. And, Lord have
mercy, somebody was always running away.
—Julius Lester
We need to recognize that infrapolitics and organized resistance are not two distinct
realms of opposition to be studied separately and then compared; they are two sides of
the same coin that make up the history of working-class self-activity.
—Robin D. G. Kelley

Frantz Fanon was painfully aware of the hegemony and misanthropy of white racist ideology. He
notes, “All I wanted was to be a man among other men. I wanted to come lithe and young into
the world that was ours and to help to build it together.”1 However, within the lived or
phenomenological domain of anti-Black racism, Fanon was expected to live, to think, to feel, to
exist, to be “like a nigger.”2 Within the context of an anti-Black racist world, the lived
experience of the Black is under the constant threat of being collapsed into the phenomenological
or lived experience of the nigger. Once collapsed, living this historical-racial schema, it is easy to
undergo a certain ontological resignation, a capitulation in the face of a reality whose past,
present, and future seem fixed and stacked against any possibility of historical breach. Although
by the end of Black Skin, White Masks, Fanon calls upon his body “to release itself from the
enmeshed web of social pathologies to the expression that best suits a mature, free
consciousness—the embodiment of questioning,”3 it is not difficult to understand and empathize
with Fanon where he writes:
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Yesterday, awakening to the world, I saw the sky turn upon itself utterly and
wholly. I wanted to rise, but the disemboweled silence fell back upon me, its
wings paralyzed. Without responsibility, straddling Nothingness and Infinity, I
began to weep.4

Historically, “the imago of the [Black] in the European mind”5 involves a process of
discursive and material violence. As I have argued, the Black body, through the hegemony of the
white gaze, undergoes a phenomenological return that leaves it distorted and fixed as a preexisting essence. The Black body becomes a prisoner of an imago—an elaborate distorted image
of the Black, an image whose reality is held together through white bad faith and projection—
that is ideologically orchestrated to leave no trace of its social and historical construction. The
aim is to foreclose any possibility of slippage between the historically imposed imago and how
the Black body lives its reality as ontically fixed. But like the white body, the Black body is
never simply pre-given. While “history has been terribly unkind to the African body,”6 the Black
body has, within the context of its tortuous sojourn through the crucible of American and
European history, been a site of discursive, symbolic, ontological, and existential battle. If the
Black body’s meta-stability reached a point of ontological closure vis-à-vis the power of the
distorted imago projected from the white imaginary, there would have been no history of the
Black body engaged in struggle and transformation. Blacks have struggled mightily to transcend
white fictions.7 They have struggled with profound issues around identity and place. Yet, Blacks
have always struggled to make a way out of no way, utilizing the resources that they had
available. Although I will return to a discussion of the Middle Passage in chapter six, one might
look at the movement through the Middle Passage to the so-called New World as a medium
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through which an especially dynamic and difficult challenge to define and redefine a narrative of
Black identity emerged. This narrative tells a complex story of the Black experience, one that is
shaped through syncretism, the blending of cultural, epistemological, and ontological retentions
with ever new horrific and challenging experiences.8
In A Tempest, which is Aime Cesaire’s version of Shakespeare’s The Tempest, the Black
body’s resistance is captured through the voice of a transformed Caliban9 as he refuses to live by
the dehumanizing imago. Cesaire’s Caliban has become cognizant of the source of his double
consciousness, he is now able to nihilate the given of Prospero’s world and to resist the
existential phenomenological problem of corporeal malediction. At the level of the gaze, he
challenges the relational asymmetry of which he has been a victim.

Prospero, you’re a great magician:
you’re an old hand at deception.
And you lied to me so much,
about the world, about myself
that you ended up by imposing on me
an image of myself:
underdeveloped, in your words, undercompetent
that’s how you made me see myself !
And I hate that image . . .
But now I know you, you old cancer,
And I also know myself !
And I know that one day
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my bare fist, just that,
will be enough to crush your world!
The old world is crumbling down!10

The significant point here is that the needed slippage did occur; indeed, I would argue that the
Black body’s history in the “New World” has been a history of resistance. This does not deny its
history of self-hatred, its passing for white,11 its history of Uncle Tomism, and its history of
accommodation. As John McClendon observes, “Resistance is cardinal and crucial to any
description, definition, and interpretation of African American culture. . . . [That culture] in its
full substance and scope is more complex than a singular thrust in the monodirection of
resistance.”12
Despite the power of white discursive disciplinary control and physical brutality, the
Black body has historically disrupted the reduction of its being to that of a thing. To comprehend
the Black body as a site of resistance, it is important to understand that the body “is not what it is
and it is not yet what it will become.”13 In short, the Black body (as with the white body) is a
process. It might be argued that the Black body/embodied Black existence vis-à-vis the white
gaze is ontologically excessive, something more than the white gaze is capable of nullifying
through its power. Of course, to refer to the Black body as a site of resistance, I am referring to
Black embodied existence, that perspective from which the embodied self is capable of
recognizing the possibility of overcoming a set of circumstances. On this score, resistance is
linked to a level of comprehension of one’s social conditions. Resistance involves seeing through
the so-called impersonal discursive practices of whites, of rejecting their nature-like
constructions that threaten the lives of Blacks. As philosopher and sociologist Paget Henry notes,
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“Agency against these normative and institutional structures require[s] the decoding of their
impersonal, nature-like appearance and their rewriting in codes that reveal their roots in ordinary
communication and social action.”14 Indeed, Black resistance is a form of decoding of the
ideological prison house of racist discourse, a discourse that “operates in the name of values”15
that valorize whiteness and dehumanize Black people. Of course, such values assume the status
of neutrality so as to appear natural.
I argue that Black resistance, as a mode of decoding, is simultaneously a process of
recoding Black embodied existence through processes of opposition and affirmation. According
to bell hooks, “Opposition is not enough. In that vacant space after one has resisted there is still
the necessity to become—to make oneself anew.”16 While I agree with hooks’ claim that
opposition is certainly not enough, I disagree with her thesis that there is a “vacant space after
one has resisted.” Indeed, I argue that resistance occupies that “vacant space” and that the
process of becoming and making oneself anew has already been enacted, though time is certainly
needed to nourish and further develop the process of becoming and remaking the self anew.
Hence, rather than asking what exists on the other side of resistance, one might explore the
affirmative dimensions of what is already embedded within resistance itself. The moment of
resistance, in other words, is the moment of becoming, of being made anew. And while “human
transcendence always involves becoming . . . , self-creation for an oppressed people whose
transcendence is denied often finds its founding moments in resistance.”17
Within a context where Black bodies are constantly under discursive and physical
erasure, to resist (re-sistere), “to take a stand,” is linked, existentially, to taking up a different
project, that is, no longer settling for a project superimposed by the white Other. On this score, to
resist is not simply limited to saying “No, I refuse!” It is not simply a negative process.
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Resistance is an instantiation of affirmation. Within the context of white myth making regarding
the docility and sub-humanity of the Black body and the refusal to grant the Black body a
perspective on the world, taking a stand demonstrates and affirms the existential and ontological
validity of having a perspective, a subjectivity. Indeed, the moment of Black resistance calls into
question the philosophical anthropological assumptions of white racism. Black resistance, then,
is a profound human act of epistemological re-cognition,18 an affirmation that carries with it an
ontological repositioning of the being of Black embodiment as a significant site of discursive
self-possession.
We typically think of resistance in terms of opposing an external force, which suggests a
reaction couched in negation. On my interpretation, under colonial conditions or enslavement,
when Black bodies re-sist, they affirm. Resistance embodies onto-existential resources that might
be articulated in the following forms: I am, I exist, I recognize myself as standing beyond the
white racist episteme that has attempted to render void my capacity to imagine other/alternative
possibilities of being. However, it is not as if the Black body opposes, or resists, and then
passively waits around, as it were, for an inventory of possible values to affirm. To take this
interpretation of resistance even further, I would argue that at the moment of resistance, there
involves an instantiation of an axiological moment that grounds the Black body with value, value
that has been historically denied by whites.
It is not that through resistance the Black body “founds” a new set of values ex nihilo.
Rather, even if the Black “leans into,” “takes up,” Anglo-American and European values of
freedom, the Black body affirms itself through a set of values historically denied it. I would
argue that the very embryonic moment of “leaning into” a set of values already presupposes a
certain level of agency that is operating in the name of affirmative values. The Black body denies
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its being as pure facticity. In affirming itself as a site of possibility, as a site of value, Blacks
realize that values are for the claiming/taking, that values are founded through human practices,
and that as a lack, as an ontological excess, as it were, new modes of being, new ways of valuing
can be explicitly taken up—despite the efforts of white racists who maintain that the servitude of
Black bodies is sanctioned by absolute values. Also, at the moment of resistance, or so I would
argue, besides the axiological moment, there is a moment of re-narrating the self, which also
involves a disruption of the historical continuity of the white same ; for to resist is to re-story
one’s identity, even if that story is only short lived. The point here is that at the moment of
resistance, a counter-narrative, perhaps even a counter-memory,19 has been performed. One
might argue that resistance, according to this construal, has built into it its own end. Hence, from
the moment that resistance is executed, in one sense, it is complete. Even if one is whipped or
killed after the moment of resistance, the act remains “complete” qua an act of resistance. This,
of course, should not be confused with the valid point that there have been historical instances of
Black resistance that have been terminated before the aims of those resisting were
accomplished.20 Nevertheless, there is something to be said about the initial moment that the
Black self proposes, reflectively generates, other ways of being-in-the-world. It is that initial
moment that points to the power of the Black self to interpellate itself and to respond to the call
to affirm itself (“I am human!”) against a history of dehumanization and Black non-being.
At the moment of resistance, a process of epistemic intervention also occurs. When
called, when interpellated as “nigger,” Blacks may knowingly refuse to answer, refusing this
form of “recognition,” preparing for an epistemic challenge. For example, I may opt to say, “I
am not the one!” Through this act of resistance, from the perspective of the white gaze, I become
a living contradiction, an anomaly. I become more than the white can measure within the horizon
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of his limited understanding of the Black body. “I am not the one!” throws the white into a state
of cognitive dissonance. After all, the Black imago has served him well. He knows that he is
being seen; his visibility is exposed. But I now return him to himself, which is a place of
reaction. It is a place of bad faith, a place where I am needed to be what he says I am. By
rejecting his need, I force him into a state of anxiety. For he is forced to see the emptiness of a
self dialectically predicated on a lie. Of course, refusing to face his freedom, he may continue to
flee, which could cost me my very life. As philosopher David Theo Goldberg argues:

While whites could cower for so long behind the presumed invisibility of their
whiteness, this paradoxically hides from view the very vulnerability of whiteness
and white folk. The presumptive invisibility of whites could be turned against
them, their spoiled nature revealing a fragility at the heart of whiteness, its
decadence a powerlessness possible to be challenged.21

Of course, I may also resist through an ironic and exaggerated locutionary act. That is, I may
respond to his interpellation with, “Yas suh, Cap’n?” In doing so, I throw back in his face a form
of servility that I actually reject, retaining an epistemologically privileged position regarding the
mimicry that I intend.
The concept of resistance is inextricably linked to the concept of identity. As one resists,
a reconfigured identity is affirmed; for in the act of resistance, the Black subject has already
achieved a level of separation from the Black imago in the white imaginary. However,
transcending the Black imago is not a case of archeologically removing all of the white
racist/colonialist distortions in order to uncover an essential Black self. As philosopher Clevis
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Headley writes:

Claiming an identity need not imply any kind of essentialist, dogmatic, or
objectivist understanding of self. Realist portraits of identity oftentimes dissipate
in the face of the fluidity of identity. The realist begins with the assumption of a
specific ontology, namely a totality of objectivist entities that are discourseindependent; these entities are called identities.22

At the moment of discursive disengagement from white racist hegemonic discourse—
which does not mean that one will be free of additional discursive and non-discursive racist
somatic attacks—one does not uncover a pre-discursive self or a real self that is believed to be
“prior to all identities.”23 This does not imply, however, that one should abandon Black identity
discourse. On my view, identity discourse does not necessarily lead to bad faith. There are ways
of claiming identity without the assumption that all identities are metaphysically fixed. This does
not mean, however, that the only alternative open to Blacks is that of strategic essentialism. The
subtext of strategic essentialism appears to presuppose that there is something fundamentally or
intrinsically problematic about identities as such.24 The expansion of embodied Black
subjectivity must move beyond the white oppressors’ representations,25 but not beyond all
representations, not beyond all forms of discursive constructivity. Hence, I reject the view that
there is a history-less “Black essence” existing simpliciter, waiting to be accurately represented,
waiting for a true representation that will establish a one-to-one correspondence as formulated in
realist philosophical and scientific parlance. And while it is the case that white racist hegemonic
and distorted representations do create profound levels of corporeal malediction in Black people,
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it is not the case that this process of corporeal malediction obtains because there is a lack of
corresponding fit, as it were, between the Black imago in the white imaginary and the Black
simpliciter.
In realist parlance, one would say that white representations of Black people are false,
because they fail to correspond to a Black essence; whereas those representations that do not
create profound levels of ego instability in Black people would be said to be true, because they
do correspond to a Black essence. This apparent aporia is due to the use of certain epistemic
operators. Through the suspension of the use of true and false epistemic operators, this problem
can be resolved. Hence, when Blacks reject and move beyond white oppressors’ representations
of them, this might be thought of in terms of moving beyond an unworkable set of categories or
narratives. In other words, the white oppressors’ narrative is not faithful to Blacks’ hermeneutic
self-understanding. But this does not mean that Blacks are in need of a true narrative, that is, one
that describes determinant or objective features about the Black as such. Rather, there is the need
for a set of categories or a narrative that illuminates Blacks’ being-in-the-world. In this way, the
discourse of workable and unworkable26 narratives replaces the logic of metaphysical
essentialism regarding racial identities, and dispenses with the correspondence theory of truth.
One advantage of the narrative perspective is that questions regarding Black identity are
not couched in ahistorical terms that necessitate a monolithic descriptive vocabulary. Instead,
multiple vocabularies regarding Black identity and Black-being-in-the-world abound. On this
score, Black identity is theorized as a dynamic core of narrative gravity that is sustained through
historical and imaginative Black agency.27 As Linda Alcoff argues:
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To self-identify even by a racial . . . designation [is to] understand one’s
relationship to a historical community, to recognize one’s objective social
location, and to participate in the negotiation of the meaning and implications of
one’s identity. The word real here is not meant to signify an identity that is
nondynamic, noncontingent, or not the product of social practices and modes of
description. Rather, the word real works to counter a view that interpellations of
social identity are always chimeras foisted on us from the outside or
misrepresentations.28

“Taking a stand,” re-narrating one’s Black identity, takes place from a historical location, a
location within which one is already constituted and yet constitutes one’s identity.
Black identity can be read as a site of meaning formation, one that avoids the totalizing
tendencies of whiteness. Within the context of anti-Black racism, whites affirm themselves
through negating Black existence. By “negating Black existence,” my aim is not to suggest that
all whites literally desire to negate qua kill Black people. To “negate” (or negare, “to say no”)
suggests the sense in which whites affirm (or make firm) their identities through the discursive or
non-discursive act of negating the reality of full Black humanity, saying no to Black worth and
no to Black critical subjectivity. After all, white identity needs Black existence in order to
aggrandize its own. Of course, this does not deny those moments where negating Black existence
does in fact mean killing Black bodies. Even in such cases as these, the killing of the Black body
is an act that functions to provide the white body with an “omnipotent” consciousness, providing
whites with the illusion of absolute power to take the life of a Black, which, according to the
racist ideology, is no more problematic than taking the life of a subhuman animal. In this way,
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although the Black body is negated qua killed, the dead Black body, the burned, castrated, and
lynched Black body, is still needed in order to aggrandize white existence. Black identity,
however, does not have as its ontological aim the negation of white people, though Blacks must
negate the ideological structure of whiteness. Black embodied subjectivity is a dynamic process
that is historically ensconced and engaged in the complex fusion of re-narrating, rearticulating,
and recreating its being-in-the-world, creating ways of combating anti-Black racist effects, and
making sense of what it means to be Black-in-the-world. Hence, Black identity is both a
historically narrated and narrating process, a process that speaks to Black facticity and
transcendence, respectively. In other words, Black identity is not to be sought in the realm of
universal abstraction. “Nor is there a question of wrapping ourselves in a delusional shroud of
‘ontological blackness.’”29 As Robert Birt argues:

Such essentialist methods create a new prison in which the many and often
enriching complexities and perplexities of black consciousness and identity are
concealed and denied. We do not wish to make of blackness a tomb within which
to bury ourselves. But to abandon our common identity as blacks, to forget the
common history, struggles and experiences which make us a people, is to deny
our situated existence. And by denying our situation we undermine the prospects
of actualizing our transcendence. Transcendence is also situated, or is realizable
only within a given situation. That is why the flight toward an abstract humanity
is vain. It forsakes our concrete, lived humanity for a metaphysical phantom.30

229
Black people have had to struggle and pro-actively create themselves in order to survive. Within
this context, identity discourse is not to be feared, but embraced as a constant process that is
shaped within historical boundaries, shaped by coefficients of adversity, and shaped through
imaginative and critical consciousness. In this way, Blacks ground their identities in a complex
history that is constantly unfolding and rearticulated because Blackness is a lived existential
project, the affirmative content31 of which is shaped by (but need not be reduced to) that complex
history. As bell hooks argues:

The unwillingness to critique essentialism on the part of many African-Americans
is rooted in the fear that it will cause folks to lose sight of the specific history and
experience of African-Americans and the unique sensibilities and culture that
arise from that experience. An adequate response to this concern is to critique
essentialism while emphasizing the significance of “The authority of experience.”
There is a radical difference between a repudiation of the idea that there is a black
“essence” and recognition of the way black identity has been specifically
constituted in the experience of exile and struggle.32

Though the history of Black people is inextricably linked to experiences of exile and
struggle, indeed, such experiences constitute a fundamental matrix out of which Black identity
has been shaped, it is important that Black identity is not defined simply in reactionary terms.
While no one will deny that aspects of Black identity are formations of recoil against white
power and hegemony, it is certainly not the case that Black identity is a cultural and historical
fragile structure waiting for the white Other’s action in order to establish the reactionary
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trajectory of its identity. Given the continued nature of white racism, Black identity must remain
attentive to and resist against oppressive modes of being whitely-in-the-world. This is not the
same as saying that Black identity is saturated with reactionary resentment. “Black is
beautiful!”33 While this affirmation is always already linked to an inter-play of voices (after all,
the affirmation already contests and speaks to a history of the white “oracle voice”34 which
claimed that Blackness is ugly), this form of identity affirmation is not to be reduced to antiwhite rehabilitation efforts to counter anti-Black racism. “Black is beautiful!” as an illocutionary
affirmation of intent to celebrate and value the vivacity of Black embodied existence should not
be reduced to an inverted value response to the white claim that “Black is ugly.” Historically,
this affirmation has had a powerful perlocutionary impact on Blacks in terms of how they have
affirmed their Black embodiment, creating a collective celebration of Black embodiment. “Black
is beautiful!” can, must, and does occupy that Black existential space—a space within which
Blacks responsibly affirm who they are—where whiteness has ceased to matter, where it has
ceased to be a point of reference.
African-American psychologist Adelbert H. Jenkins’ conceptualization of Black agency
provides a further theoretical framework that contests the imago of the Black as passive and
without an embodied subjectivity from which to negotiate the conditions of white oppression.35 I
briefly draw from Jenkins’ work because his project specifically grounds Black agency and
resistance within a theoretical framework that is opposed to a behavioral or mechanistic model
that sees behavior as the result of push and pull independent variables. The behavioral or
mechanistic view of human behavior resonates with the way in which whites conceptualized
Black people.36 According to Jenkins, to comprehend Black people, particularly within the
context of white hegemony, it is important to come to terms with the “telic” element involved in
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Black agency.37 By “telic,” Jenkins has in mind the teleological aspects of Black embodied
subjectivity, particularly regarding the concept of human intent.38
It is from an embodied subjective here that Blacks project some end for the sake of which
they engage in some set of actions. By theorizing the concept of intent vis-à-vis Black people
under conditions of oppression, Jenkins elaborates a hermeneutic framework in terms of which to
describe modalities of Black agency. For example, whites believed that Blacks were meek and
obsequious by nature. According to Jenkins:

Although Blacks showed humble and meek behavior in interracial situations
historically, the intent of such behavior was often quite at variance with such a
demeanor. Thus, at times Blacks intended in their meekness to act out of a
conception of personal (Christian) dignity (“turn the other cheek”) and/or moral
superiority.39

Where whites could only see meek or obsequious forms of comportment, Blacks intended the
very opposite of such constructions. Jenkins cites an example from Ralph Ellison’s Invisible
Man. In the example, a dying elderly Black man advises his son: “I want you to overcome ’em
with yeses, undermine ’em with grins, agree ’em to death and destruction.”40 Ellison, as this
example shows, was cognizant of the various ways that Blacks enacted agency through processes
of ironic signification. Although more will be said about this, African-American historian and
cultural critic Robin Kelley, drawing from the work of political anthropologist James C. Scott,
maintains that Black working-class people were able to resist those in power by developing a
“hidden transcript.” In short, Black people were able to engage in acts of resistance from a
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hidden transcript that was beyond the cognitive range of white oppressors.
Although engaging white expectations outwardly, Blacks were able to engage in a
process of re-signifying the meaning of their modes of embodied comportment that created an
important slippage between white a priori assumptions, mythical self-serving beliefs, racist
expectations, and Black agential reality. Take “thievery.” Enslaved Blacks living on plantations
would often steal food and tools. Rather than see agency, and, thus, recognize the possibility that
enslaved Blacks envisioned alternative ways of survival, white oppressors rationalized such
behavior as the result of a natural proclivity toward criminal behavior. Acts of stealing were not
only indicative of the capacity of Blacks to negotiate their circumstances and think beyond the
veil of white control, but such acts can be conceived as a means of maintaining a sense of
dignity. The point here is that Black people had to imagine alternative ways of securing those
things (both material and non-material) that were denied them. To steal, under circumstances of
tremendous oppression, can function as an act of self-assertion, an act of re-thinking the
possibilities inherent within a given context, no matter how oppressive. Hence, an act of stealing,
within the context of oppression, can function to reinforce and confirm one’s self-worth.
As I will show, enslaved Blacks also broke tools as a form of resistance, and no doubt as
a form of gaining some sense of themselves as empowered, but given the magnitude of whites’
denial of Black agency, they rationalized such behavior as indicative of clumsiness and stupidity.
Relentless in his belief that Blacks were agent-less, a white Louisiana doctor, Samuel W.
Cartwright, claimed that some work habits of Negroes were the direct result of what he termed
Dysaethesia Aethiopica. Concerning this disease, and commenting on Cartwright’s medical
rationalizations, historian Kenneth M. Stampp writes:
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An African who suffered from this exotic affliction was “apt to do much
mischief ” which appeared “as if intentional.” He destroyed or wasted everything
he touched, abused the livestock, and injured the crops. When he was driven to
his labor he performed his tasks “in a headlong, careless manner, treading down
with his feet or cutting with his hoe the plants” he was supposed to cultivate,
breaking his tools, and “spoiling everything.” This, wrote the doctor soberly, was
entirely due to “the stupidness of mind and insensibility of the nerves induced by
the disease.41

The reader will note the phrase “as if intentional.” Since intention is a key feature of resistance
and agency, it serves the racist aims of Cartwright to say, “as if intentional.” This allows him to
acknowledge a possible subtext of Black intentionality, and, hence, agential behavior, only to
nullify any such possibility by describing the behavior as the result of stupidity and insensibility
of the nerves caused by a “Nigger disease.”
Along with his understanding of teleological aspects of embodied subjectivity, Jenkins
argues that Blacks engage in processes of “dialectical” thinking,42 “that quality in which every
specific meaning is seen to suggest either its opposite or any number of other alternatives.”43
Disalienation is crucially dependent upon dialectical thinking. To see beyond the imago requires
the capacity to imagine a form of Black humanity that has been denied. If “basic to identity, selfimage, and being in the physical world is the body,” then Blacks had to envision alternatives to
the corporeal distortions projected from the white imaginary. Dialectically, Blacks were able to
live their bodies, to perform their bodies, in ways that transformed their identities and selfimages. Cesaire’s Caliban had to project dialectically an alternative to his colonial situation. He
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had to take a stand against the myths of colonial whiteness, demonstrating not only to Prospero,
but to himself, that he was capable of transgressing and transforming the caricatured body-image
into which he had been made. Jenkins is worth quoting in full where he summarizes:

The human individual brings an actively structuring mind to the world, one
capable of seeing alternative meanings in any given object or event. This enables
the individual in principle to rise above the environment and to create or at least
imagine something new and different. Since any one event can be interpreted in
different ways, one must know how the individual conceives that event. Looked at
this way, the survival of Black Americans can be understood as depending to a
significant degree on their capacities to imagine a dignified sense of their
humanity in spite of external circumstances.44

Black resistance in America is a powerfully and historically rich narrative journey of
individual efforts and mass movements. 45 It is a history that is variegated, that has assumed
various strategies and trajectories, and has led to defeats and incredible victories, to say nothing
of the history of resistance throughout the Diaspora by people of African descent. At this
juncture, I will examine a variety of instances of Black resistance46 and agency within the
context of everyday work activities during the antebellum period and later within the Black
working-class in the Jim Crow South. This focus is consistent with my efforts to deal with the
existential quotidian experiences of Blacks.47
As agential, Black people confront the world and construct the world from unique
perspectives. They take up their ex-istence48 within the framework of a given set of
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circumstances. Despite the horrible conditions that came with being forced to live and to work on
plantations, many Blacks were able to reconfigure what was given. They were able to take a
stand against dehumanization and negotiate ways of achieving a sense of dignity. Moreover, this
had to be done while making whites think that they had succeeded in producing the most
obedient and docile slaves around. In short, Blacks had to “conform” to white myths while
undermining those myths simultaneously. The negotiation between myth and reality took place
within a variety of work activities. For example, as stated, many Blacks would break tools and
destroy crops. As one white plantation owner related, “It always seems on the plantations as if
they [Blacks] took pains to break all the tools and spoil all the cattle that they possibly can, even
when they know they’ll be directly punished for it.”49 As has been shown, whites rationalized
such behaviors as the result of clumsiness and stupidity. Apparently, these same tools were not
broken when Blacks worked their own meager areas for planting. In fact, “one slaveholder felt
aggrieved when he saw that the small patches which his Negroes cultivated for themselves were
better cared for and more productive than his own field.”50 This suggests a process of selective
valuing. To be selective, of course, involves deliberation. Hence, contrary to the myth that Black
people were dumb chattel, Blacks cultivated these small patches of their own in order to exercise
a measure of economic independence and agency. Blacks would grow their own food, as well as
steal food from the plantation, selling it through a complex network of trade with passing ships.
Breaking tools was one way that enslaved Black people were able to exercise control
over their work. To break a tool (or destroy a patch of land) requires the establishment of a
different/alternative way of relating to a given object (the tool or the land). To engage in this type
of alternative engagement involves the telic dimensions of embodied subjectivity. In sort, Blacks
assumed a “transcendent” position in relationship to a field of objects. Deborah White notes,

236
“While some Southern whites called such behavior ‘rascality’ [breaking tools, for example],
slaves [or the enslaved] understood it to be an effective form of resistance.”51
Getting out of work or playing a role in selecting the type of work performed was an
important manifestation of Black resistance. Other Blacks, so as to avoid work, would pretend to
be “crazy” or “idiotic” without white folk being the wiser. White notes:

For instance, Josiah Henson knew Dinah . . . to be as “clear witted, as sharp and
cunning as a fox.” Yet, she purposely acted like a fool or idiot in order “to take
advantage of her mistress.” According to Henson, “When the latter said, ‘Dinah,
go and do your work,’ she would reply with a laugh, ‘Yes, yes; when I get ready,’
or ‘Go do it yourself.’ Sometimes she would scream out, ‘I won’t; that’s a lie—
catch me if you can’; and then she would take to her heels and run away.” Henson
revealed that Dinah was always doing odd things, but she escaped the whipping
that other slaves received because her mistress thought she was an idiot.52

Dinah was not what she seemed. She was able to confuse the white gaze to her advantage and to
challenge the supposed epistemic “grounds”53 that informed the perspective of the white other.
She was able to “lean into” a different form of embodied social representation. I make this point
in order to emphasize the significance of the social matrix within which resistance takes shape.
In this way, there is the recognition that agency takes place within a space of social intelligibility
that has, within it, roles that can be taken up that function as efficacious vehicles in terms of
which someone like Dinah could pull off such a deception in the first place.
Enslaved Blacks exercised their agency at work, not only in relatively harmless forms

237
such as spitting in food prepared for whites, but they also resorted to more deadly forms of
resistance. For example, White relates:

A less overt form of resistance involved the use of poison and this suited women
because they officiated as cooks and nurses on the plantation. As early as 1755 a
Charleston slave woman was burned at the stake for poisoning her master, and in
1769 a special issue of the South Carolina Gazette carried the story of a slave
woman who had poisoned her master’s infant child.54

In More than Chattel, Bernard Moitt notes that both men and women laborers in the “field gangs
were likely to participate in the plotting and execution of all forms of resistance whatever the
gender of leadership. Both groups also worked in the masters’ household as domestics and
engaged in poisoning as a means of resistance.”55 He goes on to note that there were forms of
resistance specific to Black women. For example, some Black women would pretend to be ill as
a means of escaping work. And although the subhuman conditions of plantation life were
conducive to Blacks actually suffering from various illnesses (smallpox, pneumonia, and other
illnesses), some Black women were able to fake illness by engaging in what might be called the
dialectics of feigning. In other words, Black women outwardly re-presented themselves through
one stream of embodied symbolic possibilities (looking ill) while maintaining epistemological
priority concerning the truth of the situation (being well). White:

On Landon Carter’s eighteenth-century Virginia plantation, this form of resistance
was raised to an art. Although Carter was certain that Mary faked her fits, her
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violent and uncontrollable howls always got the better of him, and she spent a
good deal of time away from the fields.56

In feigning her illness, Mary was not only able to “take a stand” against the “omniscient” white
gaze. She was also able to create an alternative meaning for her body. She resisted the “physical
labor demanded by plantation economy”57 and the myth that Black bodies were chattel.
White also suggests that the most significant distinction between Black male and female
resistance “was the greater propensity of women to feign illness in order to gain a respite from
their work or change the nature of their work altogether.”58 Given that some enslaved Black men
engaged in labor that allowed for greater mobility, and that they were trained as skilled laborers,
they could exercise a degree of agency through different labor experiences. Of course, enslaved
Black women did work as midwives. Their work did occasionally take them off the plantation.
These midwives would not only deliver babies, but were able to deliver important messages
between plantations. However, Black women for the most part were restricted to plantation
work. Hence, Black women created spaces of agency/resistance right there on the plantation.
Although some Black women feigned pregnancy as a way of resisting chattel labor, which, of
course, would only provide “relative advantages of escaping work,”59 other Black women who
were actually pregnant used their pregnancy as a means to withdraw from work for many
months. Despite the fact that Black women were still arduously worked while pregnant, some
stayed in bed for months, “playing the lady” while pregnant, thus avoiding the arduous work of
the fields.60
In another passage White writes, “Slaves may have thought about overthrowing the
system of slavery but the odds against them were so overwhelming that the best most could hope
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for was survival with a modicum of dignity. Slave resistance was aimed at maintaining what
seemed to all concerned to be the status quo.”61 While it is true that American slavery was an
overwhelming system of white oppression, one must keep in mind that Blacks exercised sound
judgment in the forms of the resistance that they enacted. They wanted to live. There is no
dispute that the deployment of such acts of resistance left the institution of American slavery
standing. In that sense the status quo remained the same. We must keep in mind, however, that a
single act of resistance (breaking a tool, poisoning food, destroying crops) was precisely aimed at
disrupting some aspect of the status quo. Micro-resistant acts do not leave the status quo
unchanged, though slavery as an institution may have remained intact. There are some who may
find the following analogy problematic, but I would argue that such acts of resistance by
enslaved blacks, to the extent that they involved sabotage and the disruption of certain aspects of
the system from within, might be compared to guerilla tactics. Short of certain death through
massive counter-violent revolutionary action, micro-acts of resistance, or leaving the plantation
altogether, Black people were severely restricted.
Work slowdowns were another means of exercising agency. Some enslaved Blacks
worked in solidarity to bring work to a crawl. Even some enslaved Black males who were “slave
drivers” only pretended to whip field workers. The workers would scream within earshot of the
plantation owner to give the impression that they were being disciplined and worked hard.62
“The amount of slowing up of labor by the slaves must, in the aggregate, have caused a
tremendous financial loss to plantation owners.”63 Such slowing up of work might be seen as a
form of working-class consciousness. Historian Thomas C. Buchanan notes that enslaved Blacks
on steamboats also engaged in work slowdowns: “For slaves, good victuals and decent treatment
by the officers, could be the difference between hard work and a work slow down.”64
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Black mariners in the antebellum also engaged in day-to-day acts of resistance. In fact,
the very idea of a Black mariner/seamen was itself a challenging proposition to white racist
myths. However, Africans brought a fund of complex skills and cultural knowledge to the New
World. David S. Cecelski relates a story about Moses Ashley Curtis as he arrived at the mouth of
Cape Fear on his voyage into the American South.65 Cape Fear, which emptied into the Atlantic,
“was a tumult of heavy waves, strong currents, and dangerous shoals.”66 Curtis would need a
local pilot to get across the inlet’s bar. So, the signal flag was raised and he noticed a pilot boat
racing toward them. As the crew from the pilot boat boarded, Cecelski relates that Curtis wrote
in his diary, “And what saw I? Slaves!—the first I ever saw.”67 Blacks and First Nation peoples
(Siouan, Iroquoian, and others) shared skills and knowledge that made for greater proficiency in
navigating through heavy currents and dangerous shoals. “Many tidewater slaves,” as Cecelski
makes clear, “came from sections of West Africa more closely resembling, and with maritime
traditions better suited to, the shallow, marshy Carolina coastline than did their colonial masters,
with their deepwater experience.”68 Moreover, Cecelski notes that Peter Wood, in his book,
Black Majority, documents that many Africans “had grown up along rivers or beside the ocean
and were far more at home in this element than most Europeans.”69
Black seamen enjoyed a measure of “freedom” that was denied other enslaved Blacks.
For example:

Moses Grandy’s master, James Grandy, allowed the slave waterman to “hire out”
his own labor. Having the space “to use his own labor,” provided Grandy with an
alternative way of understanding himself, an understanding grounded in a sense of
self-activity as opposed to an object that is acted upon. This was a common
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arrangement for watermen and other slaves with a skilled trade; it left them free to
solicit business with little oversight.70

Of course, enslaved Blacks who were allowed to hire out their own labor were deemed a threat to
white workers. As early as the 1750s in lowcountry Georgia, for example, white skilled and
semiskilled workers came to see the self-hiring of Black bondpeople as a threat to their living
standards.71 As with life on plantations, it was Black men who had far more mobility. Mobility
allowed for a greater feeling of self-activity/agency.
Despite his relative mobility, Moses Grandy still suffered from pernicious acts of white
racism. His first wife, whom he loved as he loved his own life, was sold away by one of his
many white “masters.”72 Despite this, Grandy, who eventually fled North Carolina and gained
his freedom, played a key role in helping enslaved Black communities stay informed and to
“overcome their masters’ attempts to keep them isolated from one another and uninformed about
antislavery movements.”73 Hence, not only did Grandy realize his own vision of freedom, he
exercised agency in terms of keeping other enslaved Blacks informed. As shown earlier,
midwives also exercised their agency to communicate important messages between plantations,
hence establishing complex networks of communication. Thus, as with the midwives on
plantations, Grandy was part of a larger communicative network created by Black watermen that
was used to transmit abolitionist and revolutionary news from as far as New England, France and
Haiti.74 As Elizabeth Hyde Botume notes:

Without any knowledge of newspapers, or books, or telegraphy, the slaves had
their own way of gathering news from the whole country. They had secret signs,
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an “Underground Telephone”. . . . Intuitively they learned all the tricks of
dramatic art. Their perceptions were quickened. When seemingly absorbed in
work, they saw and heard all that was going on around them. They memorized
with wonderful ease and correctness. . . .75

Information transfer no doubt helped to keep alive a sense of collective agency, struggle, and
shared identity. Perhaps it is not by accident that Denmark Vesey was a cabin boy and that David
Walker, author of the famous and feared Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World (1829),
which advocated organized counter-violent revolt against white slave “masters,” was raised in
the seaport of Wilmington, NC. Blacks restructured sites of work activity into sites of
empowerment. They used their mobility to keep close contact with family members, and to help
other Blacks to locate family members. Like enslaved Black plantation workers, Black steamboat
workers were cognizant of sites and spaces of resistant possibilities in everyday mundane work
experience. In short, they threw off the phenomenological return of the imago that depicted them
as submissive and re-narrated their identities as agential. Jenkins writes:

We are . . . aware of ourselves as agents. By agents I mean we recognize
ourselves as persons who take action, take initiative, make decisions, and make
choices from among possibilities. Thus, self is also a way of talking about our
capacity to come to a situation that is full of possibilities (as most situations are)
and make a choice in that situation.76

Unlike Moses Grandy, who operated within the “formal slave economy,” some Black
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seamen exercised agency within the context of the informal work economy. The very process of
operating outside of a “formal economy” might itself be understood as an act of resistance. As
Buchanan writes:

The men created a world of their own on docks, levees, plantation landings, city
quays, and steamboat decks of the Mississippi River economy. While these men
were not above occasionally swindling other working-class people, for the most
part their actions were directed at the region’s elites. They lied to, cheated, and
stole from bankers, shopkeepers, plantation owners, and merchants—the people
who possessed the wealth they coveted.77

The term “rascal” was appropriated by Black steamboat workers to denote something positive;
indeed, the term’s meaning was inverted to deflect its negative implications created by the power
of whites to name and thereby construct “reality.” Buchanan:

The men termed their activities “rascality.” In a world of danger and exploitation,
where death was only a steamboat explosion away, and the plantation of
Louisiana and Mississippi loomed with an ominous omnipresence, they referred
to rascality as any number of illegal acts that allowed them to create a life on their
own terms. The men took pride in their ability to avoid what they called “honest
labor,” to out think the world around them, and to take advantage of the
weaknesses of the slave economy. In a world that commodified humanity they
were independent men. They lived by their own wits as confidence men and
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tricksters.78

Avoiding “honest work” was an alternative way of exercising resistance against an economic
system that was oppressive and dehumanizing. Working outside of the sphere of formal labor,
Black steamboat workers were able to gain a new sense of “masculinity.” Their exercise of
independence provided them with a counter-white notion of Black masculinity, one that
threatened whites, for they refused to be controlled by superimposed weak and subservient
identities. More generally, of course, maritime culture, as W. Jeffrey Bolster notes, “allowed
them to ‘feel as men’.”79 Maritime culture created a space that was conducive to agential
attempts on the part of Black working men to carve out a dignified identity, even if it meant
stealing, as noted above within the context of the plantation, within the very midst of Black
dehumanization and degradation. Buchanan notes:

While these men were not social revolutionaries bent on overturning the slave
system in one bold stroke, nor were they solely foot draggers content to slow
production. Instead they sought to live outside the formal economy in a black
river world where talents were rewarded and material gain was possible. They
were outlaws. And as such their actions represent a challenge to antebellum
society that should be incorporated into our understanding of the range of ways
African Americans battled both bondage and the limits of freedom.80

Blacks who worked as “legitimate seamen” were also able to exercise resistance within
spaces of white hegemony. During roustabouts (free and enslaved) Blacks were able to take
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control over their bodies. They would sing as a way of reconfiguring the work experience and
environment. “Singing created a collective consciousness while salvaging African-American
humanity from the indignities and monotony of the work process.”81 Dancing during leisure time
was also a form of resistance; for “dancing was a way of reclaiming their bodies from the
oppression of both slave and wage labor.”82 For Jenkins, as has been argued, dialectical thought
is linked to our ability to create opposite and multiple symbolizations.83 Hence, the dancing
Black body functioned as a form of opposition to meager wages and oppressive circumstances,
signifying a form power at the site of work itself.84 The dancing Black body, within the work
environment, symbolized, among other things, an existential commitment to joy and a sense of
somatic freedom.
Historian Tera W. Hunter has done significant work on post-bellum Black women and
how they performed their bodies through the modality of dance to reclaim a level of Black
embodied autonomy. Looking at such dance performances within the context of “jook joints,”
Hunter insightfully reveals the implications of such Black working-class activity on white norms
that attempted to govern and police Black bodies and to restrict them to spaces of servile labor.
Hunter: “White employers opposed the violation of what they considered their rightful claim to
restrict black women’s exertions to manual work.”85 So, too, Black steamboat workers in the
very act of dancing and singing were projecting multiple significations of meaning: aesthetic,
agential, and self-definitional. In short, they engaged in forms of resistance that embodied acts of
self-reclamation. Hunter’s work shows how these early forms of body comportment, within a
larger framework of African American work activity, functioned as important forms of
resistance/agency during the early 1900s. She writes:
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The importance of laboring bodies in the political economy is revealed . . . in the
obsession of employers to express and contain the autonomy of workers in order
to reap the maximum benefits of their exertions. The mere sight of African
Americans, especially domestic workers, deriving pleasure and expressing
symbolic liberation in dance halls by posing alternative meanings of bodily
exertion seemed threatening to employers.86

Hunter’s discourse of “alternative meanings” resonates philosophically with Jenkins’
understanding of the dialectical character of agency and how individuals are capable of giving
multiple (alternative) meanings to what they do.
Returning to the Black steamboat “rascals” who exercised agency along the Mississippi
river, it is important to note that although each one of them engaged in very lucrative informal
economic work activity and agency (from stealing, break-ins, selling stolen goods, passing
counterfeit bills, purchasing various items from smugglers, and so on), they paid for this with
their lives, not unlike Nat Turner, Denmark Vesey, and Gabriel Prosser. Resistance must be seen
along a continuum, whether it is breaking tools, slowing down work, or on the scale of a
collectively organized revolt. The point here is that Black resistance, irrespective of its form of
manifestation, had its dangerous and deadly consequences. Self-named rascals Madison
Henderson, an enslaved Black, and three free Blacks, Amos Warrick, James Seward and Charles
Brown, who diligently worked within the lucrative informal economy, were all hanged and
beheaded once caught and separately tried for murder. “Charles Brown, James Seward, and
Amos Warrick traveled . . . widely. With contacts in both free territory and the slave South, they
were among the most feared of free black river workers.”87 Madison Henderson worked a variety
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of Mississippi River trades. He was able to make significant networks because of his contacts
with riverside society.88 Each of the men brought with him significant experiences of daring,
resistance and agency. Steamboats allowed many Blacks the opportunity to run away from
slavery, to live on the margins, and to fashion new identities fueled with daring and rebellion.
After robbing a bank in St. Louis in which a white Bank clerk was murdered, whites became
outraged.89 Buchanan interprets the murder of the Bank clerk within the framework of a form of
resistant rascality:

It is my view that the killings were a dramatic form of noncompliance and thus a
form of resistance. The pursuit of money through violence was a perfectly
understandable means of self-activity in the context of a slave system founded on
this logic.90

Buchanan also notes that during their final months each displayed a defiant sense of “resilience
and independence.”91 Henderson wore very expensive hats during the trial. Embodying what the
four men called “fashionable rascality,” and the values of working-class flamboyance, when they
got money they used it “to transform subservient identities.”92
As a feature of working-class consciousness, more generally, flamboyance might be
understood as a form of resistance that is designed to offset the appearances of poverty,
economic marginality, and existential derailment. Instead of an “extraspective” analysis of such
behavior, Jenkins, consistent with his understanding of the anatomy of agency, suggests that such
flamboyant behavior be examined from the perspective of the agent (the introspective sphere).
He argues:
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A particular Black man’s spending his meager funds on a luxury is not necessarily
just an arbitrary and irrational mimicking of (over-idealized) wealthy people. It
may also be an act that helps this man define and express a sense of dignity that is
different from the external conditions forced on him. In the terms that we have
been using, such an act at times stems from the bipolar recognition of what is
(poverty) and what could be (material comfort), were his opportunities not
unfairly blocked and manipulated by the system.93

The reader should note that it was not only Black men who participated within and
reaped rewards from resisting the sphere of formal economic activity. Like Black men (both
enslaved and free), many Black “rascal” women, as recently as the 1930s, engaged in a bipolar
or dual recognition of what is real (namely, anti-Black racism, sexism, and economic scarcity
and marginality) and what is imagined. Black women imagined, dialectically, what could be
(economic independence, power, and self-aggrandizement). In short, they exercised agency
within the sphere of the informal work economy (though work nevertheless) and were able to
self-fashion their identities. As Sharon Harley notes, “Rejecting a work life characterized by low
wages, poor work conditions, and frequent abusive treatment, a group of courageous,
independent-minded women sought first and foremost the economic benefits of working in the
largely black underworld.”94 One such Black woman was Odessa Madre, who was known as the
Black female “Al Capone.”95 Although well-educated, Madre rejected the notion of the cult of
true womanhood, rejected the “meager” pay that she may have gotten as a school teacher, and
rejected those high “yella gals” who made her feel ostracized.96 As the Black queen of the
informal underground in Washington, D.C., she had her hands in running numbers, selling
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bootleg liquor, prostitution, gaming houses, and more. At one point it was estimated that she had
an annual income of $100,000.97 Not only did Madre exercise Black womanist98 agency in a
world of white racism, but she also resisted being confined within a male dominated and
restrictive space of domesticity. Unlike the four Black male rascals, however, Madre was not
executed, though she did spend time in prison and died penniless. The important point here is
that a few Black women defined their roles/lived their bodies against the grain of societal
expectations (including Black middle-class moral sensibilities) and made huge profits beyond the
confines of wage labor. Keeping in mind the white myths about Black women, Madre disrupted
those myths. She challenged the belief that Black women were born to serve, proving that such a
belief was an ideological construction and not the result of so-called natural evolution. The
reader should also keep in mind that whether one was a patron or a worker within the vernacular
culture of the underground, such spaces provided Black women with an agential space within
which they could “escape from the world of assembly lines, relief lines, and color lines.”99
Within the context of the underground informal economic sphere, Black people danced
and celebrated (as with the roustabouts on the steamships) against the backdrop of restrictive,
structuring norms of “labor behavior.” Black people used their bodies to defy and transcend a
work ethos that consisted of implicit norms of being constantly subordinate to the work itself.
Antithetical to “a chaste, disciplined submissive, and hard-driving labor force” ethos,100 Black
people conceptualized alternatives to this ethos, carving out a non-subjugating space within
which they could cast off their identities as wage laborers. In short, the dancing Black body
functioned as a form of re-narration. The dancing Black body, in its articulated movements, rearticulated what it meant to be Black over and above the confining spaces of wage labor, and
over and beyond the stultifying effects of the white gaze. Theorizing the dancing Black body
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within the context of a blues aesthetic, the “jook joint” (a site that was even deemed repulsive by
the Black bourgeoisie101) became a cultural space within which a lived metaphysics—a
heightened experience of transcendence within the midst of the everyday—was inextricably
linked to a lived sense of profound embodiment. Within this context, many Black bodies
resisted102 disciplinary regimes that confined them, discursively and non-discursively, to a
passive piece of property. Blacks asserted their “right to use their bodies beyond their needs for
subsistence alone.”103 Hunter:

The complex rhythmic structure and driving propulsive action endowed
participants with a feeling of metaphysical transcendence, of being able to
overcome or alter the obstacles of daily life. If the sung word was more powerful
than the spoken or written words, then the danced song was even more mighty
than singing alone. It was the symbiotic relationship between music and dance
that made their combination a complex and rich cultural form. Workers used them
for personal gratification, to reclaim their bodies from drudgery and exploitation,
and actually changed, momentarily, their existential condition.104

“Hidden transcripts,” as mentioned earlier, are powerful means by which Black resistance
can be enacted. Robin Kelley writes:

Despite appearances of consent, oppressed groups challenge those in power by
constructing a “hidden transcript,” a dissident political culture that manifests itself
in daily conversations, folklore, jokes, songs, and other cultural practices. One
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also finds the hidden transcript emerging “on stage” in spaces controlled by the
powerful, though almost always in disguised forms. The submerged social and
cultural worlds of oppressed people frequently surface in everyday forms of
resistance—theft, footdragging, the destruction of property—or, more rarely, in
open attacks on individuals, institutions, or symbols of domination. Together, the
“hidden transcripts” that are created in aggrieved communities and expressed
through culture and daily acts of resistance and survival constitute what [James
C.] Scott calls “infrapolitics.”105

Kelley, in stream with James C. Scott, describes the notion of “infrapolitics” as suggestive of
infrared light that goes beyond the visible spectrum. Such “infrapolitical” forms of resistance
were designed to go beyond the cognitive radar of those (whites) in power. “Infrapolitics” is
indicative of the ability of Blacks to project one set of meanings while dialectically intending a
completely different set. Keeping the reality of accommodation before us, many Blacks have
engaged in micro-acts of resistance, incremental ways of disrupting and periodically shifting the
table of power. Describing this process in the Jim Crow South, Kelley writes:

For southern blacks in the age of Jim Crow, politics was not separate from lived
experience or the imagined world of what is possible. It was the many battles to
roll back constraints, to exercise power over, or create space within, the
institutions and social relationships that dominated their lives.106

Kelley argues that labor historians have failed to locate sites of working-class opposition that
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were not defined as “public action and formal organization.”107 For example, the act of wearing
certain clothes might be seen as a process of “infrapolitics” to the extent that this form of
actionable resistance was not necessarily the result of formal organization and contained a
meaning contrary to public (white) perception. Like Madison Henderson’s preference for
flamboyant dress, the idea of dressing in style for Jim Crow southern Blacks was a form of
aesthetic resistance to the dominant image of Blacks as workers. Newly post-bellum Black
women would wear starched dresses to redefine their bodies in ways contrary to their having
been defined as field workers for so many years. Many whites thought that the idea of Black
women “dressing up” went against the status of Black women who belonged to the working
class.108 “Seeing oneself and others ‘dressed up’ was important to constructing a collective
identity based on something other than wage work.”109
As has been shown on antebellum plantations, Blacks in the Jim Crow South also
engaged in “infrapolitics” at the level of breaking machinery, industrial sabotage, work
slowdowns, and feigning illness. Such acts of resistance—of re-conceptualizing the possible—
within the workplace allowed Blacks the space to take a modicum of control over their labor.
Such agential practices were also inter-subjectively shared between workers. For example,
“Black women household workers in the urban South generally abided by a code of ethics or
established a blacklist so they could collectively avoid employers who had proved unscrupulous,
abusive, or unfair.”110 North Carolina tobacco workers also cooperated in interdependent acts of
resistance as a mode of solidarity:

When black women stemmers had trouble keeping up with the pace, black men
responsible for supplying tobacco to them would pack the baskets more loosely
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than usual. Among black women who operated stemmer machines, when one
worker was ill, other women would take up the slack rather than call attention to
her inability to handle her job, which could result in lost wages or dismissal.111

And like Ralph Ellison’s invisible man, who stole his electricity from Monopolated Light &
Power,112 Black folk who needed to, because their utilities had been shut off due to their inability
to pay them, “stole fuel, water, and electricity: they appropriated coal, drew free electricity by
tapping power lines with copper wires, illegally turned on water mains, and destroyed vacant
homes for firewood.”113 Clearly, Blacks living in Jim Crowed spaces belied the imago of the
shiftless and helpless Negro within oppressive work environments. They found viable
“infrapolitical” modes of resistance, forms of agential opposition that have served Blacks since
living on antebellum plantations.
Some Blacks more openly exercised their agency to work for themselves. To avoid
sexual overtures and harassment, Black women were able to take control over the space within
which their labor was performed, creating a more dignified and protected space. Even the idea of
wearing a uniform to work—re-performing the Black female body—carried with it a certain
stigma. “White employers often required black domestics to don uniforms, which reduced them
to their identities as employees and ultimately signified ownership—black workers literally
became the property of whoever owned the uniform.”114 Not wearing the company uniform, that
is, dressing up in their own preferred clothes, Black women were able to defy the assumptions
that they were live-in maids as opposed to day workers.115 In short, clothes can function as a
powerful medium of semiosis through which one’s public persona gets reconfigured against the
grain of white racist assumptions.
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Living within the context of Jim Crow politics, Black people had to find ways of
“transgressing” so-called white sacred norms that defined Black spaces of being and working.
Large scale organized resistance ought to be seen as constituting a continuum of resistance, a
continuum that shades into “infrapolitics.” After all, both are forms of agency that Black people
have had to perform in order to make sense of themselves as agents within contexts of
enslavement, oppression, dehumanization, and white mythos. As Kelley argues, “we need to
recognize that infrapolitics and organized resistance are not two distinct realms of opposition to
be studied separately and then compared; they are two sides of the same coin that make up the
history of working-class self-activity.”116
Black people are indeed not what they seem. Black working people have had to re-narrate
themselves and re-negotiate their identities as workers and human beings, husbands and wives,
laborers, wage earners, and people who have a need for their own cultural space of identity and
pleasure. To understand Black people in relationship to their variegated labor history is to
understand the humanity of Black people; it is to come to terms with Black resistance. It is to
disrupt forms of knowledge where some have only seen an ersatz form of Black behavior - idle,
dependent, and agent-less. To see Blacks through this imago is to distort what it means to be
Black in America. As Jenkins concludes, “Any conception of African Americans that fails to see
them as engaged in exercising their human agency—sometimes successfully, sometimes not—
cannot hope to grasp what they are about.”117 Hence, to recognize the historical reality of Black
resistance is to affirm dynamic forms of Black embodiment that belie the historical legacy of
white lies.
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Chapter VI
Exposing the Serious World of Whiteness through
Frederick Douglass’s Autobiographical Reflections

Trained from the cradle up, to think and feel that their masters are superior, and invested
with a sort of sacredness, there are few [enslaved Blacks] who can outgrow or rise above
the control which that sentiment exercises.
—Frederick Douglass
Being “highly pigmented,” as the sociologists say, it was our Negro “misfortune” to be
caught up associatively in the negative side of this basic dualism of the white folk mind,
and to be shackled to almost everything it would repress from conscience and
consciousness.
—Ralph Ellison
Blacks are often confronted, in American life, with such devastating examples of the
white descent from dignity; devastating not only because of the enormity of white
pretensions, but because this swift and graceless descent would seem to indicate that
white people have no principles whatever.
—James Baldwin

Through the lens of his lived embodied experience of white oppression, Frederick Douglass’s
socio-politically and existentially rich autobiographical narratives, Narrative of the Life of
Frederick Douglass, An American Slave, Written by Himself, and My Bondage and My Freedom,
not only expose the discursive and non-discursive impact of whiteness upon the Black body, but
expose the perniciousness of the ideology of whiteness to whites themselves. To get a sense of the
Black body as undergoing processes of white racist disciplinary control, in this chapter I will
discuss how the Black body was subjected to what I call a “technology of docility” during the
Middle Passage, a modality of shaping the dark body to internalize its being as fixed. Of course,
this technology of docility is inextricably linked to the American slave system’s bourgeois
material interests and investment in methods of material productivity.1 Continuing with this
theme of racist disciplinary control, I will show how the Black body became marked and mapped
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by various “authoritative” voices (philosophical, scientific) that functioned to discipline the
Black body even further. These “authoritative” voices are ideological constructions that worked
to sustain the serious world of whiteness. Hence, rather than immediately focusing on
Douglass’s lived experience of the serious world of whiteness, and how he challenges this
serious world, my larger aim is to provide a sketch of the Middle Passage and a delineation of
some of the powerful philosophical and scientific discourses “justifying” the “inferiority” of
Black bodies. In other words, this broader framework reveals that the oppressive social reality
that Douglass inherited was always already in the process of being constructed to give the
appearance of necessity, and, hence, perpetuate the illusion that racist values are not existentially
founded, but ontologically “given.”
This propaedeutic move to consider the process of white mystification before turning to
Douglass’ lived experience of white oppression is similar in spirit to The Second Sex where
Beauvoir takes the reader on a historical, scientific, and philosophical journey, in volume one,
revealing how women have become who they are through the discursive practices of men. In
conceptualizing the serious world of whiteness, I draw from what Simone de Beauvoir terms, in
The Ethics of Ambiguity, “the serious man.” I argue that whiteness is fundamentally predicated
upon a world within which whites understand their being white (and the ethical, aesthetic, and
legal benefits that accrue) as an “unconditioned” state of being. On this score, acts of performing
whiteness are interpreted both as forms of flight from agency or alternative ways of
conceptualizing or narrating one’s being-in-the-world and as ways that whites construct
themselves as subjects vis-à-vis those (in this case, Black bodies) who are thereby constructed as
“things.” I will also draw from Beauvoir’s The Second Sex, pointing to some insightful parallels
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between how she conceptualizes women under androcentric hegemony and the ways in which
the Black body is denigrated under white hegemony. Important here is the fact that Beauvior was
influenced by the phenomenological and politico-praxic work of Black novelist Richard Wright.2
The issue that immediately arises is the relevance of Beauvoir’s work to understanding
Douglass’ existential situation and, indeed, its relevance to the Black experience, more generally.
It is here that the rich historical and interpretative insights of philosopher Margaret A. Simons’
work, who takes up Paul Gilroy’s challenge to read Wright intertextually with Beauvior,
demonstrates that Beauvoir is philosophically indebted to Black novelist Richard Wright. Hence,
I will at times read Douglass’ existential situatedness through the philosophical lens of Beauvoir,
who was reading sexism on the model of racism as theorized by Wright.
Simons’ interpretation of Beauvoir demonstrates how Wright was an important figure
who had an impact on moving Beauvoir from an exclusive concern with metaphysical problems
to issues involving concrete political concerns. Simons aims to “uncover evidence of Wright’s
influence on . . . Beauvoir’s philosophy, specifically in providing her with a theory of racial
oppression and liberation that she utilized as a model in constructing the theoretical foundations
of radical feminism in The Second Sex.”3 In America Day by Day, Beauvoir describes how
Wright impacted the development of her thinking about race, mythopoetic images of Blacks that
satisfy the needs of whites, and Black self-definitional agency as a means toward socio-political
praxis. “The narrative portrays Wright as Beauvoir’s teacher,” as Simons writes, “guiding her
understanding of race as a social construct.”4 Pointing to three major conceptual influences on
Beauvoir, Simons argues:
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Wright, as the intellectual heir to W. E. B. DuBois, introduces Beauvoir to the
concept of the “double consciousness” of blacks under racism, which serves as a
model for Beauvoir’s concept of woman as the Other in The Second Sex. Wright’s
phenomenological descriptions of black experience of oppression provide a
methodological alternative to both [Gunnar] Myrdal’s objectifying social science
methodology and the economic reductionism of Marxist orthodoxy. Finally,
Wright’s rejection of white-defined essentialist views of racial difference allied
with an affirmation of the salience of race in the lived experience of blacks under
oppression, and its strategic usefulness when defined by blacks in the interests of
liberation, provide Beauvoir with a model for an anti-essentialist but militant
liberation politics.5

In The Second Sex where Beauvoir discusses how women have come to accept a form of
epistemic violence, coming to know themselves as inferior, she references Wright’s work.
Beauvoir writes:

What Bigger Thomas, in Richard Wright’s Native Son, feels with bitterness at the
dawn of his life is this definitive inferiority, this accursed alterity, which is written
in the color of his skin: he sees airplanes flying by and he knows that because he
is black the sky is forbidden to him. Because she is a woman, the little girl knows
that she is forbidden the sea and the polar regions, a thousand adventures, a
thousand joys.6

265
As Simons points out, Beauvoir, when describing difficulties confronted by young girls under
the metanarrative voice of androcentricity, relies on an analogy with racism. Pointing to the
psychological phenomenon of young girls coming to discover that their “inferiority” is deemed
an essential property, Beauvoir writes:

It is a strange experience for whoever regards [herself] as the One to be revealed
to [herself] as otherness, alterity. This is what happens to the little girl when,
during her apprenticeship for life in the world, she grasps what it means to be a
woman therein. The sphere to which she belongs is everywhere enclosed, limited,
dominated, by the male universe . . . . This situation is not unique. The American
Negroes know it, being partially integrated in a civilization that nevertheless
regards them as constituting an inferior caste.7

At this juncture, I will provide a larger historical framework within which to
conceptualize the white epistemic regime into which Douglass was born and through which his
“Black” body (and the “Black” body, more generally) was discursively and non-discursively
marked.

The Middle Passage
In the name of early European capitalist modes of production, its cultural assumptions, and its
elaborate moral, scientific, and philosophical rationalizations, African bodies were torn from
their land, family ties were severed, and their bodies were confiscated and brutalized.8 This
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began the physical process of becoming “Black” qua inferior, bestial, animal-like. The point is
that the subjugation of African bodies for material profit is inextricably tied to its “representation
and regulation in discursive fields.”9 During the triangular trade10 of human flesh, Africans
(Ashantis, Mandingoes, Ibos, Fulanis, and others) were subjected to tight forms of spatialization.
Although Michel Foucault did not have Black bodies in mind, I would agree where he says that
“discipline proceeds from the distribution of individuals in space.”11 The African body, on this
score, was subjected to white power relations that seized it, that invested in it, marked it, tortured
it, and trained it to carry out various tasks, to perform various rituals and to emit certain signs.12
Bibi Bakare-Yusuf notes that “the history of the middle passage and slavery is a history of
endless assaults on bodies; of bodies forcibly subjected, in order to be transformed into
productive and reproductive bodies,”13 but also to be transformed into subhuman animals and
hyper-sexual savages. The Middle Passage was itself a regime of “truth,” a regime that involved
the production of the Black body’s “truth” as chattel, bodies to be herded into suffocating spaces
of confinement. This was not an issue of how many people could be comfortably accommodated,
but how many things, owned property, could be stuffed into spaces of confinement. The Middle
Passage, with its pernicious by-product of grammar (“breeder,” “chattel,” etc.), helped to shape
Africans into “objects.”
The reader will note that there is nothing ontologically mutually exclusive about Africans
and Europeans. Unlike Jean-Paul Sartre, I do not read the self-Other problem as ontological, that
is, that conflict must inevitably emerge between the self and the Other in virtue of the fact that
one solipsistic consciousness is seen as confronting another solipsistic consciousness, both
engaged in a mutual dance of sadism and masochism.14 This does not deny the phenomenon of
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xenophobia. However, even here, fear of Others, or suspicion of Others, presupposes some type
of differential social grouping such that one inhabits a (non-solipsistic) social space from within
which another, who properly does not have a social standing within that same social group, is
“seen” as Other. Even within the same social group, the self is certainly purchased as a result of
some form of differentiation and the recognition of difference. This differentiation and the
recognition of difference, however, need not take the specific form of a mutual attempt to hold
the other in my gaze as the other attempts to hold me in his/her gaze, a dynamic process resulting
in violent conflict.
With regard to whiteness, my view is that the (white) self and (Black) Other problem is
socio-historically contingent in its origin. The Black body became the very site of evil. Hence, as
Fanon notes, “Jean-Paul Sartre has forgotten that the Negro suffers in his body quite differently
from the white man.”15 The Black does not simply suffer on the basis of a self-Other conflict.
Indeed, it is a problem created through violent acts that are linked to material forces which are
further linked to exclusionary tactics that call into question the existential, ontological, aesthetic,
and cultural legitimacy of Black people. Moreover, on my view, the white gaze/“look” must be
historicized within this context in order to grasp its capacity to pose a violent threat to Black
subjectivity. As Charles Johnson notes:

The experience of the black-as-body becomes, not merely a Self-Other conflict,
nor simply Hegel’s torturous Master-Slave dialectic, but a variation on both these
conditions, intensified by the particularity of the body’s appearance as black, as
“stained,’ [and] lacking interiority.16
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Moreover, there was nothing ontologically problematic about the epidermis of Africans
that would have led to the “historical necessity” of their enslavement/colonization. It is not the
color of the epidermis that founds values. Rather, the “Blackness” of African bodies vis-à-vis
white bodies assumed the historical character that they did (as “evil,” as “stained”) because white
European values were conferred upon both groups. On my view, there must first exist some
material-cum-axiological/epistemological framework that “justifies” the valorization and
sovereignty of whiteness, and, by extension, the denigration of Blackness. The so-called
ontology of racial differences is actually a socio-historical ontology of differences, though
deployed as “natural” through an ideology of whiteness. Creating such differences as “natural”
functions to conceal the reactive-value creating hegemony of whites. In other words, whites are
able to assess the “differences” between themselves and Blacks based upon “objective” criteria
that is believed to be independent of anything that they do, as existing outside of their sphere of
responsibility. What in reality has become a phantasmatically constructed African body, a
fantasized object, instead is “seen” by whites as given, and thus not the result of any processes of
rationalization, projection, ejection, or denial on the part of themselves. Hence, whites are able to
mask or deny their dependency upon the fabrication of the phantasmatic object. As Bibi BakareYusuf also notes, referencing the work of Michael Taussig, the white enslaver and victimizer
desperately “needs the victim to create truth, objectifying fantasy in the discourse of the other.”17
Constructing the Middle Passage as a space of rupture and trauma, Spillers notes:

Those African persons in the “Middle Passage” were literally suspended in the
“oceanic,” if we think of the latter in its Freudian orientation as an analogy for
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undifferentiated identity: removed from the indigenous land and culture, and notyet “American” either, these captive persons, without names that their captors
would recognize, were in movement across the Atlantic, but they were also
nowhere at all. Inasmuch as, on any given day, we might imagine, the captive
personality did not know where s/he was, we could say that they were the
culturally “unmade,” thrown in the midst of a figurative darkness that “exposed”
their destinies to an unknown course.18

One might say that the African was made into the “unmade.” If one thinks of subjectivity as a
transversal relationship constituted through familiar and familial connections, then the Middle
Passage was designed to throw into disarray any sense of subjectivity and destroy any sense of
cultural teleology. The objective was to create a culture-less thing, an object that was defined
within the same context as other commodities. In this way, the very process of positioning Black
bodies within the slave ship functioned as a disciplinary technique to produce an obedient, docile
Black body. This technology of docility had both the effect of fashioning a strong work force,
fashioning Black bodies whose telos it was to labor, but it also reinforced the status of the
enslaver as an active force, as a “driver” of animal flesh.
As the human face of the enslaver was reinforced through his/her dominion over the
African body qua animal of the field, working in tandem with the power to name the African, the
humanity of the African was placed under constant erasure. Chained together like subhuman
animals, the African body, as early as the Middle Passage, was being marked and defined,
disciplined to begin the process of “seeing” itself as thing-like, of undergoing the
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phenomenological process of returning to itself as that which is not free, but owned by another.
The process was not simply to enforce the cruel practices of physical subjugation, but to get the
enslaved to appear to him/herself as an object,19 to embody and instantiate those projections
created by white racists themselves. Hence, the subjection of Africans was also an act of desubjectification.20
The captured African in the eyes of the enslaver became a tool, devoid of reason, devoid
of human feeling, and devoid of will. The “will of the captured” was the will of the white captor.
Soon, this African body would become subjected to white legalese that sanctioned its status as
chattel. Whiteness as law vis-à-vis the African body would become whiteness as divine law and
whiteness as the law of destiny, theology and evolutionary science intertwining to create an
“objective” discourse designed to mask the horrors perpetrated upon other human beings by
white enslavers. Keep in mind that it was not the objective of enslavers to kill the enslaved,
though millions of Africans died en route to the “New World” due to the diseased conditions of
the enslaver ships, to say nothing of those Africans who threw themselves overbroad,21 who
would rather die than to be enslaved or eaten22 by the ghost-like strangers. As Bibi Bakare-Yusuf
notes:

To destroy the body in pain would have been tantamount to economic and
ideological suicide. For how could the slave system perpetuate itself if the
enslaved population was destroyed? The violent subjection of the slaves was a
way of transforming their bodies into an entity that could produce and reproduce
the property necessary for accumulating wealth.”23
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Think of the dissonance, the doubleness, as the African body was returned to itself as an
unfamiliar thing chained deep down in the belly of slave ships, undergoing processes of
redefinition by its brutal treatment, its spatial confinement. Spillers notes:

Everywhere in the descriptive document, we are stunned by the simultaneity of
disparate items in a grammatical series: “Slave” appears in the same context with
beasts of burden, all and any animal(s), various livestock, and a virtual endless
profusion of domestic content from the culinary item to the book.24

Within the framework of the equation (or regulatory and disciplinary economy) where humans
become reduced to cargo, gender differentiation is redefined in terms of quantity and spatiality.
Spillers says, “The female in ‘Middle Passage,’ as the apparently smaller physical mass,
occupies ‘less room’ in a directly translatable money economy.”25 The dispassionate reduction of
Africans to cargo or merchandise is illustrated in Fred D’Aguiar’s Feeding The Ghosts, which is
a powerful fictional narration of an event that actually took place in 1781. For example, Captain
Cunningham, who is in charge of the Zong, which is heading back to England, makes the purely
calculative decision to throw 131 physically ill Africans (men, women, and children) into the
ocean to die. He calculates that if he throws about a third of the infirm Africans overboard he
will earn a profit from the remaining Africans who are not (as yet) sick. Cunningham asks his
crew, “Are we to make a loss or a profit?”26 Although his crew initially hesitates, with his first
mate Kelsal finding the magnitude of his Captain’s plan difficult to absorb, they decide that it is
profit that they desire. Referring to the enslaved Africans as “cargo,” they begin to throw them
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overboard. As men, women, and children were thrown into the ocean, “Captain Cunningham
marked the strokes in his ledger and nodded with satisfaction.”27 As the children were thrown
overboard, for profit, anger and heartrending screams came from the deck below:

Mothers shouted to children to show the evil men that they were not sick but
healthy; to struggle and scream. Men banged their chains on the decks and
shouted in Yoruba, Ewe, Ibo, Fanti, Ashanti, Mandingo, Fetu, Foulah, at the crew
to leave the children and take them instead. Mothers pulled out their hair, fell into
dead faints, wished for death to take them now, now, now, since life could never
mean a thing after this. And cried with dry eyes and hardly a breath left in them.28

The reader will note the contrast between Captain Cunningham who marks in his ledger and
nods with satisfaction, as if he were tallying up discarded inanimate objects, and the lived
African bodies that wailed with sorrow, angst, pain, horror, and powerlessness. These bodies
were not just sites of white re-presentations or discursive distortions, but sites of powerful
trauma, torn flesh, broken hearts, and psychological madness.
Further illustrating Foucault’s understanding that discipline proceeds from the
distribution of individuals in space, Africans were packed into very tight spaces on slave ships.
On the slave ship Pongas, for example, 250 women, many of whom were pregnant, were forced
into a space of 16 by 18 feet. Feminist and cultural theorist bell hooks writes:
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The women who survived the initial stages of pregnancy gave birth aboard the
ship with their bodies exposed to either the scorching sun or the freezing cold.
The number of black women who died during childbirth or the number of
stillborn children will never be known. Black women with children on board the
slave ships were ridiculed, mocked, and treated contemptuously by the slaver
crew. Often the slavers brutalized children to watch the anguish of their mothers.29

An Africa slave trader tells of 108 boys and girls who were packed into a small hold:

I returned on board to aid in stowing [on the slave ship] one hundred and eight
boys and girls, the eldest of whom did not exceed fifteen years [old]. As I crawled
between decks, I confess I could not imagine how this little army was to be
packed or draw breath in a hold but twenty-two inches high!30

Molefi Asante captures the terror of the Middle Passage where he writes:

Imagine crossing the ocean aboard a small ship made to hold 200 people but
packed with 1,000 weeping and crying men, women, and children. Each African
was forced to fit into a space no more than 55.9 centimeters (22 inches) high,
roughly the height of a single gym locker, and 61 centimeters (24 inches) wide,
scarcely an arm’s length. There were no lights aboard the ships, little food, and no
toilet facilities.31
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The reader should keep in mind that the trip lasted 35 to 90 days, contingent upon the weather.
Moreover, the decks where Blacks were held were infested with lice, fleas and rats. Diseased,
dead, and dying, Black bodies were all chained together. My point here is that the sheer nondiscursive confinement of Black bodies/selves within these tight spaces, filled with the putrid
smell of death, sickness, blood, urine and feces, was an exercise in discipline. The “Black body”
vis-à-vis the European imaginary was in the process of being created and produced, a docile and
self-hating body. On this score, whiteness, as a site of concentrated power, is productive. As
Foucault maintains:

We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms:
it “excludes,” it “represses,” it “censors,” it “abstracts,” it “masks,” it “conceals.”
In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and
rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him
belong to this production.32

Myth Making and the Preservation of White Normativity
Upon their arrival in the New World, Black people were sold from auction blocks, defined and
treated like chattel. Standing naked on the auction block, witnessed by both white men and white
women, the Black body was gazed upon and checked and assessed like a valued animal whose
sole function was to be fit to work the land. This form of examination and the objectifying
dimensions of the white gaze are part of the overall function of the white episteme. The white
gazer “sees” what he/she is not. It is not that the physiology of the eye does not send proper
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neurological and chemical signals. Rather, between the white “seer” and the Black “seen” or the
Black “unseen,” there is an invisible/imperceptible “construction” that occurs simultaneously
with the process of white gazing. This construction does not involve “seeing” the dark body and
then extrapolating that it is inferior. The drama and spectacle of the auction itself, the commodity
exchange dynamics of the context, the bidding, the physical turning of the naked bodies,
checking the teeth, the asymmetrical power relations embedded within the physical context of
separating the gazers from the gazed upon, the unquestioned power to separate children from
their parents, the ideological norms informing the white self as all seeing and all knowing, forms
the larger unthematized socio-visual epistemology that disallows for any slippage between
“seeing” and “knowing,” at least with respect to the enslaved African body.
In The History of Mary Prince: A West Indian Slave Related by Herself,33 from which I
will draw upon later, Prince describes the process of being sold from an auction block as
involving a white ritual performance in terms of which the black body, in this case, her Black
female body, became discursively marked as that which was merely usable, expendable, and
sexually exploitable. At the auction block, for example, Mary Prince notes, “I was soon
surrounded by strange men, who examined and handled me in the same manner that a butcher
would a calf or a lamb he was about to purchase, and who talked about my shape and size in like
words—as if I could no more understand their meaning than the dumb beasts.”34
Gazing upon the Black naked body, the white gazer assumes the position of knowing
subject. The Black naked body becomes the gazed upon known object. Within the white buyers’
racist saturated field of visibility, the Black does not appear as fully human. The entire
economic, cultural, epistemological, and anthropological apparatus of white domination
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collapses into a narrow aperture through which the Black body and the white body emerge as
taxonomic differences. Hence, the Black body became a flesh and blood text upon which whites
could project all of their fears, desires, and fantasies without the agony of guilt. The exoticizing
of the Black body involved the process of scripting it as bestial and sexually promiscuous. It is
through the creation of the Black phantasmatic object that whites are able to conceal their
historical practices that have created the phantasmatic object. The Black as inferior, ugly, bestial
are ejecta, that is, negative material thrown out from the white body onto the Black body. To
justify and sustain the enslavement of Blacks, one only need manufacture the Black body as an
“objective state of affairs.”
Theorizing whiteness in ways that are consistent with what I take to be ideology
exposure, Crispin Sartwell notes:

Oppression is released by the oppressor into an “objective” realm, where it is not
anyone’s doing in particular, but just a feature of the external facts. While the
oppressed person takes it in, the oppressor eliminates it, gets rid of it, makes it a
feature of objective conditions, blames the victim, or blames the economic
situation, or simply denies its existence.35

Although I will say more about this shortly, Sartwell understands, and I think correctly, that
whites have been able to deal effectively with their white lies regarding themselves and the
Black body in terms of what he terms “ejected asceticism.”36 On this score, whites created/create
fantasies regarding the Black body as sullen and immoral so as to stabilize, dialectically, their
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own fantasized identity as clean and moral. Whites project “their hate [of Blacks and other nonwhites] into the “objective” realm of laws and institutions (and “values” and “sciences”) and then
[fail] to experience themselves as haters. This movement into the objective displays the ghostwhite self writ large.”37 What becomes clear is that not only is the Black a ghost, a fantasy, but
the white is also a ghost, a fantasy. What we have is the unique case of a “white spook”
manufacturing a “Black spook.” As Sartwell notes, “Whiteness is the color of ghosts.”38
With the advent of nineteenth century white racist biological theories, the Black body
was further discursively marked and produced. Whites were fascinated by the alleged large and
“exotic” genitalia of Black people.39 The objective was to confirm “scientific truths” both about
the (“normative”) white body and (“deviant” and ape-like) Black body. Again, such “truths”
about white and Black bodies were deemed discovered, not constructed. White power networks,
consisting of norms, knowledge-claims, etc., helped to produce the myth of the “Negro rapist.”
In 1903, for example, Dr. William Lee Howard argued that Negro males attack innocent white
women because of “racial instincts that are about as amenable to ethical culture as is the inherent
odor of the race.”40 The physiological basis of the problem of the “Negro rapist” had to do with
the enormous size of his penis and that therefore “‘the African’s birthright’ was ‘sexual madness
and excess.’”41 Indeed, so it was maintained, the Negroes, by their very nature, are morally
retrogressive, physically dirty (a trope of Blackness), and morally unclean. In 1900, Charles
Carroll supported the pre-Adamite beliefs of Dr. Samuel Cartwright by describing the Negro as
an ape and the actual “tempter of Eve.”42 Stuart Hall notes:
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The ways in which black people, black experiences, were positioned and subjected in the dominant regimes of representation were the effects of a critical exercise
of cultural power and normalization. Not only, in Said’s “Orientalist” sense, were
we constructed as different and other within categories of knowledge of the West
by those regimes. They had the power to make us see and experience ourselves as
“Other.” Every regime of representation is a regime of power formed, as Foucault
reminds us, by the fatal couplet “power/knowledge.”43

The sciences of physiognomy and phrenology, with their emphasis on the prognathous
jaw of Negroes, was said to clearly support the primitive nature of African people. Examining
the so-called Negro anatomy, the French physician Pruner-Bey observed:

The intestinal mucus is very thick, viscid, and fatty in appearance. All the
abdominal glands are of large size, especially the liver and the supra renal
capsules; a venous hyperaemia seems the ordinary condition of these organs. The
position of the bladder is higher than in the European. I find the seminal vesicles
very large, always gorged with a turbid liquid of a slightly greyish colour, even in
cases where the autopsy took place shortly after death. The penis is always of
unusually large size, and I found in all bodies a small conical gland on each side
at the base of the fraenum.44
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The Black body was also believed to be a site of disease, and, hence, a site of avoidance.
Again, William Lee Howard argued: “There is every prospect of checking and reducing these
diseases in the white race, if the race is socially—in every aspect of the term—quarantined from
the African.”45 In addition, Blacks were believed to be prone to moral and sexual retrogression.
Such beliefs where held to be true by white evolutionary theorists. Dr. Paul B. Barringer, for
example, drew from the Darwinian stress on heredity. According to Fredrickson, Barringer
argued:

The inborn characteristics of the Negro had been formed by natural selection
during “ages of degradation” in Africa and his savage traits could not have been
altered in any significant way by a mere two centuries of proximity to Caucasion
civilization in America.46

Also theorizing within a Darwinian framework, the historian Joseph A. Tillinghast states: “The
Negro character had been formed in Africa, a region which supposedly showed an uninterrupted
history of stagnation, inefficiency, ignorance, cannibalism, sexual licence, and superstition.”47 Of
course, given the complexity of Egyptian culture, it was imperative to separate Egypt from
Africa. Through craniological investigations, the Egyptian skull was found to differ from that of
the Negro, providing the needed rationalization for the so-called immutable primitive culture of
Negroes. Dr Samuel George Morton, by 1840, “was confident that the brains of the five races he
had classified (Caucasian, Mongolian, Malay, [Native] American, and Negro) were successively
smaller, thereby proving the general superiority in intelligence (and hence civilization) of the
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Caucasian race.”48 Furthermore, speaking to the American Social Science Association in 1899,
Walter F. Willcox maintained “that the liability of an American Negro to commit crime is
several times as great as the liability of the whites.”49 As has been shown, constructing the Black
body involved the deployment of biological, phrenological, physiological, and evolutionary
“truths” designed to regulate and discipline the Black body, stigmatizing the Black body with
certain predictable patterns of hidden “truths” such as uncontrollable sexual and criminal habits.
In this way, the white gaze came to “see” the “truth” of its own “superiority,” presumed
unencumbered by prejudices. In doing so, however, the alterity of Black people was eradicated.
Adding to the list of “authoritative” discourses regarding the inferiority of the Black body
were those made by prominent European philosophers and intellectuals. With Emmanuel
Levinas, I think that it is plausible to argue that “Western philosophy [at least with Hume, Kant,
Hegel, et al] coincides with the disclosure of the other where the other, in manifesting itself as a
being, loses its alterity.”50 In his “Of National Characters,” David Hume maintains:

I am apt to suspect the negroes, and in general all other species of men (for there
are four or five different kinds) to be naturally inferior to the whites. There never
was a civilized nation of any other complexion than white, nor even any
individual eminent either in action or speculation. No ingenious manufactures
amongst them, no arts, no sciences. In Jamaica indeed they talk of one negro as a
man of learning; but ‘tis likely he is admired for very slender accomplishments,
like a parrot, who speaks a few words plainly.51
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What is interesting is that Hume appears willing to “commit to the flames” any views that
challenge his view regarding the superiority of whites over non-whites. It is not true as some
argue that Hume was simply speculating out of sheer ignorance. The Scottish poet and
philosopher James Beattie, who was Hume’s contemporary, argued against Hume’s views
regarding the inferiority of non-whites:

The empires of Peru and Mexico could not have been governed, nor the
metropolis of the latter built after so singular a manner, in the middle of a lake,
without men eminent both for action and speculation. Every body has heard of the
magnificence, good government, and ingenuity, of the ancient Peruvians. The
Africans and [Native] Americans are known to have many ingenious
manufactures and arts among them, which even Europeans would find it no easy
matter to imitate.52

Although Beattie implies a certain privileging of Europeans where he says, “even Europeans
would find it no easy matter to imitate,” his view empirically challenges Hume’s. Given Hume’s
response to Beattie, he appears not to have thought that Beattie’s counter-evidence was sufficient
to undermine his belief in the superiority of whites. Philosopher Clarence Johnson notes that
Hume simply made a minor change in phrasing. Instead of saying that there “never” was a
civilized nation other than white, Hume deletes “never” and replaces it with “scarcely ever.” 53
Concerning this slight rephrasing, philosopher Naomi Zack notes:
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There is empirical restraint in this formulation. Still, having forgone the constant
conjunction of dark skin shade and cultural inferiority, and having ruled out
environmental causes of culture, Hume has no basis for a causal connection
between skin shade and culture (in either direction) and no evidence for the
existence of a third factor that could cause both skin shade and culture.54

Although Kant attributes to Hume having awakened him from his dogmatic slumber, on
the issue of whiteness vis-à-vis the Black, Hume seems to have lulled Kant back to sleep. In his
Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime, Kant writes:

The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the trifling. Mr.
Hume challenges anyone to cite a single example in which a Negro has shown
talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who are
transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have even
been set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great
in art or science or any other praiseworthy quality, even though among the whites
some continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn
respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between these two races of
man, and it appears to be as great in regard to mental capacities as in color. The
religion of fetishes so wide spread among them is perhaps a sort of idolatry that
sinks as deeply into the trifling as appears to be possible to human nature. A bird
feather, a cow’s horn, a conch shell, or any other common object, as soon as it
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becomes consecrated by a few words, is an object of veneration and invocation in
swearing oaths. The Blacks are very vain but in the Negro’s way, and so talkative
that they must be driven apart from each other with thrashing.55

Moreover, in reply to advice that a Black carpenter gave to Father Labat, Kant commented, “And
it might be that there was something in this which perhaps deserved to be considered; but in
short, this fellow was quite black from head to foot, a clear proof that what he said was stupid.”56
The reader will note that Kant deduces the Black man’s stupidity from the fact that a Black
person ipso facto means a stupid person.57 Also, note that Kant says that the man’s Blackness
functioned as “proof ” of his stupidity. Kant’s use of the concept of “proof ” complicates the
familiar line that Kant was simply a product of his time. “Proof ” suggests the establishment of
the validity of a claim based upon reasoning, not simply upon the uncritical acceptance of
cultural prejudices.
It is important to note that Kant, like Hume, was also not philosophizing about the
inferiority of Blacks in a cultural vacuum that did not challenge his racist beliefs. Tsenay
Serequeberhan argues that “Kant was well aware of the faulty character of the empirical travel
literature and information about non-European peoples that was available to him.”58 Indeed, as
Serequeberhan notes, in his review of Johann Gottfried Herder’s “Ideas for a philosophy of the
history of mankind” (1785), Kant acknowledges:

[W]orking with a mass of descriptions dealing with different lands, it is possible
to prove , if one cares to do so . . . that [indigenous] Americans and Negroes are
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relatively inferior races in their intellectual capacities, but on the other hand,
according to reports just as plausible, that their potentialities are on the same level
as those of any other inhabitants of the planet.59

So, why would Kant continue to maintain his racism in the face of “reports just as plausible”?
Serequeberhan suggests that Kant turns a blind eye because of the importance that he attributes
to the making of “natural distinctions” and “classifications based on hereditary coloration . . .
[and] . . . the notion of race.”60 Of course, this only serves the colonial adventures of Occidental
hegemony. Serequeberhan concludes, “It is calculative “rational control” that, unlike the
Tahitians’ pursuit of “mere pleasure,” is the true and proper embodiment of “the values of
existence itself.”61
John Locke’s racism is also evident. Indeed, his racism triumphed over his philosophy of
natural rights and liberalism vis-à-vis Blacks. Ironically though, Frederick Douglass used
Locke’s theories to declare his self-ownership. With cutting irony, philosopher Charles Mills
notes that this was “the same John Locke who was an investor in the Atlantic slave trade and
author of the Carolina Constitution which—in seeming contradiction to his later prescriptions in
the Second Treatise—enshrined hereditary slavery.”62
Although Thomas Jefferson waxed and waned on the issue of Black enslavement,
“owning” Black bodies of his own, in his Notes on Virginia, which was written in 1782 and
1783, his belief in the superiority of whiteness is evident. Jefferson was respected as a learned
man and scientific in his outlook. Despite his famous five words, “All men are created equal,”
Jefferson perpetuated myths regarding the Negro type :
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Their existence appears to participate more of sensation than reflection. To this
must be ascribed their disposition to sleep when abstracted from their diversions
and unemployed in labor. An animal whose body is at rest, and who does not
reflect must be disposed to sleep of course.63

Jefferson also thought that “in imagination they [Negroes] are dull, tasteless and anomalous.”64
The Black astronomer and mathematician Benjamin Banneker (1731-1806) sent to Jefferson,
then Secretary of State, a copy of his Banneker’s Almanac as evidence to counter the myth that
Negroes were not endowed with intelligence. Jefferson sent Banneker’s ephemeris to the
Marquis de Condorcet. Apparently, Jefferson sent it with an enthusiastic letter.65 According to
Earl Conrad, however, “Later, in private correspondence, he belittled the mathematical and
intellectual gifts of the almanac-maker.”66
And we must not forget Hegel’s distortion of Africa. Hegel writes:

Negroes are to be regarded as a race of children who remain immersed in their
state of uninterested naïveté. They are sold, and let themselves be sold, without
any reflection on the rights or wrongs of the matter. . . . They do not show an
inherent striving for culture. . . . There [in Africa] they do not attain to the feeling
of human personality, their mentality is quite dormant, remaining sunk within
itself and making no progress, and thus corresponding to the compact,
differenceless mass of the African continent.67
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On this score, Africa is a site devoid of any Geist. Emmanuel Chukwudi Eze writes:

It is clear, then, that nowhere is the direct conjunction/intersection of the
philosophical and the political and economic interests in the European denigration
and exploitation of Africans so evident and shameless as in Hegel. Since Africa,
for Hegel, “is the Gold-land compressed within itself,” the continent and its
peoples become, all at once, a treasure island and a terra nulla, a virgin territory
brimming with natural and human raw material passively waiting for Europe to
exploit and turn it into mini-European territories.68

Concerning the issue of aesthetics, Johann Wolfgang von Goethe writes:

We venture, however, . . . to assert that the white man, that is, he whose surface
varies from white to reddish, yellowish, brownish, in short, whose surface appears
most neutral in hue and least inclines to any particular and positive colour, is the
most beautiful.”69

Moreover, certain that there was a correlation between beauty and the power of intelligence, the
German philosopher Christoph Meiners maintained that people who were light in complexion
were superior and beautiful. Darker people were “deemed both ‘ugly’ and at best ‘semicivilized’.”70 Charles White, a British surgeon who argued for the aesthetic superiority of white
women, deemed blushing to be a mark of beauty (which he believed to be a feature exclusive to
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white women).71 In a similar manner, White asks, “[w]here, except on the bosom of the
European woman, [shall we find] two such plump and snowy white hemispheres, tipt with
vermilion?”72 Enlightenment thinker Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, known as the father of
physical anthropology, Swedish naturalist Carl Linnaeus, Arthur de Gobineau, French naturalist
Comte de Buffon, Robert Knox, and others, further developed and shaped the discourse through
which Black bodies came to be “known”/“seen.” Blumenbach reiterated the “universal”
dimensions of white beauty. He linked the universality of white beauty to his belief that whites
were the progenitors of humanity, occupying the apex on the great chain of being. As
Fredrickson notes:

He was the first to trace the white race to the Caucasus, and he did so because of
the reputed beauty of its inhabitants. He then went on to hypothesize that those he
dubbed “Caucasians” were the original human race from which the others had
diverged or degenerated. They were, he affirmed, “the most handsome and
becoming,” having “the most beautiful form of the skull.73

From the above, it is clear that these thinkers believed their claims to be true and
descriptive of the Black body as such. Hence, claims differentiating Black bodies from white
bodies were deemed unconditioned, natural distinctions waiting to be “discovered” and
“accurately” described. These thinkers, after all, represented some of the “best” minds in Europe.
How could they be incorrect? Europe is the “all seeing-eye of truth,” disinterested and objective.
However, the “Black” body qua docile, perverse, and inferior, is a product of the white
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imaginary. On this score, in stream with Simone de Beauvoir, I would argue that from a
historical, discursive perspective, one is not born, but rather becomes “Black,” that is, where
“Black” denotes and connotes that which is impure, savage, immoral, stupid, dull in imagination,
ugly, the white man’s burden, evil, simian, child-like, and naturally fit to serve whites.

Black embodiment within the serious world of whiteness
I am cognizant of the fact that post-structuralism has placed the category of experience under
erasure. However, the power of Frederick Douglass’s narrative voice is precisely grounded in his
lived embodied experiences under the American institution of slavery. While I recognize
philosophically that “experience” is never simply and purely there, this does not negate the fact
that the oppressed are capable of speaking from the authority of their own experiences. While it
is true that Douglass interprets his experiences under slavery, it is not the case that his
experiences can be “reduced to linguistic effects.”74 I would argue that Douglass’s experience
under slavery exceeds the “various possible and actual discursive representations of that
experience.”75 To reject the metaphysics of presence, which, on my view, actually comes through
the backdoor of positivism, does not negate the significance of how the (non-discursive) lived
experiential physicality and materiality of white oppression inform the interpretive dimensions of
the Douglass’s enslavement. Although Douglass predates the requiem sung to the “death” of the
modern subject, the viability of meta-narratives, and the metaphysics of presence, it is ironic that
when Blacks and other minority and subaltern voices begin to speak that they often find
themselves in the midst of some new “post-paradigm” that appears to undercut their efforts at
self-authorship, self-voicing, articulating, and demonstrating the significance of the lived
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experiential and personal dimensions of existence as political.
Through the process of narrating his ex-istence, Douglass is challenging the racist
assumption that Black people have no perspective on the world. By speaking out against the
brutality of American slavery, he is fighting against the “Black” body and its history of
subjection to a technology of docility; he is defying and challenging the caricatured myths and
normativity of whiteness. He does not begin with an abstract Cartesian “I think,” but with a rich
description of an embodied here of subjectivity whose historicity is linked to the Middle
Passage. As Lewis Gordon writes, “Without a perspective, I will be an anonymous consciousness
without a point of reference. I will be a view, literally, from nowhere.” 76 When Douglass writes
about himself from his own perspective, he is engaged in a larger political project that has
existential implications in terms of resisting the state of being an object-for-white-Others. His
aim is to defend the humanity and the being-for-itself of Black people. He writes:

I see, too, that there are special reasons why I should write my own biography, in
preference to employing another to do it. Not only is slavery on trial, but
unfortunately, the enslaved people are also on trial. It is alleged that they are,
naturally, inferior; that they are so low in the scale of humanity, and so utterly
stupid, that they are unconscious of their wrongs, and do not apprehend their
rights.77

As the earliest form of Black protestational autobiography, it is through the modality of
the slave narrative that Douglass attacks the inhumanity of whites. Douglass is writing to reveal
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his pain and the collective pain of Black people. He is engaging in self-representation, one that is
counter to white re-presentation. He is exposing to the world structures of power within a
particular domain that often go unrecognized. He is demonstrating his humanity and the
humanity of Black people. He is revealing the hypocrisy of whites. And, he is exposing both how
enslaved Blacks become duped into thinking that they are fit for oppression and how white
oppressors construct ways of rendering their acts of oppression invisible.
Under the epistemic regime of whiteness, Blacks bodies came to think of whiteness as the
property of great souls and great minds. Beauvoir would argue that women have come to think,
under the epistemic regime of androcentricity, that only men have great souls, thoughts, dreams,
and perform great deeds. Whiteness, like androcentricity, is a specific historical position that
masquerades as universal, as that which exists external to a set of embodied practices. For
Beauvoir, “The serious man gets rid of his freedom by claiming to subordinate it to values which
would be unconditioned.”78 One strategy used to maintain the veneer of “unconditionedness” is
that whiteness does not speak its own name. As Russell Ferguson writes:

In our society dominant discourse never tries to speak its own name. Its authority
is based on absence. The absence is not just that of the various groups classified
as ‘other’, although members of these groups are routinely denied power. It is also
the lack of any overt acknowledgement of the specificity of the dominant culture,
which is simply assumed to be the all-encompassing norm. This is the basis of its
power.79
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Constituting itself as the site of universality and absolute presence, whiteness functions as
an epistemological and ontological anchorage. As such, whiteness assumes the authority to
marginalize other identities, discourses, perspectives, and voices. Raising the issue of white
identity as a form of ressentiment vis-à-vis the Black as Other, indeed, as the negated Other,
Lewis Gordon observes:

It is clear, then, in a wickedly ironic way, that perhaps the world would have been
more just if their [whites’] identity had not emerged since their identity is
fundamentally conditioned by hating mine. And why should anyone continue to
defend any identity that is premised upon being the primary agent of hate?80

Given the above definitions of the “Black” body as framed within the meta-narrative
sovereignty of white ideology, with its procrustean tendencies, it is clear that African people (the
Other in this case) are constructed as things trapped within an economy of exchange value,
alienated from themselves and from the rest of the civilized world, that is, “civilized” as defined
by whiteness. It is within this socio-historical theatre of whiteness that Douglass’s body becomes
an essential thing of nature. Beauvoir insightfully notes that “one of the ruses of oppression is to
camouflage itself behind a natural situation since, after all, one can not revolt against nature.”81
As he begins to narrate his own experiences within the context of his historical facticity,
Douglass is always already coded and narrated, deeply scripted by pre-existing racist
assumptions. He is born into a social reality where everything, as Beauvoir might say, confirms
him in his belief in white superiority.82 Douglass writes, “By far the larger part of the slaves
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know as little of their age as horses know of theirs, and it is the wish of most masters within my
knowledge to keep their slaves thus ignorant.” 83 To inquire about one’s age was judged an act of
“impudent curiosity.”84 For the system of enslavement to function, the enslaved should be
focused only on the role for which nature made them: to serve, not to ask questions of their own
existence. This strategy of avoiding such questions allowed the white enslaver to flee his
responsibility for treating the enslaved with at least a modicum of dignity.
Parents are also torn away, prohibiting any sense of connectedness. As Douglass says,
“Genealogical trees do not flourish among slaves.”85 Douglass realizes that the practice of
separating children from their mothers and fathers “is in harmony with the grand aim of slavery,
which, always and everywhere, is to reduce man to a level with the brute.”86 White power
relations shape the Black body into that which is history-less.87 Terms like sister, brother, father,
and mother are nominal only. According to Douglass, slavery obliterated the structure of family
life amongst the enslaved, and, thereby, robbed “these terms of their true meaning.”88 On the
plantation, “the order of civilization was reversed here.”89 Within the context of the slave system,
it was not motherly affection that mattered. What was important is that the enslaved mother
“adds another name to a master’s ledger.”90 As Bakare-Yusuf notes:

Therefore, the reproduction of mothering has radically different meanings for free
white women and enslaved black women. For white women reproduction enables
them to define themselves as human subjects since they are able to birth the next
generation of the human subject even though they are excluded from full
participation in the public realm of citizenship. For the enslaved woman,
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constituted as property, her reproductive capacity did not free her, in fact it
reinstated her role as property. In this instance reproduction is not a reproduction
of mothering but of property, because she transmits her unfreedom to her
offspring.91

This is Douglass’ situation, it is his objectivity, which involves “the quality or state of
being an object.” 92 Beauvoir notes that women have been reduced to a womb, an ovary.93 The
Black has been reduced to an animal, to his/her genitalia. Notice that Douglass mentions horses.
Horses are deemed brutes of the field. Time or meaningfully lived existential temporality,
seizing one’s life as a protensive project, a felt movement of historical becoming, is irrelevant to
horses. Comparable to a horse, Douglass’ existence is assigned a purpose by another, a white
oppressor. With horror and dread, Douglass is aware of the ontological chain of being within
which he has been assigned an inferior role. He writes:

We were all ranked together at the valuation. Men and women, old and young,
married and single, were ranked with horses, sheep, and swine. There were horses
and men, cattle and women, pigs and children, all holding the same rank in the
scale of being, and were all subjected to the same narrow examination.94

Ranked on the same ontological scale as other subhuman animals, the objective was to get
Blacks to “see” themselves as naturally occupying the same rung as beasts of burden. The more
Blacks were able to so identify with this racist categorization, the more they became the mimetic
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reflection of white projections. Beauvoir compares this type of existence to a state of vegetation
and maintains that “life justifies itself only if its effort to perpetuate itself is integrated into its
surpassing and if this surpassing has no other limits than those which the subject assigns
himself.”95
Through this method of keeping enslaved Black people ignorant of their birth dates,
parents, etc., many came to experience their lives as purely given without any sense of
subjectivity regarding historical movement marked by existential significance. One’s birth date is
not marked and recalled as a significant existential emergence in-the-world. Douglass describes
this entire process of keeping him ignorant as leaving him “without an intelligible beginning in
the world.”96 On a phenomenological or lived level, the Black body is returned as that which has
always been, always is, and always will be fit for slavery. Within such a context, Blacks
internalize their identities along an “atemporal” axis. They and their enslavers are presumed
locked in an eternal dominated-dominator dynamic. “‘The eternal feminine’ corresponds to ‘the
black soul’ and to ‘the Jewish character,’” according to Beauvoir.97 In other words, the eternal
feminine, like the Black soul, is deemed an immutable thing, an essence. But unlike Blacks, at
least white women were shown levels of respect in virtue of being mothers, wives, sisters, etc.,
of white men.98
Within the narrative, it is clear that Douglass has a sense of himself as dejected, a brute, a
thing, and as an abomination before God. His knowledge that his father was possibly a white
man further solidifies his identity as a dejected thing, a reminder of his owner’s lust for (and
possible rape of) the female Black body that has been deemed subhuman and lascivious.
Douglass notes that the biological father “may be white, glorying in the purity of his Anglo-
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Saxon blood; and his child may be ranked with the blackest slaves.”99 The presence of the
mulatto on a plantation was clear evidence of the powerful ideological workings of the slave
system. After all, the enslaved mulatto was white in phenotype, and, yet, deemed “Black.” All
that was necessary is that “the child be by a woman in whose veins courses one thirty-second
part of African blood.”100 By the one-drop rule, no matter how light, the child was still “tainted”/
“stained” Black and therefore less than human.
The ideology of the one-drop rule no doubt made it easy for white males to turn a blind
eye to their children, to flee from the anxiety possibly caused by the blatant contradiction of
enslaving their own children. Moreover, the ideological framing of the Black female body as
always sexually available, indeed, hyper-sexed, would have served to obscure the fact that the
“hyper-sexed” Black female body was a fantasy created by whites themselves. In short, as
argued, the Black body becomes the phantasmatic object of the white imaginary. In this way, the
white enslaver is able to disclaim responsibility for his actions, maintaining that the Black female
body is the site of seductive dark mystery, a seductiveness that white men are incapable, because
of Black female seductive trickery, of resisting. Thus, the white enslaver is able to objectify his
own perverse practices to be outside of his control. The Black female body, then, becomes a
distorted object, which is projected out from the inner workings of the sexual rapaciousness of
the white enslaver himself. She became the seductive “Jezebel Negress,” while he became the
honorable white Southern gentleman. This served both the function of “justifying” the brutal
rape of Black female bodies, and of providing a moral basis upon which to privilege the civilized
sexual modesty of white women. In a powerful observation, Douglass writes, “Women—white
women, I mean—are IDOLS at the south, not WIVES, for the slave women are preferred in
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many instances.”101 It is important to keep in mind, though, that the projection of the Black
female body as hypersexual is also fundamentally tied to economic ends. As Joane Nagel notes:

Ideological hegemonies do not exist in a material vacuum . . . . Enslaved women
were especially likely targets of sexual abuse since their rape was rewarded by the
possibility of pregnancy, and thus could increase a slaveowner’s holdings. This
incentive increased in importance after 1808 when the importation, but not the
reproduction of slaves was outlawed in the United States. For the next fifty-seven
years until slavery was ended in 1865 with the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a slaveowner’s holdings could only be
increased by “breeding” slaves. Enslaved black women thus labored for slave
owners in all senses of the word—as productive workers in slaveowners’ houses,
businesses, and fields, and as reproductive workers whose pregnancy,
childbearing, and childrearing increased slaveowners’ “stock” of slaves.102

Douglass witnessed the sadistic sexual practices of white male enslavers as a young boy.
He mentions an enslaved woman named Esther who lived with his old master. Douglass notes
that “this was a young woman who possessed that which is ever a curse to the slave-girl; namely,
- personal beauty.”103 It is clear that Douglass’s old master wanted her for himself; for he forbade
her to see Ned Roberts, another enslaved Black whom she loved. Upon finding out that she
disobeyed his orders, he tied her wrists and stood her on a bench with her shoulders and back
exposed. Douglass:
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Behind her stood old master, with cowskin in hand, preparing his barbarous work
with all manner of harsh, coarse, and tantalizing epithets. The screams of his
victim were most piercing. He was cruelly deliberate, and protracted the torture,
as one who was delighted with the scene. Again and again he drew the hateful
whip through his hand, adjusting it with a view of dealing the most pain-giving
blow.104

The process of the lynching of Black male bodies comes to mind here. The entire scene is
serious. As Beauvoir might say, during a lynching of a Black body, whites are “led to take refuge
in the ready-made values of the serious [white] world.”105 There is the spectacle of the scene, the
ritualism of getting dressed for the occasion, bringing children as if it were a family picnic. And
then, of course, there is the slow hanging, and the heightened sadistic and frenzied moment of
castration, of severing the fantasized, hypertrophied Black penis. Within the context of this “den
of horrors,”106 what is it about the smiling white faces as they gaze upon the mutilated Black
body? Clyde Taylor suggests that the smiling faces are indicative of people having experienced
an event that was pleasurable.107 One should not overlook the homoerotic elements played out in
the spectacle. In removing the Black penis, in “white men embracing . . . the same penis they
were so over-determinedly driven to destroy, one encounters a sadistic enactment of the
homoerotic at the very moment of its most extreme disavowal.”108 Consistent with this theme of
perverse eroticisation, Sartwell notes:
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First of all, perhaps the dirtiest secret of white racism is its eroticisation of
dominance: its sexual sadism. If we cannot acknowledge the fact that we get off
on brutalization, and that our ancestors associated orgasm with the whip and the
threat of the whip, then we cannot penetrate to the heart of whiteness. Very few
people will acknowledge to themselves, much less to others, still less to their
victims, that cruelty is pleasurable, but the whole history of American race
relations is incomprehensible without that acknowledgement. 109

On my view, the white enslaver is invested in an ideological world-picture or what
Sartwell refers to as “the technology of appearance.”110 The point here is that the ideological
world-picture is necessary; for it provides whites with a powerful means for moral elision. If this
technology of appearance were not in place, whites would realize their inhumanity, their
brutality toward those whom they have deemed inferior Others. However, the ideological
framework is needed to maintain their understanding of themselves as superior. As Sartwell
notes, “We [whites] construct our pure moral agency by the exclusion of what we construct you
[Blacks] to be: particular, appetitive, passionate, incapable of reason, incoherent.”111 However, it
is precisely Douglass’s story about Esther, the spectacle of lynching, and the rape of Black
female bodies by white men who where protected under laws that denied Blacks the legal right to
testify against them in a court of law that reveal unreason, incoherence, and perverse appetite at
their worst.112
The reader will note that there are family resemblances between the dynamics of white
ideology that I expose, Sartwell’s conceptualization of the technology of appearance, and
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Beauvoir’s conceptualization of the serious world. All three approaches aim to reveal a form of
profound dishonesty, a form of eliding one’s responsibility through the establishment of values
that are deemed fixed and universal. As Beauvoir would say, the white enslavers have become
blind and deaf, sub-men, hiding behind a world that they take to be ready-made. In this way, as
Douglass says, they can be “indecent without shame, cruel without shuddering.”113
Characterizing the serious man, Beauvoir is worth quoting in full:

Dishonestly ignoring the subjectivity of his choice, he pretends that the
unconditioned value of the object is being asserted through him; and by the same
token he also ignores the value of the subjectivity and the freedom of others, to
such an extent that, sacrificing them to the thing, he persuades himself that what
he sacrifices is nothing. The colonial administrator who has raised the highway to
the stature of an idol will have no scruple about assuring its construction at the
price of a great number of lives of the natives; for, what value has the life of a
native who is incompetent, lazy, and clumsy when it comes to building highways?
The serious leads to a fanaticism which is as formidable as the fanaticism of
passion. It is the fanaticism of the Inquisition which does not hesitate to impose a
credo, that is, an internal movement, by means of external constraints. It is the
fanaticism of the Vigilantes of America who defend morality by means of
lynchings.114
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Returning to Douglass’s early life, he did know his mother but only for a brief time. He
writes of the time that she walked twelve miles to see him despite the threat of being whipped
like a beast of the field if caught. It is this encounter that disrupts his state of “atemporality.” She
disrupts his condemnation “to mark time hopelessly.” 115 She provides him with a sense of
heritage and a consciousness of history. Douglass notes that he was “not only a child, but
somebody’s child.”116 The recognition that he is somebody’s child militates against his simply
being somebody’s property. No longer just a homogeneous thing, undifferentiated from other
disposable Black bodies at the hands of whites, Douglass is differentiated in his being as
somebody’s child. Being somebody’s child, in Douglass’s situation, creates the conditions
necessary for self-recognition as someone who is loved. Being loved opens up a dynamic selfreflective moment: I am valued in my person; I am other than how I have been depicted vis-à-vis
whiteness. As such, a dynamic subjective world is opened up to Douglass through the
recognition of the other. In this case, the other, his mother, does not collapse his world, but
expands it. Indeed, there is a mutual “we-expanding” between mother and child, an expansion
that is constantly under erasure under enslavement. Having no doubt received hostile and cold
gazes from whites, his being-for-his mother “can be a comfort and encouragement to the self.”117
This can set in motion a phenomenological return of Douglass’s dark body as that which is
admired in the eyes of another. Her presence, her embodied acts of love and sacrifice, validates
Douglass’s humanity and his historical and genealogical continuity. After all, as Beauvoir states,
“it is not as single individuals that human beings are to be defined in the first place.”118
Douglass’ mother provides a sense, though brief, of parental fellowship (Mitsein). Douglass’
mother is willing to risk possible death to show him love, to lie down with him until he falls to
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sleep at night. This is a political act. Indeed, her willingness to risk death to see her son
undermines the “absolute” anti-Black value system that attempts to define her identity as a nonmaternal, non-nurturing breeder. (The irony, of course, is that enslaved Black women were used
precisely for purposes of nurturing white infants, serving as wet nurses, allowing white infants to
suckle from Black breasts, taking in the “white” milk.) She enacts a form of existential resistance
that recognizes that the power of whiteness as a regime, and its institutional prohibitions and
myths regarding Blacks, is a human creation that can be disrupted.119
In many ways, in the above context, Douglass is treated as less than an animal. At least
an adult animal would have been allowed to raise its young. It was not long after a few brief
encounters with his mother that she fell ill and died. He writes:

The heartless and ghastly form of slavery rises between mother and child, even at
the bed of death. The mother, at the verge of the grave, may not gather her
children, to impart to them her holy admonitions, and invoke for them her dying
benediction. The bondwoman lives as a slave, and is left to die as a beast; often
with fewer attentions than are paid to a favorite horse.120

As argued throughout this project, whiteness is deemed Absolute, the essential, and the
center. According to Beauvoir, however, “universal, absolute man exists nowhere.”121 Blackness
is deemed the inessential. While young and enslaved on the plantation, Douglass was almost
naked, suffered from hunger, and whipped by his so-called white master. According to Douglass,
“The great difficulty was, to keep warm during the night. I had no bed. The pigs in the pen had
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leaves, and the horses in the stable had straw, but the children had no beds.”122 Through sheer
neglect, Douglass was being taught to “see” himself as lower than an animal. He began to
recognize in his situation “several points of similarity with that of the oxen. They were property,
so was I.”123 Douglass reveals that he was so often “pinched with hunger, that I have fought with
the dog—‘Old Nep’—for the smallest crumbs that fell from the kitchen table, and have been glad
when I won a single crumb in the combat.”124 The objective of the plantation was to stabilize
Douglass, and other enslaved Blacks, as objects, to relegate him to a state of immanence. As
Beauvoir says, “Every time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a
degradation of existence into the ‘en-soi’—the brutish life of subjection.”125 Pertinent here is
Sartre’s description of an object. He writes, “An object is what my consciousness is not and what
has in itself no trace of consciousness.” 126 From the perspective of whiteness, one might say,
“Blackness is what my consciousness is not and what has in itself no trace of consciousness.” If
“Being-for-itself ( pour-soi ) is coextensive with the realm of consciousness, and the nature of
consciousness is that it is perpetually beyond itself,”127 then enslaved Blacks were no doubt
considered sentient (like a pig or a cow), but deemed not to possess a dynamic form of
consciousness, one capable of projecting toward the future and always ahead of itself.
The point here is that Blacks were not believed to be frustrated in their transcendence.
Many whites were convinced that Blacks were happy in their state of servitude. They saw what
they wanted to see: genuine “happy darkies” fixed in their being and satisfied with their lot.
“What we want,” according to Sartwell, “is grinning, dancing idiots, so we simply manufacture
them. We then notice that these folks seem to be grinning, dancing idiots, and justify our racism
out of our own invention.”128
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Douglass’ narrative repudiates this myth and clearly demonstrates what it means for
Blacks to be profoundly frustrated in their transcendence. In existentialist terms, whites saw
Blacks as ontological plenums, they were deemed simply there—an essential thing which does
not grasp itself through a process of being and nothingness. Sartre writes that transcendence is
“the process through which the for-itself goes beyond or surpasses the given in pursuing its
project.”129 Black reality was not deemed a projective reality; the Black was a being for whom
his/her essence precedes existence. Blacks were born into the world ready-made and devoid of
“the metaphysical risk of a liberty in which ends and aims must be contrived without
assistance.”130 On this score, freedom is a form of distance that the for-itself ( pour-soi ) takes
toward its own being. Under slavery, Blacks were defined as an ontological positivity without
any value except for that conferred upon a “thing.” For Sartre and Beauvoir, at the heart of being
human is nothingness. Human being “is a lack of being, but this lack has a way of being which is
precisely existence.” 131 For Sartre, “‘Nothingness’ does not itself have Being, yet it is supported
by Being. It comes into the world by the For-itself and is the recoil from fullness of selfcontained Being which allows consciousness to exist as such.”132 To ex-ist (ex-sistere), which is
a mode of Ekstasis, means to stand out, to be distant from one’s being. One might say that to exist is to take a stand regarding one’s being, its direction and destiny. “It means that, first of all,
man [woman] exists, turns up, appears on the scene, and, only afterwards, defines himself
[herself].”133 A thing, however, is confined to “its pure facticity.”134 Of course, Blacks were not
literally regarded as rocks, but they were treated as thing-like. Reduced to their corporeality,
made to feel that they were to be slaves for life, many Blacks came to internalize themselves as
ahistorical essences, incapable of transcending toward an open future of possibilities.
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Although I have touched upon this briefly, it is important to bear in mind that slavery was
also reinforced through the use of non-discursive forms of brutality and oppression. The Black
body fell prey to the white gaze and the physical disciplinary techniques of “human fleshmongers,” those that are concerned with mere surfaces.135 Douglass tells the story of old Barney
receiving thirty lashes on his dark flesh by Colonel Lloyd.136 He tells of Demby who disobeyed
an order given by Mr. Gore and was shot in the head as a result. Douglass says that “his mangled
body sank out of sight, and blood and brains marked the water where he had stood.”137 From the
perspective of those whites in power, Demby would not have been missed, though he was
probably erased from the ledger. After all, one must keep abreast of one’s financial accounts.
The following description by Beauvoir aptly depicts Demby. She writes:

Reduced to pure facticity, congealed in his immanence, cut off from his future,
deprived of his transcendence and of the world which that transcendence
discloses, a man no longer appears as anything more than a thing among things
which can be subtracted from the collectivity of other things without its leaving
upon the earth any trace of its absence.138

Douglass gives an account that even while living in the city of Baltimore, he observed a
young girl of fourteen, Mary, who was the object, along with her older sister, Henrietta, of the
capricious will of her white mistress. Mary’s “head, neck, and shoulders . . . were literally cut to
pieces. I have frequently felt her head, and found it nearly covered with festering sores, caused
by the lash of her cruel mistress.”139 Also, there was Douglass’ wife’s cousin, a young Black girl,
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who had fallen asleep while watching Mrs. Hick’s baby and was brutalized as a result. Mrs. Hick
“jumped from her bed, seized an oak stick of wood by the fireplace, and with it broke the girl’s
nose and breastbone, and thus ended her life.” 140 Such brutal treatment further reinforced the
epistemic regime of whiteness: to be Black is to be an object of white physical aggression and
vituperation; it is to have your teeth knocked out, to be hunted by dogs, to be beaten with sticks,
shackled, lynched and burned.141 Indeed, Blacks simply had no rights which any white (man or
woman) was bound to respect. Douglass relates how his “brother” Perry was violently attacked
by the white enslaver Andrew Anthony. Because Perry was off playing when Anthony wanted
him for something of little significance, he grabbed Perry by the throat, “dashed him on the
ground, and with the heel of his boot stamped him on the head, until the blood gushed from his
nose and ears.”142
Black bodies were continuously subjected to trauma. Many Blacks had to suffer from
some form of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As Susan Brison notes:

A traumatic event is one in which a person feels utterly helpless in the face of a
force that is perceived to be life-threatening. The immediate psychological
responses to such trauma include terror, loss of control, and intense fear of
annihilation.143

In The History of Mary Prince, Prince narrates how two young boys, Cyrus and Jack, were always
beaten until their flesh was ragged and raw. She relates that “they were never secure one moment
from a blow, and their lives were passed in continual fear.”144 She writes about how she was
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stripped naked and tied to a tree branch by her wrists and to have her flesh beaten with cow-skin.
She also relates the story of an enslaved Black known as old Daniel who, because he was lame in
the hip and was thereby slow, was stripped and had his flesh beaten with rough briar. “He
[Prince’s white master] would then call for a bucket of salt, and fling upon the raw flesh till the
man writhed on the ground like a worm, and screamed aloud with agony.”145 What more could
the white enslaver desire than to make the Black body feel helpless, forever standing in fear of
non-being, and lacking self-control. After all, they had to be subdued. All savage beasts must be
controlled. It was through such acts of violence that the white enslavers were able to rest content
knowing that they were simply doing their jobs, training animals how to behave. This allowed
them to avoid the recognition of their own animality and vicious brutality. “It is the flesh, so
horribly lacerated,” according to Bakare-Yusuf, “that is marked for enslavement, for raw
violence and objectification, that serves others’ will-to-power and their becoming beings.”146
From the above acts of brutality, I would argue that the white racist “loses himself in the
object [whiteness] in order to annihilate his subjectivity.” 147 For Beauvoir, “The serious man’s
dishonesty issues from his being obliged ceaselessly to renew the denial of this freedom.”148 The
white racist attempts to deny the truth of his/her existence: freedom. The ideology of whiteness,
as a species of the serious man, is a lie. Colonel Lloyd, Mr. Gore, and Mrs. Hick lost themselves
in the lie of whiteness. Each is in a state of flight, creating complex distortions that function to
blind them to the pernicious role that they play in constructing the Black body as slavish; they
have come to avoid the recognition of the degree of choice that they have to refuse to cooperate
with the practices of white hatred toward Black bodies. We should keep in mind, though, that
freedom is always already situated. Hence, there is something to be said about the fact that the
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process of becoming a white racist is partly a matter of being “assigned” a certain role within a
heteronomous social and historical context. And yet, white racists cannot be reduced to these
social subject positions, even if they appear to have lost all feelings of humanity toward Blacks.
Choice still remains. There is always already the counter-white racist position, the counter-antiBlack voice, to be taken up, and pursued. One has the freedom to see through the “rigid training,
long persisted in”149 that reinforces the fixity of values. We must not forget the fact that racist “Islots”150 are institutional sites that have been historically constructed. They are not eternal
essences that exist external to human practices. Hence, there is always the possibility of
dislocating ourselves from one subject position and “leaning” into another. Along with
heteronomy, then, there is autonomy. Without the concept of autonomy, we would be forced to
claim that the self is no more than the plaything of external forces, a constantly shifting “voice”
not of our own. Hence, there is the sense in which the human subject is not a plenum, but always
already incomplete, capable of becoming what he/she is not yet (in this case a white non-racist),
capable of claiming a voice, though not one created ex nihilo. For the white racist to admit that
one is always already becoming what one is not yet calls into question whiteness as an essential
category of identity and mode of being. The consequence of this admittance entails coming faceto-face with a profound sense of anguish. In other words, to reject their whiteness as a superior
natural ontological kind, whites would be forced to engage in the reflective apprehension of
themselves as freedom and realize that nothing relieves them of the necessity of continually
choosing themselves.151 Hence, within the context of Douglass’ life, to choose to lynch a Black
body, and to see this as one’s “natural right,” is to choose the ideology of whiteness.
Within the context of his narrative, Douglass begins to face aspects of his “nothingness”
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qua freedom after hearing Mr. Auld scold his own wife for attempting to teach Douglass to read.
According to Mr. Auld, “if you give a nigger an inch, he will take an ell. A nigger should know
nothing but to obey his master - to do as he is told.” 152 In other words, Douglass should not seek
self-fulfillment in transcendence; rather, he should seek fulfillment in blindly executing the
desires embedded within another’s project. What does Mr. Auld fear? After all, Blacks were
believed to be “inferior” by nature. Mr. Auld is clearly a victim of the serious world. As the
serious man, Mr. Auld hides from his freedom. He believes that Douglass is by nature a slave
and inferior, and, yet, his fear of Douglass learning how to read belies this assumption. This
creates epistemic slippage, though “hidden” from Mr. Auld through an elaborate ideological
framework. Mr. Auld flees his own freedom by grounding his decision - that is, not to allow
Douglass to read - in the law, religion, tradition. In short, Mr. Auld attempts to circumnavigate
his choice in the matter of perpetuating American slavery. He does this by rendering invisible his
“membership” in a (white racist) community of intelligibility that creates the very conditions that
“justify” the inhuman treatment of Black bodies.153 His fear reveals his knowledge that Blacks
are “slaves” (or enslaved) not by nature, but because of the actions of whites. Or, in my own
preferred discourse, Mr. Auld reveals that the lived semiotics of whiteness (not white skin) does
involve a level of choice, an act of performance sustained and “justified” by individual and
institutional practices.
Douglass is aware of the fact that “southern statute books are covered with enactments
forbidding, under severe fines and penalties, the teaching of the slave to read or write.”154 Were
Blacks really animals, why would there be such fines and penalties? After all, there is no statute
book forbidding the teaching of cows to read. Douglass sees through Mr. Auld’s hypocrisy
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where he writes, “The manhood of the slave is conceded.”155 Douglass is resolved to learn how
to read.156 In short, Douglass has undergone a process of existential conversion. “To convert the
absence into presence, to convert my flight into will, I must assume my project positively.”157
Douglass has begun to challenge his existential enslavement, his immanence. Douglass says,
“You have seen how a man was made a slave; you shall see how a slave was made a man.”158
Within this context, the process of becoming a man, for Douglass, involves the process of
challenging and overcoming the serious world of whiteness that has assigned him a mode of
being comparable to that of a pig or a dog. Indeed, it involves the process of disrupting the
passive, fixed role in terms of which white myths have confined him.
Douglass’ existential conversion is also exemplified in his fight with Covey; he negates
the “unconditioned” values that have depicted him as a passive. It was Covey’s job to break socalled recalcitrant Negroes (like one would break a stubborn animal), to make them devoid of
any recognition of their transcendence and their capacity to imagine alternative ways of being.
Covey’s tactics are designed to instill in Douglass a set of oppressive norms that continue to
work in Covey’s absence. For example, Covey is always on the prowl. He is the quintessential
over-seer/over-gazer. Covey became the faceless gaze, symbolic of “thousands of eyes posted
everywhere.”159 As with philosopher Jeremy Bentham’s panopticon, which was proposed as an
effective means of imprisonment and control, Covey’s white gaze is everywhere. The dynamics
of seeing occurs without being seen. “Covey used techniques of manipulation and camouflage to
create a sense of his omnipresence.” 160 The objective was to get the Black body to internalize
the white oppressive gaze. As Sartwell notes, “For even the internal life of the slave could,
finally, be contaminated by seeing, so that one became the watcher of oneself.”161 In this way,
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the enslaved Black body would behave in subservient ways in the absence of actual surveillance
by the oppressor. This technique created an effective form of double consciousness where the
enslaved began to discipline his/her own Black body under the internalized regime of the power
of the white gaze. The theological implications here are fascinating. The white gaze became godlike. This no doubt forced many Blacks to believe that there was no place to hide from the allseeing eye, perhaps eliciting feelings of guilt and fear in those Blacks who contemplated freedom
or escape. Douglass is fully aware that this strategy was deployed to break the enslaved Black
body. He writes:

One half of his proficiency in the art of Negro breaking consisted, I should think,
in this species of cunning. We were never secure. He could see or hear us nearly
all the time. He was, to us, behind every stump, tree, bush and fence on the
plantation.162

Under the gaze and the brutal treatment of Covey, Douglass underwent epistemic violence. He
suffered both in body and in spirit. He became the victim of the constant defeating thought that
“I am a slave—a slave for life—a slave with no rational ground to hope for freedom.”163
One day in the field, Douglass became sick, felt dizzy, and could not stand. Covey kicked
him in the side commanding him to stand. He could not. Covey then picked up a hickory slab,
hitting Douglass in the head “which caused a large gash, and caused the blood to run freely.”164
Douglass manages to escape and makes it to Master Thomas’s place, who had given Douglass
over to Covey to be broken in the first place. Douglass thought that if he could not be protected
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as a man, then perhaps Master Thomas would be willing to protect his own property from the
abuses of Covey.165 Unfortunately, for Douglass, “the guilt of a slave is always, and everywhere,
presumed; and the innocence of the slaveholder or the slave employer, is always asserted.”166
Master Thomas believed that Douglass’s dizziness was really a case of laziness and an attempt to
get out of work by feigning sickness. “The charge of laziness against the slaves is ever on their
lips, and is the standing apology for every species of cruelty and brutality.”167 Hence, the power
of the stereotype cancelled out any lenience that Master Thomas, a “religious” man, was capable
of showing. In the end, he believed that Covey was justified in beating Douglass. After all,
Covey too was a “religious” man. Douglass refers to Master Thomas’ response to him as “fairly
annihilating me.”168 In short, Douglass’s subjectivity has been erased. From the perspective of
Covey’s “justified” actions, Douglass has no voice, no position, no perspective, no interiority; he
is annihilated.
Douglass was highly critical of the hypocrisy of religious practices performed by white
enslavers. Sartwell points out, however, that the epistemic structure of this situation is more than
simply hypocrisy. “For the master not only claims to be what he is not; he claims the slave to be
what he (the master) actually is.” In other words, the “master” claims to be truly merciful,
respecting the lives of others, and compassionate, but his actual behavior belies this claim. The
enslaved, however, is accused of being what the “master” really is, hateful, brutal, and godless.
Hence, the white master was able to hide behind a false religiosity, particularly given the fact
that he was “convinced” that he was given the “divine right” to protect, paternalistically, the
savage Black body from itself, the same savage Black body that he has constructed/projected. He
was the white “savior” whose duty it was/is, as argued earlier, to bring light where there is
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darkness.169 The enslaver is thereby capable of masking any guilt in the name of the divine
father. This allowed the white enslaver to construct what happened to the Black body under
slavery as something foreign to his (the white enslaver’s) agency. Beating and brutalizing a
Black body was not an act of freedom, but an act of necessity, something that had to be done
over and above choice.
It was not the African who was the savage. It was not the dark body that was evil. Rather,
it was the act of constructing (and investing in) the fantasized “Black” body, which was really
the act of constructing (and investing in) the fantasized white body, which led to acts of savagery
and evil. It was through the process of rendering the Black body hyper-visible that the white
body became invisible. “The master was civilized, Christian, and so forth, precisely in relation to
the slave.”170 Douglass was aware of the sham of the prevailing religious practices.171 He writes
that between the Christianity practiced by white enslavers “and the Christianity of Christ, I
recognize the widest possible difference – so wide, that to receive the one as good, pure, and
holy, is of necessity to reject the other as bad, corrupt, and wicked.”172 Douglass is worth quoting
in full:

I am filled with unutterable loathing when I contemplate the religious pomp and
show, together with the horrible inconsistencies, which every where surround me.
We have men-stealers for ministers, women-whippers for missionaries, and
cradle-plunderers for church members. The man who robs me of my earnings at
the end of each week meets me as a class-leader on Sunday morning, to show me
the way of life, and the path of salvation. He who sells my sister, for purposes of
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prostitution, stands forth as the pious advocate of purity. He who proclaims it a
religious duty to read the Bible denies me the right of learning to read the name of
the God who made me. He who is the religious advocate of marriage robs whole
millions of its sacred influence, and leaves them to ravages of wholesale
pollution. The warm defender of the sacredness of the family relation is the same
that scatters whole families,—sundering husbands and wives, parents and
children, sisters and brothers,—leaving the hut vacant, and the hearth desolate.173

On this score, I would argue that the ideology of whiteness (not phenotypic “white” women or
men) is idolatrous and anti-Christian. When whiteness is believed to be an absolute marker of
superiority, and when, in the name of whiteness, non-white bodies are colonized, brutalized,
murdered, raped, and, oppressed, then the ideology of whiteness is indeed anti-Christian.
After returning from Master Thomas, who threatened to beat Douglass if he did not
return, Douglass faces his last flogging from Covey. It is important to keep in mind that
Douglass had been under the oppressive rule of Covey for six months and had six more to go.
Under the cruel practices of Covey, Douglass questioned whether there was a God. He felt that
he had indeed become transformed into a brute. He felt like taking his own life and that of
Covey’s. After Douglass returned “home,” Covey, because it was Sunday, pretended as if all was
fine. Douglass:

His religion hindered him from breaking the Sabbath, but not from breaking my
skin. He had more respect for the day than for the man, for whom the day was
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mercifully given; for while he would cut and slash my body during the week, he
would not hesitate, on Sunday, to teach me the value of my soul, or the way of life
and salvation by Jesus Christ.174

On Monday morning, having ordered Douglass to go into the stable to feed and prepare the
horses for the field, Covey attempted to subdue Douglass. In a pivotal passage, Douglass writes:

The fighting madness had come upon me, and I found my strong fingers firmly
attached to the throat of my cowardly tormentor; as heedless of consequences, at
the moment, as though we stood as equals before the law. The very color of the
man was forgotten.175

It is important to note that while fighting Covey, Douglass says, “the very color of the man was
forgotten.” Of course, the color of the man is white. In that moment, for Douglass, whiteness
ceased to function as the transcendental signified; its superior status was forgotten. In that
moment of refusing to yield to white power, it was placed under erasure.
Unlike in the situation involving Mr. Auld’s refusal to allow Douglass to read, Douglass,
in his own historical parlance, claimed his manhood /humanity; it was not just conceded. In his
fight with Covey, Douglass was not only resisting further potential physical brutality, but he was
resisting the entire ideological structure upon which whiteness was constructed. Not only does
Douglass assert the materiality of his body, but he reclaims his body in the name of freedom and
self-definition, refusing to be fixed by a philosophical anthropology that profiled him within the
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framework of a set of intended meanings that collapsed his dark epidermis upon itself. He
became conscious of his body as an active force, a moral site of resistance. In resisting Covey, in
seeing through the sham of whiteness as sacrosanct, he sees whiteness as a cultural artifact, a
power bloc held together through processes of collective and individual human choice.
Describing how Douglass forgot Covey’s whiteness, Gordon insightfully writes that “the
existential dimension of the situation was such that it collapsed reflective, conceptual reality. It
broke through the saturated composition of skewed, racist reality.”176 And although in the end
Douglass wins the fight, he realizes that he is still institutionally enslaved. The Fugitive Slave
Law of 1850 guaranteed this. Yet, Douglass speaks of his freedom. He says that “however long I
might remain a slave in form, the day had passed when I could be a slave in fact.”177 Through his
act of challenging Covey’s white authority, Douglass is living the existential credo that one
becomes a human being.178 Douglass has come to realize that the price of the social expression of
his ontological freedom is death; for he refuses to be treated as a thing. He refuses to wrap
himself within the security of the serious world, but to risk. Beauvoir realizes the price of
freedom where she writes, “Whatever the problems raised for him, the setbacks that he will have
to assume, and the difficulties with which he will have to struggle, he must reject oppression at
any cost.”179 Douglass has resolved to embrace and affirm agency. He is now face-to-face with
his own anguish, feeling the open textuality of his being-toward the future, grasping the weight
of the counter-white racist narrative subject positions that have opened to him. He has become “a
being of the distances, a movement toward the future, a project.”180 Douglass experiences the
upsurge of the ontology of his freedom, though still a slave de jure. To have not resisted Covey,
Douglass would have reduced himself to a state where “living is only not dying.”181 He has
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succeeded in demystifying his situation; he realizes that it is a situation imposed and sustained by
white men/women,182 and institutional structures. Indeed, the act of fighting Covey was an act of
Douglass surpassing himself; it was an act of war against the continuity of the normativity of
whiteness.183 As Beauvoir reminds us, “Revolt is not integrated into the harmonious
development of the world; it does not wish to be integrated but rather to explode at the heart of
the world and break its continuity.”184
Douglass realizes that he is not a thing fixed according to nature. He is meta-stable and
trans-phenomenal. As the for-itself, he is always more than he appears to be. “Yet the for-itself
is. It is, we may say, even if it is a being which is not what it is and which is what it is not.”185
Moreover, he is a significant and undeniable point of moral worth. “The freedom of a single man
must count more than a cotton or rubber harvest.”186 Capturing his own sense of self-possession,
Douglass says that “I am myself.”187 This does not mean that Douglass now sees himself as an
enclosed “monadic” consciousness. The point here is that he knows the truth of his ex-istence; he
knows that he is not the “brute” seen through the aperture of the white gaze. He knows that “[his]
freedom, in order to fulfill itself, requires that it emerge into an open future,”188 a future that he
must claim. Douglass says, “I was my own master.”189 And while he realizes that his body can be
placed in chains, he knows that this does not mean that he is ontologically a slave. He realizes
that being a “slave” is not a natural category, but one that is predicated upon the existence of
“masters,” just as the superiority of whiteness is inextricably linked to the inferiorization of
Blackness. Having rejected the “natural right” of whites to enslave those deemed as dark Others,
Douglass has rejected the mythopoetic institution of North American slavery.190 Through his
lived epistemic standpoint, and because of his iconoclasm against the images portrayed of
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“happy” and “cheerful” darkies living on plantations, Douglass makes known to the world the
atrocities of slavery and renders visible the ideology of whiteness.
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Chapter VII
Desiring Bluest Eyes, Desiring Whiteness:
The Internalization of the White Gaze and Being Double

In a racially imperialist nation such as ours, it is the dominant race that reserves
for itself the luxury of dismissing racial identity while the oppressed race is made
daily aware of their racial identity. It is the dominant race that can make it seem
their experience is representative.
—bell hooks
All lists of the moral connotations of white as symbol in Western culture are the
same: purity, spirituality, transcendence, cleanliness, virtue, simplicity, chastity.
—Richard Dyer
Historically relegated to the auction block instead of the pedestal, the black
female body has been constructed as the ugly end of a wearisome Western
dialectic: not sacred but profane, not angelic but demonic, not fair lady but ugly
darky.
—Vanessa D. Dickerson

In this chapter, I expose a paradigm case of Du Boisian double consciousness generated
through the power of whiteness. As a manifestation of pathology, double consciousness
will be exposed and theorized within the context of Toni Morrison’s fictional text, The
Bluest Eye. Given the fact that Morrison is also engaged in the process of exposing
whiteness and its impact upon the Black psyche, this chapter functions as a form of
“double-exposure.” Unlike Fanon, Ellison’s invisible man, Malcolm X, and Du Bois,
Pecola Breedlove, the young and innocent protagonist of Morrison’s text, does not
manage psychologically to survive having her Black body “confiscated” and
phenomenologically returned back to her as that which is problematic, ugly, wretched,
and worthless. Indeed, she comes to fully internalize the “thrown back image”; she only
“sees” her Black self as “seen” by the (white) One. Consequently, she comes to desire the
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attributes of the One. For want of the bluest eyes, she undergoes a psychological split that
is so massive that she comes to imagine that she in fact has the bluest eyes.
As I have shown, whiteness is to good as Blackness is to evil. Blackness is ugly.
It is dirty. It is uncivilized. Within the episteme of whiteness, “Darker peoples,” as Du
Bois argues, “are dark in mind as well as in body; of dark, uncertain, and imperfect
descent; of frailer, cheaper stuff.”1 Pecola Breedlove has fully internalized the myths of
whiteness, particularly the myth of white beauty. She has come to see her dark skin, her
non-blue eyes, as composed of “cheaper stuff.” In Morrison’s text, within the semiotic
space of whiteness, blue eyes signify universal beauty. Pecola has so internalized the
standard of whiteness that her twoness, her doubleness, no longer appears to be
something that she can recognize. The internalized “white voice,” as it were, that speaks
to Pecola as being a dark problem, as something aesthetically disgusting, does not appear
to take place within a soul of “two warring ideals.” There appears to be only one voice,
the voice of the white demi-god. When she looks inside herself, there appears to be only
one soul, one thought, a single striving, one ideal: to be white, to possess blue eyes.
Pecola only sees herself “through the revelation of the other [white] world.”2 She has
learned to measure herself by the bright eyes and white pure innocence of little Shirley
Temple. She has internalized all the cultural images that visually speak to her of her
degradation and she has found her Black body/self seriously wanting. Within the process
of becoming “double,” her fragile psyche could not sustain the constant warring, so her
little dark body was “torn asunder.”
As will be shown, Pecola is a tragic figure. In the text, she has completely
bleached her identity “in a flood of white Americanism.”3 Unlike Emma Lou Brown, the
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Black female protagonist in Wallace Thurman’s The Blacker the Berry, Pecola never
gains a sense of “mental independence.”4 Initially, Emma also felt that her Black
complexion was a liability, not an asset. Indeed, she thought of her Black skin as a curse.5
As Thurman writes, “Not that she minded being black, being a Negro necessitated having
a colored skin, but she did mind being too black.”6 As mentioned before, from the
perspective of whiteness, even if someone only has one-drop of “Black blood” one is still
too Black. And although Emma insisted upon using “an excess of rouge and powder”7 to
whiten her too Black face, at the end of the text she comes to accept her Black skin,
ceases trying to be what she is not, and learns how to fight “not so much for acceptance
by other people, but for acceptance of herself by herself.”8 Pecola, however, never comes
to accept “herself by herself.” She finds salvation in blue eyes. The “salvation” of having
bluest eyes, however, turns out to mean the psychological death of Pecola. In possessing
the bluest eyes, she becomes the “bluest I,” which indicates Morrison’s powerful pun on
the title of the book.9
In terms of the historical emergence of critical whiteness studies, it is important to
note that before Toni Morrison’s seminal text Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the
Literary Imagination, from which critical whiteness theorists frequently quote and in
which Morrison explores how the literary white imagination is parasitic upon various
literary configurations of Blackness, there was The Bluest Eye. Although written over
thirty years ago, the text is powerful in terms of its location, exposure, and interrogation
of the semiotic spaces of whiteness. It is a crucial text that clearly demonstrates the
psychological price to be paid for bleaching the Negro soul in a flood of whiteness.
Like The Bluest Eye, Morrison’s Playing in the Dark critically exposes the white
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imaginary. As the title suggests, Morrison refuses to “play in the dark,” but is interested
in exposing “the serviceability of the Africanist presence”10 in white literary works.
Highlighting the significance of Playing in the Dark, Robert Gooding Williams notes that
Africanist racial representations “were constituted through the ascription of multiple
purposes and functions to individuals racially classified as black.”11 One such ascription
is that of an enabler. Morrison:

Africanism is the vehicle by which the American [white] self knows itself
as not enslaved, but free; not repulsive, but desirable; not helpless, but
licensed and powerful; not history-less, but historical; not damned, but
innocent; not a blind accident of evolution, but a progressive fulfillment of
destiny.12

Morrison uses the term American Africanism to describe “denotative and connotative
blackness that African peoples have come to signify, as well as the entire range of views,
assumptions, readings, and misreadings that accompany Eurocentric learning about these
[Black] people.”13 On this score, in the white literary imagination, Black people have
been treated as “standing-reserve,”14 raw material just waiting to be used, exploited,
spoken for, and validated by and through whiteness. Morrison asks, “What does positing
one’s writerly self, in the wholly racialized society that is the United States, as unraced
and all others as raced entail?”15 It entails the presumption of universality. It presumes
that whiteness does not mediate one’s vision or imagination. Indeed, such a white (read:
unraced) writerly self is deemed normal, typical, superior, the standard, and the measure.
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Whiteness, as unraced, normative, and autonomous, has no need of recognition
through the “Black gaze.” After all, or so the racist assumption goes, there is no Black
gaze, for this would imply a form of Black subjectivity, which would further imply a
Black perspective, a view upon the world. However, as I have shown throughout this
project, given the racist assumption that Blacks are like animals, beasts of burden, their
raison d’etre is inextricably tied to the aims and purposes of those (whites) in power. As
Morrison makes clear, however, the ascendancy and formation of white American
identity is dialectically linked to the denigration and deformation of Black American
identity. Morrison:

I want to suggest that these concerns—autonomy, authority, newness and
difference, absolute power—not only became the major themes and
presumptions of American literature, but that each one is made possible
by, shaped by, activated by a complex awareness and employment of a
constituted Africanism. It was this Africanism, deployed as rawness and
savagery, that provided the staging ground and area for the elaboration of
the quintessential American identity.16

For example, in Willa Cather’s Sapphira and the Slave Girl, Morrison shows how
that text carries the weight of America’s economy of racist discourse concerning Black
women. It is the character Sapphira whose very existential liveliness is dependent upon
her need to denigrate the Black enslaved Nancy (imaginatively and possibly physically
through the use of her nephew, Martin). Within a typical motif in North American

331
history, one discussed in the preceding chapters, not only were Black men thought to be
bestial, but Black women were also thought to be oversexed and always sexually
available. The trope of the oversexed Black woman, allows Sapphira to endow herself
with value, virtue, and self-worth. Also, regarding Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn,
Morrison wants to move beyond the interpretative framework that stabilizes the text
within a sentimental nostrum about the innocence of Americanness.17 The text “becomes
a more beautifully complicated work that sheds much light on some of the problems it
has accumulated through traditional readings too shy to linger over the implications of
the Africanist presence at its center.” 18 For example, Morrison argues that the
construction of the character Huck’s identity is inter-textually linked to the status of Jim
as a “nigger.” She exposes that “the agency, however, for Huck’s struggle is the nigger
Jim, and it is absolutely necessary . . . that the term nigger be inextricable from Huck’s
deliberations about who and what he himself is—or, more precisely, is not.”19
As a Black literary figure, Morrison brings a critical subjectivity (a kind of
returned “gaze”) to bear upon those who have for so long constructed Blacks as incapable
of critical thought and subjectivity. Although the textual foreground of The Bluest Eye
explicitly portrays the deformation of the Black body/self of Pecola, the text “pecks
away,” according to Morrison, “at the [white] gaze that condemned her.”20 Hence, prior
to Playing in the Dark, Morrison demands (in this case, by uncovering the secret of
Pecola’s “ugliness,” psychopathology) that we turn our critical gaze toward the
constituting activities, discursive field, and racist imaginary of whiteness. As has been
shown, making whiteness visible is an important goal of critical whiteness studies. The
metaphor of “pecking away” at whiteness suggests that it is concealed and concealing. It
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is Morrison’s objective to “peck away” at the powerful edifice of normativity that
whiteness has constructed, to “deconstruct” and reveal how whiteness’s normativity is
predicated upon the dynamics of power and hegemony.
Through The Bluest Eye, Morrison engages in a form of textual exposure of
whiteness as a historically contingent set of practices. In this way, Pecola is not deemed a
site of Black pathology resulting from a culture of poverty. Rather, Pecola’s
“wretchedness” is an effect of white racist power. On this score, whiteness, as critical
whiteness theorists have pointed out, occupies a particular social, historical, material, and
cultural position within a larger set of relationships. Those who are not white within these
larger social relationships experience various degrees of pain, angst, and suffering. What
is often masked, however, is the extent to which whiteness creates and sustains various
social inequalities that are inextricably linked to the suffering of nonwhite people and the
privileging of white people. Hence, the process of examining whiteness as a site of “nonraced” power and agency is an important critical strategy of interrogating whiteness. Both
Morrison and critical whiteness studies theorists examine whiteness from this same point
of strategic embarkation.
Whiteness gets performed through what Du Bois refers to as “darker deeds.”21
Pecola did not ask to be born within a society that held up a mirror to her that exclaimed,
“You are ugly and of ‘lower grade’.” It is Pecola’s returned (negatively epidermalized)
Black body, objectified and negatively reconfigured by the normalizing white gaze,
which becomes the source of her existential and ontological contemptibility. I am
reminded of African-American artists and photographer Carrie Mae Weems’
photographic work entitled “Mirror, Mirror,” where a dark skinned women looks into a
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mirror only to be faced by what looks like a pale, older white woman. Beneath the
photograph reads:

Mirror, Mirror on the Wall
Who’s the Finest of them All?
Snow White, you black bitch,
And Don’t You Forget it.22

Morrison characterizes the structure of the white gaze, revealing its power to
reconfigure Black bodies, during a moment in the text where Pecola goes into Mr.
Yacobowski’s Fresh Veg. Meat and Sundries Store to buy some candy. Mr. Yacobowski
is one of those whites, as Du Bois notes, who was taught “to believe that white people
were so inherently and eternally superior to blacks, that to eat, sit, live or learn beside
them [or even to sell them candy] was absolute degradation.”23 As an immigrant in
America, Mr. Yacobowski had “paid the price of the ticket. The price,” according to
James Baldwin, “was to become ‘white’.”24 He has seized the opportunity to become
white; to partake of America’s ideal of white identity. Mr. Yacobowski’s gaze, his
surveillance of Pecola (the surveilled), is linked to the power to define. Dialectically, his
immigrant status is diminished and the investment in his whiteness as property is
increased to the extent that he defines in negative terms this “poor Black thing” that
stands before him. Operating from this site of white identity construction, Mr.
Yacobowski has learned how to deny the active part that he plays in constructing Pecola.
His distorted construction of her body at the level of the imaginary—a body that he
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mistakes as ontic—only reinforces the illusion that he lives his own white identity/his
body as real and stable. Intra-psychologically, his interaction with Pecola, which is really
a relationship that he has with a fantasized object that he has projected outwardly from
himself, is predicated upon the introjection of a false self that conceals its own instability,
fears and anxieties. As a performance, his gaze possesses the power to call forth, as it
were, that which it “sees.” Morrison writes:

She looks up at him and sees the vacuum where curiosity ought to lodge.
And something more. The total absence of human recognition—the glazed
separateness. She does not know what keeps his glance suspended.
Perhaps because he is grown, or a man, and she a little girl. But she has
seen interest, disgust, even anger in grown male eyes. Yet this vacuum is
not new to her. It has an edge; somewhere in the bottom lid is the distaste.
She has seen it lurking in the eyes of all white people. So. The distaste
must be for her, her blackness. All things in her are flux and anticipation.
But her blackness is static and dread. And it is blackness that accounts for,
that creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes.25

Within this encounter, Mr. Yacobowski’s blue eyes are devoid of curiosity. This
suggests that the little Black girl who stands before him is always already known. Her
presence does not elicit interest, surprise, or inquisitiveness. Pecola’s uniqueness, her
individuality, is passed over. In his gaze, there is a vacuum that renders her of no
particular interest. She might be said to be nondescript. To be “nondescript,” however,
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implies belonging to no particular class or kind. The reality is that Mr. Yacobowski does
in fact recognize Pecola as belonging to a particular racial classification or kind. She
belongs to the Black kind. He does not “see” her as a social kind, but as a natural racial
kind. Pecola’s Blackness registers her anonymity. She is “recognized” and yet
unrecognized, visible in her invisibility. As Black, she constitutes the anonymous they of
Blackness. She is every Black who has ever come into the store, a mere instantiation of
Blackness. Indeed, she is every Black that Mr. Yacobowski has ever seen and been told
about. The details of Pecola’s life are irrelevant. It is enough that she is Black, typified,
pure and simple. As Morrison writes:

Somewhere between retina and object, between vision and view, his eyes
draw back, hesitate, and hover. At some fixed point in time and space he
senses that he need not waste the effort of a glance. He does not see her,
because for him there is nothing to see.26

Pecola, within the anonymous space of typification, does not even receive the respect that
might be shown to a stranger. At least the stranger might loosen the cement of social
typification in virtue of his/her not being from the same neighborhood. His/her
strangeness has the potential of triggering at least a dialogue. Moreover, a stranger (or at
least the non-Black stranger) would no doubt elicit the act of human recognition on the
part of Mr. Yacobowski. Pecola has become the ersatz human being. Note that the
emphasis is not placed upon Mr. Yacobowski’s look in terms of how it might be shaped
along an axis of gender. The structure of the social encounter has very little if anything to
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do with the fact that he is a grown man and she is a little girl. The encounter appears
primarily shaped and mediated by Yacobowski’s whiteness. Morison locates part of the
problem at the site of the physicality of the eye, at the bottom of the lid. Distaste is said to
reside there. In fact, Pecola is said to be aware of this scopic distaste in all white people.
She concludes that the distaste must be for her Blackness. Her Blackness is a signifier of
distaste, dirtiness, aversion, and discontent.
From a first-person phenomenological or lived perspective, Pecola is “flux and
anticipation.” She is trans-phenomenal and meta-stable. She possesses a sense of her
being-toward-the-future. She is always already more than she is at any particular
moment. As flux and anticipation, she exists as a possibility. It is her Blackness that is
said to be “static and dread.” Hence, her Blackness is facticity, a thing to be feared, that
which is the negation of values. Her Blackness is the embodiment of nihilism. Like
Ellison’s invisible man, Pecola no doubt aches with the need to convince herself that she
does in fact exist in the real world, but she does not strike out with her fists, curse, or
swear to force Mr. Yacobowski to recognize her. After leaving the store, she does feel
angry. Indeed, the surge of anger that she feels has a humanizing dimension. After all, the
white gaze has rendered her ontologically worthless. Her feeling of anger confirms that
she experiences the world from an existential here. Her anger functions as a kind of a
posteriori proof that she is. I’m angry, ergo I am. Like Ellison’s invisible man, who often
feels the need to bump people back, or Bigger Thomas, the protagonist in Richard
Wright’s Native Son, who actually and symbolically “slays whiteness,” anger functions
as a conduit through which some level of recognition is gained. As Morrison notes,
“Anger is better. There is a sense of being in anger. A reality and presence. An awareness
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of worth.”27 Mr. Yacobowski’s gaze is part of a larger accretion of white social forces
that come to bear upon the denigration of her Black body/self, thus eradicating the space
for a dialectics of recognition.
From what I have theorized regarding the notion of whiteness and the
phenomenon of sameness, it is not Pecola’s Blackness as such that causes the problem.
“Blackness,” after all, vis-à-vis the white gaze is a myth of whiteness. As she eagerly
waits to purchase some candy, Pecola is not “seen” at all. However, she is visible just
enough that “he hesitates, not wanting to touch her hand”28 as she holds out her hand
containing three pennies to buy some candy. This is how the Black body, Pecola’s body,
gets produced. Within this highly white mediated semiotic space, his hesitation to touch
her hand returns a negative racial epidermal schema back to her. What is fascinating here
is how the power of whiteness gets performed through something as apparently benign as
a hesitant reach for money from the hands of a Black little girl. This hesitant reach,
though, embodies the larger white world that is even hesitant to grant (as if they even had
the power to “grant”) the humanity of Blacks. This example is just one more site of white
power and how it impacts Pecola’s corporeal schema. In her painstaking narrative detail
of Pecola’s identity, Morrison is operating within a genealogical space of critique that
“painstakingly exposes the tiny influences [refusing to touch Pecola’s hand for example]
on a body that, over time, not only produce a subject of a certain sort [self-hating], [but] a
subject defined by what it takes to be knowledge about itself and its world [that Black
people were born inferior and ugly].”29
The problem is located in Mr. Yacobowski’s white gaze. It is his gaze, which has
been shaped by the everyday, quotidian practices of whiteness, which generates and
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produces Pecola’s Blackness as static and dread. In other words, consistent with what I
have argued thus far, it is his gaze, which is both a site of white racist power and its
vehicle of expression, that accounts for and creates the emptiness edged with distaste in
his eyes. He does not see the flux and anticipation of a little girl. He does not see Pecola’s
Otherness as Other. Rather, he sees Pecola’s Otherness as sameness. She is learning to
“see only what there was to see: the eyes of other people.”30 As Fanon would say, the
glance of others fixed her, sealing her “into that crushing objecthood.”31 Even after
Pecola leaves Mr. Yacobowski’s store, she feels a dart of affection that leaps out for
some dandelions that she notices. Morrison is quick to note that the dandelions (like Mr.
Yacobowski’s white narcissism) “do not look at her and do not send love back.”32
Hence, the initial dart of affection is squandered and Pecola is unable to see the beauty in
the dandelions; she is filled with Mr. Yacobowski’s negative reactive value-creating
force, his hatred of her. Thus, she begins to feel shame and self-loathing.
Carrying the weight of internalized white racism and the white gaze, Pecola has
come to “know” the deficits of her Black “lived body” all too well. As will be shown,
moving in and out of white racist semiotic spaces, Pecola will learn to relate to herself as
inferior, dirty, limited, and somatically uglified. Unlike the idyllic (read: white) Dickand-Jane reading primer that the reader encounters at the very beginning of the text – a
narrative which Morrison brilliantly collapses into a maddening stream of sentences
without punctuation – the reader becomes immediately aware of significant familial and
ontological fractures in Pecola Breedlove’s life when he/she encounters Pecola for the
first time within The Bluest Eye (narrated by Claudia, one of the central characters in the
text, and an omniscient voice33):
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Cholly Breedlove [Pecola’s father], then, a renting black, having put his
family outdoors, had catapulted himself beyond the reaches of human
consideration. He had joined the animals; was, indeed, an old dog, a
snake, a ratty nigger. Mrs. Breedlove was staying with the woman she
worked for; the boy, Sammy, was with some other family; and Pecola was
to stay with us. Cholly was in jail.34

The Dick-and-Jane reading primer tells the story of a house that is green and
white. The Mother, Father, Dick and Jane reside therein. There is a dog and a cat. There
is much happiness and laughter. The Father is strong and the Mother loves to play with
her children. And Jane is said to have friends who love to play with her. Opening the text
with this Dick-and-Jane reading primer creates an artificial narrative text against which
Pecola and her family are to be contrasted. The words in the primer, as Theresa M.
Towner writes, “scream their [white] simplistic morality, and their normalcy.”35 The
primer creates the familiar Manichean divide that has been encountered throughout this
project. As Elliott Butler-Evans notes:

The Bluest Eye depicts the struggle between two warring factions. The
Dick-and-Jane frame has as its referent not only the primer but the cultural
values of the dominant society. It is read and deconstructed by the lived
experiences of the Breedloves. Juxtapositions of the two narratives not
only reinforce the dominant theme of the novel but illuminate the novel’s
textual processes. Contrasts between the Dick-and-Jane world and the
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“real” world of the Breedloves are structured around several sets of binary
oppositions: White/Black, affluence/poverty, desirability/undesirability,
order/chaos, valued/devalued.36

Adding to an already dismal set of circumstances, Claudia adds, “She came with
nothing.”37 In the Dick-and-Jane primer, the entire family appears to want for nothing.
The familial space is replete with beauty, stability, cleanliness, safety, and
wholesomeness. For Pecola, existentially speaking, she is just there, solitary and
destitute. And like the flowers that Claudia later describes as having failed to grow,
Pecola is also unyielding and barren. But what is also significant is the reality that Pecola
had been put “outdoors.” Within the text, being put outdoors signals a profound sense of
having been ostracized. Indeed, it constitutes “the real terror of life.”38
Capturing the finality of being outdoors, Claudia says, “But the concreteness of
being outdoors was another matter—like the difference between the concept of death and
being, in fact, dead. Dead doesn’t change, and outdoors is here to stay.”39 So, the sense
of being outdoors is not just a spatial relationship; it also connotes an ontological stasis, a
sense of nothingness. Hence, Claudia’s observation that Pecola came with nothing is
itself rich with existential themes of dread and meaninglessness. Claudia goes on to say,
“Knowing that there was such a thing as outdoors bred in us a hunger for property, for
ownership.”40 In other words, in her state of “nothingness,” which acts as a trope
signifying both race and class, Pecola is desperate for something of value, something that
she can own, a piece of property. She hungers for something that will provide her with a
sense of being, belonging, and self-value. However, as Pecola fully comes to accept,
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being Black does not confer value; indeed, Blackness is tantamount to being propertyless.
Concerning the point that whiteness is a form of property, the reader will note that
Du Bois understood whiteness as a wage that paid handsomely in terms of public
deference, psychological uplift, protection from harm, access to public parks, and better
schools.41 Also referring to whiteness as a form of property, Cheryl Harris argues:

For the first two hundred years of the country’s existence, the system of
racialized privilege in both the public and private spheres carried through
this linkage of rights and inequality, and rights and property. Whiteness as
property was the critical core of a system that affirmed the hierarchical
relations between white and Black.42

Within the context of white greed, Du Bois asks himself why whiteness is so incredibly
desirable and answers, “Then always, somehow, some way, silently but clearly, I am
given to understand that whiteness is the ownership of the earth forever and ever,
Amen!”43 For Black people, white ownership and greed implies making do within socioeconomic, ghettoized spaces of mere survival.
It is important to keep in mind that the novel takes place in Lorain, Ohio, in 1941.
Lorain, Ohio is the same place that Toni Morrison actually grew up. Being Black, the
Breedlove family, like Morrison’s family, would have been hit hardest by the Great
Depression. With descriptive clarity, indicating the degree to which Blacks were
subjected to the greedy ways of white landlords, Morrison provides the reader with a
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view of the depressive physical environment within which Pecola lived. The Breedlove
family is described as “nestled together in the storefront. Festering together in the debris
of a realtor’s whim.”44 The furniture and the spatial dimensions of their living space
invoke a sense of aesthetic disgust:

In the center of the bedroom, for the even distribution of heat, stood a coal
stove. Trunks, chairs, a small end table, and a cardboard “wardrobe” closet
were placed around the walls. The kitchen was in the back of this
apartment, a separate room. There were no bath facilities. Only a toilet
bowl, inaccessible to the eye, if not the ear, of the tenants.45

Concerning the furnishings, there is really no more to be said. The furnishings “were
anything but describable, having been conceived, manufactured, shipped, and sold in
various states of thoughtlessness, greed, and indifference.”46 Having received a damaged
sofa, which occurred during delivery, one of the white mover’s argue with Cholly,
Pecola’s father:

“Looka here, buddy. It was O.K. when I put it on the truck. The store can’t
do anything about it once it’s on the truck . . . .” Listerine and Lucky
Strike breath.
“But I don’t want no tore couch if ‘n it’s bought new.” Pleading eyes and
tightened testicles.
“Tough shit, buddy. Your tough shit.”47
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Note the implied reference to Blackness as something dirty, as feces. But this is how
whiteness fortifies its purity. Whiteness involves “the all-pervading desire to inculcate,”
as Du Bois says, “disdain for everything black, from Toussaint to the devil.”48
Combining elements of class, race, and theorizing the fundamental dimensions of
internalized (white) self-surveillance, Morrison writes:

The Breedloves did not live in a storefront because they were having
temporary difficulty adjusting to the cutbacks at the plant. They lived there
because they were poor and black, and they stayed there because they
believed they were ugly . . . . Mrs. Breedlove, Sammy Breedlove, and
Pecola Breedlove—wore their ugliness, put it on, so to speak, although it
did not belong to them.49

What has created in them the belief that they were ugly? What is it about their Black
bodies such that they get “returned” in distorted form? If the ugliness does not belong to
them, then to whom does it belong? In a passage rich with figurative language, Morrison
provides a glimpse into the origins of this conviction. Relevant here is the argument that
the self is not prior to the effects of a discursive field. Morrison:

You looked at them and wondered why they were so ugly; you looked
closely and could not find the source. Then you realized that it came from
conviction, their conviction. It was as though some mysterious
all-knowing master had given each one a cloak of ugliness to wear, and
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they had each accepted it without question. The master had said, “You are
ugly people.” They had looked about themselves and saw nothing to
contradict the statement; saw, in fact, support for it leaning at them from
every billboard, every movie, every glance. “Yes,” they had said. “You
are right.” And they took the ugliness in their hands, threw it as a mantle
over them, and went about the world with it.50

In short, the Breedlove’s bodies were disciplined through the regime of whiteness,
its values and dictates, which passes itself off, as Morrison says of political
ideology, “as immutable, natural, and innocent.”51
The point here is that within the context of white racist America, the Black self is
always already formed through discourse, through various practices that “confirm” the
Black self as ugly, bestial, dirty, worthless. Commenting upon the “ugliness” of the
Breedloves, Keith E. Byerman notes the burden of this “‘ugliness’ is accepted without
direct coercion. There are few white characters in the novel to impose the view. The
ideological hegemony of whiteness is simply too overwhelming to be successfully
resisted.”52 The reality of whiteness, however, expresses itself in the form of a
conglomerate set of interlocking forces. These forces inhabit every nook and cranny of
American life, possessing the power to make itself representative. As Morrison implies,
no matter how much one looks at the Breedloves, the ugliness cannot be located on the
surface of their skin, as it were. Hence, it is their conviction that they are ugly that is the
problem. This, of course, only begs the question of which Morrison is fully aware: What
is the source of this conviction? The conviction did not emerge through a process of
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autogenesis. It is not as if the self comes into the world ready-made, autonomous and the
absolute ground of its own meaning. By the time the self becomes critically selfreflexive, it has already become the effect of power such that “certain bodies, certain
gestures, certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as
individuals.”53 Power, then, need not function in ways that are noticeably “externally
coercive.” So, by the time that Pecola comes to work through the socio-psychological
dynamics of the individual that she has become, though within the text she never reaches
this level of critical self-interrogation, the structure of her identity has already been
constituted as an individual of a certain type—what she values, how she thinks about her
eyes, her dark skin, whiteness, etc. In delineating such details as these, power has already
been discerned. This does not occlude, however, the need to address the issue concerning
the origin of the conviction that the Breedloves possess.
The (racist) force relations that constitute who the Breedloves are, though
systemic and pervasive, have an origin. This raises the issue of Fanon’s conceptualization
of the process of socio-genesis. Through various white practices, certain values and
representations (like “Blackness is ugly”) have come to appear as though they exist
independently of human action. Hence, this sense of conviction is created within the
context of white evasion, the serious attitude that reconfigures values as objects in the
world. As a master signifier, whiteness deems itself uncaused54 and unconditioned, that
mysterious reality that has the absolute power to define difference. Morrison’s reference
to “some mysterious all-knowing master” resonates with my earlier characterization of
whiteness as the omniscient One. The historical specificity and particularity of
whiteness’s knowledge of itself and “Others” is presumed universal and ahistorical. On
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this score, the Breedloves are trapped within a semiotic space of white (“universal”)
aesthetical ideals, ideals according to which they are deemed different qua non-white and
thereby indelibly stained by the disfiguring mark of Blackness. Instead of values that owe
their existence to various cultural practices, the Breedloves have come to accept certain
values—through everyday forms of anti-Black racist practices—as material facts of the
physical world. They come to believe that their ugliness is not extrinsic, but an intrinsic
feature of their very essence. The Breedloves appear unable to cast off the white imposed
cloak or veil. They have been split, doubled, through the measurement of their souls by
the tape of a world (or by an outside gaze55) that says that whiteness is ontologically and
aesthetically supreme. Invoking the image of a master, Morrison is aware of the crippling
impact of the institution of American slavery. She is cognizant of how deep white
colonialism impacts the (dark) colonized, creating a double consciousness in their very
souls through the construction of a semiotic space designed to “confirm” their colonized
status. Morrison is clearly aware of the circular logic and self-reinforcing structure of
whiteness. “You are ugly people,” when applied to Black people, carries an epistemic
truth-value within a white discursive field that already comes replete with its own
stipulated criteria for what constitutes beauty. As Du Bois was quoted earlier as saying,
whiteness comes replete with its own judge and jury and summons its own witnesses.
The mesmerizing power of whiteness, the sheer weight of its normativity and
symbolic power, is clear in the novel when Frieda, Claudia’s older sister, brings Pecola a
snack:

347
Frieda brought her four graham crackers on a saucer and some milk in a
blue-and-white Shirley Temple cup. She was a long time with the milk,
and gazed fondly at the silhouette of Shirley Temple’s dimpled face.
Frieda and she had a loving conversation about how cu-ute Shirley
Temple was.56

Why is Pecola so obsessed with Shirley Temple? What does she see in her? What does
Pecola not see in herself? Indeed, why does Pecola feel a deep sense of internal vacuity
when looking at Shirley Temple? On the view developed thus far, Shirley Temple
represents what Pecola is not. Indeed, Pecola’s difference is defined relative to Shirley
Temple’s whiteness (as transcendental signified/master signifier). Pecola’s Black
body/self is phenomenologically returned to her, reconfigured as ugly vis-à-vis the way
in which Shirley Temple’s body has been constructed as intrinsically beautiful. It is not
just the image of Shirley Temple that holds Pecola’s attention; it is also the white
substance inside the cup. It is only later in the narrative that we are told that Pecola drank
three quarts of milk. Milk symbolizes whiteness. It is not out of greediness, as believed
by Claudia’s mother, Mrs. MacTeer, that Pecola consumes so much milk; rather, it is out
of her need to become white through the very act of consuming the milk. Perhaps the
whiteness in the milk will create a metamorphosis, changing her from Black to white,
from absent to present, from nothing to something, from ugly to beautiful, from dirty to
purity.
This theme involving the ingestion of whiteness is also clear in Pecola’s selection
of candy from Mr. Yacobowski’s store. She buys Mary Janes. Even the innocent act of
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buying candy becomes an opportunity for racial self-resentment and self-denigration.
Something as presumably benign as a candy wrapper functions as a site of white cultural
semiosis. Morrison writes:

Each pale yellow wrapper has a picture on it. A picture of little Mary Jane,
for whom the candy is named. Smiling white face. Blond hair in gentle
disarray, blue eyes looking at her out of a world of clean comfort. The
eyes are petulant, mischievous. To Pecola they are simply pretty. To eat
the candy is somehow to eat the eyes, eat Mary Jane. Love Mary Jane. Be
Mary Jane.57

So, even as Pecola is rejected and denigrated by the power embedded within Mr.
Yacobowski’s gaze, whose eyes, as I have noted, are blue, she seeks the power of Mary
Jane’s blue eyes through a process of “symbolic cannibalism.”58 Blue eyes are both
threatening59 and yet signify safety and solace. Blue eyes constitute a metonymy for white
hegemony as this is expressed through white cultural aesthetic ideals. Gunilla Theander
Kester argues that “blue eyes stand as a pars pro toto, a synecdoche for a white little girl
whom a racist culture would consider beautiful.”60 Like the whiteness of the milk, the
piece of candy is believed to have the power to produce a genuine state of ontological
change in Pecola, a change from Black to white, from a state of “racialized
somatophobia,”61 to a state of clean somatic comfort and “normalcy.”
Through a process where reality and fiction are blurred, Pecola’s mother, Pauline,
is caught within a world of white filmic hyper-reality, which further nurtures Pecola’s
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inability to see through the farce of whiteness. Pauline:

The onliest time I be happy seem like was when I was in the picture show.
Every time I got, I went. I’d go early, before the show started. They’d cut
off the lights, and everything be black. Then the screen would light up,
and I’d move right on in them pictures . . . . Them pictures gave me a lot
of pleasure, but it made coming home hard, and looking at Cholly hard. I
don’t know. I ’member one time I went to see Clark Gable and Jean
Harlow. I fixed my hair up like I’d seen hers on a magazine. A part on the
side, with one little curl on my forehead. It looked just like her. Well,
almost just like.62

Like Pecola, Pauline has internalized the fiction that whiteness is supremely beautiful.
For Pecola and Pauline, whiteness, in psychoanalytic terms, has become an “objectcathexis,” an “object” in which they have come to invest all of their mental and emotional
energy. While at the picture show, Pauline is able to inhabit the filmic space of whiteness
imaginatively. She is able to be the luminescent Jean Harlow.
Richard Dyer’s work on the cultural uses of light, through lighting technology,
argues that light in film is used to construct white people as individuals. Dyer:

It is at least arguable that white society has found it hard to see non-white
people as individuals; the very notion of the individual, of the freely
developing, autonomous human person, is only applicable to those who
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are seen to be free and autonomous, who are not slaves or subject peoples.
Movie lighting discriminates against non-white people because it is used
in a cinema and a culture that finds it hard to recognize them as
appropriate subjects for such lighting, that is, as individuals.63

Dyer’s point is that even the technological uses of light can involve the exercise of
power. The process of lighting becomes a medium of racial structuration, a technology of
discipline that privileges white bodies/selves. Pauline is elevated by the medium of light
used to enhance the whiteness of the characters on the screen; she partakes in the
humanizing [read: white] and privileging powers of white light.
Elaborating on the powerful visual dimensions of Pauline’s cinematic absorption
of the value code of white aesthetics, Morrison is aware of the plenitudinous character of
white light where she says, “There the black-and-white images came together, making a
magnificent whole—all projected through the ray of light from above and behind.”64
Within a Platonic world, Pauline is like an artist’s representation of a sensible object, a
mere copy of a copy. Gary Schwartz suggests this interpretation where he argues:
“Pauline, as the viewer and learner, has absorbed the visions of light and darkness and
becomes the engine of their reproduction . . . . Wittingly or otherwise, Pauline not only
becomes the Imitation but, in turn, imitates it. She is an imitation of an imitation.”65
Living her life through cinematic white images, it is no wonder that Pauline, when Pecola
was born, describes Pecola as “a black ball of hair.”66 Pauline adds, “But I knowed she
was ugly. Head full of pretty hair, but Lord she was ugly.”67 Even that pretty hair will
eventually give way to “tangled black puffs of rough wool to comb.”68 Even at birth,
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Pauline has already rendered Pecola’s body problematic. Thus, “Pauline begins to
distance herself from her child’s body, identifying it as another strike against her own
self, since the issue of her body cannot approximate the likes of Shirley Temple . . . .”69
As an ideal servant of whiteness, Pauline plays the part impeccably,
superimposing upon Pecola her own self-hatred. Though she neglects her own home,
Pauline is obsessed with cleaning the Fisher’s house where she is a housemaid. In the
Fisher’s house, she feels in control, happy, responsible, and clean. While working in the
Fisher’s home, as when she sits mesmerized in the cinema, she feels a momentary
reprieve from her Blackness (read: ugliness and dirtiness). After all, the Fisher’s home
has “white porcelain, white woodwork, polished cabinets, and brilliant copperware.”70
Whiteness also provides Pauline with a false sense of existential meaning and emotional
stability:

Pauline kept this order, this beauty, for herself, a private world, and never
introduced it into her storefront, or to her children. Them she bent toward
respectability, and in so doing taught them fear: fear of being clumsy, fear
of being like their father, fear of not being loved by God, fear of madness
like Cholly’s mother’s. Into her son she beat a loud desire to run away,
and into her daughter she beat a fear of growing up, fear of other people,
fear of life.71

In a scene where Frieda and Claudia go to visit Pecola at the Fisher’s home,
where Pauline is on duty working, Pecola is exposed to her mother’s vigilant obsession
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with and protection of the “purity” of whiteness. While waiting for Pauline to retrieve
the wash, a young white girl—the little Fisher girl—came into the kitchen where Pecola,
Frieda and Claudia had been waiting. Anxious, she called for Pauline. Instead of calling
her “Mrs. Breedlove,” the formal address that her own children are required to use, the
little white girl calls for “Polly.” As she called for Polly, Pecola, Frieda, and Claudia
noticed a deep-dish blueberry cobbler near the stove. Pecola decided to touch it to see if it
was hot. As she did so, the blueberry pie fell by accident. The hot blueberries went
everywhere, with most of the juice splattering on Pecola’s legs. As Claudia narrates:

In one gallop she was on Pecola, and with the back of her hand knocked
her to the floor. Pecola slid in the pie juice, one leg folding under her. Mrs.
Breedlove yanked her up by the arm, slapped her again, and in a voice thin
with anger, abused Pecola directly and Freida and me by implication.72

Pauline calls Pecola a “crazy fool,” as she worries about the dirtiness of the floor. In the
meantime, the little white girl begins to cry. Pauline immediately turns her loving
attention to the white girl’s pink sunback dress that had gotten dirty by the blackish
blueberries. She repeats, “Hush. Don’t worry none.”73 She sooths the tears of the “little
pink-and-yellow girl,”74 reassuring her that all will be just fine, as “she spit out words to
us like rotten pieces of apple.”75 On this score, the white body is a site of concern, love
and attention. The Black body, however, is vulnerable to insult, blame, and attack.
Vanessa D. Dickerson notes:
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Pecola is one instance of the black child robbed of the affirmation of the
caretakers of her body. She is one example of the black child whose need
for his or her mother is sacrificed to the white child’s pleasure or comfort
in a mammy . . . . The little white girls (and boys) take to themselves
relations, reflections, experiences, and feelings that ought rightfully
belong to the Claudias and Pecolas of the world.76

Capturing the larger mutual exclusivity between Black bodies and white bodies, an
exclusiveness based upon an essentialist, racial binary logic that valorizes the latter and
de-valorizes the former, Dickerson also notes:

Unlike the body of the Fisher girl, which receives no concrete physical
description, Pecola’s is given a solidity and reality that brings it more
sympathetically near. Nevertheless, while the narrative represents Pecola’s
body as the real, embraceable body and the Fisher girl’s as the specterized
and distant body, Pecola’s is socially assaulted, the Fisher’s girl’s held
dear. To put it another way, the white child’s body is what Mary Douglas
in Purity and Danger would identify as the tidy body, the one associated
with culture and civilization; Pecola’s is the unruly body, the polluted or
polluting body associated with nature.77

As the three girls leave, they can hear Pauline promise to make another pie for the
little white girl. The white girl twice asks Polly who they were. Consistent with her own

354
self-negation, Pauline refuses to answer. Symbolically, Pauline erases Pecola through the
act of not identifying her. The white girl is left to internalize the image of Pecola, Frieda,
and Claudia as unnamed and unnamable problems, Black phantoms whose existence is
best left unknown and unknowable. Pecola is left to make sense of a mother who
cherishes little white girls over Black girls. She is left to conclude that it is whiteness that
guarantees love and affection. This is why Pecola sits for hours “looking in the mirror,
trying to discover the secret of the ugliness, the ugliness that made her ignored or
despised at school, by teachers and classmates alike.”78 Of course, there is no “ugliness”
that is intrinsic to Pecola to be discovered. Her “ugliness” is what emerges dialectically
vis-à-vis whiteness. Whiteness is that silent norm, the transcendental signified, which
manifests itself through her mother, through film, through small gestures and gazes. It has
the power to leave its effects without leaving a trace of its origin. Part of its power and
strategy is to leave its devastating effects upon the Black body/self while effectively
redefining such effects as natural dispositions of the Black body/self.
Even when it appears that Pecola is “recognized,” this only further reinforces her
status as denigrated Other. For example, a young Black character named Junior, who is
the son of Geraldine, “recognizes” Pecola only to physically and emotionally traumatize
her. Like Pauline, Geraldine is obsessed with cleanliness. Unlike Pauline, however, she is
a middle-class Black woman who is married to a predictable middle-class Black man,
Louis. Geraldine’s family reflects the “clean” and “pure” life depicted in the primer, with
the cat and all. Geraldine is the embodiment of the “cult of true womanhood.” She made
sure that her son, husband, and cat were given the best comfort that she could provide.
She practiced “thrift, patience, high morals, and good manners.”79 Seduced by a value-
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code that was shaped along an axis of both class and race, she was always trying to get
rid of the “funkiness” of life. Morrison:

Wherever it erupts, this Funk, they wipe it away; where it crusts, they
dissolve it; wherever it drips, flowers, or clings, they find it and fight it
until it dies. They fight this battle all the way to the grave. The laugh that
is a little too loud; the enunciation a little too round; the gesture a little too
generous. They hold their behind in for fear of a sway too free; when they
wear lipstick, they never cover the entire mouth for fear of lips too thick,
and they worry, worry, worry about the edges of their hair.80

From the above quote, what comes across clearly is a form of pathology vis-à-vis
the Black body in particular and embodiedness, more generally. What is also clear is that
Geraldine takes her cue from the model of dutiful and well-respected middle-class white
women. Geraldine makes a concerted effort at deracinating any trace of funkiness.
Funkiness is too “gaudy,” aesthetically or otherwise. “Gaudiness” might be characterized
as a “nigger” attribute. Geraldine took the time to explain to her son the difference
between colored people and “niggers.” For her, “colored people were neat and quiet;
niggers were dirty and loud.”81 Apparently, niggers did not concern themselves with
cutting their hair as short as possible so as to get rid of any sign of “wool.” And despite
the fact that Junior was light-skinned, she made sure that he received plenty of Jergens
Lotion “on his face to keep the skin from becoming ashen.”82 Clearly, Morrison is
complicating received notions of what it means to be “Black.” She is also exploring how
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Black self-perception differs along an axis of class. Thus, in the mouth of Geraldine,
there is an anti-Black racist discourse that creates its own binary.
To the extent that Blacks imitate and valorize the behavior, thought, and feeling
patterns of whites, is the extent to which Blacks qua coloreds are able to reap the benefits
of whiteness: order, cleanliness, respectability, income, stability, and so on. These are the
code words, however, that inevitably return with an exclusionary sting. If one does not fit
within the confines of these behavior, thought, and feeling patterns, one is then ridiculed
for being a nigger, a result of having been characterized and fixed by a (white projected )
negative image of what it means to be Black in the first place. Hence, folk like Geraldine
end up hating other Blacks that have been stereotyped and marked as disorderly, gaudy,
destitute, savage-like, embodied, and emotional. One might say that just as the fabricated
Black presence83 is important to the identity of whiteness, the fabricated presence of the
“nigger type” is important to the “colored type.” Whiteness creates a fabricated nigger
type, to which the colored type gives credence and from which it differentiates itself, and
thereby creates a false and unachievable set of aspirations/goals for the colored type,
getting them to behave as if they are substantially different, perhaps closer to being white.
The irony here, though, is that the colored type vis-à-vis whiteness never achieves the
status of whiteness.
Hence, Pecola becomes the quintessence of all that is negative in the purview of
whiteness, a perspective that Geraldine has internalized. It is Junior who tricks Pecola to
come to his house. He “recognizes” her to the extent that she is not like him. She is a
nigger and is ugly.84 He displaces his anger onto her, because of his lack of genuine
affection from his mother. After inviting Pecola into his house under the pretext of seeing
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some kittens, he throws his big Black cat in her face. The cat scratches her face and chest.
After attempting to make Pecola his prisoner, and seeing that she has stopped crying and
has taken an interest in the Black cat’s blue eyes, he snatches the cat and begins to swing
it around. When Pecola tries to stop him, he and Pecola fall, the cat lands on the radiator
and then falls behind the sofa. It is at this moment that Geraldine comes through the door.
Junior lies saying, “She killed our cat.”85
The death of the cat might be said to foreshadow the devastating consequences
that await Pecola as a result of being Black and desiring blue eyes. Although the black cat
with blue eyes is physically dead, it is psychic death that awaits Pecola. After Junior
targets Pecola as the source of the problem, a designation that Pecola has internalized as a
result of having her very existence positioned as a problem by her family, the community,
and other social forces, Geraldine’s gaze fixes on Pecola, taking care to note her matted
hair, her Black “stained” skin, dirty socks, old muddy shoes, her “ugliness,” her
disorderliness, and her lack of postural refinement. Again, however, Pecola was not
“seen.” She was assessed vis-à-vis the ideals of white culture and was found wanting. It
is Geraldine’s gaze that has the capacity to “niggerize” Pecola. It is through her own selfhatred that Geraldine hates Pecola. Geraldine then speaks Pecola into existence; she
further performs Pecola’s sense of self-hatred through the use of the power of words:
“Get out,” she said, her voice quiet. “You nasty little black bitch. Get out of my house.”86
Again, Pecola’s Black body is returned to her. Only this time she does not return simply
as the opposite of pretty Shirley Temple or as the object of distaste in the eyes of an older
white man, she returns as a nasty little black bitch. Indeed, she returns as the very
negation of Shirley Temple and all that is white and pure.
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Pecola is a site of disgust. She is a joke. Even her teachers tried not to glance at
her.87 She is an object to be lampooned, a “nasty little Black bitch” used to solicit anger
from young boys. Morrison:

She also knew that when one of the girls at school wanted to be
particularly insulting to a boy, or wanted to get an immediate response
from him, she could say, “Bobby loves Pecola Breedlove! Bobby Loves
Pecola Breedlove!” and never fail to get peals of laughter from those in
earshot, and mock anger from the accused.88

She is the object of constant derision. For example, Claudia relates a story where she and
Frieda found Pecola surrounded by a group of boys hurling racial epithets her way:
“Black e mo. Yadaddsleepsnekked. Black e mo black e mo ya dadd sleeps nekked. Black
emo . . . .”89 Whiteness is dutifully served. The boys, through their ritual performance of
self-hatred, have demonstrated their effective capacity of negative self-surveillance.
Although Claudia and Frieda helped to break the circle of this ritual of self-denial, the
theme of self-hatred is subtly and symbolically reintroduced through a mulatto character
named Maureen Peal. Maureen, who was only passively watching the events unfold,
suddenly puts her arm through Pecola’s and walks away as if they had been the best of
friends:

“I just moved here. My name’s Maureen Peal. What’s yours?”
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“Pecola.”
“Pecola? Wasn’t that the name of the girl in Imitation of Life ?”
“I don’t know. What is that?”
“The picture show, you know. Where this mulatto girl hates her mother
’cause she is black and ugly but then cries at the funeral. It was real sad.
Everybody cries in it.
Claudette Colbert too.”
“Oh.” Pecola’s voice was no more than a sigh.
“Anyway, her name was Pecola too. She was so pretty. When it comes
back, I’m going to see it again. My mother has seen it four times.”90

The reader will note the similarity between the name “Pecola” and “Peola,” who
played the self-hating mulatto in the 1934 film Imitation of Life. One significant point
here is that the girl in Imitation of Life is called Peola, the “c” is absent. Schwartz
suggests an interesting line of reasoning: “Pauline puts her own creative imprimatur on
this child with a predestined name. The name with the ‘c’ has some suggestion of Latin
peccatum (mistake, fault, error) while Peola sounds floral.”91 Through the act of giving
her daughter a name that phonetically sounds similar to “Peola,” Pauline has nominally
over-determined her. As it turns out, Pecola and Peola share the reality of internalized
self-hatred. So, although Maureen is mistaken in terms of the correct pronunciation of the
name, she is correct that Pecola is trapped by whiteness and would rather settle for being
an imitation of whiteness than being Black. One wonders whether Pauline, by naming her
daughter Pecola, wished for her daughter to be like Peola, pretty with “white” skin.
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Misnaming Pecola also functions as a form of rejection. As John Bishop notes, “Maureen
Peal’s mistake has a larger relevance as well, for in Morrison’s novels the act of
(mis)naming signifies the community’s power to deny individual autonomy.”92 Bishop
goes on to note that “they cannot see Pecola because only the pretty, pale Peola is
deemed worthy of notice—they do not c the real girl.”93
As stated earlier, Pauline’s obsession with whiteness functions as a generative
force that enables Pecola’s self-hatred; she reinforced and cemented the belief that
whiteness is a mysterious thing of desirability. But it is Claudia’s interrogation of this
thing of desirability that provides glimpses of the possible source of Black self-hatred and
perhaps, through Foucauldian problematization,94 provides a glimpse into possible ways
of freeing thought in order to think differently. During a heated exchange with Maureen,
where she also reveals her own self-hatred, calling both Claudia and Frieda “ugly black
emos,” Claudia reflects: “And all the time we knew that Maureen Peal was not the
Enemy and not worthy of such intense hatred. The Thing to fear was the Thing that made
her beautiful, and not us.”95 It is here that Claudia demonstrates an awareness of the
particularity (non-universality) of white beauty. This Thing, this signifier of purity,
cleanliness and goodness, is the product of a generative context of white hegemony. This
Thing is not an unconditioned reality, but a socio-ontological reality. This Thing is
whiteness.
The power of whiteness (this thing) can be called upon in hours of need.
Whiteness, on this score, is talismanic and soteriological. The theological implications
are quite obvious. When we think of that which is unblemished, sinless and pure, most of
us unconsciously think of that which is white, resembling light, possessing luminosity. In
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popular movies, for example, we have automatically come to associate things dark with
things evil. Think of Star Wars. The core narrative of the movie is framed within a
Manichean divide between the Dark Side of the Force and the Light Side. It is the Light
Side that defeats the Dark Side. My point here is that the construction of whiteness
functions problematically in popular culture’s imaginary in its relationship to Blackness
(and, by association, Black people). Blackness signifies hopelessness, dread, and that
which should be avoided. Whiteness, however, signifies hope, possibility, goodness, and
has the power to solicit support and empathy. Think of the movie version of John
Grisham’s A Time to Kill. After his young Black daughter is horribly raped and left
probably infertile by two white men, Carl Lee Hailey, who is played by actor Samuel L.
Jackson, takes the law into his own hands and shoots them as they are escorted through
the courthouse. Because of his justified lack of trust in the justice system in the South,
Hailey knew that he had to make the white male rapists pay. So, he kills them. A white
lawyer, Jake Brigance, played by actor Matthew McConaughey, takes on his case. As
Brigance delivers his closing statements to an all white jury, he asks them to close their
eyes. He then proceeds to describe the horrible details of the rape of a young girl,
detailing how her body was soaked in their urine, their semen, and how she was left to
die.96 Brigance asks the jurors, “Can you see her?” At the very end of his descriptive
journey, one that is designed to put a “human” face on the victim, he says, “Now,
imagine she’s white.” Hailey is found not guilty, and the movie ends with the Brigance
family, his wife and young daughter, making an effort to cross the racial socio-economic
divide by going to an all Black side of town to visit the Hailey family and their friends.
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The tragedy here is that it is only through the process of imagining Hailey’s
young Black daughter as white that the jurors are able to apparently muster “empathy”
for the young Black girl. The young girl’s Black body alone, however, would not have
justified the acts of Hailey. The imagined young white girl’s body was needed to elicit
the necessary emotional response to empathize with Hailey’s actions. If “empathetic
understanding begins with an appreciation of that person’s situation,”97 then the white
jurors never really came to appreciate Hailey’s situation, namely his love for his Black
young daughter. It would appear that the all white jurors could only truly infer the other
person’s emotions (Hailey’s emotions) if the young girl was white. Hence, since the
young girl was Black, they could not have predicted that he would have been so angry
that he would have shot and killed the white perpetrators. As Black, he had no right to
kill white men, even if they brutally raped his daughter. After all, or so the white myth
goes, as a Black girl “she is always already ripe for the taking, [and] cannot be raped by
white men.”98 Indeed, the young girl was Black, the “murderer” was Black, and those
killed were white southern boys out having a little fun. Instead of finding
correspondences with Hailey’s situation, the jurors had to negate an essential feature of
his situation: that he was a Black man whose Black daughter was raped. The jurors never
really give their verdict of not guilty based upon a Black father’s justified course of
action given the rape of his young Black daughter. They gave the verdict of not guilty
based upon an imagined raped white girl. Through the power of the imagined raped white
girl, and the moral despicableness, pain, and horror that this image induced in the white
jurors, the Black girl’s actual rape was erased. Her humanity and inviolability were not
conceded, but negated. Hence, in letting Hailey walk free, they really let their own white
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selves walk free. At the end of the movie, it is not justice that prevails, but it is whiteness
that prevails and saves the day. The movie only gives the pretense that there has been a
victory over racism. The reality is that the hegemony of whiteness has been re-inscribed.
In The Bluest Eye, Pecola firmly believes in the saving powers of whiteness.
During a scene where Cholly and Pauline are having one of their horrendous physical
fights, which are fed by long-standing feelings of failure engineered by a society that
systematically chisels away at their humanity, Pecola calls upon the “omnipotence” of
whiteness. Claudia narrates, “If she looked different, beautiful, maybe Cholly would be
different, and Mrs. Breedlove too. Maybe they’d say, ‘Why, look at pretty-eyed Pecola.
We mustn’t do bad things in front of those pretty eyes.”99 Pecola firmly believes that she,
that is, her Blackness, is responsible for the irascible and violent behavior of her parents.
However, it is the internalization of “epistemic violence” that leads her to believe this.
Feminist philosopher Susan Bordo’s contention that anorexia nervosa is linked to
androcentric disciplinary technologies of the body is key here. For like many who suffer
from this condition, Pecola is also subjected to her own “ghosts” who speak and confirm
her wretchedness and ugliness.100 She knows herself as the degraded Other, she knows
herself as a problem. This knowledge causes her to wish for her own disappearance:
“Please, God,” she whispered into the palm of her hand, “please let me disappear.”101
Indeed, “each night, without fail, she prayed for blue eyes.”102 This is Pecola’s way of
attempting to de-problematize her identity. It is her wish not to be seen as ugly, as Black,
but as beautiful and desirable. In short, it is her desire to be seen as white.
The wish to disappear might also be interpreted as a trope of whiteness. As I have
argued, whiteness, as normative, deems itself unmarked, invisible, and transparent. So,
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Pecola’s rejection of her body functions on at least three different levels. First, she wishes
that she could disappear as the “Black cause” of her parent’s turmoil. Second, there is a
sense in which she wishes for some form of “corporeal death.” She at least desires to be
unburdened of her epidermal racial-schema, a form of embodiment that she sees as
having been cursed. Third, her wish to disappear suggests the desire to be “unrecognized”
in her normalcy, to “disappear” within a flood of whiteness and thereby lose the stain of
Blackness, that which makes her hyper-visible.
Pauline, by example, taught Pecola to deny herself and to deny life. Denying her
own Blackness, unconsciously wishing for the love and protection of a man like Clark
Gable, trying her best to look like Jean Harlow, and finally learning to be content with the
mantle of ugliness that the power of whiteness imposed upon her, Pauline learned to
settle. She became a “Black hole,” as it were, the penetration of which came to mark her
worth and her closeness with Cholly. In fact, the only time that Pauline seems close to
him is when her “flesh is all that be on his mind.”103 It is in these moments of bodily
objectification that Pauline is made to believe that she is beautiful: “Not until he has let
go of all he has, and give it to me. To me. To me. When he does, I feel a power. I be
strong, I be pretty, I be young.”104 Mixed with overtones of masochism, has Pauline
come to accept her self-value through being sexually objectified? Pauline is most happy
when she is either under the control of filmic white images, dutifully fulfilling the needs
of white folk, or being sexually objectified by Cholly. In all three situations, Pauline
undergoes a form of erasure.105
Cholly Breedlove’s affections are also hermetically sealed off from his children:
“Having no idea of how to raise children, and having never watched any parent raise
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himself, he could not even comprehend what a relationship should be.”106 Cholly spends
most of his time in a drunken stupor, reflecting the pangs of racism and feelings of
rejection that he had experienced in his own life. Unlike the father in the Dick-and-Jane
primer, Cholly is thrown within a world of rejection, existential malaise, and anti-Black
racism. He is the Black father who does not measure up to the Dick-and-Jane primer.
Like Pauline, he too undergoes very powerful experiences of erasure. Like Pecola and
Pauline, Cholly’s identity is situated within a racial and racist context of unequal power
relations. Cholly’s identity is “given birth to,” as it were, within various contexts that do
not ever really generate a positive sense of self-definition.
Cholly’s life begins with rejection. When he was only four days old “his mother
wrapped him in two blankets and one newspaper and placed him on a junk heap by the
railroad.”107 It was his Great Aunt Jimmy who saved and raised him. Indeed, he was not
even given a name at birth by his mother. As Aunt Jimmy says, “Your mama didn’t name
you nothing.”108 Thrown out like trash by his mother and left unnamed, Cholly is born
into a society within which the power structure is “controlled by traditional white
patriarchs.”109 One can imagine the degree of repression required to fight back memories
of being thrown away like junk and being unloved by his mother. Within a society where
Blackness is already devalued and rejected a priori, Cholly already has a tremendous
burden to carry.
We learn that years later, as told by the omniscient narrator, Cholly undergoes a
devastating encounter with whiteness as he experiences his first sexual act. Instead of
directing his anger toward the larger white social structure partly responsible for what he
has become, Cholly’s anger becomes implosive, impacting all those closest to him. While
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attending a gathering in honor of his recently deceased Great Aunt Jimmy, Cholly and a
girl named Darlene clandestinely go off to copulate. As they begin, they are startled by an
“invasive presence”:
There stood two white men. One with a spirit lamp, the other with a
flashlight. There was no mistake about their being white; he could smell it.
Cholly jumped, trying to kneel, stand, and get his pants up all in one
motion. The men had long guns. “Hee hee hee heeeee.” The snicker was a
long asthmatic cough. The other raced the flashlight all over Cholly and
Darlene. “Get on wid it, nigger,” said the flashlight one. “Sir?” said
Cholly, trying to find a buttonhole. “I said, get on wid it. An’ make it
good, nigger, make it good.”110

In the above passage the reference to the effusion of light is reminiscent of
Pauline’s experience at the movie house. Schwartz, directing attention to the
pornographic overtones of this scene, writes, “Flashlight and Spiritlamp, two sources of
white light, looking at what looks most fascinating to them: what is not white. What is
not white is obscene . . . .”111 The reader will recall that this “attraction-repulsion”
dynamic was played out by French men as they gazed upon the “non-white obscenity” of
Sarah Bartmann’s Black body. Like Bartmann, Cholly had his behind literally exposed,
with the flashlight making a moon on it.112 Again, within this context, Morrison captures
the significance of the relationship between the performance of the white gaze, power,
and context. With his behind exposed, Cholly feels vulnerable to white penetration,
symbolically and literally. By shining the light on his buttocks, a light that does not
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provide greater clarity, but greater distortion, his masculine somatic schema and body
integrity is challenged. Through the structure of white male spectatorship, he is reduced
to fragments of flesh. After all, he is on top of Darlene, and the white onlookers never
demand to see her. Hence, it is Cholly who is reduced to a gyrating “piece of ass.” The
implications of mixed race homoerotic desire are prevalent in this scene. One might also
argue that the intrusiveness of the white men disrupted Cholly’s sense of generative,
sexual agency just as enslaved Blacks were forced to copulate at the behest of whites
(“Get on wid it, niggers”) in order to replenish more pieces of property. Cholly became
just another indistinguishable Black animal in estrous, performing before the white gaze.
Consistent with what was demonstrated in the previous chapter, Shelley Wong makes an
important analogy, noting:

This intrusion of the white world maintains a historical precedent in
slavery. The slave trade disrupted generative, and genealogical, time by
breaking up families and by rendering family members commodities, that
is, by reducing the ever-changing, ever-proliferating body to the status of
exchangeable homogenous units.113

The white gaze, as a ritual performance, as I have argued, is inextricably bound
up with objectifying, exoticizing, and sexualizing the Black body, inscribing it with
myths and codes that function to ontologize it, thus returning it as that which it is not.
Cholly experiences “the degradation of having this very private act of affirming his
manhood turned into a sideshow, into a spectacle of two animals rutting in the woods.”114
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He and Darlene are symbolically returned to themselves as libidinous animals on display
in a public zoo. This is indicative, as I have argued throughout this project, of the white
gaze’s power of socio-ontological constitutionality. The white gaze reconstitutes the
innocence of the sexual act into something dirty through a mode of re-presentation (partly
created through verbal and non-verbal white male actions) that renders the sexual
performance of the two Black bodies pornographic. Forced by the voyeuristic white
onlookers to continue, Cholly could only pretend: “Cholly, moving faster, looked at
Darlene. He hated her. He almost wished he could do it – hard, long, and painfully, he
hated her so much.”115 Symbolically, the white gaze has disrupted Cholly’s show of his
“manhood.” The white gaze not only sees, but generates Cholly’s impotence. The white
male gaze has symbolically emasculated Cholly.
It is also important to keep in mind the very real historical association of Black
male sexuality as a threat to white female “purity.” The ritual of castrating Black men can
be interpreted as the manifestation of the need for white men to prove their masculine
prowess, to protect their women from contamination resulting from the “unnatural”
practices of miscegenation, and to possess that large and threatening object (the Black
male penis) that they themselves had created through myth. In Cholly’s situation, the two
white males have successfully challenged his “masculine” identity where this identity is
linked to his inability to protect Darlene116 and his inability to maintain an erection.
Cholly did not direct his anger toward the white gazers. “They were big, white, armed
men. He was small, black, helpless.”117 Once again feeling abandoned, Cholly hates
Darlene, a hatred that he also feels toward himself. Dickerson observes:
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Unable to protect, to fight, to hide, Cholly cannot manifest the patriarchal
prowess, benevolence, or obscurity (after all, his backside is literally
exposed) that is traditionally associated with maleness and manhood. Like
Darlene he is accessible, weak, and naked. And to be thus naked is to
share not only the tenderness and the plight of the female, but also to share
a role traditionally assigned to her. The naked male is feminized, if not
humanized.118

What is interesting is Cholly’s perception that his “masculinity” and “manhood”
have been threatened. At one level of analysis, this threat is real, ideologically speaking,
particularly in a culture that is so incredibly phallocentric in its values and practices. The
concept of “masculinity,” though, is by no means historically stable.119 Given the
American context where men prove themselves through their domination of women,
Cholly has become the vehicle through which the power of this ideology gets performed.
Within the framework of the masculine ideology, the symbol of the erect penis means
masculine power. What is significant to note is that once Cholly’s masculinity is
challenged and he feels threatened, he re-inscribes phallocentric power through his desire
to fuck Darlene “hard, long, and painfully.” Because the white men have exposed his
“weakness,” an attribute that male culture has stipulated as “feminine,” which is another
unstable concept, Cholly feels the need to regain a sense of male power, a form of power
that he thinks is retrievable through the further humiliation and sexual domination of
Darlene.
Feeling exposed, weak, and emasculated, Cholly goes in search of his father,
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Samson Fuller, in Macon. Only fourteen, Cholly finds his father playing a game of craps.
The reader will note that playing craps would not have been an unusual practice for Black
men as they were, in large numbers, excluded from the formal economy. As Cholly is
shown a man whose name is Samson Fuller, he feels a certain level of affection. As
Cholly attempts to identify himself, he cannot recall the name of his mother, a name that
he wonders if he had ever known. His father is more interested in the game. Almost as if
his father had been confronted with this scenario before, he responds to Cholly with
indifference. In an unforgettable and powerful act of rejection, Morrison writes:

But Fuller had turned back to the game that was about to begin anew. He
bent down to toss a bill on the ground, and waited for a throw. When it
was gone, he stood up and in a vexed and whiny voice shouted at Cholly,
“Tell that bitch she get her money. Now, get the fuck outta my face!”120

Initially feeling utterly paralyzed, Cholly finds the strength to run away. Mastering all of
his strength not to cry, “his bowels suddenly opened up, and before he could realize what
he knew, liquid stools were running down his legs.”121 Having “soiled himself like a
baby,”122 Cholly assumes the role of an infant, unprotected, and being unable to control
basic bodily functions. The theme of infantilism is significant here. Not only was he
thrown away on a junk heap by his mother when he was an infant, had his bare behind
exposed to white male onlookers, but now, neglected by his father, he soils his pants and
runs away only to physically assume a fetal position. Morrison:
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Finding the deepest shadow under the pier, he crouched in it, behind one
of the posts. He remained there in fetal position, paralyzed, his fists
covering his eyes, for a long time. No sound, no sight, only darkness and
heat and the press of his knuckles on his eyelids. He even forgot his
messed-up trousers.”123

As a Black man in America, Cholly is “stripped by his past of the possibilities of
material accumulation and of social standing.”124 Destitute and Black, living in poverty
and squalor that was typical and socio-economically and existentially overbearing for
Black folk, being sold inferior furniture and then being identified as “shit” for not
wanting it, having lost his self-esteem, rejected by his biological parents, violated by the
white male gaze, having no sense of positive self-empowerment, and being an alcoholic
to boot, which no doubt functions as a crutch to deal with so much pain and suffering in a
white man’s world that constantly holds up to him an image that he is not, Cholly is the
epitome of the white man’s burden. Perhaps “there was nothing more to lose.”125 He is
described as being “truly free” and without bounds, “alone with his own perceptions and
appetites, and they alone interested him.”126 This “freedom,” however, is only symbolic;
it is born of powerlessness. Feeling god-like and omnipotent, which is the inverse reality
of his once real and remembered sexual impotence, which also functions as a trope for
economic, affective, and parental impotence, he attempts to control everything within his
immediate grasp, though with reckless irresponsibility and devastating consequences.
“So it was,” as Claudia sadly narrates, “on a Saturday afternoon, in the thin light
of spring [a time of new and joyous beginnings], he staggered home reeling drunk and
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saw his daughter [Pecola] in the kitchen.”127 Reeking with self-doubt, self-hatred, feeling
like a failure in the white man’s world, Cholly undergoes a process of implosion, a
process which expresses itself inward as well as outward: He rapes Pecola. “No longer
merely a site of ugliness,” as Dickerson says, “Pecola’s body has become a vessel of
sin.”128 Pregnant with her father’s child, having dark skin, which symbolically represents
evil, having the habit of drinking three quarts of milk, which Mrs. MacTeer says is
“downright sinful,129 Pecola’s sinfulness is multiplied. Part of the Dick-and-Jane primer
opens up the chapter within which Pecola’s rape is described. The words run together in
unpunctuated sentential madness:

“SEEFATHERHEISBIGANDSTRONGFATH
ERWILLYOUPLAYWITHJANEFATHER
ISSMILINGSMILEFATHERSMILESMILE.”130

The powerful irony is that once again, the primer reads like a fairytale/fake narrative visà-vis the life of the Breedlove family. The sentential structure of the primer also clearly
lacks boundaries, a reality reflected in Cholly’s relationship with Pecola. Unlike the
father in the primer, Cholly does not smile, and his act of “playing” with his daughter
becomes a site of unspeakable violence, physical and psychological trauma. Pecola
needed to be loved, to feel it, to know its gentleness, to know its unconditionality and
warmth, to reciprocate it. “Your brown eyes are beautiful, Pecola.” “Now, what kind of
candy can I get the beautiful little girl in the pretty dress?” “Pecola, you’re special and
your father and I love you so much.” Unfortunately, from the narrative, these words were
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never spoken. Then again, Pecola did wonder what love felt like. Overhearing her mother
and father copulating in bed, she came to think of love as “choking sounds and
silence.”131
Describing the horrible experience of Pecola’s rape, the reader is told, “. . . the
gigantic thrust he [Cholly] made into her then provoked the only sound she made—a
hollow suck of air in the back of her throat.”132 Perhaps Pecola was correct all along.
Love was silence (words of parental affection lacking) and choking sounds (having your
body invaded, and forced to emit sounds of profound distress). Pecola needed eyes that
refused to see her as ugly, that could not possibly see her as ugly. She needed genuine
familial affection, and affirmation, but Cholly could only manage to push her legs apart
violently and drop “his seeds in his own plot of black dirt.”133
Doubly stained (being Black and physically sullied by her father), Pecola’s Black
body returns to her as fucked, both literally and figuratively. She has come to learn
multiple messages about being embodied. As a Black young female, she learns the pain
and terror of not only what it means to live-her-body-as-Black within a culture where the
standard of beauty is indelibly marked by whiteness, but she lives her body in a world
where the female body always already “makes one prey”134 within the context of male
dominance.135 Philosopher Susan J. Brison notes, “Those who endure long periods of
repeated torture often find ways of dissociating themselves from their bodies, that part of
themselves which undergoes the torture.”136 Pecola’s body is tortured through the process
of abusive words, denigrating performative gazes, and redirected self-hatred. Pecola does
not appear to resist the inscriptions of white racist discourse, inscriptions with which she
has thoroughly identified. Wherever she goes she encounters communicative projective
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fantasies that construct her “ugly” dark body as destiny, as a fixed and timeless entity.
Pecola’s rejection of her body has absolutely nothing to do with Platonic
metaphysics. It is not pure disembodiment that she desires. Rather, it is white embodiment
that she seeks, and, of course, by extension, disembodiment from her Black body. Cholly
only quickens her desire to cast off the dark nuisance she calls her body. Philosopher
Linda Alcoff provides a phenomenological description of sexual abuse as traumatically
experienced by a young child, insightfully referencing feelings of corporeal dislocation:

The child . . . feels shame marked on the body itself, as a thing to be used,
a kind of living spittoon. The flesh of one’s own body envelops and
incorporates the dreaded other, with its disregard for oneself and its
capacity for psychic or physical violence. No wonder these events often
produce a psychic dislocation from one’s own corporeal present and one’s
ability to accept inhabiting this body, which is the continued site of the
other. One’s body now will forever retain a layer of remembered
experience as the colonized space for a monstrous subjectivity.137

Cholly only adds to the profound loathing that Pecola feels for her dark embodied
immanence (etymologically, the sense of “remaining in place,” stasis).
On the symbolic order, to be embodied-in-white is to transcend the autochthonous
“black static dirt” that she has become. Symbolically, white embodiment is paradoxically
a form of disembodiment. Whiteness is beauty transcendent, pure, clean, untainted,
brilliance, genius, above and beyond the dirt and filth of the earth. Whiteness is
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associated with forms of angelic embodiment typically represented in iconographic
depictions as luminescent “bodies” descending from the heavens. For Pecola, to be
white, to have blues eyes that are the color of the sky is to escape the world of choking
sounds and silence. It is to escape Mr. Yacobowski’s dehumanizing gaze and to be loved
like the young Fisher girl. It is to live a life that actually breeds love. Cholly, of course,
does not breed-love, but hate, fear, trauma, and incest. Similar to the white gaze, he is a
body snatcher. Reminiscent of the 1956 science fiction film Invasion of the Body
Snatchers, both the white gaze and Cholly are invaders of bodies. They confiscate bodies.
After taking possession of them, the bodies are then returned, though reconfigured, alien,
and often monstrous.
Given the tenor of The Bluest Eye, the reader is made to feel sympathy for Cholly
over and above the inexcusable and unconscionable act of raping his daughter. After all,
Cholly has been the object of systemic forces of white racism and profound levels of
parental neglect. However, immediately leading up to the rape, the actual rape itself, and
immediately thereafter, the reader is aware of the stark irony displayed. The entire scene
is filled with contradictions and oppositions such that the reader’s attention and concern
are shifted toward Pecola. Elliott Butler-Evans captures the significance of such irony in
his analysis of the juxtaposition of contradictory terms used during this tragic moment
within the text:

Central . . . is the recurrent use of tender and tenderness in a context that is
clearly intended to be ironic. Cholly envisions “tenderly” breaking his
daughter’s neck, fantasizes about violating her body with “tenderness,”
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and wants to “fuck” her “tenderly.” The oxymoronic construction itself
undermines whatever sympathies one has for Cholly. The fusion of
tenderness with acts of fantasized and real violence is experienced by the
reader as a contradiction. Consequently, Cholly’s antiheroic stature is
significantly diminished in the text. This is reinforced at the end of the
description, when the narrative focus shifts to Pecola: “So when the child
regained consciousness, she was lying on the kitchen floor under a heavy
quilt, trying to connect the pain between her legs with the face of her
mother looming over her.”138

It would appear that for all of his life Cholly had been “fucked.” What else, then, does
he have to offer? White racist society placed him and many other Black males in the
position of “fuckees.” Being so placed, perhaps the only logical response is to “fuck” the
world out of which they were spawned. Raping his daughter, Cholly has become the very
quintessence of the how the white imaginary envisioned the Black body. Cholly is weak,
wild, irresponsible, beats his wife and neglects his children. He is economically destitute.
He is sexually rapacious and bestial. As noted earlier, Cholly is described as being
beyond the reaches of human consideration. He is said to have joined the animals,
described as an old dog and a snake. Indeed, before he rapes Pecola, the reader is told that
he crawls toward her on all fours.139
Although other Black males within The Bluest Eye are poor and struggle to create
lives for themselves and their families (for example, Claudia and Frieda’s father, Mr.
MacTeer), Cholly’s life stands out as the tragic outcome of living in a society where
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Blacks have been systemically bombarded with violence. It is not the “successful” Black
males within the text against which we should measure Cholly. This can lead to the
simplistic conclusion that Cholly could have done otherwise, that he could have risen
above his circumstances. While this is true in theory, and as one should continue to think
Cholly’s rape of Pecola morally abhorrent and unacceptable, there is more to be critiqued
than Cholly. The process of critiquing and overthrowing the power of whiteness and
phallocentric conceptions of masculinity (two central antagonists within the text) is far
more significant than leaving the system intact and continuing to expect that someone
like Cholly will succeed in spite of the larger systemically anti-Black racist context into
which he was thrown.
Having been racially Othered, rejected, uglified, put outdoors and taught to hate
herself, and humiliated by people within the community (e.g., Mr. Yacobowski, Maureen
Peal, Junior, Geraldine, teachers, students), Pecola’s rape and subsequent impregnation
by Cholly decisively broke her fragile spirit, forcing her to seek refuge in bluest eyes, the
obtaining of which lead to a complete split in the fabric of her psyche. The Black
community in Lorain, Ohio, could not prevent this devastating psychological split. The
community also suffered from measuring its soul by the tape of a world that measured
whiteness as supreme. “The novel’s central paucity,” as Cat Moses argues, “is the
community’s lack of self-love, a lack precipitated by the imposition of a master aesthetic
that privileges the light skin and blue eyes inherent in the community’s internalization of
this master aesthetic.”140 Perhaps this explains why it is so easy for Pecola to seek out
and find a light-skinned character named Soaphead Church, who is said to be capable of
helping the unfortunate to “overcome Spells, Bad Luck, and Evil Influences [read:
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Blackness].”141
Church, like Pecola, hates his Blackness. In fact, he came from an English lineage
of “mixed blood” and was instilled with Anglophilia.142 The entire family is described as
having “married ‘up,’ lightening the family complexion and thinning out the family
features.”143 The family is described as “hoping to prove beyond a doubt De Gobineau’s
hypothesis that ‘all civilizations derive from the white race [and], that none can exist
without its help’.”144 Church felt that he had to do something for this “little black girl
who wanted to rise up out of the pit of her blackness and see the world with blue eyes.”145
Ironically, he is also a pedophile, though he never makes sexual advances toward Pecola.
Hence, Pecola moves cyclically within a social space of pathology, a space of actual and
potential trauma. What is it about a community, indeed, an entire society, such that a
young Black girl who had been recently molested by her biological father can only
receive help to overcome her “corporeal malediction” through the care and understanding
of another pedophile?
At a deeper level, Morrison is raising the issue of theodicy, the problem of how to
account for profound suffering and injustice within a universe where God is said to exist.
In fact, once Pecola successfully performs the necessary task that will grant her blue eyes
(viz., killing a dog that Church despises), it is Church who writes a letter to God,
exclaiming: “I did what You did not, could not, would not do: I looked at that ugly little
black girl, and I loved her. I played You. And it was a very good show.”146 When the
reader encounters Pecola again she has become double. Her “body, which has been the
vortex of a hateful social prejudice and a devastating paternal love, is reinscribed in a
self-reflexive dialogue of italicized and roman print that constitutes a fleshing out of
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double consciousness.”147 Hence, we find Pecola happily engaged in a lively
conversation with herself about her new “blue eyes”:

Sure it is. Can you imagine? Something like that happening to a person,
and nobody but nobody saying anything about it? They all try to pretend
they don’t see them. Isn’t that funny?. . . I said, isn’t that funny? Yes. You
are the only one who tells me how pretty they are. Yes. You are a real
friend. I’m sorry about picking on you before. I mean, saying you are
jealous and all. That’s all right. No. Really. You are my very best friend.
Why didn’t I know you before. You didn’t need me before. Didn’t need
you? I mean . . . you were so unhappy before. I guess you didn’t notice me
before. I guess you’re right. And I was so lonely for friends. And you were
right here. Right before my eyes. No, honey. Right after your eyes.148

Finally, Pecola has completely undergone a process of psychological transmogrification.
She has entered “a twilight zone of being.”149 She has completely measured herself by a
white world that only sees ugliness in Black people. Like a bird longing to fly high and to
envelope itself within the blueness of the sky, Pecola can be observed “beating the air, a
winged but grounded bird, intent on the blue void it could not reach—could not even
see—but which filled the valleys of the mind.”150
It is interesting that after Du Bois’ encounter with the tall white newcomer, he
also found himself living within a region of blue sky, but it was not “the blueness of the
sky” that metaphorically speaks to the fanciful flight of insanity. Rather, after having his
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Black body/self negatively returned vis-à-vis the white gaze, Du Bois says, “I had
thereafter no desire to tear down that veil, to creep through; I held all beyond it in
common contempt, and lived above it in a region of blue sky, and great wandering
shadows.”151 Pecola did not hold what was beyond the veil in contempt. To have done so
would imply a certain level of indignation, a certain level of resistance to white power. In
her soul, Pecola became white. But in Pecola’s agony and sorrow, where were the Sorrow
Songs, as Du Bois says, that breathed hope? Where were those comforting cadences that
should have emboldened and enabled her to see that there is an ultimate justice? There
was no release from existential angst and despair that resulted in victory, triumph, or
confidence marked by inner peace. Du Bois asks, “Do the Sorrow Songs sing true?”152
Answer: For Pecola, not in this world. Not in this world!
It is important to note that of all of the characters in The Bluest Eye, Claudia is the
most resistant to the epistemic regime of whiteness. Although Pecola is the “Bluest I” in
the novel, it is Claudia who enacts a blues ontology. She is the one who bears witness in
the African-American tradition of testifying to the horrors that have befallen Pecola.153
Unlike Pecola’s family, Claudia’s family has greater cohesion and order, though there is
a paucity of material wealth. And though there were days, like Sundays, that were “full of
‘don’ts’ and ‘set’cha self downs,’”154 there were also days of singing and delight. Claudia
says:

If my mother was in a singing mood, it wasn’t so bad. She would sing
about hard times, bad times, and somebody-done-gone-and-left-me times.
But her voice was so sweet and her singing-eyes so melty I found myself
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longing for those hard times, yearning to be grown without “a thin di-iime to my name.” I looked forward to the delicious time when “my man”
would leave me, when I would “hate to see that evening sun go down…”
‘cause then I would know “my man has left this town.” Misery colored by
the greens and blues in my mother’s voice took all of the grief out of the
words and left me with a conviction that pain was not only endurable, it
was sweet.155

In the above quote, Morrison brilliantly and insightfully has Claudia reference her
mother, Mrs. MacTeer, singing lyrics from W.C. Handy’s “St. Louis Blues.”156 Although
there is specific reference made to “St. Louis Blues,” Mrs. MacTeer’s blues repertoire
could have included songs by Gertrude “Ma” Rainey, Bessie Smith, and others. Songs by
these Black women would have provided Claudia with examples of strong Black women
who were capable of directly confronting emotional pain—articulating the edges and
curves of such pain through song—and mustering the courage to transcend it, if not
simply to live with it in all of its complexity, but never to become a prisoner of it.
Handy’s piece is filled with pain, but also movement. “St. Louis Blues” opens up with:

I hate to see de evenin’ sun go down
I hate to see de evenin’ sun go down
Cause mah baby, he done lef’ dis town

Feelin’ tomorrow lak I feel today
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Feelin’ tomorrow lak I feel today
I’ll pack mah trunk, an’ make mah getaway157

Hating to see “de evenin’ sun go down” is just one movement on the rung of
existential angst, and intra-personal sorrow. Being linked to a larger process of
resistance and movement, the depression experienced by the “evenin’ sun going down”
does not constitute stasis. It is only momentary. Anticipating tomorrow the same feelings
of angst that she feels today, she knows what she must do: “I’ll pack mah trunk, an’ make
mah getaway.” She knows that she must move on and resist the angst. Making her
getaway is emblematic of her meta-stability, and her capacity to take charge, make a
radical change, and re-direct her life. In other words, the meaning of angst is not fixed,
but can be re-narrated over and over again in song “like a certain Derridean notion of
ceaseless movement and play”158 The message that Claudia receives is that Black women
need not accept their lives as a given, but can resist the conditions that attempt to deplete
their longing for a better life and for something different. It is through her mother’s
musicking that Claudia feels empowered with a sense of infinite possibility.
Theorizing this leitmotif of movement in the blues songs of Gertrude Rainey,
Angela Davis notes:

A good number of Rainey’s songs that evoke mobility and travel
encourage black women to look toward “home” for consolation and
inspiration. In these songs the activity of travel has a clear and precise
goal. Travel is not synonymous with uncertainty and the unknown but
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rather is undertaken with the aim of bringing certainty and stability into
the women’s life.”159

Consider Rainey’s “Lost Wandering Blues.” Davis points out that the first stanza,
“leavin’ this mornin’ with my clothes in my hand,” is indicative of “an absolute rupture
with the old conditions the protagonist is rejecting.”160 Davis argues that the theme of
getting away and rupturing old conditions is even stronger where Rainey “transforms a
recurring males blues image into one with a specifically female content.”161 Unlike where
the matchbox is used as a metaphor to indicate both baggage and being poor, Rainey
reconfigures the meaning of the matchbox to fit her precise determination to leave a
troubled situation. Davis cites the lyrics of Blind Lemon Jefferson’s “Matchbox Blues” to
make the point of contrast. A verse from “Match box Blues” reads:

I’m setting here wondering will a matchbox hold my clothes
I’m setting here wondering will a matchbox hold my clothes
I ain’t got so many matches but I got so far to go.”162

Davis insightfully notes:

However, when Ma Rainey sings, “I got a trunk too big to be bothering
with on the road,” the matchbox emerges as a metaphor for the
protagonists conscious decision to strip herself down to the bare essentials,
leaving behind everything that may have defined her place under former
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conditions. What once served as a sign of impoverishment and want
becomes for Rainey an emancipatory vehicle.”163

Thinking about the blues as part of the same African American musical tradition
as the sorrow songs, which functioned as sites through which the Black spirit could both
sing of its pain and yet move beyond it, listening to her mother sing the blues instilled in
Claudia a profound sense of existential hope and indefatigability. This is characteristic of
enacting a blues ontology. What is important to this way of being blue is the ability to
improvise during moments of pain and sorrow. Singing the blues is a way of making a
way out of no way.
My sense is that even if Pecola had been within earshot of Mrs. MacTeer’s
“musicking” of the blues she may not have been receptive to the influences of how the
blues carried and communicated a motif of resistance, didacticism, and how they could
be heard in terms of their functionality to disclose a field of possibility and resoluteness.
After all, Pecola was already showing profound signs of self-hatred when she arrived at
the MacTeer’s home. Moreover, unlike Claudia, Pecola may have received subtle
messages from Mrs. MacTeer that her presence was experienced as an unwanted
intrusion, which would have functioned as just one more instance of feeling unwanted,
one more experience of having her bodily presence rejected.164 “Although Mrs. McTeer
does what Geraldine would never do—she takes Pecola into her home—she clearly
experiences Pecola’s body as economically and morally intrusive,”165 as Dickerson notes.
Recalling the magnitude of her mother’s complaints, articulated in dramatic monologues,
Claudia says:
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My mother’s fussing soliloquies always irritated and depressed us. They
were interminable, insulting, and although indirect (Mama never named
anybody – just talked about folks and some people), extremely painful in
their thrust. She would go on like that for hours, connecting one offense to
another until all of the things that chagrined her were spewed out.166

It is important to note that the blues, like the sorrow songs, jazz, and rap, should
be understood as signifying a “nexus of musical pleasure, religious zeal, sensual
stimulation, and counter-hegemonic resistance.”167 In short, African-American musical
forms are multifaceted. It is the counter-hegemonic aspect of the blues that is of interest
here. One might say that blues musicking was a form of resilience and identity formation
for Black people. The image of the railway junctions signify impermanence, agency;
“they symbolize sharecroppers, in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, migrating by
trains to the North in search of jobs, safety, and a less racist environment.”168 As AfricanAmerican literary theorist Houston A. Baker, Jr., notes, “The railway juncture is marked
by transience,”169 a form of transience that is physical, emotional, and existential.
Enacting a blues ontology speaks to the subjunctive mode of being, an ability-to-be. This
speaks to human reality as Seinkonnen. The blues, then, as a site of becoming, deparalyzes the spirit. Baker:

Even as they speak of paralyzing absence and ineradicable desire, their
instrumental rhythms suggest change, movement, action, continuance,
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unlimited and unending possibility. Like signification itself, blues are
always nomadically wandering. Like the freight-hopping hobo, they are
ever on the move, ceaselessly summing novel experience.170
Africans were enslaved and forced to come to the so-called New World, only to
recreate themselves through processes of improvisation, movement (physical and
psychological), syncretism and bricolage, processes that possess family resemblances.
Through a process of bricolage, Claudia appropriated the blues lyrics sung by her mother,
which were immediately available to her, and was able to feel the tragic sense of which
they spoke and yet was also attentive to the possibility of transcendence of which the
lyrics also spoke. Unlike Pecola who was not exposed to blues music, the blues frees
Claudia from the stultifying impact of internalized whiteness.
Not only does Claudia realize that the problem has to do with what she calls this
Thing, that is, whiteness, but she takes a resistant stance against the seductive symbolic
powers of whiteness. Given a white doll one Christmas, she relates:

When I took it to bed, its hard unyielding limbs resisted my flesh—the
tapered fingertips on those dimpled hands scratched. If, in sleep, I turned,
the bone-cold head collided with my own. It was a most uncomfortable,
patently aggressive sleeping companion. To hold it was no more
rewarding. The starched gauze or lace on the cotton dress irritated any
embrace. I had only one desire: to dismember it. To see of what it was
made, to discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the desirability that had
escaped me, but apparently only me. Adults, older girls, shops, magazines,
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newspapers, window signs—all the world had agreed that a blue-eyed,
yellow-haired, pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured.171

Unlike so many of the Black children in Kenneth and Mamie Clark’s famous
experiments172 who showed a distinct preference for white dolls over brown ones,
Claudia rejects the white doll, preferring to dismember it, to ascertain what makes it so
special in virtue of being white. Claudia literally destroyed the white doll by breaking off
parts. Of course, adults could not understand why she did this. After all, how could a
young Black girl not want to possess a beautiful white doll? Claudia:

Grown people frowned and fussed: “You-don’t-know-how-to-take-careof-nothing. I-never-had-a-baby-doll-in-my-whole-life-and-used-to-crymy-eyes-out-for-them. Now-you-got-one-a-beautiful-one-and-you-tear-itup-what’s-the-matter-with-you?173

Referring to the doll as “a beautiful one,” the adults reveal the core of their longing. As
they would cry out their eyes over not having something beautiful (read: white), one gets
the impression that they were really crying out their eyes over being Black, the symbolic
negation of beauty. They longed for beauty qua whiteness. To embrace the beautiful
white doll was an important way of vicariously possessing an aspect of whiteness. “How
strong was their outrage. Tears threatened to erase the aloofness of their authority. The
emotion of years of unfulfilled longing preened in their voices,”174 noted Claudia.
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Claudia longed for familiar experiences, quotidian joys and pleasures that were
achievable within the confines of her own Black family culture. She did not look to that
which was extraneous; she did not desire the imposed normative scenes of whiteness.
Had they asked her what she desired, she would have been forthright. Claudia:
I want to sit on the low stool in Big Mama’s kitchen with my lap full of
lilacs and listen to Big Papa play his violin for me alone. The lowness of
the stool made for my body, the security and warmth of Big Mama’s
kitchen, the smell of the lilacs, the sound of the music, and, since it would
be good to have all of my senses engaged, the taste of a peach, perhaps,
afterward.175

Claudia’s body screams out against the Dick-and-Jane reading primer. She hates milk176
and moves against the desired “cleanliness” (that is, desired whiteness177) of Pauline and
Geraldine. Claudia “looked with loathing on new dresses that required a hateful bath in a
galvanized zinc tub before wearing.”178 She found herself

. . . slipping around on the zinc, no time to play or soak, for the water
chilled too fast, no time to enjoy one’s nakedness, only time to make
curtains of soapy water careen down between the legs. Then the scratchy
towels and the dreadful and humiliating absence of dirt. The irritable,
unimaginative cleanliness. Gone the ink marks from legs and face, all my
creations and accumulations of the day gone, and replaced by goose
pimples.179
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Note that the “cleanliness” is not just a passing moment of dislike. It is irritable and
unimaginative. Bathing feels more like a ritual of bleaching, leaving one as white as
snow, simple, clean, cold, chilly, perhaps even scary, leaving her with goose pimples.
There is something about “dirt,” which suggests the opposite of being sullen, which gives
character to Claudia’s body. She sees something humiliating in being so clean, perhaps so
“white.” She would rather the dark ink creations and accumulations to remain, marking
her body’s identity with counter-signs that militate against cleanliness (whiteness). To
forge an interpretive leap, perhaps this was Morrison’s way of having Claudia engage in
her own self-scripting, putting up a fight against the “washed cleanliness” of the Black
body as symbolic of whiteness.
Although acknowledging Claudia’s resistance to whiteness, Keith E. Byerman
argues that within The Bluest Eye “the ideological hegemony of whiteness is simply too
overwhelming to be successfully resisted.”180 Byerman argues, “Claudia, the strongest
character in the book, cannot defy the myth and is even made to feel guilty for her
childhood doubts. Knowing full well that the myth is a lie, she must nonetheless bow
before its idol.”181 Byerman points to a passage where Claudia is critical of her own
ruminations about causing whites pain by literally pinching their eyes. Claudia:

When I learned how repulsive this disinterested violence was, that it was
repulsive because it was disinterested, my shame floundered about for
refuge. The best hiding place was love. Thus the conversion from pristine
sadism to fabricated hatred, to fraudulent love. It was a small step to
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Shirley Temple. I learned much later to worship her, just as I learned to
delight in cleanliness, knowing, even as I learned, that the change was
adjustment without improvement.182

Contrary to Byerman’s interpretation, however, it is not clear that Claudia has given into
the myth of whiteness. She realizes that such rituals as “worshiping Shirley Temple” and
“delighting in cleanliness” does not lead to any improvement, but only an adjustment.
Perhaps there is something of greater value that Claudia is after, something according to
which a small adjustment might secure. Perhaps it is by coming to worship Shirley
Temple and delight in cleanliness that Claudia feels that she might be even more
desirable to her mother/other Black women. Recall that Claudia witnessed Pauline turn
her loving attention to the little white girl, not to Pecola, during the blueberry pie
incident. Indeed, perhaps there is also a peculiar form of Black mother-daughter
identification formation at play. Concerning this point, Anne Anlin Cheng argues:

Claudia thus eventually learns to love Shirley Temple, I would argue, not
merely or even primarily as a gesture of social compliance, but rather as a
response to the call of the mother, as a perverse form of maternal
connection. Only by learning to love little white girls can little black girls
be like their mothers.183

Claudia’s treatment of white dolls resonates symbolically with one of the
significant objectives of this dissertation project, that is, to see how whiteness is
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constituted, to “deconstruct” and dismantle it so as to discover what makes it so special.
Pecola’s tragedy suggests that at the very core of the alleged universal status of
whiteness—and the negative reactive value-creating power linked to whiteness’s
assimilative capacity to reduce the Otherness of the Other to its own sameness—resides
the reality of madness. Whiteness is a form of madness predicated upon defining all
differences against the meta-narrative voice of its self-appointed status as the One.
However, as I have argued, the socially constructed allure, power, and hegemony of
whiteness are passed off as the “natural” order of things. This “natural order,” however,
is maintained through various practices that attempt to conceal whiteness’s historically
contingent status and cultural particularity. For Pecola, even blue eyes were not enough.
She was after the bluest eyes. However, this aesthetic and ontological feat is achievable,
as Morrison makes clear, at the very expense of sanity itself.
As stated, Pecola is a tragic figure. She at once reflects the many existential
realities of everyday Black life and functions as a powerful fictional character through
whom we are able to gain imaginative access184 to a life of trauma. Morrison does not
describe an abstract conception of the “self,” delineating the ideal epistemic
circumstances under which all cognitive agents (regardless of “race,” gender, class,
global geography) come to know x in some “objective” fashion. Rather, she provides the
narrative of an embodied, young, raced, gendered, sexed self; a self indexed to a
particular historical, social, and cultural space. Morrison is not depicting abstract and
universal truths, but “accidents of private history”185 that philosophically shed light on
what it means to be a self (in this case, a Black female child) that cuts against the grain of
metaphysical speculation regarding the nature of the self as “whatever it is whose
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persistence accounts for personal identity over time.”186 As has been shown, Pecola’s
identity does not persist over time. Even Pecola’s memory, another usual philosophical
candidate for maintaining personal identity, has been partly destroyed and reconstructed
vis-à-vis her experience of trauma, racial degradation, and sexual molestation. Indeed,
even her body, at the phenomenological level, is not the same body. Hence, because of
the massive rift in her consciousness, that is, through the emergence of her double
consciousness, she is no longer that “ugly” Black body. For Pecola, there is a lived or
phenomenological “severance” of bodily continuity; she has become someone else. Male
gendered language aside, Fanon places his finger on Pecola’s “hallucinatory whitening”
where he writes:

If he is overwhelmed to such a degree by the wish to be white, it is
because he lives in a society that makes his inferiority possible, in a
society that derives its stability from the perpetuation of this complex, in a
society that proclaims the superiority of one race; to the identical degree to
which that society creates difficulties for him, he will find himself thrust
into a neurotic situation.187

In an interview describing how she understands her own literary efforts, Morrison
says that her “books are about very specific circumstances, and in them are people who
do very specific things.” She continues:
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But, more importantly, the plot, characters are part of my effort to create a
language in which I can posit philosophical questions. I want the reader to
ponder those questions not because I put them in an essay, but because
they are part of a narrative.188

Within the context of a narrative, as opposed to a philosophical architectonic system,
Morrison is able to place the reader into an imaginative lived space, a powerful narrative
space that is able to articulate modalities of lived existence where bodies are raped,
racially brutalized, dehumanized, marginalized, and traumatized. In short, through
narrative, Morrison moves the reader through the messiness of the impact of existentially
contingent history upon the body. Hence, one might say that Morrison posits
philosophical questions that are inextricably linked to narrative. After all, our lives are
lived narratives, journeys of pain, endurance, contradiction, death, inter-subjectivity,
suffering, racism, sexism, terror, and trauma. Avoiding abstract and non-indexical
discourse, Morrison reveals the power of literature to embody the flesh and blood reality
of what it means to-be-in-the-world.189
Morrison is also writing out of her own unique lived context. Her narrative
embarkation toward exposing what it means for a young Black girl to experience
profound levels of self-loathing (in this case, desiring blue eyes) is linked to an actual
experience. Morrison reflects:

We had just started elementary school. She said she wanted blue eyes. I
looked around to picture her with them and was violently repelled by what
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I imagined she would look like if she had her wish. The sorrow in her
voice seemed to call for sympathy, and I faked it for her, but, astonished
by the desecration she proposed, I “got mad” at her instead.190

It would appear that it was during this early stage in Morrison’s life that she began to feel
the weight, at least emotionally, of what it would mean for a young Black girl to wish for
blue eyes. One might say that The Bluest Eye was the narrative site through which she
came to terms with the deeper philosophical implications of such a wish.
There is a fundamental link between Morrison’s lived experiences and how she
eventually renders such experiences intelligible through her narrative constructions. For
example, she talks about cleaning the homes of white people at thirteen, homes that had
very nice things that her family did not have. She notes:

Years later, I used some of what I observed in my fiction. In “The Bluest
Eye,” Pauline lived in this dump and hated everything in it. And then she
worked for the Fishers, who had this beautiful house, and she loved it. She
got a lot of respect as their maid that she didn’t get anywhere else. If she
went to the grocery store as a black woman from that little house and said,
“I don’t want this meat,” she would not be heard. But if she went in as a
representative of these white people and said, “This is not good enough,”
they’d pay attention.191
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Hence, it is not only the context of her lived experiences that enables Morrison to expose
significant features of whiteness, but her lived context also forms the backdrop against
which she creates various plots and characters which function as part of her effort to
forge a language in which certain philosophical questions might be posited. The Bluest
Eye is ripe with an abundance of philosophical questions: What is the nature of the Black
self within the context of whiteness? What is the nature of the white self within the
context of Blackness? What is the most effective way to combat the semiotics and
political power of whiteness? What happens at the inter-subjective and social ontological
level when communities fail to protect its young? What is needed when communities are
in bad faith regarding the causes of those who suffer? How do we guarantee social
justice? In what language do we best describe the experience of rape of women’s bodies?
What impact does sexual trauma have on women’s identities and the reconstruction of
their identities after the fact? Is the self a metaphysically abstract entity? Or is the self
fundamentally an embodied narrative? How does narrative discourse get at the truth of
lived experience in ways that abstract philosophical discourse fails? How does society
best protect female bodies from male dominance? How do we generate empathy and
moral responsibility for those who are victims of racism, sexism, classism? How do we
best “deconstruct” the self-Other divide along racial and gendered lines? What are the
best strategies to deal most effectively with the white gaze? What are the social, cultural,
and political structures that sustain the power of the white gaze and the white episteme?
In my view, it is one thing to pose these questions in the abstract or to respond to
them in the abstract. Morrison’s narrative depictions have a way of taking the reader
beyond the abstract, enveloping her imaginative characters in flesh and blood, pain, and
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sorrow and thereby creating an emotional vortex through which readers are forced “to
pose living metaphysical questions to themselves.”192
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Chapter VIII
Existential Conversion and
Non-whitely White Bodies

Have you ever felt your sense of self shaken?
—Chris Cuomo
What is helpful is to recall and be reminded of those galvanizing, searing
moments where what I assumed to be the truth of a position, the truth about the
nature of life, about who I am, was shaken so violently that I could never
reoccupy that earlier imagination.
—Gerald Monk

White parasitism must be revealed, shaken and cracked at its core. When the fractures
and fissures begin to show themselves, “it’s best to avoid denial . . . wait for new
possibilities to emerge. Isn’t that what white folks need to allow? Must we not crack up
in order to be something new?”1 Indeed, “as long as whites are in bad faith and
phobogenic constructions of blacks provide needed reinforcements of ego
determinations,” according to Paget Henry, “antiblack racism will be with us.”2
White racist embodiment involves a profound, though often invisible, core of
fragility. The reader will recall Du Bois’ phenomenological return vis-à-vis the white tall
newcomer who refused to exchange visiting cards with him. She refused it peremptorily,
as Du Bois says, with a glance. As a basis upon which to give critical attention to ways of
disrupting whitely modes of being, I will revisit her phenomenological or lived mode of
relationality to her own sense of identity.3
In her refusal, she performed her identity through negation, establishing her space
both physically and psychologically. She lived her body in an expansive modality. She
lived her identity with epistemic certainty. She lived her body as a pre-delineated
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404
sacrosanct site that “excluded” differences. Of course, it is my contention that her
embodiment was itself a site of white racist dramaturgy, an enactment of a role, which
actually differentially values and exaggerates differences. However, for the newcomer,
she simply acted with an always already sense of “entitlement.” She lived her body “as a
corporeal entitlement to spatiality.”4 As she moved through space, however, she racially
carved it up, as it were, distorting it, marking it with her white presence. Embodying
space in this raced way, she demarcated her immediate lived space as “civilized,” as pure,
as privileged. Her refusal, though clearly disclosed, simultaneously involved a process of
concealment. In other words, the concealed background of racist ideology is what
rendered her white (territorial) embodied comportment through social space coherent,
“justified,” and intelligible. In other words, there is a white racist dominant history of
knowledge production that established her white identity as secure.
Having internalized what it means to be “normal,” her identity is sealed, leakproof; she had become a site of a monadic structure who at least thought that her identity
and her whiteness were non-relational. Of course, to remain ignorant of the relational
dynamic upon which her white identity is actually predicated functions as the
desideratum of whiteness. Indeed, she has come to live her whiteness, her identity, as an
“unconditioned” state of being. But her identity is already connected to those non-white
identities that she judges abhorrent.
This is precisely how whiteness as the so-called oracle voice functions. Its
unquestioned, “non-historically” mediated capacity to speak with absolute authority is a
farce created through the subordination of non-white voices. Indeed, the very notion that
there is a white oracle voice (or “pure” white voice) is belied by the reality of the socio-
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linguistic matrix that human speech acquisition presupposes. Hence, like white identity,
whitespeak is fundamentally relational. Whitespeak can never be pure, despite its
aspirations to speak as if emanating from the mouth of a god. Its mono-vocal appearance
is simply due to its greater saliency, which is purchased through the deployment of
various tactics to nullify and relegate to insignificance non-white voices. Hence,
whitespeak is an “impure” voice because it is a socially ensconced voice, always already
dragging with it the residue of other voices, no matter how inaudible.
On my view, existential conversion addresses not only the “unconditioned” reality
of white identity, but also the presumption of the existence of a white oracle voice.
Whitespeak and white identity are sites of value-creating forces that deny the historical
contingency of such values. Through existential conversion, whites are encouraged to
come to terms with the reality that white identity and whitespeak are created through
human action, and not grounded in some transcendental source.5
As I have argued, it is not necessary that the newcomer is able to articulate her
beliefs in the form of propositions. Consistent with my emphasis upon the lived
existential dimensions of whiteness, there is a deeper philosophical point here. Selfreferentiality is not necessary for the white tall newcomer to enact her whiteness. In short,
it is possible to make sense of her racism without reference to her “self-consciousness.”
This does not negate, however, that there are self-conscious racists. Furthermore, this is
not to say that becoming self-conscious of one’s racism is not important vis-à-vis efforts
at white racist transformation. In short, the tall newcomer has become absorbed in the
world of whiteness. Within the process of “being-in” the world of whiteness, she lives its
fantasies, psychologically projecting them outwardly and inwardly, all the while being
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unaware of how she is both duped by whiteness and functions as an agent of whiteness.
My aim here is not to conceptualize her whitely everyday mode of being-in-the-world in
terms of what she believes, but in terms of what she does. She animates a white racist
script on cue, because she knows how and when to do so. Doing so constitutes a set of
practices just as I know how to ride a bike without knowing the specific explanans (that
which in fact does the explaining) of the physics that keeps me in motion or prevents me
from falling off a bike (the explanadum).
I emphasize the doing of whiteliness to underscore the point that fighting against
anti-racist ways of being-in-the-world is not simply a matter of becoming cognizant of
one’s prejudices, but requires news ways of being-in non-white racist forms of life.
According to philosopher Alison Bailey:

Racial scripts are internalized at an early age to the point where they are
embedded almost to invisibility in our language, bodily reactions, feelings,
behaviors, and judgments. Whitely scripts are, no doubt, mediated by a
person’s economic class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, religion, and
geographical location, but privilege is granted on the basis of whitely
performances nevertheless.6

In the case of the tall newcomer, she has internalized a white racist script that has
tremendous implications for how she articulates her body vis-à-vis Blacks. She has
learned to enact particular somatic norms of white hegemony. Like the white woman in
the elevator, she has become imprisoned through inherited “legitimation narratives”7 of
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white power that attempt to keep their true historical origins under constant erasure. She
lives her body within the framework of a narrative, one that is distal, one that is forever
present, and one that projects her forward, placing her ahead of herself,8 as it were,
equipping her with a ready response to all those non-white. Her narrative is structured by
an overarching myth that provides the necessary axiological and epistemological frame of
reference to make sense of her identity. As she continues to enact her whitely modes of
being, ontological effects are generated, giving the impression that the white body is a
finished project. This effectively guards against conceptualizing whiteness/white
embodiment as a process. In short, the tall newcomer has come to inhabit the serious
world of whiteness.
The serious world of whiteness functions as a pre-established axiological and
ontological cartography that imposes fixed coordinates that all must follow. The white
order of things appears to place categorical demands on human reality.9 Growing up in
Jim Crow Georgia, Lillian Smith notes:

I do not remember how or when, but . . . I knew that I was better than a
Negro, that all black folks have their place and must be kept in it . . . that a
terrifying disaster would befall the South if ever I treated a Negro as my
social equal . . . I had learned that white southerners are hospitable,
courteous, tactful people who treat those of their own group with
consideration and who carefully segregate from all the richness of life “for
their own good and welfare” thirteen million people whose skin is colored
a little differently from my own.10
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For Smith and the tall newcomer, the divide between whites and non-whites is presumed
to be out of their control. It is the way things are. “As a consequence,” as Lewis Gordon
notes, “the question of what human beings choose to be isn’t important. What is
important is determining the ways human beings are already predisposed to act.”11
Given that whitely-being-in-the-world is an ideological and historical
phenomenon, this raises the issue of the role of historical agency on the part of
phenotypic whites to transgress whitely ways of being. Indeed, I would argue that whites
ought to transgress whitely modes of being. If whiteness was a fixed essence, the
discourse of ought would be immediately belied. The discourse of ought, however,
speaks to the condition of lack. This not only raises the issue of whiteness to that of the
ethical level, it also raises the issue of whiteness to the existential ontological level. To
invoke the ethical and the existential ontological within this context raises the motifs of
anguish and anxiety. If whiteness is not an essence, then the reality of choice becomes the
pressing issue.
On the other side of whiteness as a serious mode of being-in-the-world is the
existentially converted white who recognizes the ideological grounds upon which
whiteness is a farce and how whiteness is a site of values that are existentially founded.
Existentialist conversion involves the rejection of grounding values in any putative
absolutes. “Existentialist conversion,” as philosopher Eleanore Holveck notes, “cancels
the grounding of values in any absolute, whether that absolute be a god, a church, a state,
etc. By existentialist conversion, one sees that all values refer to choices made by some
one who is finite and limited.”12 Deemed an “absolute,” whiteness provides a space for
the serious man/woman to take flight in the face of his/her freedom. In the case of the tall

409
newcomer, she has come to embody her whiteness as it “permanently confers value upon
[her].”13 What is required is “an affectivity which would throw [her] dangerously beyond
[her whitely self].” 14
This process of existential conversion involves a profound level of relationality.
Not only are phenotypic whites faced with the anxiety of relating to non-whites in terms
that render problematic their previous epistemic certainty regarding the non-white Other,
but existential conversion calls into question, indeed disrupts, their previous certainty
regarding how they understood and valued themselves. Keep in mind that Black people
vis-à-vis whiteness were denied their humanity. In fact, white “humanity” was
constructed in terms of the distortion/erasure of Black humanity. There is a deeper
philosophical issue at stake here. If the “humanity” of whites was constructed upon the
erasure of Black humanity, then to disengage the dialectical process of affirming white
humanity through the negation of Black humanity requires rethinking the very category
of white humanity. Whites, then, are required to think and to affirm a different
philosophical anthropology, one that is not ethically bankrupt. The objective is to begin
to re-narrate a radically different history, one that aligns itself with those few courageous
whites who had, even if not completely cognizant of their existential project, begun tobe-in-the-world-non-whitely. Concerning this point, Alcoff suggests a form of white
double consciousness, though different from that of Du Bois’, which “requires an
everpresent acknowledgement of the historical legacy of white identity constructions in
the persistent structures of inequality and exploitation, as well as a newly awakened
memory of the many white traitors to white privilege.”15
The fundamental premise of existential conversion is that one is not condemned to

410
whiteness. If the newcomer undergoes a process of existential conversion, she would
come to terms with the possibility of her being other than she is, refusing to animate
those narratives that “renew the denial of her freedom.”16 She would no longer have need
of the empty promises of whiteness to justify her existence. It is through this critical
insight that she affirms her agency to “lean into” a counter-metanarrative of whiteness.
At the core of existential conversion, then, at least for the tall newcomer, there is the
revelation that whiteness is not an absolute value. In this way, she is able to move from a
mode of naïve-being-in-the-world to a mode of taking responsibility for the ways in
which she enacts herself whitely. Of course, there is the extremely important question
regarding why any white would want to transgress or perform a treasonous act against
whitely ways of being. In addition to showing whites how their whitely-ways-of-beingin-the-world negatively impact non-white bodies/subjectivities, there is also the
possibility of getting whites to be cognizant of oppression in their own bodies.17 In other
words, the aim would be to get whites to come to terms with the various ways in which
they oppressively claim their bodies, value their bodies, and secure their bodies. Within
this context, whites would need to become aware of how living their bodies in ways that
are normative are really oppressive. After all, it requires work to maintain the white
body’s appearance of “superiority,” of its standing in the social sphere as just “ a human
body.” Think here of how many women live their bodies oppressively vis-à-vis the
expectations of men, that is, how they have embraced an oppressive aesthetic that keeps
them always cognizant of “getting their bodies just right,” though not for themselves, but
for men whose voices speak through them as if these voices were their own.
The answer, at least from my perspective, has to do with choosing freedom,
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realizing, of course, that one’s freedom is always already situated. On my view, on the
one hand, if one chooses freedom, one must choose against whiteness. On the other
hand, if one chooses whiteness, one must choose against freedom. Choosing freedom
while choosing whiteness is incompatible. Hence, one has to choose one or the other.
Whiteness comes replete as a value that is deemed an unconditioned value for which one
must abdicate responsibility and simply accept. On this interpretation of whiteness, to
choose whiteness is to choose one’s un-freedom, which has implications for the violation
of the freedom of others.
Through existential conversion, the tall newcomer has come to choose freedom
and thereby has chosen against whiteness. Whiteness here is not that which functions as a
phenotypic marker. Rather, in choosing freedom, the newcomer chooses against acting in
the world whitely. In this way, choosing freedom does not mean that one chooses against
one’s phenotypic white body. To deny one’s white body is to fall into bad faith. Hence,
the newcomer should not reject her body, although it too is non-accidentally linked to
broader social norms, “discursive rules and regulations that dictated the biological chain
that produced”18 her white skin. In choosing freedom, she embraces her facticity and also
rejects the privilege of exclusive transcendence, a privilege that whites have claimed for
themselves. In rejecting her whiteness as exclusive transcendence, since this is
dialectically linked to the reduction of Blacks to mere facticity and immanence, she
affirms not only the facticty of Blacks, but their transcendence as well. One might argue
that the newcomers’ existential conversion enables her to “live in a real world among real
people.”19 In other words, she is not restricted to inhabiting the existentially stilted
serious world of whiteness predicated upon a lie. In this way, the newcomer is able to
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live her body as a “calling out to the Other” as opposed to foreclosing any and all
alternative, non-whitely communicative practices. Thus, she creates cracks within the
prison house of whiteness’s sameness, rejecting the ideological structuration of her
identity as fixed and “superior.”
As the newcomer develops new ways of socio-ontologically and ethically living
her body, calling into question the same/Other dialectic, living a non-whitely semiotics of
the body, that is, signifying and articulating her body in ways that do not communicate
forbidden sacrosanct “racial” boundaries or that communicate trepidation in the presence
of non-white bodies, thus disengaging from whiteness’s narcissism, a space for
intersubjectivity20and mutual recognition is cleared. Hence, to live her phenotypic white
body in freedom is to live her body in ways that facilitate the freedom of other non-white
bodies; whereas, living one’s whiteness in the mode of the serious occludes the non-white
from speaking and possibly from being. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for
whites to answer the appeal of the Black body. This is because “the condition for the
appeal is . . . that you can make your voice heard, that there is no silencing.”21
Perhaps there is something to be said about the site of friendship as a form of
relationality that requires the bracketing, if not the eradication, of whitely-ways-of-beingin-the-world. After all, friendship, by its very nature, requires a suspension of sorts.
Indeed, the incipiency and development of a friendship requires “leaping” forward
beyond certain presuppositions.22 As long as the white assumes the position of “superior”
subject vis-à-vis the “inferior” Black, the possibility of a genuine friendship is precluded.
Friendship is also predicated upon inter-subjectivity. The assumption is that one is
capable of learning from the Other, “who can open up a world aspired to by the self. The
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Other also provides us with objectivity, not in a hostile sense, but in the sense of
correcting the limitations of our own perspective.”23 Of course, there is risk and
vulnerability involved here, particularly involving the forming of friendships between
whites, particularly those whites who stereotype Blacks, and Blacks who are reasonably
justified in their reticence vis-à-vis whites. In the presence of the Black body, as in the
case of the white woman in the elevator, the white can seize this moment as an
opportunity to be shaken, to be torn away from his/her manner of thinking24 and being
whitely. This anti-whitely way of being has the potential of disclosing the Black body in
ways that belie the force of the white imaginary. This anti-white way of being also has
the potential of disclosing the white body as “Other” to itself. Friendship has the power of
expanding one’s vision, of un-concealing possibilities that were concealed/closed off
through the myopic horizon of whiteness. Of course, to be committed to this friendship
will involve the constant choice of re-claiming this friendship, particularly in the light of
the possible multiple levels of misunderstanding that are bound to occur. Nevertheless,
“inter-racial” friendships can function as sites of transformation, sites of mutual
disclosure of the self, sites that belie important dimensions of bad faith, particularly
where the white self hides from itself and the Other through the objectification mistake of
thinking that the differences separating whites and Blacks are natural as opposed to
socially and historically constructed.
Marilyn Frye conceptualizes non-whitely ways of being as transformative acts of
consciousness that have political implications for white women’s perpetuation of white
male dominance:
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The first breakthrough is in the moment of knowing that another way of
being is possible. In the matter of a white woman’s racedness, the
possibility in question is the possibility of disengaging (on some levels, at
least) one’s own energies and wits from the continuing project of the
social creation and maintenance of the white race, the possibility of being
disloyal to that project by stopping constantly making oneself whitely.
And this project should be very attractive to white women once we grasp
that it is the possibility of not being whitely, rather than the possibility of
being whitely, that holds some promise of our rescuing ourselves from the
degraded condition of women in a white men’s world.25

For the newcomer, what was once perceived as a privilege as such, that is, her whiteness,
begins to be re-interpreted and re-narrated as a site of oppression, not only toward others,
but toward oneself. Whiteliness, as power, “cuts across individuals’ lives in a variety of
ways that can entail privilege and oppression for the same person in different respects.”26
I conceptualize existential conversion vis-à-vis whiteness as a constant
affirmation of freedom. After all, one has to live in the everyday world in which
whiteness, despite one’s commitment, continues to be ideologically seductive. Hence,
existential conversion, at least with respect to whiteness, must involve a self-reflexive
way of being-in-the-world where the newcomer continually takes up the project of
disaffiliation from whitely ways of being; there must be a constantly renewed sense of
transgressing sites of “entitlement,” sites that threaten the re-inscription of bad faith.
Given the complexity of social existence, whites may “lean into” ways of being whitely
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in ways that they may not intend. In doing so, they animate ways of being whitely and
thus legitimate the normative structure of whiteness. Derald Sue reminds us of the
everyday insidious forms of whitely being-in-the-world where he asks, “Would it surprise
you, for example, to know that the greatest threat to racial minorities in the United States
comes from good and decent White folks, lovers of justice and democracy, and moral
church-going people?”27 And as Noel Ignatiev notes, “The white club does not like to
surrender a single member.”28
Concerning the insidious forms of whitely modes of being, Alison Bailey’s
distinction between privilege-cognizant and privilege-evasive white scripts proves
helpful. Within the framework of this discourse, the newcomer must constantly reaffirm
her commitment to enacting a privilege-cognizant white script, that is, she must remain
cognizant of the ways in which she is privileged (or privileges herself) because of her
phenotypic whiteness. According to Bailey, privilege-cognizant whites are race traitors
“who refuse to animate the scripts whites are expected to perform, and who are unfaithful
to worldviews whites are expected to hold.”29 In this way, privilege-cognizant whites
are committed to “doing whiteness differently.”30 If “race is constituted through the
repetition of acts, verbal and nonverbal, that continue to communicate difference,”31 then
whites must engage in counter-stylized iterative whitely acts.32
Edward H. Peeples, who works on issues of violence and white supremacy, shares
an experience that he had in Richmond, Virginia around 1976, which is an example of
such a counter-stylized iterative whitely act. He recounts going to purchase an African
American newspaper that he had not read in several weeks. Furthermore, this particular
newspaper was a couple of days old. After attempting to pay the white cashier, he notes:

416
When the cashier caught sight of the paper I had selected, she stared at me
for a moment, as if she was searching for her cultural grab bag for the
rules and words needed to advise a fool who is about to violate a natural
law. Shortly, she put it all together and proclaimed, “You don’t want that
newspaper, [it is] the colored newspaper.”33

The reader will note that the white woman quickly animates the white script that she has
come to believe that whites are expected to perform. She makes him aware of his racial
faux pas, effectively communicating that he does not really know what he has done; he is
unaware of the oxymoronic nature of his newspaper selection. It is as if he had
mistakenly sat on the “colored only” side of a movie theater, or drank from the “colored
only “ fountain. In a radical move to de-animate the scripts whites are expected to
follow, Peeples’ writes:

Seeing that I had an audience, I turned back to the cashier, who by now
was informing me where to obtain the “white newspaper.” I let her finish
speaking , and then I said in a loud, crisp voice, “You must think I’m
white.”34

He then notes her response:

She was startled. But within seconds she came to realize that these simple
words represented a profound act of racial sedition. I had betrayed her
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precious “white race.” At this moment her eyes wandered beyond me to
see, as I could also see, the two black patrons who were apparently
amused because their faces had broken into a grin. Upon being discovered,
they both sought to cover their faces with their hands. The cashier became
furious. But she was clearly at a loss of what to do with this Judas.35

“You must think I’m white” actually functions to undermine the “racial” boundaries
presupposed by the white woman. “You must think I’m white” throws into disarray the
white woman’s expectations and her desire to construct a shared reality. Peeples
challenges the notion that his phenotypic whiteness ipso facto makes him a member of
the whiteness club. Through his utterance, his body as racially “given” is suspended,
having rendered its white “racial” substantiality dubious. Implicit in her reminding him
about the newspaper, she not only names his identity, but she inculcates white
normativity. To have agreed with her and thanked her for making him aware of his poor
judgment, that is, to have been privilege-evasive, he would have participated in the coconstitution of the white body as the whitely body. But it is precisely his utterance that
renders the construction unilateral. This is a very effective way of reconfiguring the
meaning of the white body.
This kind of utterance could be effectively utilized in many situations. Consider
the scenario where the newcomer is standing around with other “racially” marked white
bodies and a racist joke is told. Members of the group/white club begin to laugh, thus
collectively giving approval to this type of white social bonding. The newcomer, in the
midst of the hilarity could say, “You must think I’m white.” Of course, she does not
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mean that she is really Black or that she is only “passing.” The utterance communicates,
“You have mistaken me for a member of the club. I might be white, but I’ve learned to
rearticulate, rename, and re-perform my body in ways that call into question the historical
sedimentation of repeated whitely acts that have taken my whiteness as the appearance of
something unconditioned.”36 I view such efforts as instantiations of what Clevis Headley
refers to as “a continuously affirmed refusal to prolong the ontological and existential
project of whiteness.”37
Although Bailey would recognize the importance of Peeples’ and the newcomers’
traitorous acts to the white club, indeed, she would even acknowledge the fact that other
whites may come to ostracize them for such acts, she does not maintain that they now
occupy positions on the outside of racial privilege. In other words, through their
traitorous acts “they do not exchange their status as insiders for outsider-within status.”38
Bailey also warns, “Animating a privilege-cognizant script requires more than
occasionally interrupting racist jokes . . . . An occasional traitorous act does not a traitor
make. Truly animating a privilege-cognizant white script requires that traitors cultivate a
character from which traitorous practices will flow.”39
While I would argue that the above examples are clear instances in which
phenotypic whites have engaged in acts of defying whiteliness, I would not argue that
these acts constitute acts of abolishing the white race. According to Noel Ignatiev,
cofounder with John Garvey of the journal Race Traitor, “abolitionists seek to abolish the
white race.”40 If by “abolish the white race” they mean a commitment to doing away with
whitely ways of being-in-the-world, then I would certainly agree. Although Ignatiev and
Garvey make it clear what they do not mean by abolishing the white race,41 it is not clear
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how abolishing or disavowing whiteness is to take place, particularly given the multiple
ways in which whiteness positions the phenotypic body regardless of its intentions to the
contrary. Opting out of the club of whiteness, which they also advance, is indeed one way
of being disloyal to the club. However, even after such an act, one remains white. This is
the same problem that emerges after one rejects the absolute values of whiteness through
existential conversion. Alcoff notes, “One’s appearance of being white will still operate
to confer privilege in numerous and significant ways, and to avow treason does not
render whites ineligible for these privileges, even if they work hard to avoid them.”42 In
other words, the problem appears to reside in the new abolitionists’ “seeming inability to
untangle the difference between whiteness as a social construction and whiteness as a
physical marker, or an indelible part of one’s visible identity.”43 To be fair to the
abolitionists, Ignatiev does admit that whites who step outside of the white club “in one
situation can hardly avoid stepping back in later, if for no other reason than assumptions
of others—unless, like John Brown, they have the good fortune to be hanged before that
can happen.”44 While he does appear to understand the difficulty of stepping outside the
white club, he also seems to suggest that one way (or perhaps the only way) of avoiding
unwanted privileges is to have the “good fortune” of being killed. Given the historical
association that they establish between themselves and the historical John Brown who
orchestrated an attack on Harpers Ferry, my assumption is that his language here is not
simply hyperbolic. But there are other viable ways of disrupting whitely ways of being
without having the “good fortune” of being killed.
Part of the problem with the new abolitionist view has to do with the clarification
of what constitutes a white race traitorous act. Of course, there is also the problem of
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specifying the needed discourse to describe “white identity” as a phenotypic marker of
identity given that the new abolitionists “deny the existence of a positive white
identity.”45 Ignatiev and Garvey write about a time when one of them, because he was
unfamiliar with the traffic rules in New York City, made a right turn on a red light, which
turned out to be illegal. He was stopped by two police officers and was “released with a
courteous admonition.”46 They note:

Had he been black, they probably would have ticketed him, and might
even have taken him down to the station. A lot of history was embedded in
that small exchange: the cops treated the miscreant leniently at least in part
because they assumed, looking at him, that he was white and therefore
loyal. Their courtesy was a habit meant both to reward good conduct and
induce future cooperation. Had the driver cursed them, or displayed a
bumper sticker that said, “Avenge Rodney King,” the cops might have
reacted differently.47

While anyone familiar with the phenomenon of “driving while Black” within the context
of “racial” profiling will understand how “driving while white” will not typically result
in the same consequences for that phenotypic white body, the way in which they envision
being a race traitor leads to rather peculiar consequences. After being released with a
courteous admonition, one could say, “You must think I’m white.” This may even force
the police officers to think, perhaps for a moment, about their motivations for letting him
off. What happens, however, if the police officers, not acting from a racist sensibility,

421
give the abolitionist a ticket because they think that he deserves it? Will the abolitionist
praise the officers for being able to see beyond the white racist club? Indeed, will he
praise the officers for treating him as they would a Black person? Is it not possible that
the abolitionist simply deserved the ticket? What if they let the abolitionist off because
they were having a good day and not because they were part of the white race club?
Indeed, assuming that they were having a good day, what would happen once the
abolitionist cursed them or accused them of being racists, of being members of the white
race club that overlooks the illegalities committed by other whites? They would probably
then decide to give the abolitionist a ticket. Would the abolitionist then be satisfied
because the white officers had seen the white racist error of their ways, became traitors to
their race, and decided to give him a ticket? Again, it is difficult to delineate what would
constitute a “race traitorous” act in this situation.
Ignatiev and Garvey also deny the existence of a “positive white identity.” The
presupposition is that they do not believe that there can exist “positive white identities.”
So, all “white identities” are negative identities. But what does a phenotypic white
person, then, take up as an identity that is not a white identity? Ignatiev:

When there comes into being a critical mass of people who look white but
do not act white—people who might be called “reverse oreos”—the white
race will undergo fission, and former whites, born again, will be able to
take part, together with others, in building a new human community.48

“Reverse oreos”? But what would it mean to embody Blackness on the inside, as it were,
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and yet appear white on the outside? He is presumably not referring to the “wigger”49
identity. Rather, to be Black “inside” seems to signify some form of white treason, a way
of being phenotypically white and yet Black—a trope, in this case, for “angry,”
“frustrated,” “indignant” regarding the system of American injustice. In crass consumer
terms, to say nothing of the history of colonial desire,50 is it not presumptive and
narcissistic to claim “Blackness” in this fashion? While I recognize the efforts of
Ignatiev and Garvey to rethink ways in which to abolish white racism, it is problematic to
appropriate “Blackness” as an effort “to disengage with whiteness.”51 And is it not
indicative of “the ultimate in white privilege for any white subject to claim to be
nonwhite”52 as they continue to be socially and “racially” positioned as privileged.
Ignatiev and Garvey also claim that “treason to whiteness is loyalty to
humanity.”53 However, when the very category of the “human” is defined by whites,
would not treason to whiteness be disloyalty to humanity?
There is a great deal to be gained through the encouragement of phenotypic
whites to reflectively animate their privileged white scripts.54 White racist ways of beingin-the-world are divisive, arrogant, oppressive, and misanthropic. A challenge must be
waged not only against white supremacists and wealthy whites who animate whitely
scripts, but against poor whites who must also reflectively examine ways in which they
enact their whiteness. As Marilyn Frye notes:

Many poor and working-class white people are perfectly confident that
they are more intelligent, know more, have better judgment, and are more
moral than black people or Chicanos or Puerto Ricans or Indians or
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anyone else they view as not white, and believe that they would be
perfectly competent to run the country and to rule others justly and
righteously if given the opportunity.55

While I am aware of the historical divide and conquer tactics of the white bourgeoisie
vis-à-vis sustaining divisions and tensions between working-class Blacks and workingclass whites, and how this prohibited/prohibits the recognition of shared interests, “we
must tell the full story of white racism in all of its complexity, and this complexity cannot
be fully resolved through a class analysis that sequesters the guilty as only among the
rich.”56
It is not easy to discern the subtle and yet pervasive ways in which the ideology of
whiteness profoundly distorts authentic forms of human relationality. Contesting the
normative status of whiteness “means living in constant struggle, always working with
self and those around you. . . . It is a process that . . . [builds on] the notion that all benefit
when whiteness inflicts less violence [on] others in the world.”57
It is important to keep in mind, though, that when threatened, when thrown back
upon themselves, made to recognize their freedom, whites, as I have argued, may decide
to flee. As history has shown, when threatened/challenged, whiteness can return with a
vengeance. As Paget Henry notes, “Sooner or later the persisting need for confirmation of
its [white, secure, and powerful] self-image would reassert itself. If not accommodated,
the earlier sense of crisis, of losing its grip on itself would only return with greater
intensity.”58 Whiteness is in a constant process of renegotiating its reality, reconfiguring
and remolding its apparent stability through the invention of an “Other” in terms of which
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white identity is preserved through another act of negation. As Linda Alcoff observes:

As whites lose their psychic social status, and as processes of positive
identity construction are derailed, intense anxiety, hysteria, and depression
can result. The most likely solution to this will be, of course, for new
processes to develop that simply shifts targets to create new categories of
the abject through which to inflate collective self-esteem, and this is
already happening in revivals of nativism, the vilification of illegal
immigrants . . . and so on.59

In Beauvoirian terms, whiteness is like an “inhuman [idol] to which one will not
hesitate to sacrifice” all that is of value, even the white body itself. Therefore, the serious
world of whiteness is a dangerous world. Whiteness makes tyrants out of human beings.
The white, eliding “the subjectivity of his [her] choice,” acts as if whiteness is an
absolute value that “is being asserted through him [her].” Whiteness also requires
ignoring, indeed, even erasing, “the subjectivity and the freedom of others, to such an
extent that, sacrificing them to the [idol of whiteness]” means absolutely nothing. White
procrustean expansiveness creates its own satellites of whiteness throughout the world.
And whites who have raised their existential projects to “the statue of an idol will have no
scruple about assuring” their implementation “at the price of a great number of lives of
the [indigenous]; for what value has the life of [“savages”]” who stand in the way of
modernity-in-white. Whiteness is a form of fanaticism “which is as formidable as the
fanaticism of passion.”60 It is precisely this fanaticism that we must fear and combat. For
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it territorializes and defines what is and what is possible. By doing so, it occludes other
voices from speaking and other (non-white) ways of revealing the depths of, and the
possibilities inherent in, the human.
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Conclusion
This project has been an attempt to theorize and understand Black embodiment within the
context of white hegemony, that is, within the context of a white racist anti-Black world.
Indeed, the Black body’s lived historicity, from the perspective of whiteness as an
“unconditioned” state of being, has been one of profound existential trauma and
corporeal deformation. The experience of such trauma has had profound implications on
how Blacks have been forced to see themselves through the distorted Black imago of the
white imaginary. Within this context, I examined and theorized such themes as double
consciousness, invisibility, and corporeal malediction that captured the phenomenological
or lived reality of Black bodies under tremendous existential duress. I theorized the ways
in which the Black body was/is subjected to powerful discursive regimes that historically
rendered the Black body as “docile” and as the site of “evil,” bestiality, and “inferiority.”
The point was to demonstrate that the Black body is a historically lived text, as it were, in
terms of which whites have inscribed their projections, projections that actually speak to
important dynamics regarding whites’ self-conceptualization.
Moving through the crucible of the Middle Passage and enslavement, the Black
body became the site not only of white racist discursive constructions, but the victim of
white brutality and inhumanity that literally left the Black body marked, scarred, and
mutilated. As I have argued, whiteness is predicated upon a destructive parasitism. The
“humanity” of whites is fundamentally predicated upon the erasure of non-white
humanity. This, of course, led to the exploration of the historical emergence of a white
racist Manichean paradigm within which whiteness functions as the transcendental
signified. I also argued that whiteness, even before its historical link to the conceptual
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apparatus of race, was a trope for goodness and purity. This facilitated the Manichean
discourse within which Europeans later divided up the world.
As the transcendental signified, I demonstrated how the power of whiteness,
manifested through the white gaze, which is a structured way of “seeing” that is always
already mediated by certain reactionary value-creating forces, interpellated the Black
body as that which is epistemologically and ontologically “given.” In other words, the
white gaze is said to “know” all there is to be known about the Black body, because the
Black body is ontologically fixed. But the “truth” of the Black body, which was actually
a caricature of the Black body, was actually predicated upon “the lie” of the white body.
This involved an exploration of the racist epistemological framework within which nonwhites are constructed.
Given that the construction of the Black body is dialectically linked to the
historico-ideological construction of the white body, it was necessary to turn (or return)
the gaze upon the constitutional acts of white racist intentional consciousness. To
theorize whiteness in terms of its self-conscious claims to supremacy, however, would
have left un-theorized the various ways in which whiteness expresses itself in very subtle
and insidious ways. As I have argued throughout this project, the discussion of whiteness
does not begin and end with a discussion of white supremacy. In other words, it was
necessary to render the unseen of whiteness seen, that is, to theorize whiteness at the site
of the quotidian. In this way, whiteness is theorized in terms of its impact on Black
bodies in everyday mundane social spaces of being-in-the-world. This might be described
as a process of theorizing a phenomenology of the everyday transactional manifestations
of white racism.
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Through blending autobiography, history, and philosophical fiction, I provided a
philosophically rich analysis of the ways in which whiteness “confiscates” the Black
body through its own presupposed fixed subjectivity. I was also able to provide a vivid
description, and a philosophical analysis, of what it means to live one’s existence in
Black vis-à-vis the actual and potential threat of white hegemony. This method of inquiry
calls into question certain conceptualizations of what constitutes doing philosophy.
Hence, the subtext of my approach suggests alternative ways in which philosophy might
be done, particularly with regard to exploring white racism. As I have also argued
throughout this project, it is not enough to demonstrate that race is not a natural kind or
through conceptual analysis to show that the concept of race is ontologically empty and
epistemologically false. The fact of the matter is that racism exists unabated in the face of
philosophical conceptual analysis. This is why it is important, as I have argued, to
explore the phenomenological or lived dimensions of white racism. Although a fiction or
a social construction, race has social ontological effects, maintained through embodied
communicative acts.
Given the agential reality of Black embodiment, it is not enough to theorize the
Black body in terms of its “niggerization” within the white imaginary. The point here is
that Black embodiment, despite the power of white ideological constructions, never
reached a point of ontological closure. Hence, this led to a consideration of the reality of
the Black body as resistant, as “taking a stand” against white fictions and white brutality.
In this context, I theorized a conception of Black agency and explored various historical
modalities of Black resistance. The historical narrative of Black resistance in the socalled New World speaks to the profound ways in which human beings are protean,
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trans-phenomenal, and have the capacity to create and develop their own perspectives on
the world. Indeed, at a deeper philosophical level, Black resistance is a story of a people
who forced the very re-conceptualization of a bankrupt and pernicious philosophical
anthropology, one predicated upon the procrustean and narcissistic values of whitelyways-of being-in-the-world.
To leave under-theorized the question of white anti-white praxis would leave out
the significant project of how whites can contribute to the demise of an ideology that
oppresses not only Black bodies, but white bodies as well. Seeking ways in which Blacks
might live their “raced” bodies in less oppressive forms, it is not enough that Blacks take
up this project within a vacuum where white efforts are absent or within a context where
the Black body vis-à-vis the white body continues to be the phobogenic source of the
white body image. It is here, through the work of philosopher Marilyn Frye that I
distinguished between white phenotypic bodies and whitely ways of being-in-the-world.
This distinction provides a way in which white bodies are not demonized or
problematized as such, but white forms of being are targeted as the sites of critique. And
while one should not forget the ways in which white racism socially and legally positions
white bodies independently of their intentions, there are still ways in which white bodies
can perform “traitorous” anti-whiteness acts. Indeed, if white racism qua whiteliness
involves various historically contingent communicative practices, learned stylized ways
of performing the white body whitely, ideologically inculcated ways of comprehending
the white self and the so-called non-white Other, then there is no historical necessity that
prevents phenotypic white bodies from discontinuing the lived project of white racism.
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I have suggested existential conversion as a way of coming to terms with
whiteness as a set of values and relations that are founded through human action. As
white racism continues to exist, and as the white “oracle” voice continues to speak the
only “single” truth, which turns out to be indicative of its desire to become the only
legitimate voice, white and Black anti-white racist praxes must continue. This project is
my first comprehensive attempt to speak to the dynamics of whiteness, its impact upon
Black existential embodiment, its profound bad faith, its distortion of genuine forms of
human relationality, and the possibilities of imagining an alternative future for whitely
ways of being-in-the-world. As of this writing, it is not clear to me what a completely
“rehabilitated” white racist identity looks like. There is, however, the recognition that this
great unknown will not emerge unless whiteness is mapped, critiqued, confronted, and
transformed not only at the quotidian level, but also in terms of its institutional and global
manifestations.
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